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Abstract 
 
In 1996, a concept was proposed by the UK Ministry of Defence with the intention 
of making the field of reliability more useful to the end user, particularly within the 
field of military aerospace. This idea was the Maintenance Free Operating Period 
(MFOP), a duration of time in which the overall system can complete all of its 
required missions without the need to undergo emergency repairs or maintenance, 
with a defined probability of success. The system can encounter component or sub-
system failures, but these must be carried with no effect to the overall mission, until 
such time as repair takes place. It is thought that advanced technologies such as 
redundant systems, prognostics and diagnostics will play a major role in the 
successful use of MFOP in practical applications. 
 
Many types of system operate missions that are made up of several sequential 
phases. For a mission to be successful, the system must satisfactorily complete each 
of the objectives in each of the phases. If the system fails or cannot complete its 
goals in any one phase, the mission has failed. Each phase will require the system to 
use different items, and so the failure logic changes from phase to phase. Mission 
unreliability is defined as the probability that the system fails to function 
successfully during at least one phase of the mission. An important problem is the 
efficient calculation of the value of mission unreliability. 
 
This thesis investigates the creation of a modelling method to consider as many 
features of systems undergoing both MFOPs and phased missions as possible. This 
uses Petri nets, a type of digraph allowing storage and transit of tokens which 
represent system states. A simple model is presented, following which, a more 
complex model is developed and explained, encompassing those ideas which are 
believed to be important in delivering a long MFOP with a high degree of 
confidence. A demonstration of the process by which the modelling method could 
be used to improve the reliability performance of a large system is then shown. The 
complex model is employed in the form of a Monte-Carlo simulation program, 
which is applied to a life-size system such as may be encountered in the real world. 
Improvements are suggested and results from their implementation analysed. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction to Reliability and Risk Assessment 
 
On rare occasions an incident will occur with catastrophic consequences due to the 
failure of an industrial system. The industries within which these systems operate 
include aeronautical, nuclear, oil and gas, and transport. Incidents such as the 
explosion on the Piper Alpha oil platform in 1988 and the Air France disaster over 
the Atlantic in 2009 both resulted in multiple fatalities. Examples such as this 
demonstrate the importance of efforts to assess accurately and reduce the risk posed 
from complex systems. Applying system safety assessments at an early stage in 
design can reduce or prevent the possibility of unwanted incidents occurring once 
the system is in active use. 
  
Developing techniques to assess the risk and reliability of systems has been a 
research interest for many years, with a great deal of progress made since the 
Second World War. These techniques provide the ability to evaluate the causes, and 
probability or frequency, of a hazardous event occurrence, taking into account, 
where necessary, the failure of safety systems to respond. The risk or ‘expected 
loss’, R, of any hazardous event is defined as the product of its consequence, C, and 
the probability or frequency of its occurrence, P: 
 
 R = C × P  
1.1 
 
In safety studies, a consequence can be, for example, number of fatalities, cost of 
compensation, or damage to buildings. The risk can be reduced either by reducing 
the associated consequences of the hazard, or by reducing the probability or 
frequency of its occurrence. 
 
 - 2 - 
A quantitative risk assessment of a potential hazard involves four basic stages: 
 
1. Identification of potential safety hazards. 
2. Estimation of the consequences of each hazard. 
3. Estimation of the probability or frequency of each hazard. 
4. Comparison of the results against the acceptability criteria. 
 
The consequences of a hazard are usually measured by the expected number of 
fatalities and indicate the severity of the incident. Consequence modelling is very 
much industry dependent, as systems and their modes of failure can vary 
significantly from one industry to another. Reliability assessment techniques, 
however, which are concerned with calculating the probability or frequency with 
which system failure can occur, are generic. Methods such as Failure Mode and 
Effect Analysis (FMEA), Event Tree Analysis, Markov Analysis and Fault Tree 
Analysis are used extensively in many industries.  
 
Once a hazard has been assessed to find the consequences and probability of its 
occurrence, Equation 1.1 is used to determine the associated risk. In order to assess 
whether a level of risk is acceptable, the HSE (Health and Safety Executive) 
consider the use of a three-band approach known as the ALARP (“As Low As 
Reasonably Practicable”) principle [1]. This is shown in Figure 1.1. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 – The ALARP Principle [1] 
 
Unacceptable
Satisfactory if 
ALARP 
Broadly 
Acceptable
Consequence
Frequency 
Low 
High 
Low High
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Risks that fall into the “Broadly Acceptable” region are considered low enough to 
be permissible. Generally, they have a low probability of occurrence and do not 
have a severe hazard associated with them. Risks that fall into the “Unacceptable” 
region are not tolerated and either the probability or consequence of the event must 
be reduced. Between these bands is the “Satisfactory if ALARP” region, where risks 
are considered to be acceptable if they are as low as reasonably practicable. The test 
for reasonable practicability takes into account factors such as cost, effort, industry 
or legal standards, comparative risk prevention by competitors, and so on. 
 
1.2 System Failure Quantification 
 
It is possible to predict the reliability performance of a system from the known 
reliability performances of the components which make it up, by using appropriate 
techniques. This reliability performance of system or components can be expressed 
through the quantification of failure probabilities. The common parameters that are 
used throughout this thesis are defined below. 
 
If a system or component can be repaired, and so its failure can be tolerated, a 
useful measure of performance is availability, A(t). This is defined as: 
 
the fraction of the total time that a system or component is able to 
perform its required function. 
 
This parameter can also be defined at a specified time point t as: 
 
the probability that a system or component is working at time t. 
 
The complement of availability is unavailability, where: 
 
Unavailability = 1 – Availability 
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Unavailability is defined as the probability that a component or system does not 
work at a given time t, and is denoted by qc(t) for a component and Qsys(t) for a 
system. 
 
Reliability of a system or component, R(t), can be defined as: 
 
the probability that a system or component will operate without 
failure for a stated period of time under specified conditions. 
 
Reliability is typically more appropriate for systems where failure cannot be 
tolerated, and so the successful functioning of the system or component over a given 
time interval is an important performance measure. The probability that a system or 
component fails to work continuously over a given duration and under specified 
conditions is known as its unreliability, F(t), where: 
 
Unreliability = 1 – Reliability 
 
If a component or system is non-repairable and it is working at time t, then it must 
have worked continuously since t=0. Therefore for the non-repairable case, the 
unavailability is equivalent to the unreliability. 
 
The transition of a component or system to a failed state can be characterised by the 
conditional failure rate, h(t), also known as the hazard rate. This parameter is a 
measure of the rate at which failures occur amongst those items which have not yet 
failed, i.e. those that are still functioning at time t. It is defined as follows: 
 
the conditional failure rate, h(t), is the probability that a system or 
component fails in the interval (t, t+dt), given that it has not failed in 
[0,t). 
 
A component family will typically have reliability characteristics which can be 
modelled by a “reliability bath-tub curve”, as shown in Figure 1.2.  
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Figure 1.2 – Reliability Bath-Tub Curve 
 
Phase I of the curve in Figure 1.2, called “Burn-in”, sees the hazard rate reducing 
over time as weaker components fail and are removed from the overall population. 
During the second phase there is an almost constant hazard rate, leading to this 
period of life being known as the “useful life” of the components. The hazard rate 
Phase III increases as the components start to wear out and fail. Reliability 
assessment is typically performed on components which are thought to be in their 
useful life phase. The system reliability, Rsys(t), can be expressed in terms of a 
constant hazard or failure rate λ by equation 1.2. 
 
tetR λ−=)(sys  
1.2 
 
Further component and system quantification methods can be found in [2] and [3]. 
Tools exist which allow the evaluation of the reliability parameters of a system in 
terms of those of its constituent components. Two of the typical methods, Fault Tree 
analysis and Markov methods, are discussed below. 
 
1.3 Fault Tree Analysis 
 
Fault Tree Analysis is a concept first introduced by H. A. Watson in the early 1960s 
[4], and is a deductive procedure for identifying the causes of a particular system 
failure mode using a “what could cause this” technique. The fault tree diagram 
provides a visual representation of the combinations of component failure events 
which result in the system failure mode occurring. The system failure mode under 
Hazard 
Rate 
I 
Burn-in II 
Useful Life 
III 
Wear-out 
t 
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consideration is referred to as the “top event” of the fault tree and branches of the 
tree are constructed below, each one of which represents a contributory cause. The 
events are continually redefined in terms of their causes, until each branch ends with 
a basic event, which is typically a component failure or human error. A fault tree 
can then be analysed to provide information on the causes of top event in terms of 
the basic events, with the probabilities of the latter allowing the calculation of the 
top event probability.  
 
As the Fault Tree Analysis process starts with the top event and works downwards, 
building the fault tree beneath, this is known as an example of a “top-down” 
technique. This is in contrast to other methods, such as Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis (FMEA), which are known as “bottom-up” approaches, since their starting 
point is a set of component failure conditions and the process allows the 
identification of the possible consequences using a “what happens if” approach. 
 
Techniques which allow the quantitative analysis of a fault tree, known as Kinetic 
Tree Theory (KTT), were developed in the early 1970s by Vesely [5]. KTT allows 
the calculation of various system reliability parameters, such as probability and 
frequency of top event occurrence, using those of the basic events. This allows an 
assessment of whether the risk of system failure is acceptable and so if the required 
safety standards are being met. 
 
The main disadvantage of KTT is that as fault trees grow larger, the analysis 
becomes more and more computationally intensive and so may require the use of 
approximations. This obviously leads to inaccuracies in the calculations. As the 
techniques are already so well developed, further refinement is unlikely to result in 
vast improvements.  
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1.4 Markov Methods 
 
KTT is based on the assumption of statistical independence between the basic 
events in a fault tree. In many cases this is invalid, such as in systems which feature 
standby redundancy, common cause failures, secondary failures, or multiple-
component states. 
 
Markov analysis provides a means of analysing the reliability and availability of 
systems whose components express these dependencies. The method is a state-space 
approach. The likelihood of any event in the chain is determined only by the 
immediately preceding state and is independent of any other past events. As with 
fault tree analysis, the main disadvantage of the Markov approach is that as the 
number of components, and thus the number of system states, grows, the model can 
grow very rapidly in size. 
 
1.5 Monte-Carlo Simulation 
 
Sometimes, a system cannot be easily solved by graphical or simple mathematical 
methods. Another solution is to simulate the reliability performance of the system 
on computer. The method works by generating a computer model of the system 
failure logic in some way, and using a random number generator to simulate times 
to failure for each component. The failure times generated can be made to follow 
the distribution of times for each component, such that if a sufficient number of 
times were randomly generated and plotted with frequency of occurrence against 
time, the distribution would be recreated. These times are then fed into the failure 
logic for the system, and the combinations of component failures at generated times 
will lead to system failure after a certain time. As more simulations are performed, a 
description of the system reliability failure distribution is built up, which can then 
be used for analysis. 
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1.6 Phased Mission Systems 
 
A common scenario in many real-world situations is one where a system undergoes 
missions, with distinct and differing objectives at consecutive time intervals. Such a 
concept is known as a Phased Mission, as first described by Esary and Ziehms [6], 
while each time interval with a unique objective is known as a phase. During the 
mission, in order to complete the different objectives for each phase, different sub-
systems and components will need to be in use at different times, and as such the 
ways in which the overall system can fail changes with time.  The phases in a 
mission may be identified in ways such as phase number, time interval, system 
configuration, task(s) to be undertaken, performance measure(s) of interest, or 
maintenance policy. 
 
A multi-phased mission can be considered as a sequence of individual events. The 
success of each of these events means success of the overall mission. Thus, for the 
mission to be successful, each of the phases must not fail. Examples of systems 
which undergo phased missions include aircraft flights, rocket launches and many 
military operations for aircraft or ships. An aircraft mission can be thought of as 
containing the following phases: Pre-flight check, taxi to runway, take-off, ascent, 
transit to destination, descent and approach, landing, and taxi to the terminal. 
Components in the system may fail at any time, but their failure may only be critical 
for the failure of the system during a specific phase. As a result of this, the transition 
from one phase to the next may be the critical event which causes system, phase and 
mission failure, if component failures occurred earlier in the mission. 
 
It is not possible to find the reliability of a mission by simply finding all of the 
phase reliability values and multiplying them together. This is due to the condition 
that at phase change times, the system must be in a state which is operational for 
both the current and the next phases. This creates statistical dependence between the 
phases. In order to understand how phases and missions can fail, it is necessary to 
express how the combinations of component failures can occur in each phase and 
thus cause system failure. Quantification of this allows mission failure probability 
and frequency to be determined. Mission unreliability is defined as the probability 
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that the system fails to function in at least one of the phases within it. An important 
problem is the calculation of the exact value of this parameter to a high level of 
efficiency. 
 
The techniques which have been applied to solve for phased mission reliability 
parameters are predominantly those of fault tree, Markov or simulation analysis. 
Fault tree analysis is commonly used in industrial applications to find the 
probability of failure of their systems. It can be used to express the failure logic of 
the system in each phase. The combination of a different model for each of the 
potentially many mission phases makes the process of solving for reliability 
parameters considerably more complex than a single-phase system. If the 
assumption of independence between component failures is not applicable in a 
given situation, another method such as Markov analysis may be employed. If the 
modelling of a system by either of these methods is impractical or unfeasible, then it 
may be necessary to simulate the performance of the system. An instance where this 
may be required could be one where the system is too complex to use deterministic 
analysis, or if the component failure or repair rates are not constant. Simulation 
techniques typically offer a very high level of breadth in terms of representation and 
analysis, but suffer from often very expensive computational requirements. 
 
1.7 Maintenance-Free Operating Periods 
 
The concept of Maintenance-Free Operating Periods (MFOP) is an attempt to 
provide a more useful way of describing the reliability performance of a system. 
Created with the operators of military aircraft in mind, for whom the successful 
planning and execution of missions and maintenance is critical, it expresses the 
availability of an aircraft in a slightly different way. An MFOP can be defined as: 
 
The period of operation during which an item will be able to carry 
out all its assigned missions, without the operator being restricted in 
any way due to system faults or limitations, with the minimum of 
maintenance [7]. 
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In other words, an MFOP is a time interval in which the system will perform as 
required without any emergency or unexpected maintenance being needed, with a 
specified confidence level. A period of maintenance follows each MFOP, and is 
known as a Maintenance Recovery Period (MRP). During each MRP, the system is 
recovered to a state whereby it can complete the next MFOP. It is allowable that the 
system may carry some faults into an MFOP, as long as they are not critical for that 
time period.  
 
Research has indicated that the application of technologies such as prognostics 
(which allow estimation of future failure times) and redundancies (providing extra 
systems which are typically offline, only becoming operational when the primary 
system fails, covering for the loss of functionality), are critical in allowing an 
MFOP of a meaningful size. However, the concept is still relatively young and as 
such there is very little operational experience of the ways in which the technologies 
and procedures which will enable it can be applied to yield a satisfactory 
maintenance-free duration. 
 
1.8 Research Objectives 
 
The aim of this research is to develop methods which would allow an accurate 
analysis of Maintenance-Free Operating Periods and how they could be applied. 
This needs to take account of all of the technologies and maintenance schemes 
which would be critical in providing an MFOP value which is of use to the operator. 
Some of these reliability technologies are novel and very complex, and the sum total 
of their effect on a system may be similarly complex and not well understood. The 
analysis method developed should allow further insight into as yet unforeseen 
problems which may arise, and contribute to assessments into whether MFOP is a 
metric which will be useful in future applications. 
 
Also important for consideration is the performance of the missions within an 
MFOP. These missions are performed sequentially, without emergency 
maintenance, and so each of them must be successfully completed. Considering 
each of these as single-phased would not provide an accurate enough figure for 
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mission reliability, and so a multi-phased mission approach is applied. The analysis 
method developed must take into account real-world considerations of the multi-
phased nature of missions, such as alterations to the mission plan while it is being 
carried out. 
 
The combination of phased missions analysis with the novel concept of MFOP is 
one which requires a very powerful way of modelling the reliability performance. 
The research objectives are to find a modelling tool which will provide this power, 
and present a modelling method using this tool.  
 
Meeting these objectives involved the following: 
 
• Review of research into Maintenance-Free Operating Periods: the creation 
and development of the concept, the methods by which it is expected to 
work, the mathematical and computational models which have been created 
to analyse it. 
• Review of existing methods for phased missions systems: the development 
of the concept, and the ways in which it has been analysed for both the 
repairable and non-repairable cases. 
• Establishment of a method which allows modelling of MFOP and phased 
missions in combination, to a satisfactory level of detail. 
• Development of a modelling method which considers both these concepts in 
depth. The complexities of MFOP and phased missions, such as prognostics, 
redundant systems, and real-time mission reconfiguration should be taken 
into account. 
• Application of the modelling method into a form which allows analysis of a 
real-world system. This is a computerised form, making it possible either to 
swiftly calculate end-values, or to simulate system reliability data. 
• Demonstration of the modelling method to a real-world system, showing 
how it can be of use in designing new systems or developing current ones to 
achieve a high value of MFOP with a high confidence level. 
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Chapter 2 Reliability Analysis Tools 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Predicting the reliability performance of a system is typically done in terms of the 
reliability performance of the components which make it up. The methods most 
widely used for this purpose are Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Binary Decision 
Diagrams (BDDs) and Markov analysis, which are discussed in this chapter. 
 
2.2 Fault Tree Analysis 
 
In a fault tree, a specific system failure mode is expressed using a visual symbolic 
representation of how component failure events can combine to cause it. In this 
way, FTA allows the causes of system failure and corresponding reliability 
parameters to be established by a logical and structured process. The method is 
often employed at the design stage of a system, in order to highlight potential areas 
for improvement, both in its inherent reliability and the way it is used by operators. 
 
2.2.1 Fault Tree Construction 
 
A fault tree is typically constructed in a top-down fashion. This means that it must 
begin with the identification of the system failure mode to be analysed. If a system 
has more than one failure mode, then a different fault tree for each mode is required. 
The system failure mode becomes the top event of the tree, with the branches below 
it describing the events which could cause this. Each event in the tree has the causes 
for its occurrence ascertained, gradually increasing in resolution until each branch 
terminates with the failure of a component, known as a basic event. Intermediate 
events are those which are between basic events and the top event. Each basic event 
can be described in terms of its failure probability over time, and the combination of 
these in the specific logic visualised by the fault tree establishes the failure rate of 
the top event. 
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Events in a fault tree are linked logically by gates. Each gate is a way of 
establishing how an intermediate event can be caused by basic or other intermediate 
events of a higher resolution. The symbols for events used in fault trees are shown 
in Table 2.1. Table 2.2 shows the symbols for gates, of which there are three types: 
AND, OR, or NOT, which represent the Boolean operations of “intersection”, 
“union” and “complementation” respectively. A fourth type is also shown, which is 
a simplified way of representing an output event occurring when k out of n inputs 
have occurred. 
 
Table 2.1 – Event Symbols 
Event Symbol Explanation 
 
Top Event 
 
Intermediate event 
developed by gate 
below 
 
Basic event 
 
A system in which failure can only be caused by component failures and in either 
AND or OR logic is known as a coherent system. If at least one component success 
is used anywhere to define system failure, a NOT gate is required for each success 
and the system is known as non-coherent. 
 
Analysing a fault can be done in two ways. The first identifies the logical 
combination of component failures which cause system failure, and is known as 
qualitative analysis. The second allows calculation of system reliability parameters 
using those of components, and is known as quantitative analysis. 
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Table 2.2 – Gate Symbols 
Gate Symbol Gate Name Causal Relation 
 
AND Gate Output event occurs only 
when all input events 
have occurred. 
 
OR Gate Output event occurs 
when at least one input 
event occurs 
 
k-out-of-n 
Voting Gate 
Output event occurs if at 
least k out of the n input 
events occur 
 
NOT gate Output event occurs if 
the input event does not 
occur 
 
2.2.2 Qualitative Analysis 
 
This type of analysis is used to logically express the failure of a system in a 
particular way in terms of the component failures which can combine to cause it. 
Each individual combination of basic events which will definitely lead to system 
failure is known as a cut set, defined as: 
 
A cut set is a collection of basic events such that if they all occur, the 
top event also occurs. 
 
A cut set may contain events which do not contribute towards the system failure 
mode. If the cut set {A B C D} ensures that the system will fail, but components B 
and D could cause this alone, then the states of A and C are irrelevant. This allows 
the definition of a minimal cut set: 
 
k
n inputs 
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A minimal cut set is the smallest combination of basic events, such 
that if any basic event is removed from the set, the top event will not 
occur. 
 
If one fault tree shares the same minimal cut sets as another, then they are logically 
equivalent. The number of basic events within a minimal cut set defines the cut set’s 
order. Typically, minimal cut sets of a lower order influence the system failure rate 
most, and so at the design stage, it is these which should be focused on and 
removed. If NOT logic is used anywhere within a fault tree, the combinations of 
basic events which cause system failure are known as implicants. Minimal sets of 
these are called prime implicants. 
 
Determining a fault tree’s minimal cut sets can be done either in a “top-down” or a 
“bottom-up” approach, which results in a Boolean expression for system failure in 
terms of component failures. The “top-down” approach continually substitutes 
Boolean events lower down the tree for those higher up the tree, so the top event is 
consistently “broken-up” into smaller events which are all eventually basic. The 
“bottom-up” approach begins with each set of events for each gate at the bottom of 
the tree and gradually combines these until the top event is reached. The product 
symbol, ‘·’ is used to represent ‘AND’, while the sum symbol, ‘+’ represents ‘OR’ 
in logical expressions. The logic is typically expressed in a sum-of-products (s-o-p) 
fashion from which the cut sets can be found. In order for only minimal cut sets to 
be found, the s-o-p expression must be minimised by removing any redundancies in 
accordance with Boolean algebraic laws. See [2] for a more detailed explanation, 
with examples, of constructing fault trees. 
 
For a complex system there may be thousands of minimal cut sets which can only 
be analysed by intensive and expensive computation. In these conditions, it is 
possible to make approximations by removing cut sets above a certain order, or 
removing those of a low probability while they are being quantified. While this may 
be faster, it reduces the accuracy of the analysis and produces further error in the 
quantitative analysis. 
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2.2.3 Quantitative Analysis 
 
This method of analysing a fault tree allows parameters to be evaluated which 
describe the reliability performance of the overall system. Important parameters 
which are widely used in industrial applications are the probability, frequency and 
expected number of top event occurrences. 
2.2.3.1 Top Event Probability  
The probability of the top event occurring, which is also the unavailability of the 
system, can be obtained by combining the failure probability for each event in a 
minimal cut set in a specific method, known as the inclusion-exclusion expansion. 
The probability that a minimal cut set Ci exists is equal to the product of the 
probabilities that each basic event within it exists. For instance, if cut set Ci = 
{A,B}, its probability of occurrence equals the probability of A failing multiplied by 
the probability of B failing. In general, this is expressed by equation 2.1. 
 
∏
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As the top event is caused by any of the minimal cut sets occurring, a system with 
Nmcs minimal cut sets will have failure probability at time t, QSYS(t), equal to the 
probability of the union of the set of minimal cut sets, as shown in equation 2.2. 
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This may be expanded as shown in equation 2.3. 
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If a top event is made up of many minimal cut sets, using the inclusion-exclusion 
expansion to calculate the top event probability may be unfeasible due to the large 
number of calculations required. In this case, approximation techniques are 
employed to find bounds for the parameter. 
2.2.3.1.1 Upper and Lower Bounds for System Unavailability 
In the inclusion-exclusion expansion shown in equation 2.3, as the number of cut 
sets being combined increases, the contribution of each term towards the exact 
figure reduces. The series can be truncated to give upper and lower bounds for the 
system unavailability, shown in equation 2.4. 
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 Lower Bound Exact Upper Bound 
 
The upper bound is also known as the rare event approximation since the rarer the 
component failures, the closer this figure comes to the exact system unavailability. 
2.2.3.1.2 Minimal Cut Set Upper Bound 
The Minimal cut set upper bound, QMCSU, is more accurate than the rare event 
approximation. It is given by equation 2.5. 
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2.2.3.2 Importance Measures 
A valuable exercise is the calculation of how dependent the system is on a particular 
component, in terms of its reliability. Importance measures may be calculated, 
which assign a value to basic events or cut sets. These express in various ways the 
likelihood of a component failure causing system failure. There are several different 
types, used in different ways, which can be broadly categorised in two ways: 
deterministic and probabilistic.  
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Deterministic importance measures do not consider component failure probabilities. 
Instead, the structure of the system is analysed and the value of the importance 
measure stems from that. An example of one of these is the Structural Importance 
Measure, given by equation 2.6. 
 
components remaining )1( for the states ofnumber  total
component for  states critical ofnumber 
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A critical state for component c is one where the other (n–1) components are in a 
state such that the failure of c will cause the system to transition from a working to a 
failed state.  
 
A major drawback of this type of importance measure is the lack of consideration 
shown to the component failure rates. As such, probabilistic measures of importance 
are typically of more use than deterministic measures. 
 
Probabilistic importance measures take account of the contribution of component 
failures to system failures in terms of the component failure and minimal cut set 
occurrence probabilities. As mentioned above, they come in two types: those 
concerned with either system unavailability or system unreliability. The Birnbaum 
measure of importance, Gc(q(t)), also known as the criticality function, is defined as 
the probability that the system is in a critical system state for component c. It can be 
determined using equations 2.7 or 2.8. 
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The criticality measure of importance is defined as the probability that the system is 
in a critical state for component c, and component c has failed. This is weighted by 
the system unavailability and is shown in equation 2.9. 
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The Fussell-Vesely importance measure [8] is defined as the probability of the 
union of the minimal cut sets Ck containing c given that the system has failed. 
Equation 2.10 shows this. 
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The Fussell-Vesely Measure of Minimal Cut Set Importance is defined as the 
proportion of times a cut set Ck causes system failure. This is calculated as in 
equation 2.11.  
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2.3 Binary Decision Diagrams 
 
Fault trees and the analysis methods used to solve them can become very large and 
inefficient when the systems they are applied to are themselves large or complex. 
Instead of analysing in this way, it may be more efficient and worthwhile converting 
the fault tree to a Binary Decision Diagram (BDD), and then performing analysis. 
Initially developed by Rauzy [9], a BDD in reliability analysis allows the top event 
failure logic to be expressed in the form of a Boolean equation. This Boolean 
equation can be solved in a much simpler way than the inclusion-exclusion 
expansion shown in equation 2.3, and so they are a preferred option in reliability 
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analysis. The method allows for both qualitative and quantitative analysis, with 
exact solutions being found without the need for approximations as are standard in 
the fault tree approach. 
 
2.3.1 BDD Properties 
 
A BDD is a directed acyclic graph, made up of both terminal and non-terminal 
nodes (also called vertices) connected by branches. Its acyclic nature means that 
paths are followed in one direction only, without any loops. Non-terminal nodes 
represent basic events of a fault tree, while terminal nodes express the final state of 
the system. This state is binary, where a 0 represents “system works”, and 1 
represents “system fails”. An example of this is shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
 
Figure 2.1  - Example Binary Decision Diagram 
 
Every root and non-terminal node has two branches underneath. The left branch, 
labelled ‘1’, represents the occurrence of the basic event (that is, a component has 
failed). The ‘0’ branch represents the component’s success. The size of a BDD is 
expressed in terms of the number of non-terminal nodes. 
 
Each path through a BDD begins at the root node and runs through a series of non-
terminal nodes until a terminal node is reached. If a path ends with a ‘1’ node, a cut 
set of the system can be described by including in it all those basic events through 
which a ‘1’ branch was followed. For instance, in Figure 2.1, two paths end in 
A
B 0
C1 
01
Root node
Terminal 0 
node 
Non-terminal 
node 
Terminal 1
node 
1
1 
1 0
0
0
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terminal 1 nodes, A→B and A→ B →C. By ignoring the success of B in the second 
path, the cut sets become {A,B} and {A,C}. 
 
In order to create a BDD for a system, the basic events need to be considered in an 
order. An order can be chosen which will create the best size of BDD and speed up 
analysis; however, if the order is poorly chosen, a large BDD can result. Sinnamon 
and Andrews [10, 11] have researched both the qualitative and quantitative aspects 
of BDDs. 
 
2.3.2 Formation of a BDD using If-Then-Else Structure 
 
Developed by Rauzy [9], the if-then-else (ite) method of converting fault trees to 
BDDs takes each gate in the fault tree in turn, beginning with the top event. These 
are expressed in the form of a Boolean function, f(x), pivoted about any variable X1. 
Shannon’s formula can be expressed as in equation 2.12: 
 
f (x) = X1·f1 + ·f2X1  
2.12 
where f1 and f2 are functions with X1=1 and X1=0 respectively. 
 
The ite structure for this is represented as ite(X1,f1,f2), and is explained as “if X1 
fails, then consider f1, else consider f2”. In the BDD, a ‘1’ branch of X1 will 
achieve f1, while a ‘0’ branch achieves f2. These represent “X1 occurs” and “X1 
does not occur” respectively, as shown in Figure 2.2. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 – BDD Vertex of ite(X1,f1,f2) 
 
X1
f1 f2
1 0
 - 22 - 
When beginning the process of constructing a BDD, each basic event x is given the 
structure ite(x,1,0). Each gate in the fault tree is then considered using a bottom-up 
approach, with the following rules applied: 
 
 If X < Y J ⊕ H = ite(X,f1 ⊕ H, f2 ⊕ H) 
 If X = Y J ⊕ H = ite(X,f1 ⊕ g1, f2 ⊕ g2) 
 
where J = ite(X,f1,f2) and H = ite(Y,g1,g2) are the gate inputs.  
 
An advantage of this method is the automatic elimination of any repeated nodes.  
 
2.3.3 BDD Minimisation 
 
If the ordering of the variables is not optimal, the BDD and the calculated cut sets 
will not be minimal. Rauzy [9] developed a minimisation process which will create 
a minimal BDD which represents the minimal cut sets of the fault tree. Each node in 
the BDD has a general ite representation of 
 
F = ite(x,G,H) 
2.13 
 
If δ is a minimal solution of G, and δ is not a minimal solution of H, then the 
intersection of δ and x, ({δ}∩ x), will be a minimal solution of F. The set of all 
minimal solutions of F, solmin(F), will also include the minimal solutions of H, and 
can be expressed as in equations 2.14 and 2.15. 
 
solmin(F) = {σ } 
2.14 
where 
σ = [{δ}∩ x] ∪ [solmin(H)] 
2.15 
 
 - 23 - 
Rauzy also defined the without operator, where all minimal solutions of G which are 
also minimal solutions of H are removed. By removing all minimal solutions of G 
which are also minimal solutions of H, equation 2.15 is minimal. 
 
2.4 Markov Analysis 
 
Markov methods are used where components of a system have strong dependencies 
between each other. They allow the calculation of the reliability and availability, but 
are more useful for smaller systems, due to a size explosion as systems grow larger. 
The Markov approach assumes that a system’s future state depends only upon its 
present state, not on any states it has gone through previously. Thus, each event is 
dependent only upon the present system state, and not upon any previous events. 
The approach also assumes that the rate of switching from one state to another is 
constant, and thus allows a solution for the reliability characteristics to be 
calculated. 
 
A Markov model consists of two parts: states and transitions. States describe the 
operation or failure of components in the system at the current point in time, while 
transitions describe the rate at which the switch from one state to another is 
possible. If states are not linked by a transition, the system cannot go from one state 
to the other directly. Some states have no outgoing transitions, in which case they 
are described as absorbing states. 
 
The method described below assumes that there are a fixed number of discrete 
system states and that the transition rate between them is either zero (impossible) or 
constant. These rates thus imply that component failure and repair times follow the 
exponential distribution. Thus, the Markov method used here is discrete in space 
and continuous in time. 
 
The starting point of Markov analysis is typically the construction of a Markov 
model. This is a directed graph where each node represents a system state, and the 
edges between them represent the transitions in the direction of the arrow, with 
associated rates. This results in a set of equations of the form of equation 2.16. 
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2.16 
where [ ]P&  is the instantaneous probability per unit time of being in each state. 
 
In general, the matrix A is found from the Markov diagram, by using the following 
rules: 
 
- The matrix is square, with the number of rows and columns equalling the 
number of states. 
- The sum of each row is zero. 
- All non-diagonal elements in row i and column j represent the transition from 
state i to state j. 
- All diagonal elements ii represent the total transition rate out of state i. 
 
As the Markov state equations are linear differential equations with constant 
coefficients, one method of solving them is by using Laplace transforms. However, 
where a Markov model is large or complex, it is typically more suitable to solve the 
resulting large set of Ns differential equations using numerical methods. Equation 
2.16 may be expanded to give equation 2.17. 
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Equation 2.17 may be rewritten as equation 2.19. 
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The general numerical solution to the set of differential equations is therefore given 
by equation 2.20. 
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This leads to a recursive solution to the differential equations over a duration of 
time. 
 
2.5 Summary 
 
This chapter has introduced methods which allow the reliability of a system to be 
predicted, based on the reliability of its components.  
 
Fault tree analysis provides a logical method of gradually breaking down a specific 
system failure mode into the sub-system and component failures which may build 
up to cause it. This approach considers that a failure typically occurs either when 
one of many possible causes occurs (OR logic), or all of several causes occur (AND 
logic). This structure allows the calculation of cut sets, which are combinations of 
basic events which will lead to system failure. Minimal cut sets are the necessary 
and sufficient forms of these, with repetitions and unnecessary events removed. The 
failure probabilities of the cut sets can be combined in an inclusion-exclusion 
expansion to calculate system failure probability. Importance measures, which 
describe the contribution of a component or cut set to system failure, can be 
calculated using the qualitative and quantitative expressions of system failure. 
 
Evaluating system failure probability in an inclusion-exclusion expansion for a large 
or complex system is time consuming and inefficient. A Binary Decision Diagram 
method has been created to speed up the process. A fault tree can be converted to a 
BDD, which expresses the top event failure logic in the form of a Boolean equation. 
This equation can then be solved much more simply and quickly than a standard 
fault tree evaluation technique, without approximations being needed. 
 
Markov analysis expresses the state of a system in terms of the combinations of the 
states of the components within it, typically categorising them as “operational” or 
“failed” states. The initial conditions and the rates between the states determine the 
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probability, at a given point in time, of being in any of them. A matrix set of 
equations can be used to express the set of state probabilities and transition rates, 
which can then be solved using analytical techniques such as Laplace transforms or 
numerical methods. 
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Chapter 3 Maintenance Free Operating Periods 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In 1996, the Ministry of Defence introduced the idea of the Maintenance Free 
Operating Period (MFOP). This was to satisfy what it saw as the needs of the 
typical military customer, which were centred on improved operational reliability & 
availability and the need to reduce costs. The supplier guarantees the customer that 
for a specified proportion of the operational time, the overall system will not 
completely fail or lose enough functionality such that it cannot carry out all its 
assigned missions. After this there is a period of maintenance where the system is 
recovered to full capability. 
 
This chapter aims to expand in detail the aspects of MFOP, both basic information 
and the technologies which will allow it to work. It will explain some of the 
advantages and disadvantages that introducing the concept may create, and state 
some of the arguments and opinions regarding MFOP. Also presented is an 
investigation of the factors that will affect its implementation, in design, 
manufacture, operation and maintenance and how the literature published to date 
has attempted to mathematically and computationally model MFOP, with 
explanations of some of these analysis methods. 
 
Note: The concept of MFOP was originally intended to be applied to the field of 
military aircraft, although it is general and can be applied to many other fields. 
Confusion can, however, arise in the use of terminology: a “system” can mean 
either an overall item, such as a single aircraft, or a sub-system of it (such as landing 
gear). In keeping with the aerospace industry, and to avoid this confusion, the term 
“platform” is used to refer to the overall system, such as an aircraft. “System” refers 
to one of the individual parts of the platform, such as a fuel or a weapons system. 
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3.2 Explanation of MFOP 
 
The constant drive for improvement in all areas of engineering has resulted in an 
increased focus on reliability and availability. As a result, in 1995 the Ministry of 
Defence (MoD) looked at the needs of the modern military aircraft customer and 
looked at ways of providing a platform with the necessary technologies to satisfy 
these. These needs include dependable systems that work when required for a long 
period of time, with failure- and maintenance-free periods in order to carry out all 
missions without any loss in capability or functionality. The equipment must be 
affordable, not just in terms of acquisition costs but whole life cost (WLC), 
considering reduced cost of operation and support to match reduced funding and 
number of personnel (i.e. value for money). Also important is the ability to plan and 
predict, with  high probability of success, all aspects of missions and mission 
support, allowing for quick deployment and the spreading of fighting across several 
areas, providing for increased emphasis on expeditionary warfare. The overall goal 
is, in summary, smaller, resourceful fleets that are more capable and cheaper to 
maintain. 
 
Some of the needs mentioned above, such as dependable systems and good WLC 
are already important considerations of the current schemes in operation. 
Maintenance Free Operating Periods were first proposed by the MOD at a seminar 
in 1996 as a way of providing for all of the needs listed above [12]. The MFOP is 
defined, in [7], as: 
 
The period of operation during which an item will be able to carry 
out all its assigned missions, without the operator being restricted in 
any way due to system faults or limitations, with the minimum of 
maintenance.  
 
In effect this is a period in which there are no failures of any type which can cripple 
the platform or prevent it from carrying out its mission specifications. Accompanied 
with this is a probability of the MFOP being completed, sometimes called MFOPS 
(MFOP Survivability). MFOP considers the overall platform survival, so as long as 
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sufficient failure tolerance is built in, individual system failures can occur if they do 
not affect operations. Although MFOP may become a prime metric in reliability 
engineering, it will not necessarily improve the reliability of the platform’s systems 
– it may in fact be reduced.  
 
A particular MFOP would require, for example, 12 days of continuous operation. 
After this time it is anticipated that the platform will have built up component or 
system failures that have not affected its functionality or caused mission failure but 
which require attention prior to the next MFOP. The period during which the 
majority of maintenance will take place is called the Maintenance Recovery Period 
(MRP). It is intended that this period will not end up being so long as to inhibit 
operations but will efficiently consolidate all necessary maintenance actions into the 
same time interval, hence saving on costs. After each MRP the platform is ready for 
completion of another full MFOP.  
 
An MFOP is not defined to contain absolutely no maintenance; rather it is 
considered that minor actions, such as refuelling, rearming and repairing important 
safety related features, will still need to take place. 
 
3.3 MFOP Basics 
 
Over time the definition of MFOP has changed and is now more pragmatic in 
nature. The Committee for Defence Equipment Reliability and Maintainability 
(CODERM) and the Ultra Reliable Aircraft (URA) consortia agreed definition is: 
 
A period during which the system will operate without failure and 
without the need for any maintenance, however, faults and minor 
planned, contractually agreed maintenance are permissible. [21] 
 
 This definition may further mature over time and may need to be specifically 
documented in contracts. 
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MFOP is driven by a “weakest-link” style hierarchy – the lowest system MFOP will 
decide the platform MFOP. Improving this will therefore improve the platform 
MFOP [13]. As Figure 3.1 shows, the platform takes the MFOP level of system D, 
which has the shortest length, rather than A B or C. By improving system D, the 
platform MFOP will increase. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 – Nature of MFOP Platform 
 
The changes to the reliability specification are largely technology driven and so are 
likely to be carried out over the longer term. A platform would need to be designed 
to operate MFOPs and so it will be realistically impossible to introduce MFOP into 
the current generation [14]. Use of MFOP does not remove the need for a “faults per 
hour” parameter, even if faults are not causing system failure. 
 
3.4 Impact of MFOP 
 
3.4.1 Technologies Within MFOP 
 
MFOP has the potential to be used as a means of significantly improving the 
operational capability and platform-level reliability of the platform applying it and 
therefore provide a way of better meeting the customer’s needs. There are various 
potential improvements, listed below and outlined in detail in Section 3.5.1. These 
are regarded as beneficial in creating a consistent period during which high 
likelihood, critical system failures will not occur. 
 
One of these improvements involves understanding and increasing the reliability 
and availability of each component and system. Detailed research, investigation and 
effort will allow failure modes to be removed or improved, while knowledge of 
components' failure time distributions can be updated. Where this method is 
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restricted by cost or time constraints, redundant components and systems can be 
used to back up those that are more prone to failure, or which have unacceptable 
consequences upon failure. With mechanical equipment this may be inapplicable 
due to an unacceptable weight or bulk penalty, but avionics are able to use this idea. 
An extension of this is reconfigurable systems, which can adapt their behaviour 
either to take over the operation of a failed module or sub-system, or continue their 
current operation, allowing for the fact that another module has failed. 
 
Other technologies include prognostic systems to predict the future failure of a 
component or system, using Health Monitoring and accurate failure time 
distribution knowledge to allow improved estimation of the time of failure. 
Similarly, diagnostic systems detect and locate the components that are currently 
failed, perhaps with the capability to relay this information back to main base to 
allow efficient planning of maintenance operations. Providing maximum support for 
inspection, such as ease of access to systems and improved Built In Test Equipment, 
will shorten the MRP, increasing availability and reducing costs. 
 
These technologies are not new and are not exclusive to MFOP, but the expectation 
is that the setting of an ambitious goal, such as a guaranteed maintenance-free 
period, will drive all those involved with the development and operation of the 
platforms towards the ambition of having one which requires no maintenance at all. 
 
3.4.2 Advantages 
 
The key advantages of introducing MFOP (from the supplier’s point of view) will 
be those that create or increase consumer interest in their product. In this case the 
primary advantages will be linked to improving the purchase and whole life costs of 
the platform or providing operational benefits.  
 
Examples of the advantages which using MFOP will confer include the 
predictability of maintenance periods which allows for overheads such as manpower 
and facilities to be used less often and with more planning, with little probability of 
emergency or reactive maintenance. Facilities need not be available throughout a 
 - 32 - 
mission or series of missions, saving on costs or allowing for greater flexibility in 
mission planning. Another cost-related benefit will be realised if maintenance is 
made to be more efficient, by employing more powerful diagnostic tools, or 
planning repairs and spares better. Details of failures discovered mid-mission could 
be transmitted back to the repair facility, allowing for spares and manpower to be 
made available. 
 
Successful application of MFOP will create a better chance of completing a mission 
and will reduce the time spent in the failed state (improving availability). If this is 
the case, it may be possible to perform missions to the same standard with a smaller 
fleet, as fewer backup platforms are necessary to cover for any one becoming 
inoperable. Also, if the platform is more reliable then its availability and 
effectiveness will be increased. This is key for the military customer whose funding 
partially rests on ability to perform. 
 
Having a system which is very reliable and well understood will allow good 
prediction of its failure time. The key of MFOP is that the platform only needs to 
maintain its ability to operate for the next period. If prognostic systems predict that 
a system is not going to last for the duration of the next MFOP then it can be 
replaced or corrected before dispatch. Although this will lead to components or 
systems potentially being scrapped before failure, it is thought that the consequent 
improvement in reliability and reduction in necessary manpower can reduce costs 
enough to overcome the increase in throughput of spares. The resultant increase of 
“wasted” life of a component and overuse of spares can be reduced by more 
accurate health monitoring. 
 
3.4.3 Disadvantages 
 
While there is much that could be gained from the use of MFOP, there are also 
potential downsides. For instance, as shown in Figure 3.1, MFOP is based on a 
hierarchy whereby the system with the smallest MFOP dictates the MFOP of the 
platform. This allows for the most unreliable system to be improved, after which the 
system with the next lowest MFOP is improved, and so on. This method of 
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improvement was adopted by the Germans during WW2 while working on their V2 
rockets. Their eventual quality was poor, as they did not focus on the overall 
reliability of the platform but its constituents. This approach therefore has a 
historical basis to be considered as weak. 
 
The large level of improvements and technologies that will have to be developed to 
allow the MFOP concept to be successful is very ambitious and will take much 
time, money and effort to bring about. Contracts requiring MFOP before 
understanding of it is mature will only lead to strained relations between customer 
and supplier. All stakeholders must have knowledge of the starting situation and the 
timeframe of improvements. However, the addition of complex technologies to a 
system may well lead to a reduction of quality and availability unless the 
complexity is understood and allowed for. New technologies typically feature new 
components whose reliability is not well understood, and so a reduction in 
reliability or availability in the short term may result. Also, there may well be 
unforeseen problems which appear when MFOP is being implemented. 
 
3.4.4 Arguments Surrounding MFOP 
 
The novelty of the concept of MFOP will inevitably lead to a debate within the 
target industry (military aircraft) over whether it is a good thing or not. There are 
several aspects of this that are worth stating. The MoD papers that have been 
published to promote the concept of MFOP, particularly Knowles [15], Appleton 
[13] and Turner et al (1997) [14], have argued that the use of the term “Mean Time 
Between Failures” (MTBF) has a negative effect on reliability engineering. Some of 
their arguments include  
 
− Use of MTBF implies the use of the negative exponential distribution 
and constant Rate of Occurrence of Failure (ROCOF) 
− Use of the term indicates that engineers have no desire to understand the 
causes of random failures, and that as a mean level of failures per unit 
time is contracted for, failures are ‘allowable’ 
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− As a result of not understanding when failures are going to occur, 
maintenance support is required to be available round the clock, wasting 
time and money. 
 
MTBF is the average time across any given distribution of failure times, not just the 
exponential distribution. Efforts to improve the MTBF level require an improved 
understanding of cause, and given that it is impossible to completely eradicate 
failures, allowances must be made for this. Even with an MFOP methodology in 
place, it is unrealistic to expect a perfect, accurate prediction of exactly when a 
failure will occur. As such it will always be necessary to have maintenance crews on 
standby for situations where emergency repairs must take place. Stating that the 
designers do not consider failures to a full extent or that the motivation to 
understand failures is lacking (a charge made by Knowles [15] against electronics 
designers), will irritate members of the industry who are working to these goals, and 
help to instil a resistance to the proposed idea. 
 
The lack of objectivity of some of the statements made does little to convince others 
in the industry that MFOP is a worthwhile cause. It is likely that the best way to 
inspire confidence in MFOP is to outline the proposed benefits, rather than to focus 
on the perceived failures of the current methods. The most successful reports in 
getting the necessary ideas across are those that concentrate purely on MFOP, its 
advantages, how it would work and how it is to be studied, evaluated and 
implemented. 
 
3.5 Using and Achieving MFOP 
 
The published research investigating MFOP can be split into two broad camps: 
those advocating a sea-change in the current methods and cultures by adopting 
MFOP in its entirety; and those that want to use the current reliability information, 
such as hazard rate, to estimate MFOP. 
 
Several mathematical models (detailed in Section 3.6.1) have been put forward 
which aim to estimate MFOP based on a components’ MTBF or Weibull 
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distribution variables [16, 17]. However, these models do not consider many issues 
which are of concern in application, such as environmental effects. This is 
understandable given their infancy, but there will always be a limit on the level of 
detail that can be included in mathematical models. 
 
Others [12, 14, 18] tend towards the argument that every component’s exact 
distribution and parameters, should be found as accurately as possible and the 
approach should be more investigative and considered, with a design-led desire to 
improve reliability in all areas of engineering. Whilst this would be worthwhile, 
there are several constraints such as cost and lack of availability of failure data 
which prevent the possibility of this being fully realised. 
 
3.5.1 Enablers of MFOP 
 
There are many different ideas and technologies that will contribute to prolonged 
maintenance-free operation of a platform. These are outlined in the sections below.  
3.5.1.1 Inherent Reliability (IR) 
Bringing about a lengthy MFOP will require, in part, that the components and 
systems have the best reliability levels that are feasible to obtain with the time and 
financial constraints in place. It is thought that the technology currently employed 
would not yield a long MFOP at an acceptable probability [19]. Improving 
component reliabilities through tests and investigations into failure modes, etc., will 
allow the supplier not only to understand their components better but will also assist 
the other enabling technologies in providing a more integrated set of reliability 
management systems. 
 
The desired outcomes of any tests and investigations into component reliabilities 
will be: 
 
• To find all the failure modes, and for frequent or catastrophic events, to 
eradicate either the effects or the mode itself. This is generally performed by 
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Failure Modes Effects (and Criticality) Analysis (FME(C)A) [19] and would 
ideally lead to a high mean and a low variance in the reliabilities of items. 
• To understand the physics of failure [15] – that is, the absolute root causes of 
or descents to failure – of every component. 
• To find the true failure distribution of each component in the system, and 
obtain accurate parameters for these distributions. If this were achieved, a 
much better assessment of the overall system failure rate could be realised.  
• To understand the effects of environmental parameters, such as vibration or 
temperature, in degrading a component or causing it to fail. This will allow 
more complete computational or mathematical models to be produced for 
analysis of system reliability. 
 
These outcomes do not stand alone – they will link into one another as they also 
interact with the other enablers. Investigating failure modes and then attempting to 
minimise them or eradicate them will require investigations into how a component 
is to be used in service and how the environment it is subjected to can contribute to 
its failure; these environmental issues may affect which distribution is thought to be 
the governing one, and so on.  
 
The testing of components to find all this information is a difficult problem – it is 
not typically feasible to wait for a sufficiently large number of components to fail in 
normal operation, even though this would provide the best quality information, due 
to the large time to failure of most components. Other ways of testing components 
in laboratories to estimate this information do not always simulate operational 
conditions and involve some way of “speeding up” the process. These methods 
include Reliability Demonstration or Reliability Growth Testing, Accelerated Life 
Testing and Fatigue Testing [20]. 
 
The problem of investigating times to failure has led to the creation of several 
groups with this purpose in mind. These are such as the Society of British 
Aerospace Companies (SBAC) and the Center for Advanced Life Cycle 
Engineering (CALCE) in the USA.  
 - 37 - 
3.5.1.2 Prognostics 
Prognostics systems are those that allow the future failure of a component to be 
predicted. They are considered an important part of the MFOP concept. Prognostics 
technology draws on information regarding components’ failure life characteristics 
(FLCs), if they exist, and good knowledge of their physics of failure and failure 
time distributions. In order to detect a future failure, there needs to be either a 
understanding of the signs that are shown by components before they fail or, in the 
event of invisible or no signs of deterioration, an understanding of the conditions 
under which the component is likely to fail faster. Electrical components are more 
likely to fail spontaneously, whereas mechanical parts are prone to visible wearing. 
Items that visibly wear will be regularly inspected, and if the remaining life for a 
part is thought to be too low, that part is replaced. 
 
Lack of signs of wear is being dealt with by the introduction of Condition or Health 
Monitoring (HM) systems. These systems consider various aspects of a 
component’s usage, such as the value of the component’s relevant reliability factor 
(flights, hours, etc), the types of excursions taken, environmental factors and so on. 
The HM system should then be able to use these figures and calculate the effects on 
the aeroplane system, and allow for better scheduling of replacement. A reliable 
HM system should keep the level of premature replacement and overuse of spares to 
a minimum. More research into the effects of various factors on the health of 
systems is needed before HM becomes accurate [21]. 
 
According to Cini & Griffith [20], because mechanical components are generally 
more bulky and difficult to replace than other components, any decisions made by a 
HM system in requiring replacement must be both trusted and accurate (“full 
authority”) in their analysis of whether to remove a mechanical item – the advice 
must not be merely advisory. They state that the helicopter industry has good 
experience in condition monitoring of mechanical parts and may be able to lend 
itself to the MFOP philosophy. 
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3.5.1.3 Diagnostics 
Diagnostic systems are those which check for and locate current failures in a system 
or platform. Many failures are found through inspection by a maintenance engineer. 
Built In Test (BIT) systems [20] have been introduced which perform tasks such as 
identification of faults, without the need for extra personnel. As the name suggests, 
they are built in to the system, thereby easing the diagnosis of faults. However, a 
problem can occur with BIT systems if they have a high “No Faults Found” (NFF) 
rate. This is a figure which indicates the accuracy of the BIT equipment, as they 
sometimes report faults when none have occurred, increasing the cost of 
maintaining the platform through unnecessary replacement of operational items. As 
is the case with some commercial aircraft, such as the landing gear control and 
interface unit of the Airbus A320, BIT equipment can be set to control the automatic 
change-over to a standby system. 
 
To assist inspection and maintenance, the most unreliable components and those 
that require inspection from an engineer will need to be easily accessed and 
removed, well-mounted and connected to allow ease of test [22]. Warrington et al 
claim that if a technician has access to more information, they have to perform less 
work in diagnosing and fixing faults and so need not be as capable [23]. The authors 
imply that too much reliance on technician’s skill in handling faults will lead to 
more mistakes through human error than automating the process. 
3.5.1.4 Redundancy/Reconfigurability 
The MFOP concept allows for items to fail as long as the overall platform continues 
operation. Failure tolerant items, which involve either redundancy or 
reconfigurability, will consequently be a key aspect.  
 
The time of failure of a particular component cannot be specified exactly. If the risk 
of a component failure is high, either due to probability or consequence, redundant 
or backup systems can be provided in parallel to take over operation in the event of 
a failure, such as two electrical power supplies. Some components already contain 
redundant sections (e.g. dual rams on a hydraulic actuator). However, redundancy 
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for mechanical components is more difficult to implement than electronics due to 
the mass/volume/cost implications [24]. 
 
Accompanied with redundancy is firstly a diagnosis system that can reveal the 
failure if it has not been revealed through impairment of performance, followed by 
some method of switching off the failed system and switching on the backup. This 
could be manually performed by an operator or automatically managed by a 
computer. The backup can be either ‘cold’ (cannot fail while remaining unused), 
‘hot’ (operates with normal reliability while in backup state), or ‘warm’ (reliability 
figures are in between hot and cold). Newton [21] suggests that hot standby would 
give the smoothest switching, but mentions that this creates problems with 
establishing which system is faulty.  
 
Despite being widely regarded as a ‘good’ concept, redundancy has not been 
extensively researched and so possible problems have not been fully investigated 
[21]. Potential difficulties include a common cause fault damaging both the main 
and back-up systems (e.g. a power surge) or switching problems. The cost/benefit of 
redundancy and its balance with the cost/benefit of improving inherent reliability 
will need to be carefully considered as sometimes money invested in redundancy 
could be better used elsewhere Throughput of spares would be expected to rise with 
increased redundancy, so the costs of this may be deemed unacceptable [24]. 
 
Reconfigurability is a more high-tech area of redundancy provision. Reconfigurable 
items are capable of adapting their functionality either to carry out the function of a 
failed item or continue functioning, taking the item’s failure into account. Integrated 
Modular Avionics (IMA) is an area which seeks to exploit this idea, by having 
standby processing modules which can be switched over or combined in the event 
of failure of a different module. The tasks performed by each module must be 
managed by an intelligent management or overview system to control the switching 
[24]. 
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3.5.2 Considering MFOP in Design 
 
Those endorsing MFOP are keen to emphasise the importance of the design process. 
Money spent on improvements or considerations at the design stage goes much 
further than that spent at later stages in the development of new technologies. The 
various papers published on aspects of MFOP indicate a range of factors and 
possible problems affecting design and reliability. 
 
Achieving a good balance between the various enablers will reduce costs. Efforts to 
improve inherent reliability will only go so far before they become too expensive, 
and so effective prognostic systems or good redundancy may need to be employed 
[24]. Some component failure modes may have no effect on the system at different 
phases of flight – a fuel valve failing open mid-flight may not cause a problem 
while a valve failed closed could; an open-valve failure may however present 
difficulties for refuelling where a closed failure would go unnoticed. FME(C)A can 
find root failure modes and causes, and coupled with a detailed knowledge of the 
parameters and effects of the intended operating environments and typical usage, 
these can be exploited to great effect [14]. 
 
Parameter variations such as tolerances, drift, ageing, etc. will naturally occur 
during the life of the platform, and can cause failures. The ability to cope with 
varying environmental stresses must be built in: as benign an environment as 
possible should be provided for the equipment. Simplicity in design is important, 
even with the various enablers considered - if new technology or components 
provide no discernible advantage over older technology, then the proof of the older 
items in service means it should be retained. Conversely, equipment with known 
problems should be removed from the design at the earliest opportunity [22]. 
 
Design engineers should consider the MRP and attempt to ensure low variation in 
its length [19]. Maintainability is a key part of MFOP – equipment which is more 
prone to failures will need to be accessed easily and be well-mounted and connected 
to allow for quick replacement [22]. 
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Relf [24] considered a design methodology with relevance to MFOP. The process 
consists of: 
 
1. Laying out the system architecture of the platform so it can be analysed 
2. Finding the platform and system MFOP values 
3. Identifying the “weak link” system MFOP; that is, the lowest-value 
system MFOP 
4. Applying one or more enablers to it or adapting the system architecture to 
improve the low system MFOP and thereby improve the platform MFOP 
5. Another analysis of the platform MFOP can then be performed and the 
next weak link found and improved.  
 
As discussed in section 3.4.3, this may not be the most effective way of designing 
systems to perform MFOPs. 
 
3.5.3 Maintenance Recovery Period 
 
The MRP is a period during which the platform is brought back to a state where it 
can fully complete the next MFOP with the required level of confidence. All 
maintenance, except specific activities noted in the customer’s contract, will take 
place during the MRP. It will consist of inspection, monitoring, overhaul or testing. 
 
The diagnostics systems on the aeroplane, when they detect a failure, should display 
the failure data to the pilot. This can then be communicated back to base, either by 
an automated procedure (such as Airbus’ Future Aircraft Navigation System 
transmitting Centralised Maintenance System data [20]) or by the pilot. A thorough 
knowledge of failures, and their effect on current and future missions will allow the 
operators to plan what maintenance will be needed at the end of the MFOP. This 
will allow deployment of manpower, spares and facilities ‘just in time’ [13]. 
Advance knowledge is key to maximising efficiency, in terms of both missions and 
maintenance planning, although failures occurring towards the end of the MFOP 
will not be handled with as much efficiency. The diagnostics systems (such as a 
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“simple” Troubleshooting Manual or an inbuilt system) have a strong requirement 
placed on them to be accurate.  
 
The MRP should not be planned to be too long or too short. Due to the different 
nature of problems that will arise, the length will vary, especially when performing 
structural inspections. The integration of these inspections (which fit the MFOP 
philosophy very well) into the MRP will need investigation. The MRP may get 
longer as the vehicle ages, especially if it is thought to have a non-constant hazard 
rate [20]. The quality of inspections and the effect of false positives and negatives 
on the cost of maintenance within the MFOP framework is investigated by Dagg & 
Newby [25]. The maintenance itself has various challenges, including prioritisation 
of tasks, allocation and scheduling of resources, and fault visibility and isolation. 
Priority can be ordered based on the criticality of systems or components with 
regard to system failure; or by taking into account issues such as the duration of 
repair, access limits, resources and costs.  
 
Line Replaceable Items (LRIs) are groups of components or other LRIs created to 
ease repair, and may exist across several systems. An LRI containing other LRIs is 
known as a ‘parent’, while one which exists in another LRI is a ‘child’. Replacing 
the parent replaces all the children, while a child can be replaced individually [26]. 
However, the concept of an LRI means that if one is found with a failure, it is 
replaced without requiring much knowledge of the actual problem, making it 
difficult to design out. The removal of LRIs will lead to them being stripped, rebuilt 
and tested which can lead to more component failures than might have occurred if 
the LRI had not been removed. More maintenance may therefore lead to more 
spares being required [16]. Not isolating a failure down to its root cause due to time 
or cost restrictions often results in several Line Replaceable Items (LRIs) being 
replaced at the same time and a higher NFF rate in BIT systems. This means a 
restriction on the number of LRIs replaced at one particular time, or a ban on certain 
types of maintenance at certain times, may be needed [23]. 
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3.6 Analysing MFOP 
 
Moving immediately to the MFOP concept with the necessary degree of confidence 
within defence budgets and timeframes is neither credible nor achievable for current 
platforms – high-confidence, high-value MFOPs cannot be expected for some time. 
In the meantime, efforts are being made to estimate a realistic MFOP for a typical 
platform. 
 
There have been several attempts to produce mathematical models for or simulate 
MFOP in order to gauge what problems may arise, how easy it would be to predict 
and determine, how achievable the customer’s requirements are and the feasibility 
of the overall concept. The following sections detail the current research into 
mathematical modelling of MFOP, and the current URAM MFOP simulation 
project.  
 
3.6.1 Mathematics of MFOP 
 
The research into mathematically expressing MFOP and discovering it from a 
system of components of mixed distributions is largely adapted from current 
methods. It will be necessary for any flaws in the models to be identified well in 
advance so new methods of theoretically evaluating MFOP can be researched [16]. 
 
The mathematics establishes a link between the MFOP and its probability of 
survival, referred to as MFOPS (MFOP Survivability), Si (t+u | t). The notation 
represents the probability that item i will survive u units of time (the MFOP) given 
survival at time t.  
 
The probability, Ri(t), of item i surviving from 0 to t is given in equation 3.1. 
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And the probability of i then surviving to time t+ u is shown in equation 3.2. 
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A system comprising of n independently distributed components in series has a 
survival probability from time t to time (t + u) of: 
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where ui and ti are individual MFOP and life values for each component i. 
 
Components whose mode of failure is not dependent on age have the survivability 
function, Snar, as shown in equation 3.4. 
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Increasing survivability is possible either by reducing the MFOP duration u or 
introducing redundancy. Replacement will have no effect. Also note that if a high-
confidence MFOP is to be achieved, the MFOP duration must be much smaller than 
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the relative MTTF value as Figure 3.2 shows (this applies purely to components 
with exponentially-distributed failure times). The data used to create Figure 3.2 is 
taken from [21]. 
 
The various enablers that will be in place should lengthen the components’ typical 
times to failure and produce systems whose own times to failure are much greater 
than this, due to prognostics and redundancy. 
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Figure 3.2 – Chart showing Probability of Achieving a Given MFOP Duration 
 
Components whose times to failure are dependent on age are often modelled with 
the Weibull distribution. The survivability function for component i is given by 
equation 3.5. 
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Combining equations 3.4 and 3.5, the survival probability of the system can be 
estimated as in equation 3.6. 
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The design life of the system, also called the maximum MFOP length, umax, for a 
stated value of Ssys is the age at which the reliability falls below the designed 
reliability value, given for the Weibull Distribution [17] by: 
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Equations 3.4 and 3.5 can be rearranged, to give the survival period for a given level 
of confidence: 
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The relationship of MFOP to the Weibull distribution changes with β (the shape 
parameter). MFOP generally decreases with age, as β is generally greater than 1, but 
can have other behaviours, as Figure 3.3 shows. 
 
[Weibull-distributed failures]
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Figure 3.3 - Graph Showing MFOP for Varying Values of β (η = 200, S = 0.95) 
 
• If β < 1, MFOP curve is convex starting from zero – MFOP increases with 
age. 
• If β = 1, MFOP is constant throughout life. 
• If β > 1, MFOP curve is concave tending towards zero – MFOP decreases 
with age. 
 
Note that if the MFOP is considerably shorter than the characteristic life, 
survivability does not decrease much over consecutive MFOPs for age-wearing 
components. Also note that the units for MFOP (u), characteristic life (η) and age (t) 
are undefined here but will be the same as each other. Common units are hours, 
days or years. 
 
The assumptions and limitations of this model are rather restrictive: 
 
• All components use the same units of aging. 
• All Weibull distributions are two-parameter, not three. 
• This model cannot consider redundancy as the components must all be in 
series. 
Age 
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• The normal and lognormal distributions have not been considered. 
 
Todinov [27] uses the broader measure Minimum Failure-Free Operating Period 
(MFFOP). This is not directly applicable to the MFOP concept mentioned here as it 
is based on the homogeneous Poisson process, and only exponential failure times 
are considered. Also, being based on FFOPs, no consideration is made of 
redundancy. 
 
3.6.2 Ultra Reliable Aircraft Model (URAM) 
 
The mathematical models that have been produced are limited in their scope. An 
alternative approach to evaluate other aspects of MFOP, including more realistic, 
complex systems, is Discrete Event Simulation (DES). This allows many factors of 
a realistic MFOP scenario to be considered. 
 
URAM [23, 26] is a user-configurable tool that not only assesses the MFOP 
capability of an item at all levels (platform down to component), but also considers 
other factors such as operating scenarios, maintenance regimes, logistics support, 
etc. It can consider most enablers of MFOP, except for reconfigurability, which is 
still in development. It outputs a variety of reports, most importantly the probability 
of completing an MFOP of a certain length. The program allows designers to 
investigate possible options and provides a theoretical method of experimentation. 
 
URAM considers various factors relating to maintenance [23]. These include 
forward planning, such as prediction of future failures, scheduled replacements and 
changing mission plans based on the system state. Diagnosing faults takes account 
of visibility of system failures and varying maintenance regimes. It also includes the 
ability to group components and systems in LRIs. Other factors, such as balancing 
the importance of controlling costs, minimising repair time and achieving maximum 
mission effectiveness are considered. Manpower, spares and other resources can be 
scheduled according to need. 
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URAM uses “mode maps” to model the relationships between components having 
several failure modes, the potential for systems to have various functions within a 
given mission, and the potential effects of system failures. These maps can also 
allow failures to impact on other systems and components. Consideration is given to 
the impact of environmental stresses and how it can vary with location. Different 
components can age in different ways, and the environment in which a platform is 
operating can speed up or slow down this aging. 
 
URAM is a very large, complex simulation program and is capable of handling 
many different aspects of the proposed MFOP idea. However, there are still some 
areas where improvement is possible. For instance, the requirement to build the 
Reliability Block Diagrams within the program, as is currently the case, is very 
time-consuming for large systems, and can lead to over-simplification of the failure 
modes of the platform. Similarly, the capability of the software to cover the many 
different aspects of MFOP operation is reflected in the complexity and time 
consumption of setting up simulations. Even a simple system set-up can take a long 
time to implement in URAM. 
 
URAM has only a limited ability to analyse systems which perform phased missions 
(see Section 4.2 for more explanation of this subject). While it is possible to 
perform a basic analysis of an MFOP system performing phased missions, it cannot 
consider more complex real-world factors such as abandonment of missions, choice 
of next phase or choosing between a primary mission objective (such as destruction 
of a target) or performing a less important, secondary mission objective (e.g. 
reconnaissance of target area) due to time, fuel or system failure constraints. In 
addition, the simulation results produced for phased missions are not tailored to 
offer the data required for in-depth analysis of relevant factors such as phase and 
mission failure probability, criticality of component failures to phase and mission 
failures, and speed of convergence of the phase unreliabilities. 
 
As outlined above, the modelling of the specific scenario of MFOP systems 
performing phased missions needs extending. This is an area addressed in this 
thesis. 
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3.7 Summary 
 
An MFOP is a period where the platform can be guaranteed for a given (high) 
percentage of the time to survive without loss of functionality from failures. A 
Maintenance Recovery Period follows each MFOP. This puts the platform back in a 
state to complete the next MFOP. The concept of MFOPs has been proposed to 
more effectively fulfil the requirements of the current and future aeronautical 
industries by bringing together many technologies for a common purpose. MFOPs 
are thought to offer considerable advantages in operational availability and 
capability, saving the operators time and money. Considerable effort is required to 
overcome problems involved with the complexities of implementation. 
 
It is expected that a platform with successful MFOPs will contain the following 
features: 
 
• Good inherent reliability – although balanced with cost, it is essential that 
the overall reliability of components and systems is improved. Also 
important is an understanding of the modes of failures. 
• Prognostics – the ability to predict when a system is going to fail, to an 
accurate timeframe, would be critical in an MFOP platform and would 
enable early replacement to prevent any onboard failures. 
• Diagnostics – understanding the precise location and cause of a component 
failure would make the provision of maintenance faster and more efficient, 
saving costs. 
• Redundancy/Reconfigurability – backup systems and the ability to recreate 
the functionality of a failed system would act as a cover for less reliable 
equipment and further enhances the confidence in the platform. This has to 
be managed by a capable diagnostics system. 
 
The current efforts to produce values for MFOP have been restricted to 
mathematical models and simulation software. MFOPs are a very complex idea and 
so the mathematical models produced thus far have not been able to adequately 
consider the effects of combining the various enablers. Much more work is needed 
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before these can be used for accurate evaluation of a platform’s MFOP. The only 
published MFOP simulation software is the URAM project, which aims to simulate 
all aspects of a highly reliable aircraft. This includes maintenance, operations, 
missions planning and so on. It is able to consider many more factors than the 
analytical mathematical models. However, there are limitations in URAM’s ability 
to simulate MFOP systems performing phased missions. For example, as lack of 
necessary figures (e.g. phase and mission failure probabilities and speed of 
convergence of these probabilities), and inability to model real-world phased 
missions scenarios, such as choosing between several options for the next phase, 
and reconfiguration of the mission profile to suit time, fuel or system failure 
constraints. Hence, there is a need for further research into the combination of 
MFOP with phased missions. 
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Chapter 4 Phased Missions and Petri Nets 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
A conceivable and common scenario in real world applications of reliability 
engineering is one where a system performs missions, in order to complete one or 
more objectives. Often, these missions can be broken up into distinct time intervals, 
each of which has at least one goal which must be completed. These time intervals 
are known as phases, and due to the necessity of completing different phase 
objectives, the system may need to operate different sub-systems at different times. 
The failure logic of the system is therefore subject to change as time progresses. 
This chapter gives details on how these types of systems have been analysed. 
 
Also investigated in this chapter is the development of a modelling method known 
as Petri nets. These are a very versatile way of combining the flexibility of state-
space models with the logical function of combinatorial models. Their development 
from first concept through to variations in modern-day use is reviewed. Their 
application in the field of reliability, particularly with respect to phased missions, is 
also explained. 
 
4.2 Phased Missions 
 
4.2.1 Non-Repairable Systems 
 
In 1975 Esary and Ziehms published a paper [6] outlining the first consideration of 
methods of analysing phased missions. A mission is split up into sequential phases, 
each of which has a specific task to perform. Various combinations of the non-
repairable basic events may cause phase failure, and these combinations may differ 
from phase to phase. If all phases are completed successfully, the mission is a 
success. The probability of this is known as Mission Reliability, RMISS. 
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Mission reliability cannot be calculated exactly by simply multiplying the individual 
phase reliabilities; this will lead to an overestimate of RMISS. This is because the twin 
assumptions that all components are in the working state at the beginning of each 
phase, and that no components are shared between the phases (and are hence 
independent) are both false. 
 
The consideration of non-repairable components means that any component will 
work continuously until its failure, thence remaining in the failed state. Esary and 
Ziehms’ method transforms a multi-phased mission into a single-phase mission 
(assuming zero-duration phase boundaries), following which existing techniques 
can be used to calculate mission reliability. 
4.2.1.1 Transformation of a Multi-Phased Mission to an Equivalent 
Single-Phased Mission 
A non-repairable system undergoing a multi-phased mission will require its 
components to function through all previous phases in order to be operational in the 
current phase. As such, a single component c operating in phase j may be 
represented by j components in series. Each “sub-component”, c1, c2,...,cj, 
corresponds to the behaviour of component c in each phase up to j. Figure 4.1 shows 
this transformation. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 – Single and Multiple Phase Component Block Diagrams 
 
Similarly, when using Fault Tree Analysis to display the failure of component c, 
this can be replaced by an OR combination of the failure of component c in any 
phase up to and including phase j. 
 
Following the component transformation, the phase configurations can be joined in 
series. Figure 4.2 shows this for a simple three phase and three component mission. 
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Figure 4.2 – System Component Configuration in Three Phases 
 
In Figure 4.2, components A, B and C combine in various ways to form the system 
in each of the three phases, thus also changing the failure logic in each. The 
transformation of this as described yields the equivalent single-phase mission 
profile in Figure 4.3. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 – Equivalent Single Phase Mission to System in Figure 4.2 
 
The single-phase network is created from each of the transformed original systems 
(with expanded sub-components as in Figure 4.1) placed in series in the order of the 
phases from the start of the mission to the end. Due to sharing common 
components, the sub-systems are not independent, and so sub-system reliabilities 
cannot be multiplied to produce the mission reliability. These sub-system 
reliabilities, Ri, are: 
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The true mission reliability, 
321321321 CCCBBBAAAMISS
R ρρρρρρρρρ= , is found by 
finding the simplest form, discussed in the next section, of Figure 4.3, as shown in 
Figure 4.4. This reliability value is greater than the product of the subsystem 
reliabilities. 
 
 
Figure 4.4 – Simplest form of Figure 4.3 
 
4.2.1.1.1 Cut Set Cancellation 
It is possible to simplify the multiple phase configurations before transformation to 
a single-phase structure, by using the technique of cut set cancellation. If a minimal 
cut set in a phase contains any minimal cut sets of a later phase, they may be 
removed from the earlier phase. This is because the failure logic for later phases 
automatically includes mention of the failure of components in all phases up to that 
phase, and so these earlier phase cut sets are superfluous. 
 
Continuing the example in Figure 4.2, the fault trees for the phases are shown in 
Figure 4.5. The minimal cut sets for each phase are: 
 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
{A} {A,B,C} {A} 
{B,C}  {B} 
  {C} 
 
 - 56 - 
 
Figure 4.5 – Phase Fault Trees of System in Figure 4.2 
 
Cut set {A} can be removed from phase 1 as A is also a cut set of phase 3, and A’s 
failure in phase 1 will also cause failure in phase 3. Similarly, if component B fails 
during phase 1, this will cause mission failure during phase 3, making C’s state 
irrelevant. Cut set {B,C} can therefore be removed from phase 1. {A,B,C} can be 
removed from phase 2 using the same logic, making the phase minimal cut sets: 
 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
- - {A} 
-  {B} 
  {C} 
 
In spite of the cancellations of phase cut sets, the systems are equivalent and will 
result in the same figure for mission reliability. The latter approach is easier to 
convert to a single-phase mission structure, however. 
4.2.1.2 Obtaining Bounds for Mission Unreliability 
Mission unreliability is defined as the probability of failure of successful system 
operation during at least one of the phases of a mission. It is important, however, 
that this figure or bounds for it are calculated as quickly or efficiently as possible. 
Burdick et al [28] have reviewed the method of Esary and Ziehms and present 
methods to approximate mission unreliability for non-repairable systems with 
statistically independent components. The methods are applicable to systems with 
large numbers of components, where calculation of an exact mission reliability 
figure would be costly. 
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Esary and Ziehms’ method of transforming each basic event c into a series of events 
c1,…,ci for each phase i creates a large increase in the number of cut sets for the 
mission and thus also in the time and cost of an exact calculation of mission 
unreliability. The methods of Burdick et al to estimate mission unreliability avoid 
the need for basic event transformation, of which four of the most accurate and 
conservative are presented here. 
 
• Inclusion-Exclusion Expansion of Phase Unreliabilities 
Each phase fault tree is used to find that phase’s minimal cut sets. These are 
then used in an inclusion-exclusion expansion (equation 2.3) to find the 
unreliability of phase i, Qi, using unconditional basic event unreliabilities. 
Equation 4.1 shows an expression to find the conditional basic event c 
reliability 
jc
ρ . The unconditional basic event c reliability 
jc
p  derives from 
this, as shown in equation 4.2. 
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By multiplying these individual phase reliabilities, an approximation to the 
mission reliability, EXINQ − , can be reached (equation 4.3). 
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Instead, by summing the individual phase unreliabilities, an approximation 
to EXINQ − , the mission unreliability, can be reached, as shown in equation 
4.4. 
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If the technique is applied after the cut-set cancellation method mentioned in 
the previous section is implemented, another approximation to the mission 
unreliability, )(CCEXINQ − , can be found. Due to there being generally fewer 
cut sets in each phase due to the cancellation, the resulting approximation is 
usually less than EXINQ − . 
 
• Minimal Cut Set Bound 
In this approximation, after the minimal cut sets are found, Equation 4.5 
allows calculation of the probability of failure of cut set Ci in phase j, 
jiC
q . 
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where c is the occurrence of basic event c in cut set Ci of phase j 
 
The reliability of phase j can thus be estimated using the minimal cut set 
bound in equation 4.6. 
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4.6 
 
This method can be used to find an approximation to the mission reliability, MCBQ  
also, by applying equation 4.3. Once again, the cut set cancellation technique can be 
applied before the approximation to give another approximation to the mission 
unreliability, )(CCMCBQ . 
 
The four approximations to the mission unreliability can be ordered in terms of their 
accuracy, as shown in equation 4.7.  
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As the approximations do not consider the outcomes of previous phases, the bounds 
are only estimates. These are useful, for instance, in systems where a large amount 
of components prevents an exact calculation of the mission reliability due to cost or 
difficulty. 
 
Veatch [29] presents another technique for estimating the unreliability of a phased 
mission system. The method constructs a lower bound structure function for 
application to periodic systems. 
4.2.1.3 Expected Number of Failures 
Finding the expected number of failures for a multi-phased mission is a more 
difficult task than finding the same parameter in a single-phase mission. Phase 
transitions can cause system failure without a component failure occurring at that 
time. Montague and Fussell [30] describe a method for finding the expected number 
of failures for a phased mission. 
 
However, their method does not consider the outcome of previous phases. The 
combination of all of the cut sets and path sets, to find the expected number of 
phases across the phase boundary, would be very time consuming and inefficient for 
large systems, and approximation techniques would not be accurate. Due to the 
method ignoring the outcome of earlier phases, the value of the expected number of 
failures it gives cannot be accurate. 
4.2.1.4 Laws of Boolean Phase Algebra 
The performance of a component c has been considered by other methods to be a 
separate event in different phases, while the system reliability parameters are based 
on the product of the event probabilities. Dazhi and Xiaozhong [31] have 
established a set of Boolean algebraic laws to combine and simplify expressions of 
component behaviour.  
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If phases j and k are ordered such that 1 ≤ k ≤ j, the rules of logical AND and OR for 
events as expressed in equations 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 can be applied to phased mission 
systems. 
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4.10 
 
The event of a system being failed in phase j, Xj, could have occurred in any phase 
from the first to j inclusive, as shown in equation 4.11. 
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Mission unreliability can then be found from equation 4.12. 
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4.12 
 
The combination of the different phase events in equation 4.12 contains an 
automatic implementation of the cut set cancellation technique presented in Section 
4.2.1.1.1. Kohda et al [32] supply further Boolean laws which use the minimal cut 
sets and path sets for each phase which removes any need to convert the mission 
into a single phase system. The use of Boolean laws to solve phased mission 
reliability removes the false assumption made by Esary and Ziehms which is that 
the performance of the component through different phases is independent.  
 
Somani and Trivedi [33] introduced another method whereby Boolean algebraic 
methods were employed to find phased mission system reliability without 
converting all the phases into a single mission. This solution necessitates the 
transfer of information from one phase to the next, as phases are not independent. 
 
Their method uses cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) with a mass at the 
origin. A random variable X has a CDF with time t given by equation 4.13. 
 
)1()1()( 11 tTTX eeetq
λλλ −−−
−+−=  
4.13 
 where  T1 is the time at the start of the phase. 
 
The function’s mass at the origin is given by P(X = 0) = (1 – 1Te λ− ), which is the 
probability that the component exists in the failed state at the start of the phase. The 
other part of the equation, 1Te λ− (1– te λ− ), represents the continuous part of the 
function which is the failure probability distribution of the component in the current 
phase. These distribution functions can be used to represent the failure probabilities 
of components. 
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The situation considered by Somani and Trivedi is the simplest, with each phase 
having the same system configuration and failure criteria. Each phase differs from 
the rest by having differing component failure rates. Phase- and age-dependent 
failure rates are considered in addition to random phase durations. Consideration is 
also given to situations where the system configuration varies between phases. The 
research considered four plausible scenarios across a phase boundary: 
 
1. Accumulation of component failures is insufficient to cause system failure in 
either phase j or j+1. 
2. Accumulation of component failures causes system failure in both phase j 
and j+1. 
3. Accumulation of component failures does not lead to system failure in phase 
j but does lead to system failure in phase j+1. 
4. Accumulation of component failures leads to system failure in phase j but 
not in phase j+1. 
 
Cases 1 and 2 do not require a change in failure combinations between phases, 
while the combinations in case 3 can be thought of as failure in both phases, as the 
failure will occur at the transition point. The mission reliability for these three cases 
is found in the same way as for a mission where all phase configurations are 
identical, by solving the fault tree for the final phase. 
 
A method is given to solve the fourth situation which accounts for the probability of 
occurrence of failure combinations in phase j. System unreliability can be divided 
into two parts – common failure combinations and phase failure combinations. 
 
• Common Failure Combinations – considers the component failure 
combinations that are common to all phases. If phase j+1 can fail through a 
particular combination, that combination can also fail phase j. The 
unreliability due to these combinations are found using the same method 
mentioned above, that is, finding the failure distribution for each component 
and solving for the last phase fault tree. 
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• Phase Failure Combinations – considers the component failure combinations 
which can cause failure in phase j but in no subsequent phases. Phase failure 
combinations for phase j (PFCj) that are treated as success combinations for 
all the subsequent phases are given by equation 4.14. 
 
)))((( 21 mjjjj EEEEPFC ∧∧∧= ++ KK  
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This is simplified in equation 4.15. 
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The phase failure combinations for phase j use the same notation as for the Esary 
and Ziehms’ method where a separate symbol (aj) is used to denote the occurrence 
of an event in each phase j. A new notation is defined, where Aj represents the 
failure of component A in any phase up to and including phase j, 
 
Aj = a1 ∨  a2 ∨  … ∨  aj 
 
and jA represents the success of component A from the start of the mission to the 
end of phase j, 
 
jj aaaA ∧∧∧= L21  
 
As the expressions for phase failure combinations represent both failure and success 
events, simplification will merge combinations of both terms. Algebraic rules are 
introduced to simplify these combinations. If i and j are two phases in a mission 
where i < j, the Boolean laws can be summarised as in equations 4.16. 
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1. jji AAA →∧  5. jji AAA →∨  
2. iji AAA →∧   6. 1→∨ ji AA  
3. 0→∧ ji AA   7.  →∨ ji AA no physical meaning 
4. iji AAA →∨  
4.16 
 
The laws presented in equations 4.16 contain an error. The sixth law represents the 
situation where component A succeeds up to and including phase i OR component A 
fails in any phase up to and including phase j. This is combined to become 1, which 
is incorrect as for this to be true, the former term would need to be the complement 
of the latter, which is not the case. The correct expression would be 1→∨ ii AA , 
which is not the same as rule 6 in equations 4.16. Inaccurate results will result if 
these simplification techniques are used uncorrected. 
 
The method becomes even more complicated when terms are combined which 
cannot be simplified, such as ji AA ∧ . This represents the event where component A 
is operational until the end of phase i, and then fails between the end of phase i and 
the end of phase j. This is not the same as Aj, which is the event that component A 
fails in any phase up to and including phase j. The probability of this combination is 
given in equation 4.17. 
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It can be seen from equation 4.17 that the probability of event ji AA ∧ is the same as 
the probability that component fails between the end of phase i and the end of phase 
j. It would be of use to find the value of this term without requiring the use of the 
component success probabilities. 
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System unreliability is found by evaluating the PFCs for all phases and is given in 
equation 4.18. 
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The unreliability at the end of each phase j can be expressed in equation 4.19. 
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At the time of phase change, the unreliability figure may jump, due to more 
stringent failure criteria in a later phase. This is referred to as a latent failure. 
 
Somani and Trivedi’s method successfully identifies the possible situations that can 
occur across a phase boundary. The Boolean laws defined in their work allow for 
added simplification of component failure and success events in a phased mission 
system, despite the noted error in the laws. All previous methods consider that a 
phase failure would result in mission failure, thus preventing the continuation of the 
mission after the phase failure event. Phase j failure could not, then, combine with 
phase j+1 success. Somani and Trivedi’s method allows the phases of a mission to 
occur in any order, allowing this situation to occur. The calculation of the system 
performance parameters involves the combination of the current phase failure 
combinations with the success combinations for all subsequent phases. This leads to 
lengthy calculations for situations where there are numerous phases or cut sets in 
each phase. 
 
Ma and Trivedi have extended this work by using a computational algorithm to find 
the mission unreliability in the form of the sum of disjoint products [34]. 
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4.2.1.5 Binary Decision Diagrams 
BDDs have previously been used to represent single-phase systems, using the 
method shown in Section 2.3. For adaptation to the multi-phased scenario, the 
dependence of a component’s failure state on its performance in all previous phases 
must be considered. This complicates the BDD technique. 
 
Zang et al [35] present a method to apply the BDD technique to multi-phase 
missions. Component behaviour in the current and all previous phases is represented 
by using a series of sub-components, as described in Section 4.2.1.1.  
 
The failure function for component c in phase j, )(tq
jc
, is the probability that 
component c fails in phase j given that it worked at the start of phase j, and is 
expressed in equation 4.20. 
 
Since all ci¸ i = 1, 2, …, j are in series, 
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The first term of equation 4.20 represents the probability that the component has 
already failed during the previous 1, …, j–1 phases. The second term represents the 
failure probability distribution of the component in phase j. 
 
As for a single-phase mission, a BDD requires that the basic events be ordered in a 
sequence before it can be constructed. Zang et al present two possible ordering 
schemes, expanding each component c into its series of sub-components in the 
following ways: 
 
• Forwards Phase-Dependent Operation (PDO): The variables are ordered in 
the same pattern as the phase order, c1, c2, …, cm. 
• Backwards PDO: The variables are ordered in the reverse of the phase order,       
cm, cm-1, …, c1. 
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The ite structure of the performance of component c in two phases i and j can be 
represented by Ei and Ej respectively, 
 
Ei = ite(ci, G1, G2) 
Ej = ite(cj, H1, H2) 
 
Logic operations between Ei and Ej can be represented by BDD manipulations as: 
 
Forwards PDO : ite(ci, G1, G2) ⊕ ite(cj, H1, H2) = ite(ci, G1 ⊕ H1, G2 ⊕ Ej) 
Backwards PDO : ite(ci, G1, G2) ⊕ ite(cj, H1, H2) = ite(ci, Ei ⊕ H1, G2 ⊕ H2) 
 
The order of events before BDD construction has a great effect on the resultant size 
of the diagram. Methods may be used for the selection of the most appropriate or 
efficient ordering sequence of variables in the BDD. Once the order has been 
selected, each component is replaced by a series of sub-components in either of the 
orders mentioned above. Generally speaking, backwards PDO results in a smaller 
BDD and common component cancellation is performed without any additional 
calculations.  
 
An algorithm is presented for construction of a BDD for a phased-mission system: 
 
1. Obtain the failure function for each variable using equation 4.20. 
2. Order the mission components using an heuristic method. 
3. Generate the BDD for each phase using logic equations. 
4. Use phase algebra and the backwards PDO to combine each phase BDD 
using OR logic to obtain a mission BDD. 
5. Calculate the unreliability of the PMS from the mission BDD. 
 
In a backwards PDO BDD, the ‘0’ branches (non-occurrence of the basic events) 
always link two variables that belong to different components. The ‘1’ branches 
(basic event occurrence) can connect either variables of the same component, or 
those of different components. 
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Considering a BDD for function G, 
 
G = ite(cj, G1, G2) = 21 GcGc jj ⋅+⋅  
 
Since the ‘0’ branch always links events of different components, G2 cannot 
represent any event of component c. It follows that cj and G2 are always statistically 
independent events, and so, 
 
P( jc ⋅ G2 = 1) = P(cj = 1) ⋅ P(G2 = 1) 
 
If a ‘1’ branch links nodes from different components, G1 also cannot represent any 
event of c, and the same method can be applied as for a single-phase system shown 
in equation 4.21. 
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For a ‘1’ branch linking nodes belonging to the same component, G1 will be 
dependent on a variable of c. Due to lack of independence between the two node 
events, the following structures apply: 
 
G = ite(cj, G1, G2) = 21 GcGc jj ⋅+⋅  
G1 = ite(ci, H1, H2) = 21 HcHc ii ⋅+⋅  
Also, 
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Using the rules of phase algebra in equations 4.16, a branch linking two nodes 
belonging to the same component is given in equation 4.22. 
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Depending on whether the ‘1’ branch links events of different or the same 
components, equations 4.21 or 4.22 would apply respectively. 
 
As failures are possible at phase transition time, the unreliability may jump at this 
instant. Phase BDDs can be used to find the system unreliability just before and just 
after this time so that the size of the ‘jump’ may be calculated. 
 
Xing and Dugan [36, 37] noted the limitations of the approach given by Zang et al. 
The developed PDO will only generate the correct phased mission BDD if the 
following rules are adhered to: 
 
1. Orderings implemented in the generation of each phase BDD must be 
consistent or the same for all phases. 
2. Variables belonging to the same component in different phases must stay 
together in the ordering scheme. This is achieved by expanding each 
component into sub-component form after the ordering of components has 
been defined using heuristics. 
 
If any random ordering scheme is used, the PDO is not complete enough to combine 
the single phase BDDs into an equivalent mission BDD. However, a BDD with 
backwards PDO may represent an impossible scenario, such as the success of an 
event in a later phase ordered before the failure of that event in an earlier phase. An 
example of this is shown in Figure 4.6. 
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Figure 4.6 – BDD Using Backwards PDO Pattern 
 
If A is working in phase 2, it cannot have failed in phase 1. If impossibilities such as 
these are shown by the BDD, they can be removed. The incoming branch to each 
impossible node is instead passed to the node on its right ‘0’ branch, as for any 
component to work in a later phase, it must have worked through earlier phases. 
Nodes below the left son are removed. Thus Figure 4.6 becomes as shown in Figure 
4.7. 
 
 
Figure 4.7 – BDD as in Figure 4.6 but with Impossible Nodes Removed 
 
Similarly, with the forwards PDO, another method must be applied to remove 
impossible nodes. Once all impossible node combinations are removed, any 
ordering scheme may be used to find the final phased mission BDD. 
 
The method presented by Zang et al reveals a very simple, efficient way of 
representing the failure logic of a phased mission, despite the limitations identified 
by Xing and Dugan. However, each phase j BDD is only constructed from the 
A2
B21 
1 0
A2
B21 
A11
1 0
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failure logic for phase j, which discounts the potential outcomes of previous phases 
and so the phase BDDs will be incorrect. 
 
Dunnett and Andrews [38] outline a method which allows the formation of a full 
mission BDD from each of the phase BDDs. The phase BDDs are found by 
converting phase fault trees to BDD form. If a component operates successfully 
through a phase, it is possible for it to then go on to fail in a subsequent phase. The 
construction of the mission BDD therefore considers each phase in turn, with all 
BDD paths which end in a terminal ‘0’ vertex being connected to the top node for 
the next phase BDD. Each path which ends in system failure is marked to indicate 
the first phase which would be failed by that combination of component failures. 
The initial overall mission BDD is thus very large, but rules are provided for its 
reduction, by removing paths which represent impossible component conditions 
such as failing more than once or working in a phase following a failure. 
 
The BDD method has also been applied [39-41] to scenarios where several different 
platforms, some of which may be unmanned, execute individual missions which 
contribute towards the completion of an overall objective. The completion of the 
mission objective may require the platforms to perform different phases 
simultaneously, or to finish or commence certain tasks at the same time. In order to 
allow the completion of these goals, accurate and fast information is needed on the 
state of components at the current point in time, both before and during a mission 
(diagnostics), and the likelihood of mission success based on this information 
(prognostics). The research uses BDDs as a way of quickly finding reliability 
parameters in order to make judgements on whether the overall mission should be 
abandoned, amended or substituted for a alternate objective. 
4.2.1.6 Non-Coherent Fault Trees 
The methods provided so far allow calculation of mission reliability parameters, but 
do not allow the system failure probability for each phase to be found. La Band and 
Andrews [42] established a method of finding these values using a fault-tree 
approach. Their approach continues the fault tree convention of the event of a 
component failing in phase i being that where the component could have failed in 
any phase from 1 to i. System failure in phase i is represented as the AND 
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combination of the system successfully completing phases 1 to i-1 and failing in 
phase i. This can be shown in fault tree form as in Figure 4.8. 
 
 
Figure 4.8 – Generalised Phase Failure Fault Tree 
 
If the phase failure probabilities, Qi, i = 1,...,n are found, the mission unreliability, 
QMISS, is found by their sum: 
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For every phase other than the initial one, its fault tree as shown in Figure 4.8 will 
be non-coherent, due to the inclusion of a NOT gate. This gate is used in 
representing the ways in which the previous phases will have survived. The 
combinations of basic events which lead to top event occurrence are referred to not 
as cut sets but as prime implicants. In order to find qualitatively the ways in which 
the system could fail in phase i, the top event failure must be expressed in terms of 
the prime implicants. Section 4.2.1.4 established notation for the success or failure 
of a component, which is extended by La Band and Andrews to include the event 
where a component A fails at some point from the start of phase i to the end of 
phase j, Aij. The probability of this event can be found by integrating the 
component’s failure time probability density function, fA(t), as in equation 4.24. 
G1 Failure 
conditions met 
during phase i
Failure during 
phase i 
Phase i fault tree with 
each basic event 
replaced by an OR 
combination of 
component failure in any 
previous phase or the 
current phase 
Failure in 
phase 1 
Failure in 
phase i-1
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This notation allows the algebraic laws in equations 4.16 to be updated and 
extended as in equations 4.25, where i < j. 
 
1. Ai ∧ Ai = Ai  
2. Ai ∧ Aj = 0   
3. Ai ∧ Aij = Ai 
4. 0=∧ ii AA  
5. jiiji AAA ,1+=∧  
6. ijjii AAAA =∧∧∧ + ...1  
7. Ai ∨ Ai+1 ∨ ... ∨ Aj = Aij 
4.25 
 
The prime implicants occurrence probabilities are combined in an inclusion-
exclusion expansion as in equation 2.3. This method allows phase reliabilities to be 
found in terms of the prime implicants which cause phase failure. This is useful for 
the analysis of phase risk, where consequences of phase failure must be taken into 
account (consider the difference in consequence between a plane failing while 
grounded or while in the air). However, although ways of reducing the resulting 
fault trees are also provided, the inclusion of previous phase success in each phase 
fault tree can very quickly lead to a large fault tree for each subsequent phase or 
extra component. If this is then used with an inclusion-exclusion expansion, the 
calculation for phase unreliability may require a great deal of computer power. 
Because of this, the authors present methods for converting the phase fault trees to 
binary decision diagrams. Each phase fault tree is converted to a BDD, using the 
standard ite method explained in section 4.2.1.5. The prime implicants are found 
from each disjoint path which leads to a ‘1’ node, and these are simplified using the 
techniques in equations 4.25. This makes the procedure much more efficient. 
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4.2.1.7 Importance Measures 
Importance measures, as previously explained in section 2.2.3.2, are a way of 
expressing the contribution of a specific component to the system failure. If the 
failure of a particular component is found to highly contribute to system failure, this 
allows resources to be concentrated on improving the reliability performance of that 
component. Andrews [43] extends the concept to find importance measures for 
components in systems which undergo phased missions.  
 
Birnbaum’s measure of importance, also known as the criticality function, considers 
the probability of the system being in a state such that it is critical for a given 
component. This function is also applied to phases, with a critical state for 
component i in phase j being defined as “a state of the remaining components 
through the previous and current phases such that the system is working in phase j 
and the failure of component i will then cause phase (and mission) failure”. The 
conditions for this to be true are that all phases prior to j must have successfully 
completed, and component i must be working at the start of phase j. 
 
A tabular approach is used to demonstrate the philosophy of the method, but this is 
impractical for large systems or missions. A faster method of calculating the phase 
criticality function, based on the phase failure likelihood function, is given in 
equation 4.26. 
 
ji
j
ji q
Q
G
∂
∂
=,  
4.26 
 
While the phase criticality function is useful in qualifying and quantifying the 
probability of the system being critical for a given component, a drawback of it is 
that, for each component, the function does not depend on its own failure 
probability. As such, other importance measures exist which consider the 
component’s failure probability in conjunction with the criticality function. 
 
A system failure occurs when it is in a critical state for a component and that 
component subsequently fails. If the probability of this is divided by the system 
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failure probability, the result is the proportion of times the component failure will 
cause system failure. This is a useful expression of component i’s contribution to 
system failure. There are two ways in which the criticality and subsequent phase 
failure can occur: 
 
1. The system can be in a critical state for a component i in phase j and 
component i then fails during the phase causing phase failure (Phase 
Importance). 
2. The failure conditions for phase j exist prior to that phase beginning, and 
phase failure occurs on transition to phase j (Transition Importance). 
 
For transition failure to occur, the system must be in a critical state for component i 
in a phase prior to phase j, with i also failing prior to phase j. Andrews then defines 
two measures of component importance: 
 
• Phase Component Importance for component i in phase j is the probability 
of the system being critical for component i in phase j, and the component 
then fails in that phase (equation 4.27): 
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• Phase Transition Importance for component i in phase j is the probability of 
the phase failing as it starts, due to the failure of component i. Qj is the 
probability of failure in phase j. It accounts for the probability of either 
failing during the phase or on transition into the phase. Thus, to find the 
probability of failure on phase transition, the logic equations for this must 
remove any of the failure events which occur in phase j. Thus, the causes of 
phase j failure must occur in phases 1 to j-1, without any of the earlier 
phases having failed. 
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The phase criticality function for phase j transition failure due to component i in a 
phase k prior to j, T kjiG ,,  is shown in equation 4.28. 
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The phase transition importance measure is the proportion of system failures which 
are caused by entry to that phase, as shown in equation 4.29. 
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The total importance contribution of component i to failure in phase j is the sum of 
the phase and transition importance measures, as shown in equation 4.30. 
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A measure of the total contribution of the failure of component i to failure of the 
whole mission is therefore as shown in equation . 
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This method is extended by Andrews in another paper [44] with the use of Ternary 
Decision Diagrams (TDDs, an extension of BDDs) to allow fast calculation of 
Birnbaum’s phase and transition criticality measures. 
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4.2.1.8 Markov Methods 
It is not necessary to use combinatorial approaches such as Fault Tree methods in 
order to solve multi-phased missions. Instead, Markov methods may be used either 
by solving for each phase individually, or by analysing the entire mission in a single 
model. The former approach requires each phase Markov model to be solved 
independently, and linked to that of the next phase through a state probability 
vector. Dugan [45] considered the latter method, presenting a method of 
constructing a single continuous-time discrete-space Markov model for phased-
mission systems, with a state space equal to the size of the union of the components 
in each phase model. Phase fault trees are used in its construction. 
 
Continuing the example shown in Figure 4.2, a Markov model may be constructed, 
assuming the following: 
 
• Failure rates for the components are constant for the duration of the phase, 
but can be different for each phase. 
• The system fails due to failure in any phase of the mission. 
• Phase change times are deterministic. 
 
If the set of components is not consistent throughout the phases, or if a component 
cannot fail in a given phase, the Markov model generation will encounter problems, 
as the system states will not match. The phase fault trees in Figure 4.5 can be 
converted to Markov chains for further analysis, with system states showing the 
states of components A, B and C in the form {A B C} with 0 as working and 1 as 
failed, as shown in Figure 4.9.  
 
The combination of these three Markov models into a single model requires the use 
of a multiplicative factor, Φi, which is appended to each phase i transition. 
Transitions are thus defined by the sum of corresponding phase transitions, as 
shown in Figure 4.10. 
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Figure 4.9 – Phase Markov Models for Figure 4.2 
 
 
Figure 4.10 – Combined Mission Markov Model 
 
Standard numerical techniques can be employed to solve the combined model in 
Figure 4.10. For solutions to phase i (ti-1 ≤ t ≤ ti), Φi = 1, while Φj = 0, i ≠ j. This 
removes any transition not belonging in the current phase. The state space does not 
change – only the state transitions vary from phase to phase. 
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If the components used differ from phase to phase, the model can still be formed by 
creating a full Markov state listing. This is an expansion of all components which 
have some contribution at any point of the mission. It is possible for a system state 
in a particular phase to be a failed state, and for this not to be true in the earlier 
phases. If, however, a failure state is reached in any given phase, it becomes 
absorbing for all future phases. The system states can be defined as “operational for 
all phases” or “failed in phase i”, where i is the first phase in which the system fails. 
 
The combined Markov model gives a set of differential equations, for which a 
numerical solution method such as Runge-Kutta must be used [45]. The initial 
conditions for the first phase are known, while the failure probability for each phase 
is found by using the Markov state probabilities at the end of the previous phase. 
The final phase state probability vector is passed directly to the following phase for 
further analysis. 
 
The state space of the combined model is defined by the total number of 
components in use at any point of the mission. Due to this, a multi-phased system 
using a high number of components will cause a very large Markov model to be 
created, and will increase the number of differential equations that require solving. 
This potential inefficiency for large systems is a drawback to the Markov method.  
 
4.2.2 Repairable Systems 
 
All of the methods reviewed thus far have been applicable only to non-repairable 
systems. While repairs are typically unfeasible on a spacecraft or an in-flight 
aircraft, an analysis where repairs are frequently made would be useful. There are, 
however, situations where intra-mission repairs are possible, and so it is necessary 
to understand the associated reliabilities of these systems. The following sections 
review the published methods of analysing repairable multi-phased missions. 
4.2.2.1 Combinatorial Approaches 
Somani extended his earlier work with Trivedi [33] by applying a combinatorial 
method to the situation of repairable multi-phased missions [46]. His approach 
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considers the probability that a component is failed or working at the start of a 
phase, and the probability that it has changed state (by failing or being repaired 
during that phase). By evaluating these, it is possible to calculate the probability that 
a component is in either state after time t. However, his method is restricted by the 
condition that only components which are not active in the phase being analysed 
may be repaired. 
 
Vaurio [47] put forward a method of approximating the unavailability and failure 
intensity for each phase of the mission. These values for each component c at the 
start of the mission are obtained by using Laplace transforms, and are then used to 
calculate phase unavailability and failure intensity, as well as the expected number 
of mission failures. However, his method does not model the dependencies that 
arise in repairable systems, while the values for phase unavailability and failure 
intensity are only approximations of the exact values. Also, the phase calculations 
do not consider the outcome of previous phases. 
 
Combinatorial methods, therefore, have not so far been able to allow a satisfactory 
solution to finding mission reliability for a repairable multi-phased system. Other 
approaches must be considered instead. 
4.2.2.2 Markov Methods 
As Markov methods allow a consideration of the repeated change of state that a 
component’s repairability produces, they are more tuned to the solution of 
repairable multi-phased systems than combinatorial methods. Much research has 
been undertaken in this area using Markov approaches. 
4.2.2.2.1 Homogeneous Markov Model 
For a Markov model to be homogeneous, the state transitions must not be dependent 
on time, being governed instead by a constant rate. Other assumptions are: 
 
• The system comprises elements which may be working or failed with 
independently, exponentially distributed failure and repair times. 
• Repair of a component makes it as new, i.e. perfect condition. 
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• The purpose of a phase is not considered, and so each phase may have more 
than one. The only criterion for mission failure is failure of the system in any 
phase. 
• Phase change is instantaneous. 
 
Clarotti et al [48] were among the first to investigate the applications of Markov 
methods to repairable phased missions. 
 
Continuing the example in Figure 4.2, there are eight possible states of the system, 
based on the two states of each of the three components, as Table 4.1 shows. 
 
Table 4.1 – System States of Component Combinations 
State A B C 
S1 0 0 0 
S2 1 0 0 
S3 0 1 0 
S4 1 1 0 
S5 0 0 1 
S6 1 0 1 
S7 0 1 1 
S8 1 1 1 
 where  0 = working 
 1 = failed 
 
Considering each of the three phases, 
 
Phase 1 (0,t1) 
 
The probability vector expresses the probability of the system being in any of the 
eight possible states. The mission begins with the assumption that each component 
is in the working state, which results in an initial condition probability vector, P(0), 
as shown in equation 4.32. 
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Phase 1 success requires A and either of B and C to be working. Therefore, from 
Table 4.1, the states which will cause phase failure are states S2, S4, S6, S7 and S8. 
The matrix form as defined in equation 2.16, the progression of phase 1 can be 
represented by the matrix equation 4.33. 
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where  0 represents an impossible state transition 
 – represents an absorbing state (no transition is possible out of the state) 
 Σi is the sum of the non-diagonal entries in row i. 
 
At phase change time t1, the system must be in a state which fails neither phase 1 
nor phase 2. For success in phase 2, the system must not have all three components 
failed. Thus, states S1, S3 or S5, as shown in Table 4.1, are required. The probability 
of the system residing in each of these states at time t = t1 is represented by )( 11 tPS , 
)( 13 tPS  and )( 15 tPS  respectively. The sum of these probabilities gives the 
probability of completing phase 1 and successfully entering phase 2, as shown in 
equation 4.34. 
 
)()()()( 1111 531 tPtPtPtR SSS ++=  
4.34 
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Phase 2 (t1,t2) 
 
Phase 2 can only start if the system is in states S1, S3 and S5, and will progress to 
other states from these. The vector of initial phase 2 system state probabilities has 
all entries equal to zero except those corresponding to working states for phase 1 
and phase 2, as shown in equation 4.35. 
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The matrix equations for solution of phase 2 are given in equation 4.36. 
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After the phase change time, any state other than S8 is allowable, due to the failure 
logic in phase 2 (see Figure 4.2), where no components are working. Therefore, as 
long as any one component is operational, the system will not fail. Once the time for 
transition from phase 2 to phase 3 is reached, however, the system must occupy a 
state where it is working in both of the phases. For this to be true, the system must 
be in state S1, with all components working, at time t = t2. The probability of this is 
given in equation 4.37. 
 
)()( 22 1 tPtR S=  
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Phase 3 (t2,t3) 
 
For the mission to complete successfully, the system must remain in state S1 for the 
entire length of phase 3. The initial phase 3 probability vector is given in equation 
4.38. 
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The matrix equation for the solution of phase 3 is given in equation 4.39. 
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The success probability of the mission is the probability that it does not enter any of 
the absorbing states (states S2 to S8) and is in S1 at the end of the mission (t = t3). 
This is shown in equation 4.40. 
 
)( 31 tPR SMISS =  
4.40 
 
The method identifies the need to find the initial conditions for each phase. Gray 
[49] also identifies this requirement, and uses parallel subgroups with identical 
components to solve it. The deficiency of the Clarotti et al method is that every 
phase uses the same state space to represent the system. Some missions will have 
phases where success does not depend on the performance of some components, or 
where a high number of components is used. This will result in a very large and 
complex Markov model which will be difficult and expensive to solve. Also, the 
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Clarotti et al method considers phase reliabilities to be found which include a 
successful transition at the end of the phase. This does not give true phase 
reliabilities, however, as the successful transition out of a phase does not affect its 
reliability; as long as the system has remained in a successful state for that phase 
alone, the phase will be successful. Failure upon transition to the next phase should 
be considered by that phase’s reliability. 
Random Phase Durations 
The methods presented thus far have had an assumption that each phase has a 
deterministic length which is defined at the start of the mission. However, this is not 
necessarily realistic, as some missions, such as those of a military aircraft, will have 
phase lengths prone to variation depending on the circumstances of the flight. Wells 
and Bryant [50] first considered this, but in application to a single-phase system.  
 
Alam and Al-Saggaf [51] described two approaches to satisfactorily describe the 
marginal distributions of the mission phase change times (MPCTs) when the phase 
change times are random variables. The first is a general formula for the joint 
probability density function of the MPCTs, while the second models the MPCTs as 
order statistics of a continuous random variable. The solution is found similarly to 
the method by Clarotti et al, using the expected probability values of being in each 
phase. Kim and Park [52] developed this idea by using the system eigenvalues to 
solve the differential equations created by the Markov model. 
 
Somani et al [53] also consider random phase durations using Markov models. 
Their method investigates the change in system failure criteria between phase 
Markov models. The system states in the model for phase i is mapped to that for 
phase i+1, using computer software (Hybrid Automated Reliability Predictor, or 
HARP) to perform this if there are problems. Examples of these are a state not 
having an equivalent in the following phase, or several states sharing an equivalent 
state in the next phase. 
State Dependent Phase Sequences 
A possible mission profile is one where each phase has a pre-determined length, but 
the order of them is subject to the system state at the time of switching. Mura and 
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Bondavalli [54] present a method which analyses a phased mission system on two 
levels. The higher level method models the mission structure with regard to the 
phases, while the lower level models the state of the system in the phases.  
 
Components within the system can undergo different failure and repair rates in 
different phases, as long as they remain constant within each phase. This satisfies 
the requirement for homogeneousness within phases. The phase order can be 
changed mid-mission, depending on the state of the system at the end of a phase. An 
example system is presented of a spacecraft mission: 
 
Launch (L): Launch of spacecraft. Short, stressful phase. 
Hibernation (H): Large periods of dormant behaviour, with 
minimal activity, for cruise navigation. 
Planet (P): Landing of spacecraft on planet. Short, 
stressful phase. 
Scientific Observations (SO): Performed in proximity to stellar objects. 
Main goal of mission. 
 
Figure 4.11 shows the higher-level model of the spacecraft mission. While the 
failure of any active phase will cause mission failure, this model ignores this and 
shows merely the possible phase sequences.  
 
Each phase of the mission relies on a given number of computer processors in order 
to operate properly. If this number of processors is not available, the phase will fail. 
The numbers are: 
 
Phase No. Processors Required 
Hibernation 
Launch 
Planet 


nsObservatio Perform
Cruise
nsObservatio Scientific
1 
3 
3 
3 
1 
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Figure 4.11 – Higher-level Model of a Spacecraft Mission 
 
Four processors are provided for the completion of the mission. Phase SO2 is the 
main objective of the mission, and therefore its performance is essential. SO1 is a 
secondary goal, to be performed if possible. The choice of whether it is performed 
or not rests on whether, at the end of H2, any processors are faulty. If this is true, 
SO1 is skipped and a second successive hibernation phase (H4) is entered. If the 
system has no faults, SO1 is carried out as normal. The phase carried out after H2 is 
therefore state dependent. Reward rates can be applied to phases, to indicate the 
benefits of carrying it out. 
 
The lower level models can be represented by generalised stochastic Petri nets (for 
an explanation of these, see section 4.3). These Petri nets can be translated into a 
continuous time Markov model, which indicates the number of working (#W), spare 
(#S) and failed (#F) processors in the form {#W, #S, #F}. {F} is the absorbing 
failure state. In the SO phases, all components are required, and so the states are 
represented by {#W, #F}. 
 
A separate phase transition model is presented which maps the final state 
probabilities of one phase to the initial state probabilities of the next phase. Where 
no choice is possible, such as when phase H1 makes a transition to phase P, a 
deterministic model is applied. The phase transition model for this change is shown 
in Figure 4.12, where c represents the probability of successful reconfiguration of 
the system ready for the new phase. The Figure shows the mapping only between 
the non-failure states. 
L 
H1
P 
H2
SO1
H3 
SO
2 
H4
SO2 
 
SUCCESS
pL,H1 
pH1,P 
pP,H2
pH2,H
pH2,SO1
pSO1,H3 
pH3,SO2 
pSO2,S 
pSO2,S pH4,SO2 
where pS1,S2 is the probability of executing state S2 after state S1. 
1 
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Figure 4.12 – Deterministic Phase Transition Model from H1 to P 
 
Because phase P requires three processors to operate, the successful transition from 
H1 to P will only be true if the number of working and spare processors is at least 
equal to this number. The deterministic model shown can be represented by a phase 
transition matrix, with the number of rows equalling the number of operational 
states in the exiting phase, and the number of columns being the number of 
operational states in the entering phase. The elements of the matrix equal the 
probability of switching from one state in the starting phase to another in the 
subsequent phase. 
 
If the phase transition is not deterministic, and there are state dependencies between 
the phases, a probabilistic phase transition model represents the possible system 
states at the end of the switching phase, as shown in Figure 4.13. 
 
 
Figure 4.13 – Probabilistic Phase Transition Model from H2 to SO1 or H4 
 
2,2,0 2,1,1 2,0,2 1,0,3 F 
3,1,0 3,0,1 F SO1 
H2 
c 
2,1,1
2,0,2
2,2,0
1,0,3 
F 
11
1
1-c
H4 
2,2,0 2,1,1 2,0,2 1,0,3 F 
3,1,0 3,0,1 F P
H1 
c 
c
(1-c)c 
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The probabilistic state transition matrix is generated as above, except that the 
number of columns equals the total number of possible states in all possible entering 
phases.  
 
The lower level models are solved in the order in which their corresponding phase 
appears in the higher-level model. The initial phase state probability vector can be 
found by applying the appropriate transition matrix to the state probabilities at the 
end of the finishing phase. Solving the higher-level model then allows calculation of 
reliability parameters. Mura et al discuss further methods of solutions to this 
problem using deterministic and stochastic Petri nets [55].  
4.2.2.2.2 Non-Markovian Models 
The standard Markov method presented thus far requires each phase to be 
considered individually, so that a state probability vector at the time of phase 
change can be calculated. A linear transformation of this vector then creates the 
initial condition for the subsequent phase. This process works through each of the 
phases in the mission until the state probability vector for the last phase is found, 
which represents the mission reliability estimate. A limit of this approach is that the 
phases are assumed to instantaneously change at specific times, with the condition 
that the system must be operational in both the exiting and the entering phases. This 
model cannot represent the amount of work performed or the importance of certain 
tasks compared to others in a typical mission. 
 
If the transition matrix [A] as shown in equation 2.16 contains globally time-
dependent coefficients, the model is known as non-Markovian. If these rates are 
constant, the model is homogeneous. Smotherman and Zemoudeh [56] identified 
problems with the homogeneous method. Firstly, phase changes and their timing are 
dependent only upon the current phase, and not the state of the system. A feasible 
scenario is one where the system has deteriorated, but not failed, such that it takes 
longer to complete a given phase than a fully functional system would. Another 
issue is that the number of phases with a random time duration is limited, or 
requires the computation of order statistic integrals. Also, failure and repair rates 
must be constant within a phase. This, therefore, ignores the burn-in and wear out 
stages of a component life, as shown in Figure 1.2. 
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They present a generalised method of finding system reliability performance 
parameters using a continuous time finite-state Markov process. Phase change times 
are remodelled as non-overlapping uniform distributions ordered in the same way as 
the phases. Failure and repair rates are assumed to be globally time-dependent. 
Transitions in the model represent phase changes as well as component failures and 
repairs. Thus, arbitrary distributions of phase change times can be expressed in 
hazard rate form as time-varying transition rates. The model is solved numerically, 
using a fifth-order Runge-Kutta method with the non-Markovian matrix set of 
differential equations. This is extended for time-dependent transition rates, and 
includes information on each type of phase change: exiting state, entry state(s) and 
the branching possibility for multiple entry states. If a phase changes at a fixed-time, 
the probabilities are transferred instantaneously from the exiting state to the entry 
state(s). 
 
Smotherman and Geist [57] introduce the idea of reward rates which model the 
effectiveness of the system in particular states. This is applied to a single non-
Markovian mission model, and can be used in situations where component failures 
are not exponentially distributed. 
 
If { }0|)( ≥ttX  is a finite state stochastic process with the state probabilities 
[ ]itXPtP
iS
== )()( , the set of state differential equations can be expressed by 
equation 4.41. 
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The matrix form of this is similar to equation 2.16, with the difference that the 
transition matrix is time dependent, [A(t)]. The possible system states for each 
phase are given as a subset of the overall set of states in the single model. Phase 
changes are time-variant and state dependent, with non-instantaneous phase changes 
being modelled by the inclusion of an intermediate state. Thus, missions with more 
than one objective and phase change durations greater than zero can be represented. 
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In the reward model, each system state, Si has a weight, called a reward rate, )(tR
iS
, 
which expresses the “reward” for being in that state for a given length of time. The 
accumulated reward, Y(t) is calculated instantaneously. The vector of system state 
reward rates, R(t), is defined as in equation 4.42. 
 
R(t) [ ]TSSS tRtRtR SN )(,),(),( 21 K=  
4.42 
 
The instantaneous reward rate of the system at time t is given by P(t)·R(t). The 
expected value of Y(t) is given as in equation 4.43. 
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This type of information may give details such as the expected time in a given 
subset of states. This allows it to be used to calculate parameters such as expected 
time on duty or expected time under repair. 
 
A disadvantage of this type of non-Markovian model is the requirement for it to be 
solved numerically. A standard initial-value solution algorithm may perform this, 
but the transition matrix must be re-evaluated at each time step, as the transition 
rates vary with time. If a particular transition rate approaches a discontinuity, the 
time steps must become smaller and smaller, and so the problem takes much more 
computing time to solve. Because the model accounts for every state in every phase, 
the state space is potentially very large, and so the flexibility of the model is 
counteracted by the increase in computational power required to solve it. 
 
Smotherman and Geist provide a worked and quantified example to explain the 
method further. 
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4.2.3 Summary 
 
Various methods for analysing systems which undergo phased missions have been 
presented. The methods are split into those which consider repairable or non-
repairable systems. Whatever the type of system being analysed, the main parameter 
of interest is that of mission reliability, or the likelihood of mission success. This is 
equal to the probability that no phases within the mission fail. 
 
The bulk of the literature detailing analysis methods for non-repairable systems has 
focused on combinatorial methods. The original analysis method was concerned 
with the formation of a single mission fault tree from those of each of the phases. 
Basic events were broken down into sub-events representing the failure of the 
component in each phase. Thus, existing fault tree techniques can be employed to 
solve the single mission model. This method can yield very large mission fault trees 
if the number of components or phases increases by only a small amount, and so the 
computation of the reliability parameters may be expensive. Approximation and 
reduction techniques have therefore been researched and presented, in order to make 
the analysis easier to compute. Boolean algebra phase laws can be employed to 
simplify expressions for phase and mission failure, combining component success 
and failure throughout multiple phases. 
 
Binary Decision Diagrams have been employed to speed up the process of 
evaluating the mission’s reliability performance. Parameters other than mission 
reliability, such as importance measures for each component’s contribution to the 
failure of the mission, or the expected number of mission failures in a given time 
interval, can be calculated. Markov methods have been employed with non-
repairable systems to a small degree. 
 
For repairable systems, the bulk of the research has focused on state-space 
approaches such as Markov methods, with combinatorial approaches typically being 
unable to account for the dependencies that arise with repairable systems. State-
space methods such as Markov consider each phase to have a set of states relating to 
the operation or failure of each of the components in the system. Homogeneous 
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Markov methods consider that the transitions between these states are constant with 
respect to time. Homogeneous Markov methods express the set of transitions from 
state to state in the form of a matrix. The probabilities of being in any state, some of 
which will represent phase and mission failure, is calculated. The state probabilities 
at the end of one phase become the initial conditions for the next phase. By 
considering each phase in turn, the state probability vector for the final phase gives 
the mission success probability. 
 
Further developments, such as state-dependent phase sequences, or the 
consideration that phases may have random durations, have been considered. Non-
Markovian methods, which do not require each state change to have a constant rate, 
have been employed. Their increased flexibility in analysis is countered by the 
requirement to solve them numerically. 
 
4.3 Petri Nets 
 
4.3.1 Introduction 
 
Petri nets (PNs) were first created in 1962 by Carl Adam Petri [58]. Since that time, 
many people have researched extensions and adaptations to the original technique, 
often for application to their specific area of concern. The most important 
developments, such as the addition of timed elements, and a form of NOT logic, are 
explained within this chapter. 
 
Since around 1987 the Petri net has been adapted to analyse system reliability. The 
versatility of PNs allows a PN reliability model to incorporate fault trees, event 
trees, Markov models and other system representations. Scenarios capable of being 
modelled by PNs include phased missions, various maintenance policies, MFOPs, 
fleets performing various missions, and non-exponential component failure time 
distributions. Prof. Petri himself feels that reliability modelling is an excellent 
application of PNs [59]. 
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This part of this chapter aims to review the development of Petri nets from their 
initial conception to the status quo, and their application to the field of reliability 
analysis. 
 
4.3.2 Formal Definition 
 
This formal definition of a Petri net is taken from Schneeweiss [60]: 
 
A Petri net, GPN, is a bipartite digraph with markings of nodes and edges as 
shown in equation 4.44: 
 
 ( ) )()(   ,,),0(;,, pttptpPN VVVVEWDMEVVG ×∪×⊆=   
4.44 
 
where  M(0) is the initial marking vector of the set Vp of places,  
 
The components of M and W are integers and those of D are non-negative real 
numbers. Thus, a PN is an ordered 6-tuple of two sets of nodes (Vp and Vt), edges 
(which are ordered pairs of nodes), vector integers (M and W) and a random non-
negative real vector (D). 
 
4.3.3 Basics of Petri nets 
 
Two sources offering explanations of the basic operation of Petri nets are 
Schneeweiss [60] and Bobbio [61].  
4.3.3.1 Original Petri net Concept 
The original 1962 Petri net concept is a directed bipartite graph with two distinct 
types of node: places, drawn as circles, and transitions, shown as bars. These nodes 
are connected to one another by directed edges or arcs. These arcs are usually 
considered to be input arcs if they go from a place to a transition, and an output arc 
if they are directed the other way, although this convention is not universal.  
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Places contain marks or tokens, shown graphically as bullet points, which represent 
the dynamic aspect of the net: the marking (the position of all tokens throughout the 
entire PN) at any point shows the current state of the system being modelled. This 
marking changes when any transition switches. This switching can only take place 
when the transition is enabled. This process is shown in Figure 4.14. 
 
 
Figure 4.14 – Enabled Transition Firing 
 
As Figure 4.14 shows, a transition (the bar in the middle of the net) is enabled when 
each of the places (circles) which input to the transition contain one or more tokens. 
More specifically, there must be a token available for each arc having an input to 
the transition. Once the transition is enabled, it fires, taking one token from each 
input place and depositing one token in each place with an arc leading away from 
the transition. The marking of the net has thus been altered: the system state 
represented by the first marking has now changed to the one shown by the second. 
4.3.3.2 Timed Petri nets 
The limited applicability of the original Petri net model, where each transition fired 
the instant it was enabled, led to the incorporation of temporal modelling. Various 
proposals were consequently put forward to model transient system behaviour [62]: 
 
• In Ramchandani’s doctoral thesis [63], it was proposed that each transition 
have a delay associated with it. This became the accepted practice. 
• Merlin [64] and Berthomieu & Menasche [65] suggested using two values, 
minimum and maximum times, to define a range of delays for each 
transition. 
• Sifakis [66] suggested associating the delays with places. Coolahan and 
Roussopoulos [67] used a similar approach. This does not increase the 
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modelling power over Ramchandani’s approach, but does retain the 
immediate firing feature of the ‘standard’ PN model. 
• Razouk [68] proposed using firing and enabling times – in his model, tokens 
are “absorbed” by the transition after a given enabling time has passed, and 
tokens are not output until the firing time has elapsed. 
 
The time associated with delaying transitions can be either deterministic or 
stochastic. If a PN is required to model processes that have a random (or pseudo-
random) nature to them, and this randomness follows a certain pattern such as a 
statistical distribution, the transitions can sample their switching times from this 
distribution. Stochastic Petri nets (SPN) were created [69, 70], where the firing 
times for each transition follows the negative exponential distribution. Ajmone-
Marsan et al [71] put forward Generalised Stochastic Petri nets (GSPN) which also 
allow transitions to have zero firing time (they fire as soon as they are enabled), 
thereby reincorporating the original ‘standard’ Petri net into the more developed 
technique. Investigations into applying other distributions to the transitions’ 
switching times are fewer in number than those using only exponential times [72]. 
 
Graphically, while an immediate transition is shown as a single, thick line as Figure 
4.14 shows, a timed transition is typically shown as a hollow rectangle – see Figure 
4.15. 
 
 
Figure 4.15 – Timed Transitions and Arc Multiplicities 
 
In Figure 4.15, t is the time delay associated with the transition. The Figure shows 
the transition to be enabled, but only after t units of time have passed will the 
transition fire. 
 
2 
4 
3
t tAfter 
time t
2
4
3
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It is conceivable that situations may arise which cause a conflict. Examples of these 
include: 
 
• If two or more transitions are enabled from a common place, then the one 
with the earlier time delay will switch first. If the input place’s token is 
taken, the other transition will be disabled. 
• If two transitions sharing a common input place are immediate or share the 
same switching time, both will try to take the place’s token at the same time. 
If this occurs, there are several options to resolve the situation: 
o Transitions are given a certain level of preference as to which takes it 
(say, transition A has a 60% chance of taking it, while B has a 40% 
chance) 
o The preference could be based on the number of tokens in the input 
place(s) for the transitions 
o One transition automatically overrides the other. 
• If a transition is disabled while waiting for its switching time to pass, there is 
often a choice as to how this time is affected upon re-enabling [73]: 
o The time can be renewed from the previous enabling 
o A completely new time could be generated 
o The old time could be regenerated 
 
Different transitions may use different resolutions to these problems within the same 
Petri net. 
4.3.3.3 Arc Multiplicities 
A widely accepted extension to the standard PN is having more than one arc 
between a place and a transition. Each place has to have a token for each arc before 
the transition would be enabled [62]. It is more normal now for the arcs to be 
contracted into one, with the single arc crossed and a number written next to it 
which indicates the multiplicity or weight of the arc; that is, either how many tokens 
are needed on that arc before a transition will be enabled; or how many tokens will 
be put in an output place [74]. Note that if no multiplicity is explicitly shown, it is 
always assumed to be 1.  
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Figure 4.15 shows the effect that arc multiplicities have on the transfer of tokens. In 
the Figure initially, the three places which input to the transition have, from the top 
down, two, one and five tokens respectively, while the places to which the transition 
outputs have one and no tokens. Because each of the input places has a number of 
tokens greater than or equal to the multiplicity of its arc to the transition (these are 
2, 1 and 4 respectively), the transition is enabled. After a time delay of t, the 
transition switches, removing the weight-number of tokens from each of the input 
places and putting the weight-number of tokens (three and one) in the output place. 
This leaves the net with a marking of (0  0  1) in the input places and (4  1) in the 
output places. 
4.3.3.4 Inhibitor Arcs 
Like arc multiplicities, inhibitor arcs have become an integral part of the Petri net 
technique. Inhibitor arcs go only from places to transitions, and act such that if the 
place inhibiting the transition contains a token, the transition cannot switch, 
regardless of whether it is otherwise enabled. These arcs can also be associated with 
multiplicities, so that the place must have a weight-number of tokens before it will 
inhibit the transition [73]. 
 
The inhibitor arc is shown in Figure 4.16 by a normal arc with a circle on the end 
rather than an arrow. Any multiplicity is shown in the same way as normal arcs. In 
the initial net, the transition’s input places have enough tokens to enable the 
transition, but the inhibiting place is marked, and thus disables the transition. Hence, 
after time t has passed, the transition does not switch. 
 
 
Figure 4.16 – Inhibited Transition 
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Inhibitor edges are useful in resolving possible clashes between transitions (see 
Section 4.3.3.2), allowing one to be disabled while the other takes the token. They 
are also useful for ensuring that, if an immediate transition has a particular place 
which is both an input and an output, it does not repeatedly fire and place an infinite 
number of tokens in any other output places. 
4.3.3.5 Reachability Graphs 
A common way of expressing all the possible markings of a Petri net from a given 
initial marking is the reachability graph (RG). This is a state graph in which each 
node corresponds uniquely to a given marking. For example, consider the Petri net 
in Figure 4.17. The Figure shows a PN with three numbered places and three 
numbered transitions. Associated with transitions 1 and 2 are time delays D1 and D2. 
Transition 3 is immediate. 
 
 
Figure 4.17 – Example Cyclic PN [59] 
 
When one considers the initial marking (1  2  0) as shown in Figure 4.17, there are 
two possible ways for the marking to change: 
 
o If D1 < D2, transition 1 will switch first. Place 2 will then have three tokens, 
and the others none. 
o If D2 < D1, then transition 2 will switch before the others, and all places will 
have one token. Transition three immediately switches, placing a token in 
place 1, emptying places 2 and 3, giving a marking of (2  0  0).  
 
The full RG of the PN in Figure 4.17 is shown in Figure 4.18. 
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Figure 4.18 – Reachability Graph of Example PN  
 
Schneeweiss [60] gives a mathematical notation of RGs. The marking in a given RG 
node, as shown in Figure 4.18, is displayed in the form: 
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In a RG, the movement from state to state is linked by an arc which shows the 
transition that switches to make the state change. The RG in Figure 4.18, no matter 
which transitions switch first, always ends in the absorbing state  (0  0  1), with 
places 1 and 2 empty and place 3 containing 1 token. An absorbing state is one 
where no more transitions can switch, and the marking cannot change. 
 
As a RG describes all the possible markings that a Petri net can reach from a given 
initial marking – if a marking is not on this RG, then it is described as unreachable 
from the initial state. Probabilities or sampling times attached to the switching of 
each transition can therefore govern the probabilities of the PN being in a given 
marking at any time. This is useful, for example, in giving the probability of a place 
marked “System Up”/”System Down” being marked. Reachability graphs of a Petri 
net are closely related to Markov models (see section 4.3.4.1). 
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4.3.3.6 Coloured and Aging Petri nets 
Coloured Petri nets (CPNs) have had some application in the field of reliability, by 
Volovoi [73, 75] and Mura & Bondavalli [76]. Created by Kurt Jensen [77], each 
token can affect the firing of a particular transition in a different way, depending on 
its colour. The colour is merely a graphical way of distinguishing between different 
tokens, by giving them a label.  
 
 
Figure 4.19(a) – Inhibiting Coloured Tokens; (b) – Varying switching times for coloured tokens 
 
Figure 4.19 shows two examples of CPNs. Figure 4.19(a) shows place 1 as input to 
a transition which outputs to place 2, while place 3 inhibits this transition. If the 
tokens were indistinguishable, the transition would never be able to fire, due to the 
token in place 3. In this CPN, a token can only inhibit the switching of a token 
which is the same colour. In Figure 4.19(a), once the transition’s enabling time has 
passed, the transition will switch the dark token, but not the white token, as a white 
token is inhibiting the transition. Figure 4.19(b) shows the effects of two different 
coloured tokens on the time to switch a common transition. The white token will 
switch it after time a, while the black token is switched after time b. These 
switching times can be sampled from dissimilar time distributions. 
 
In a standard Petri net, tokens in places which input to transitions are destroyed 
when the transition switches, while tokens are “created” to be put in the output 
places: the two events are considered to be independent of one another. These 
actions can instead be considered as a single action of moving a token from the 
input to the output. For standard PNs the difference is indistinguishable, while the 
second interpretation is core to the notion of CPNs [73]. It is possible for the label 
or colour of a token to change once it has passed through a transition. All rules 
pertaining to the effects of specific tokens on transitions, and vice versa, are decided 
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for the specific modelling situation, and may differ for transitions within the same 
net. 
 
Volovoi introduced aging tokens in the papers [73, 75] as an extension to CPNs, 
allowing tokens to have ‘counters’ as labels. These counters can change 
continuously throughout the time the token enables a transition, rather than once the 
transition switches, as in standard CPNs. For instance, the value of a counter might 
be between 0 and 1, to indicate the proportion of its life that has expired. The 
primary application of this in reliability engineering is in modelling damage to 
components or systems, such as in warm spares, or the effects of different 
environments on a particular equipment. 
4.3.3.7 Other Variations 
Other variations in Petri net design include: 
 
• Bi-directional transitions have one associated distribution of times to switch 
when enabled in one direction, and another distribution when enabled in the 
other. These transitions connect to places using edges with no arrowheads. 
This is an attempt to minimise the size of the overall model, and offers no 
extra modelling power [78]. 
• Stochastic Reward Nets – These attempt to minimise the often confusing 
nature of large Petri nets. By establishing Boolean logical statements 
between certain places, transitions which offer only a logical function may 
be removed. Although the authors claim this offers more clarity and more 
power than Petri nets, they have not been widely used [74, 79]. 
 
4.3.4 Application of Petri nets to Reliability 
 
Petri nets have been applied and adapted to modelling different situations, including 
workflow management [80] and concurrent computing [81]. One of the original 
investigations of using Petri nets for reliability prediction was with assessing their 
ability with respect to the modelling of computer software system reliability [62]. A 
large number of papers using the Petri net for reliability analysis consider Markov 
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Regenerative Stochastic Petri nets. This involves producing a reachability graph, 
which is converted back to a Markov model, allowing an analytical solution to the 
problem [76, 82]. This section aims to review the ways in which Petri nets have 
been applied in the field of reliability engineering. 
4.3.4.1 Markov Analysis 
The concept of Markov analysis was explained briefly in Section 2.4. It is possible 
to represent a Markov model using a Petri net, as shown by Figure 4.20. The system 
states are shown as places, while a Markov arc is replaced by two arcs and a 
transition, using the same rate or distribution of times. The Markov PN will only 
ever have one token in it, in the place representing the current system state. Upon 
state change, one of the transitions switches and moves the token to a different 
place.  
 
 
Figure 4.20 - A PN representation of a Markov model 
 
The relationship between PNs and Markov is not restricted to a conversion from one 
model to the other. As explained in Section 4.3.3.1, the markings of a PN represent 
the current system state. Continuing the example in Figure 4.17, the initial marking 
of (1  2  0) represents the operation of the system in a particular way. If transition 1 
switches, the marking changes to (0  3  0), which represents the operation of the 
system in a different way. The RG in Figure 4.18 shows all the possible system 
states that can be reached from the initial marking, and the transitions that must 
switch to reach those states. If the time delays of transitions 1 and 2, D1 and D2, are 
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randomly sampled from the negative exponential distribution, then the RG is 
equivalent to a Markov model, and Markov state equations can be created from 
which the required system reliability characteristics can be evaluated [2].  
 
The Markov state equations for a Markov model are given by equation 2.16. 
Considering as an example the RG given in Figure 4.18, firstly it is necessary to 
combine states which are only reached instantaneously into the following state. As 
shown in Figure 4.17, transition 3 is an immediate transition, and so any markings 
enabling this need not be considered. Applying this, there are nine states, including 
the initial marking (1 2 0), that are reachable for a fixed time. These are given in 
Table 4.2.  
 
Table 4.2 – State numbers of markings of PN in Figure 4.17 
State No. Marking State No. Marking State No. Marking 
1 1 2 0 4 1 1 0 7 1 0 0 
2 0 3 0 5 0 2 0 8 0 1 0 
3 2 0 0 6 1 0 1 9 0 0 1 
 
Applying the state markings in Table 4.2 to equation 2.16 gives the set of 
simultaneous system equations in equations 4.46, where λ1 and λ2 are the rates of 
occurrence of transitions 1 and 2 switching, respectively, gives equations 4.46. 
  
)()()( 1211 tQtQ λλ +−=&  )()()( 61426 tQtQtQ λλ −=&   
)()()( 22112 tQtQtQ λλ −=&  )()()()( 7161527 tQtQtQtQ λλλ −+=&   
)()()( 31123 tQtQtQ λλ −=&  )()()( 82718 tQtQtQ λλ −=&   
)()()()()( 42131224 tQtQtQtQ λλλλ +−+=& )()( 829 tQtQ λ−=&   
)()()( 52415 tQtQtQ λλ −=&   4.46 
 
When the equations 4.46 are combined with equation 4.47, 
  
 ∑
=
=
9
1
1)(
i
i tQ ,  
4.47 
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results can be reached for the values of Qi(t) with respect to λ1 and λ2, by using a 
Laplace Transform to convert the differential equations into a set of solvable 
algebraic equations.  
 
A criticism that has been levelled at PNs [61] is that they can become very large 
when modelling complex systems. While this is true, the number of different states 
within a large PN is also very large, and hence a representation of this in a RG or a 
Markov model would be enormous. Referring specifically to Stochastic Petri nets 
(SPN), Volovoi mentions a “commonly shared belief about SPNs being a mere 
preprocessor to Markov chains” and “associated assumptions about the limitations 
of SPNs” [73]. By stating this he is criticising the approach of converting PNs into 
Markov chains, thus limiting the modelling possibilities of the PN technique. 
Volovoi mentions alternatives to this such as discrete event simulation or “direct 
numerical solutions of SPNs balance equations”, citing Horton [83] for further 
reading on this latter technique. 
4.3.4.2 Fault Tree Modelling 
Fault trees have been introduced in section 1.3 and explained further in section 2.2. 
While Fault Trees are useful for breaking down the occurrence of a top event into 
basic events, they require the basic events to be independent of one another in order 
to find an exact analytical solution to the top event probability. Other common 
reliability scenarios such as component repair or bringing redundant systems online, 
which may then affect their rate of failure, cannot be accounted for in a standard 
fault tree. It is useful then to convert a fault tree into PN form and adapt it to include 
these other real-life factors. 
 
Trivedi and Malhotra [74] outline the simplest way of converting a fault tree to a 
PN, and provide an algorithm for this purpose. Starting from the top event, each 
non-basic event is represented by a place, and the logic gates are formed by 
immediate transitions linking the places representing events further down the tree.  
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Figure 4.21 – OR and AND Gate PN Representation 
 
An OR gate produces its output event if any number of the input events occur. In 
PN form, as shown in Figure 4.21, each input to the OR gate is a place, connected to 
an immediate transition, and each transition inputs to the single output place. If any 
gate-input place receives a token, that token will move to the output place. An AND 
gate produces its output event only when all of the input events occur. As the Figure 
shows, the PN equivalent is a series of input places all providing an input to the 
same immediate transition, as transition switching inherently includes an AND type 
logic rule. This transition then outputs to the higher-level event place. Only once all 
the input places are marked will the transition switch and deposit a token into the 
output place. 
 
A problem with Trivedi and Malhotra’s PN representation of OR gates is that if 
more than one input event occurs, more than one token will be put in the output 
place. Although this is a minor problem, this could cause effects in other parts of the 
net. It may then be necessary, once an input event has occurred, to prevent the other 
gate transitions from switching. 
 
Malhotra and Trivedi also present the PN version of basic events. These are very 
simple, containing only two places and two transitions each, as shown in Figure 
4.22. The two places represent the states “Component Up”, where the relevant basic 
event is in a working state, and “Component Down”, where it has failed. They are 
linked by a timed transition, whose time to switch may be sampled from a 
distribution of failure times which matches that of the relevant component. Once 
this time has passed, the basic event will fail, the transition will switch and the token 
will move into the “Component Down” place. Added to Malhotra and Trivedi’s PN 
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representation of a basic event is a repair transition, which allows a failed 
component to return to the working state after a given time period. 
 
Figure 4.22 – Repairable Basic Event in PN Representation 
 
 
Figure 4.23 – NOT Gate PN Representation 
 
A PN for the NOT gate is shown in Figure 4.23. This is adapted from Liu and Chiou 
[84]. When no token is present in the input place, the gate place enables transition 2, 
which switches and places tokens in both the output place and back in the gate 
place. The output place then inhibits transition 2 to prevent an infinite number of 
tokens being output to it (this was omitted in Liu and Chiou’s paper). If a token 
appears in the input place and the output place is marked, transition 1 (also omitted 
from Liu and Chiou’s paper) is enabled and switches, removing the token from the 
output place and placing a token back in the input place. Transition 2 thus becomes 
inhibited. 
 
As logic gates in PN representation use only immediate transitions, then, as with 
Boolean algebra, Petri nets can be cut down in size [60]. For instance, in the 
situation that an OR gate has several AND gates as inputs, the PN may be 
constructed as in Figure 4.24(a). If there is a single place followed by a single 
transition, then these are superfluous elements and may be removed, as shown in 
Figure 4.24(b). Liu and Chiou [84] call this absorption. 
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Liu and Chiou [84] developed a method to get minimal cut sets from PNs which is 
identical to MOCUS in Fault Tree structures. 
 
 
Figure 4.24 – Contraction or absorption of a PN. 
 
4.3.4.3 Multi-Phased Missions 
Phased missions were described earlier in this chapter. There have been a small 
number of papers that have attempted to model multi-phased missions using Petri 
nets and their work shall be highlighted here. 
 
Mura and Bondavalli, in conjunction with others, have previously published papers 
[55, 85] concerning Phased Missions and PNs. These culminate in the most recent 
method, contained in their 2001 paper [76], to model more complex areas of 
concern of Phased Missions. Volovoi also discusses the modelling (not the 
computation) of phased mission reliability [75]. The 2001 Mura & Bondavalli paper 
[76] outlines a PN method of modelling four situations which gradually become 
more complex: 
 
• The simple case, hitherto handled by all previous phased missions literature, 
of constant-duration phases in a fixed order. Intra-phase behaviour is 
modelled by a time-homogeneous Markov chain. 
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• Missions of different goals, either primary (a vital mission goal that must be 
completed unless system failures prevent this) or secondary (a less 
important, often optional, mission goal which can be performed based on 
conditions such as failures of systems, fuel levels and environment). The 
next phase can be dynamically decided depending on the events which occur 
during the mission. If, for example, a system failure prevents a primary goal 
being carried out, the next phases will change to include performance of a 
series of secondary tasks. Alternatively, if a mission is very successful, 
secondary goals may be scrapped, bypassing some possible intermediate 
phases. This then yields a tree of choices for the mission to follow. 
• Phase changes are triggered by random events, creating phases of random 
start time and length. Even if the start times of phases are modelled by the 
negative exponential distribution, this is still a very complex problem. 
• Intra-phase behaviour not satisfactorily modelled by time-homogeneous 
Markov chains. The papers published previous to Mura & Bondavalli’s 2001 
paper concerning Petri nets and phased missions used PNs where the system 
behaviour does not change with time. In this situation, transition switching 
delays are modelled using the negative exponential distribution, so the PN is 
time-homogeneous. The accuracy of modelling the reliability of systems 
within phases can be affected if no consideration of system aging is made. 
Two other papers [56, 57] have considered non-homogeneous Markov 
models with respect to Phased Mission reliability. 
 
The main method suggested by Mura & Bondavalli is the use of at least two 
different Petri nets to model systems performing phased missions. The first, known 
as the Phase Net, models the tree of phase choices and the progression from the first 
phase to the last. The transitions model the timings of phase changes. An example 
phase net is shown in Figure 4.25. 
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Figure 4.25 – Example Phase Net 
 
In Figure 4.25 each phase is represented by a place. Only one of these phase places 
can be marked at any time. If phase place P1 is marked, transition t1 will switch after 
a time delay which is either deterministic or sampled from a distribution of phase 1 
lengths. After phase 2 has completed, there is a choice of the next phase: the 
mission can go to phase 3 or phase 3’, which may correspond to a choice between a 
primary or secondary objective, and may be influenced by variables in the model, 
such as system failures or current mission time. Regardless of the phase chosen, the 
mission ends once the token finishes in the PSTOP place. 
 
The second PN, called the System Net, models the system failures in each phase 
(the authors combined this into a single PN for their example). A system failure may 
be modelled by the System Net and affect the choice of the specific phases 
performed. Similarly, component failure rates may be affected by a switch from one 
phase to another. The Mura and Bondavalli (2001) paper does provide an example 
system net, but it is rather obscure and disorganised. Instead, a good example of a 
system net may well be a fault tree in Petri net form, such as that in Figure 4.24(a). 
Success of each phase in the mission would depend upon the operation of several 
different systems, which themselves rely on the working of their constituent 
components. A component failure could then cascade through the fault tree Petri net 
(FTPN) and cause system, phase or mission failure. 
 
Converting the PN to a Markov chain allows analytical solutions to be used. When 
this is not possible because of the system features, or the size of the PN prevents an 
efficient and accurate Markov solution being reached, Petri nets can be used in 
conjunction with simulation. This allows greater use of the flexibility of PNs, for 
example letting various distributions control the transition switching times, and 
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allows the PN modelling technique to be tailored more directly to a particular 
problem. 
 
Volovoi [75] uses aging coloured tokens to attempt to simplify the modelling of 
systems performing phased missions. Despite this, the article is focused more on the 
aging of components within the phased mission system and not on providing a more 
accurate model of this scenario. One section involves the failure of phases, as shown 
in Figure 4.26. 
 
Figure 4.26 – Phase Failure Model [75] 
 
Figure 4.26 shows two places (corresponding to phases of a mission) which run 
cyclically. Each phase place i has a transition associated with it with delay ei. 
However, in Volovoi’s model, the token currently in the “Phase 1” place is capable 
of aging when enabling either of the phase failure transitions. These transitions can 
age the token at different rates, simulating the effects that different phase 
environments might have on a common system. If the age of the token becomes too 
high, one of the failure transitions will switch and the system fails. As shown in 
Chapter 5, this model can be adapted for use with non-aging tokens in simulating 
the reliability of phased mission systems.  
 
4.3.5 Summary 
 
Petri nets are an extremely versatile and useful tool when applied to systems 
modelling. They have a significant capability when modelling the situations 
encountered in predicting system reliability. These features include component 
failures and repairs, logical combinations of component failures producing higher-
level system failures, universal (perfect) repair, queued repair and multiple phases 
Phase 1 Phase 2
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within missions. If those missions have probabilistic phase choices, this can also be 
modelled. 
 
While there have been many extensions of Petri nets since their conception, such as 
the inclusion of coloured or aging tokens, the components mentioned above form 
the basis of modern PNs. A Petri net with inhibitor arcs and arc multiplicities is 
regarded as “high-level”. 
 
Reachability graphs (RG) detail all the possible markings of a PN from an initial 
state, and the transitions that must switch to achieve these. If a PN is time-
homogeneous, it is known as a Stochastic or Generalised Stochastic PN (SPN or 
GSPN). The RGs produced for SPNs can be analysed mathematically using Markov 
techniques, to find the probability of reaching a particular PN marking. If a PN 
model is very large or aspects of it prevent this approach from being adopted due to 
incompatibility or inefficiency, then a technique such as discrete event simulation 
can be used to find these marking probabilities. 
 
If the Petri net is used with a computational simulation tool, then the potential scope 
for modelling widens dramatically. A simulation PN model can include non-
exponential switching time distributions, various repair schedules can be modelled, 
and so on. This can then use Monte-Carlo simulation to analyse any size of 
problem.  
 
Perhaps one of the reasons why Petri nets are not as widely used as other methods 
for system reliability assessment is due to there being no unified standard definition 
of a Petri net. However, the basic “modern” Petri net (with timing, arc multiplicities 
and inhibitor arcs) can be extremely useful for modelling. Further adaptations may 
provide extra power, but should only be considered if the benefits over the basic PN 
are apparent. 
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Chapter 5 Development of Initial Model 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The limitations of the MFOP modelling methods presented and the suitability of 
Petri nets for modelling system reliability afforded an opportunity to develop a 
robust and flexible MFOP model. A preliminary model was created first, however, 
in order to prove the concept and provide a basis from which more complex aspects 
of MFOPs and Phased Missions can be analysed. 
 
An MFOP can be considered as a sequence of missions which are performed back 
to back, without maintenance taking place between them. The simplest type of 
MFOP will be one where one mission is repeated a finite number of times before the 
MRP takes place. This scenario is the one considered in this chapter. 
 
Each of the parts of the Petri net as used in the modelling of Phased Missions and 
MFOPs has a particular purpose. Places are used mainly to represent a particular 
state, event or a given factor or variable. For example, a place may represent the 
failure or operation of a component, the level of damage a system has incurred, the 
activity of a phase of a mission, the failure of an MFOP, etc. The presence of tokens 
within these places indicates that the event that the place represents has occurred, or 
can show what the value of a factor is. If a “component failure” event has an 
associated place, and this place contains a token, then the component is considered 
failed. Transitions move tokens between places, and thus change the status of the 
system or mission. For instance, the repair of a component involves the change of 
state from “component down” to “component up”. This requires a transition to 
remove a token from the place representing the former state and create one in the 
place representing the latter. Similarly, a component failure can cascade through 
several levels of sub-system and system failure to cause platform failure for a  
phase. This cascading requires transitions to pass a token from the ‘cause’ place to 
the ‘effect’ place. 
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This chapter describes the development of a simple Phased MFOP model using 
ideas contained within the noted literature. The model developed can analyse a 
simple repetitive mission and MFOP profile containing a defined sequence of 
phases. The development of the PN model took place at the same time as its 
implementation in a simulation program. As a result, some of the decisions taken 
while growing the capabilities of the model came as a result of feedback from 
unsuccessful attempts to implement previous ideas. 
 
5.2 Development of Model 
 
Section 4.3.4.3 details some of the work undertaken by others in representing 
aspects of phased missions using Petri Nets. Figure 4.25 and Figure 4.26 show the 
two ideas that provided a base from which to develop further ideas. The 
System/Phase net idea from Mura & Bondavalli was developed to provide a more 
structured and rigorous modelling platform, the Phase Net being renamed to the 
Master PN (see Section 5.2.2), while the System Net also underwent many changes 
as explained in the next section. The method of modelling phase failure proposed by 
Volovoi [75] was also considered. 
 
5.2.1 System Net 
 
The purpose of the System Net (SN) is to model the failure of the system in the 
different phases and propagate any failures to the Phase or Master PN, so it can 
establish whether a phase failure (and therefore a mission and MFOP failure) has 
occurred. As this research models the multi-phased mission scenario, it was 
necessary to consider the failure logic for each individual phase in the SN. One of 
the simplest ways to represent the possible component-level causes of system failure 
in a particular phase is by using Fault Trees. As mentioned in Section 4.3.4.2, it is a 
very simple task to convert a FT into a PN, and so it was decided that the System 
Net would contain PN versions of the FTs for each phase. Each fault tree’s top 
event (system failure in that phase), would then feed into the Master PN to 
propagate system failure into phase and mission failure. 
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A problem that became apparent in the programming of this part of the model was 
the usage of computer memory: the way that place and transition data were stored 
meant that a single System Net would be less memory efficient than having a 
different System Net for each phase failure FT. However, taking this step to reduce 
memory efficiency presented a further problem. It is likely for most systems that 
there are components whose failure will affect the system in more than one phase. 
In this instance, it was not immediately apparent where the component information 
would be stored and how each System Net would use it. There were several options 
available for this: 
 
• It could be stored in the first phase failure PN to use that particular 
component. Subsequent phases affected by the failure of that component 
would take their inputs from it. A problem with this approach is that keeping 
track of all the components would be very complicated, and the phase failure 
PNs would very quickly lose the simplistic graphical nature of the FTs. 
• Each instance of the component failure in different PNs would simply have 
its PN representation repeated throughout them all. This would, however, 
unnecessarily increase the memory taken up by the fault trees, and it would 
be difficult to ensure that the failure of each component was instantaneously 
repeated for all its instances. 
• All the component failures would be modelled in a separate PN, the 
Component PN, which would then feed the occurrence of each failure into 
the correct phase failure PN as required. This would not increase the 
memory requirements, but would complicate its appearance further. 
 
The third option was chosen as the most efficient way of representing the 
components in the system. This means that the System Net section can be broken 
down further into two subsections – the phase PNs and the Component PN. The 
different PNs communicate in this model by using linking arcs. These are standard 
arcs, shown as dotted lines to indicate their passing from one PN to another. The 
different PNs, therefore, could theoretically be combined into one whole – the 
separation is merely for ease of representation. 
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The three resulting Petri net types – component, phase and master – connect to each 
other for various reasons, as shown in Figure 5.1. The component PN links the 
failures of the components to the Phase PNs. The phase PNs, in turn, output their 
phase failures to the master PN. The master PN and the component PN interact in 
terms of the ending of one MFOP, the component repair process taking place, and 
the next MFOP beginning. 
  
 
Figure 5.1 – Interactions Between Petri Nets 
 
5.2.1.1 Phase Petri Nets 
The phase Petri nets (PPNs) are the PN representation of the phase fault trees that 
are inputted to the model, and show the occurrence of the top event (system failure 
in the relevant phase) in terms of the basic events contained in the Component PN. 
The requirement here, therefore, is to convert and model as accurately as possible 
from the information that a FT provides.  
 
Each top or intermediate event in the phase fault tree is represented in the PPN by a 
place. If that place has a token, the event can be considered to have occurred. The 
logic gates are reproduced in PN form by using immediate transitions in different 
ways. An example PPN is shown in Figure 5.1. 
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When a component is simulated to have failed, a 
token will be deposited in a “component n failed” 
place in the Component PN. This will have a 
linking arc to one or more of the PPNs, and so will 
cascade the token down to a certain point in the 
PPN based on the failures of other components and 
the failure logic. The parts of the net facilitating this 
propagation are the immediate “logic gate” 
transitions. There are several different gates used in fault tree analysis, and these can 
be represented by Petri nets. Examples of OR and AND gate representations used in 
earlier work are shown in Figure 4.21. In this work, however, it is desirable to 
highlight each failed gate in a phase fault tree, regardless of whether a higher gate 
has also failed, due to the data that the simulation software must collect. Therefore, 
inhibitor arcs have been added to the AND and OR gates developed previously to 
enable this – see Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3). 
 
When there are sufficient tokens in the input places to a gate to mark the output 
place, a token is passed to the output place by the gate transition, and also back to 
the input place (see the double-edged arcs in Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3). The 
inhibitor arcs from the output place to the gate transition then prevent an infinite 
number of transition switches, and each gate which is failed stays as marked. 
 
  
Figure 5.2 – Actual PN AND Gate Used in 
Model 
 
Figure 5.3 – Actual PN OR Gate Used in 
Model 
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5.2.1.2 Component Petri Net 
The component Petri Net (CPN) was formed, as mentioned in Section 5.2.1, from 
the necessity of organising and modelling the basic event failures effectively and 
efficiently. A PN representation of a repairable basic event, adapted from a non-
repairable version by Malhotra and Trivedi, has been shown in Figure 4.22. If a 
linking arc is created between the “component down” place and an input transition 
in one or more PPNs, this will allow the marking of the component as failed to be 
propagated to items higher in the system architecture.  
 
The switching times associated with the failure transitions are randomly sampled 
from any one of a number of statistical distributions (negative exponential, normal, 
Weibull, etc); the behaviour of the repair transition depends on the maintenance 
policy being used in the modelling.   
 
For instance, if each component was to be repaired individually a certain time after 
it failed, then each repair transition would (similar to the failure transition) have a 
unique time to switch. However, if, as in an MRP, the repairs will only commence 
at given times, the behaviour of the basic events is modelled differently. The 
maintenance policy used to simply model an MRP is that each failed component is 
instantaneously repaired at the same time as all the others. An example of a model 
of an MRP is shown in Figure 5.4. 
 
 
Figure 5.4 – Example Component PN 
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The Figure shows a set of three basic events, each with the standard “Compt n Up” 
and “Compt n Down” places, a timed failure transition but an immediate repair 
transition. Each repair transition is controlled by a “Repairing” place, shown at the 
top centre of Figure 5.4. During missions, a token resides in the “Not repairing” 
place. When an MFOP is ended, the timed transition (simulating the length of an 
MRP) will switch, beginning the repair process. Note that if only flying hours are 
considered to age components, this time should be zero. When a token is in the 
“Repairing” place, and components are failed, the immediate transition ending the 
repair period cannot switch due to the inhibitor arcs leading from the “Compt n 
Down” places. Instead, the repair place enables the repair transition for any failed 
basic events until each component’s token is in the “Compt n Up” place. Only then 
will the “Repairing” immediate transition switch, ending the repair process and 
allowing a new MFOP to commence. 
 
Also of note in Figure 5.4 is that a component failure may cause mission and MFOP 
abandonment, as shown by the arc leading from the “Compt 3 Down” place to the 
Master PN. This is explained further in Section 5.2.2. 
 
5.2.1.2.1 Dependency Modelling  
It is conceivable that dependencies can exist in the system and 
failures do not occur independently. In this circumstance a 
component may fail faster depending upon the functionality 
or failure of a different component or system. A simple 
example of this is the processor and fan in a computer – if the 
fan fails, the processor overheats and fails much quicker. This 
behaviour is dealt with in the model by allowing a component 
to have more than one failure transition. Only one of these can 
be enabled at any one time, depending on the components or 
systems which cause the acceleration of failure, as shown in 
Figure 5.5. In the Figure, the dependent component has four 
failure transitions, due to the dependency between two 
different components. Figure 5.5 shows the dependent and 
Figure 5.5 – 
Component 
Dependencies 
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independent components to be presently operational. This state means that 
transitions A.B, .BA  and BA.  are inhibited, while transition B.A  is operational. If 
A fails but B remains operational, then transition BA would be newly enabled, 
while all the others, including B.A , would be inhibited. A new time to failure can 
now be sampled from an alternative distribution. This simple dependency modelling 
is capable only of describing the effect of other components on a component’s 
failure rate, and not other factors such as phase change or redundancy configuration. 
 
5.2.2 Phase Net (Master Petri Net) 
 
The Master Petri Net (MPN) has been developed from the Phase Net idea discussed 
in Mura and Bondavalli. The point of this net is to show the completion of the 
phases in sequence, after which the mission is considered complete. Where MFOPs 
are considered, one mission will lead to the next without any maintenance.  
 
 
Figure 5.6 – Master Petri Net 
 
The MPN is a complex net and as such can be considered in three interdependent 
sections, as shown in Figure 5.6. These sections are: 
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• Control of the sequence of phases, and failure or success of each mission 
(solid line border) 
• Ending each mission or MFOP and performing repairs (dotted line border) 
• Abandoning the mission due to specific component or system failures 
(dashed line border). 
 
The section surrounded by a solid line controls the changing of the phases. Each 
phase has a place which, if marked, indicates that that phase is currently in 
operation. This outputs to a timed transition whose switching time is the length of 
the phase. Whilst these phase durations are often considered to be deterministic, it is 
possible that randomly sampled phase lengths may be desirable, which are as easily 
created. This timed transition inputs to the next phase place, whose timed transition 
is then enabled. 
 
If the phase n top event occurs as a result of sufficient component failures, then a 
token will be present in the top place of the phase n PN such as that in Figure 5.1. 
This is connected to an immediate transition by a linking arc and, if phase n is 
currently in operation, allows the failure of the system in the mission. Both 
conditions (phase n execution and phase n failure) are required to be simultaneously 
true for mission failure to occur. This means that if a phase has completed before 
the top event occurs, then the mission can still succeed, whereas if a phase failure 
occurs before that phase has started, the mission will fail once the phase begins. 
This style of modelling phase sequences and failures was adapted from Volovoi 
[75, 73], see section 4.3.4.3. 
 
The final phase place has two timed transition outputs modelling its duration, only 
one of which can be enabled at any time. If the mission completes successfully, it is 
possible either that another mission will take place straight away, before any 
maintenance, or that the system will enter an MRP. If the former is true, there will 
be a positive number of tokens in the “Number of Missions Left” place. This 
inhibits the top of the output transitions shown in Figure 5.6 and enables the bottom 
one. After this switches, it redeposits a token in the phase 1 place and restarts the 
mission. If the “Number of Missions Left” place is empty, the top transition is 
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uninhibited and enabled. This transition, upon switching, ends the current MFOP, 
after which the “repair” section of the MPN (the dotted part of Figure 5.6) becomes 
important.  
 
The phases token will enter the “MFOP Finished” place, and, as mentioned in 
section 5.2.1.2, enable the “Commence Repair” transition in the component PN to 
begin system repair. This transition can only switch if there are a positive number of 
tokens in the “Number of MFOPs Left” place, and is reduced by one with each 
MRP that takes place. Once it switches, a number of tokens equal to one less than 
the number of missions to perform in each MFOP is deposited in the “Number of 
Missions Left” place. Once repair is complete, the token goes back to the “Not 
Repairing” place, and another is put in the “Phase 1” place for the next MFOP to 
begin. When the number of MFOPs left reaches zero, the immediate transition 
output from the “MFOP Finished” place is no longer inhibited. Completion of the 
final mission of an MFOP will thus cause a token to be placed by the transition into 
the “Simulation Success” place. 
 
The final section has a dashed border in the Figure and allows for a mission to be 
abandoned. This abandonment occurs when critical safety-related failures occur. For 
example, an aircraft is returned to base to undergo repairs, prior to loss of the 
platform. This means that the current set of missions will cease, the MFOP is 
considered failed and an MRP will begin. 
 
The modelling of abandonment is quite simple – once the “Phase 1” place is 
marked, it also marks a “Mission Active” place. If a particular component or sub-
system fails, the relevant place representing its failure will be marked, as shown in 
Figure 5.4 and at the top-left of Figure 5.6. A linking arc from that place will cause 
an immediate transition in the MPN to become enabled, which in turn deposits a 
token in the “Mission Abandoned” place. Each phase place has a corresponding 
immediate transition which, if the mission is active and that particular phase is 
operational, becomes enabled upon mission abandonment and places the phase 
token in the “MFOP Finished” place, to begin the MRP. In this instance, there could 
be tokens left in the “Number of Missions Left” place, so an immediate transition 
removes these. 
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5.2.3 Simulation Model 
 
Software simulating the Petri net to produce the overall system reliability has been 
developed. It takes in the phase fault trees and component failure data in text-file 
format, and automatically produces the different nets mentioned above. The 
component failure data and phase lengths (which can both be sampled from a 
number of distribution types such as normal, exponential, etc.) are used to give the 
relevant timed transitions distributions of switching times. A time for each transition 
to switch can be randomly sampled from these distributions, by using various 
methods such as those described in [2]. The simulation algorithm runs for ns 
simulations as follows: 
 
1. Randomly sample switching times for each newly enabled timed transition 
in each net from the switching time distribution assigned to it 
2. Find the transition with the earliest switching time and switch it 
3. Search through each of the immediate transitions and if any are enabled, 
switch them 
4. Repeat step 3 until no more immediate transitions are enabled 
5. Test for any of the following conditions and log them: 
a. If system has failed, begin next simulation 
b. If system has been abandoned, begin next MFOP 
c. If mission has completed, begin next mission 
d. If MFOP has completed, begin MRP 
e. If MRP has completed, begin next MFOP 
f. If all MFOPs and MRPs completed, simulation is complete – begin 
next simulation 
6. If simulations completed < ns, go to step 1, else end. 
 
The results of the ns simulations can then be outputted to a text-file for analysis. 
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5.3 Model Validation 
 
To ensure that both the PN modelling method and the programmed version of are 
giving a satisfactory output, it is necessary to compare the results given against 
theoretical values. This section takes an example small system and compares the 
theory with the PN simulation model results for both non-repairable and repairable 
versions of the same system. If the results are similar, it places confidence in the 
ability of the model to accurately portray the mission reliability of systems 
undergoing MFOP. A third, larger, example has also been modelled. 
 
5.3.1 Non-repairable Small System 
 
In order to validate the model, results have been obtained for a simple non-
repairable system and compared with the theoretical results. This simple phased-
mission system was modelled with the Petri net software developed using the 
models described above. 
 
The phase fault trees for the example considered are shown in Figure 5.7, with the 
corresponding PPNs shown in Figure 5.8. The system undergoes four phases, and is 
dependent upon four different components for operation. Each MFOP is assumed to 
consist of three missions of the four phases. The lengths of the phases and 
component failure characteristics are given in Table 5.1. The full Petri net for this 
example is given in Figure 5.9. The software described above was then executed 
and results obtained for the probability of mission and phase failure.  
 
 
Figure 5.7 – System Phase Fault Trees 
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Figure 5.8 – System PPNs 
 
Table 5.1 – Phase Lengths and Component Unreliabilities 
Phase Phase Length (Hrs) Component Failure Rate - λ (h-1) 
1 0.5 A 0.0045 
2 2.5 B 0.0130 
3 4.0 C 0.0081 
4 1.25 D 0.0011 
 
5.3.1.1 Theoretical Analysis 
In order to obtain an accurate measure of reliability for each phase in each mission 
of the example, it is first necessary to adapt the problem. Firstly, a three-mission 
period of four phases per mission without maintenance can be considered as a 12-
phase non-repairable mission, with each phase fault tree occurring three times. The 
method of Esary and Ziehms [6] combines these phase fault trees into a single 
model for the mission. This method could not, however, calculate the individual 
probabilities of phase failure. Instead, the method of La Band & Andrews [42], as 
outlined in Section 4.2.1.6, can determine these phase unreliabilities, thus allowing 
comparison between the theory and the model. Mission unreliability is then the sum 
of the phase unreliabilities. This method has been used to establish values for the 
probability of system failure in each phase, mission and the overall MFOP.  
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Figure 5.9 – Full PN for Example in Section 5.3.1 
 
As an example, consider the occurrence of a system failure during phase 2 of the 
phased mission presented. This would be described by the prime implicants 
(minimal combinations of working and failed component states in non-coherent 
fault trees that cause top event failure) obtained from the fault tree shown in Figure 
5.10. From Figure 5.10, the prime implicants of a system failure within Phase 2, 
represented by T2, can be expressed in the following way: 
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Figure 5.10 – Phase 2 Failure Fault Tree 
 
Using the rules expressed in equations 4.25, equation 5.1 becomes: 
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5.2 
 
Once the prime implicants have been established, finding the probability of failure 
in phase 2 requires the application of the inclusion-exclusion expansion, as 
expressed in equation 2.3. As the number of prime implicants increases, it takes 
more terms in the inclusion-exclusion expansion to reach an exact value for the top 
event probability. If the amount of terms becomes large, it is necessary to 
approximate the overall failure probability, for example using either the rare event 
approximation or minimal cut-set bound methods as explained in Section 4.2.1.2. 
However, these approximations to the true reliability figure may not be accurate 
enough.  
 
Since the simplification for sequential component phase failures uses OR logic, as 
shown in equations 4.25, it is more likely that using this will lead to higher numbers 
of prime implicants when finding overall phase failure probability (Ai+1,j expands to 
give j–i separate terms which would produce prime implicants). The simplification 
for component success in subsequent phases, however, inherently considers them 
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with AND logic ( jiA ,1+  has just one term in the prime implicant). Therefore, the 
expression for success up to the end of a phase is generally simpler than the 
expression for its failure. This can be exploited to give a more efficient way of 
finding the exact conditional phase failure probability, using equation 5.3. 
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5.3 
 
For instance, the success up to the end of phase 2 has the path sets (combinations of 
component failure and success events which cause the system to function) shown in 
equation 5.4. 
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5.4 
 
Using the inclusion-exclusion expression given in equation 2.3, the mission success 
up to the end of phase 2, R1,2, can be determined from equation 5.5: 
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5.5 
 
The evaluation of the failure or success probabilities of each basic event can be 
determined using equation 5.6. 
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For constant failure rates these become: 
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5.7 
 
Applying this to the expression for phase 2 success gives: 
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Hence, from equation 5.5,  
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All values given are to four decimal places. A similar application of the previous 
steps to the path sets of success of phase 1, 1111  and DABA , yields the phase 
reliability to be R1 = 0.9977. Using this and equations 5.3 and 5.8, the unreliability 
for phase 2 is therefore: 
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The alternative approach to calculating this value is to use the four prime implicants 
for phase 2 given in equation 5.2, and use the inclusion-exclusion given in equation 
2.3. For later phases, the calculations saved by using the method described above 
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increases. This method was applied to obtain the unreliability in each of the twelve 
mission phases. The results are shown in Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2 – Prime Implicants and Unreliabilities of Mission Phases 
Phase Prime Implicants (Phase Success) 
Mission 
Reliability at 
Phase end 
Phase 
Unreliability 
1 1111 , BADA  0.9977 0.00225 
2 2,12,112,12,1 , CBABA  0.9593 0.03850 
3 3,12,13,113,13,12,13,13,11 ,, DCBADBACBA  0.9103 0.05107 
4 4,13,113,13,14,13,13,14,1 ,, CBADBACBA  0.9086 0.00194 
5 5,13,15,13,15,15,13,15,15,1 ,, DBADBACBA  0.8772 0.03452 
6 6,16,15,13,16,16,13,16,16,1 ,, CBADBACBA  0.8294 0.05448 
7 7,16,17,15,17,17,16,17,17,15,1 ,, DCBADBACBA  0.7862 0.05210 
8 8,17,15,17,17,18,17,17,18,1 ,, CBADBACBA  0.7836 0.00327 
9 9,17,19,17,19,19,17,19,19,1 ,, DBADBACBA  0.7580 0.03271 
10 10,110,19,17,110,110,17,110,110,1 ,, CBADBACBA  0.7164 0.05493 
11 11,110,111,19,111,111,110,111,111,19,1 ,, DCBADBACBA  0.6784 0.05302 
12 12,111,19,111,111,112,111,111,112,1 ,, CBADBACBA  0.6753 0.00451 
 
5.3.1.2 Petri Net Model Results 
The Petri net model was used in the simulation program to randomly sample from 
the appropriate distributions to produce timed transitions’ switching times. To 
ensure a good convergence of the model to the reliability, 10,000,000 simulations 
were performed, with three four-phase missions in each maintenance-free operating 
period, and one MFOP per simulation. The system is, in effect, non-repairable. 
Table 5.3 shows the results obtained. 
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Table 5.3 – Results of Simulated Model 
Phase 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Phase Failures 22258 384042 490352 17581 312836 478172 
Phases Started 10000000 9977742 9593700 9103348 9085767 8772931
Unreliability 0.00223 0.03849 0.05111 0.00193 0.03443 0.05451 
       
Phase 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Phase Failures 432422 25978 257002 416899 379478 30325 
Phases Started 8294759 7862337 7836359 7579357 7162458 6782980
Unreliability 0.05213 0.00330 0.03280 0.05500 0.05298 0.00447 
 
The software is capable of producing tables for each phase which show the 
instantaneous unreliability at regularly spaced points, for investigation of the 
convergence of the simulation results. The convergence of the first phase of the 
MFOP over the 10,000,000 simulations performed is shown in Figure 5.11. The 
graph shows the number of simulations against reliability level, measured every 
200,000 simulations. 
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Figure 5.11 – Convergence of Phase 1 Unreliability 
 
As can be seen from Figure 5.11, the convergence to the approximate phase 
unreliability value is very swift – the first point recorded, at 200,000 simulations, is 
just above the actual unreliability. Executing further simulations does not lead to a 
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much more accurate estimate for the system reliability, and for most of the rest of 
the set of simulations, this estimated value stays below the real figure. 
5.3.1.3 Comparison of Results 
Table 5.4 shows a comparison between the conditional phase failure probabilities 
produced by the Petri net software and the analytical solution. All, except the first 
phase, show a percentage error of less than 1%. The convergence of the model over 
the ten million simulations is very swift as Figure 5.11 shows. A good estimate to 
the unreliability can be established after around 600,000 simulations (within 2% of 
the analytical solution). Extending the analytical approach to a much larger system, 
as is typically found within industry, would require extensive calculations. 
However, extending the simulation model does not require a much greater increase 
in the length of time to find phase reliability.  
 
Table 5.4 – Comparison of Analytical and Simulation Unreliability Results 
Phase 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Analysis 0.00225 0.03850 0.05107 0.00194 0.03452 0.05447 
Simulation 0.00223 0.03849 0.05111 0.00193 0.03443 0.05451 
Per cent Error 1.118% 0.037% 0.081% 0.246% 0.247% 0.057% 
       
Phase 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Analysis 0.05210 0.00327 0.03271 0.05493 0.05302 0.00451 
Simulation 0.05213 0.00330 0.03280 0.05500 0.05298 0.00447 
Per cent Error 0.069% 0.947% 0.253% 0.141% 0.081% 0.840% 
 
5.3.2 Repairable Small System 
 
Further demonstration of the accuracy of the modelling method is provided in the 
following example. This considers the same system, MFOP, mission and phase 
profile as that described in Section 5.3.1, but in this case the components are 
repairable. Components A and B, which have revealed failures, are repaired after 
each MFOP if failed; while components C and D, which have unrevealed failures, 
are inspected during every third MRP and repaired if failed at that point. 
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In order to provide analytical reliability figures for the repairable situation, a 
Markov model was produced which models the deterioration of the system from 
having all components working at time t = 0, over 12 MFOPs. The approach is 
taken from Clarotti et al [48], and details are provided in the next section. 
5.3.2.1 Markov Analysis 
The Markov model for the component failures is shown in Figure 5.12. 
 
 
Figure 5.12 – Markov Model of Component Failures 
 
Table 5.5 shows the system failure states for each phase, according to the state 
numbers in Figure 5.12. Since states listed in the second column of Table 5.5 lead to 
system failure, they are made to be absorbing states for the relevant phase and all 
transitions leading from them are disabled. For instance, the fault tree for phase 1 
has cut-sets {A} and {B.D} (see Figure 5.7). Hence, state 2 (A failed, all other 
components operational) cannot lead to any other states, as it causes system and 
phase failure. The three transitions leading from this state are therefore disabled. 
States marked with an asterisk are unreachable states in that phase.  
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Table 5.5 – Failure and Acceptable States for Phases 
Phase i Failure States in i Acceptable States at ti 
1,5,9 2,6,7,8,10,12,13*,14,15,16* 1,4,5,11 
2,6,10 3,6,7,9,10,12*,13,14,15,16* 1,2,4,5,8 
3,7,11 3,6,9,10,11,12,13,14,15*,16* 1,2,4,5,8 
4,8 7,12,14,16 1,3,4,5,9,11 
12 7,12,14,16 1,2,3,4,5,6,8,9,10,11,13,15 
 
At time ti (the end of phase i), in order for transition between phases, the system 
needs to occupy a state which causes failure neither in phase i nor in phase i+1. The 
third column in Table 5.5 shows the states that satisfy these requirements for each 
phase. The repetition of the mission profile within the MFOP leads to repeated sets 
of failure states for given phases. However, while phases 4 and 8 lead back to the 
profile of phase 1, phase 12 leads to a repair state, so its acceptable states at the 
phase end time differ.  
 
The probability of the system being in each state at phase change is calculated, 
given the failure rates and phase lengths shown in  
Table 5.1. This yields the probability of system success or failure at ti. The 
probabilities of being in each of the acceptable states at ti form the initial conditions 
for the next phase. The process of calculating the initial conditions for the next 
phase continues until the repair phase. When repair takes place, if components C 
and D are not inspected, the system is returned to any of the states 1, 4, 5 or 11. If 
they are inspected, the next MFOP will begin from state 1.  
 
The Markov analysis tool within the modelling software FaultTree+ was used to 
find the MFOP success and failure rates. This uses numerical integration methods to 
find the state probabilities after set times. These figures were also predicted using 
the Petri net modelling software after performing 10,000,000 simulations. Both sets 
of results are given in Table 5.6 and results from the two models are compared in 
the next section. 
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Table 5.6 – Results from Markov Analysis and Petri Net Model 
MFOP Platform unreliability up to 
end of MFOP (Markov) 
MFOP Failure 
Prob. (Markov) 
MFOP Failure Prob. 
(Petri Net Model) 
Percentage Error 
between results 
1 0.32473 0.324730 0.324872 0.0437% 
2 0.5498 0.333304 0.333222 0.0246% 
3 0.7026 0.339405 0.339228 0.0522% 
4 0.7992 0.324815 0.324865 0.0154% 
5 0.8661 0.333167 0.332750 0.1252% 
6 0.91157 0.339582 0.339362 0.0648% 
7 0.94029 0.324777 0.323946 0.2559% 
8 0.96018 0.333110 0.333117 0.0021% 
9 0.97370 0.339528 0.339884 0.1049% 
10 0.98224 0.324715 0.324741 0.0080% 
11 0.98816 0.333333 0.333041 0.0876% 
12 0.992179 0.339443 0.339061 0.1125% 
 
5.3.2.2 Comparison of Results 
A comparison of the MFOP failure rates produced by the Markov model and that 
produced by the Petri net model software (as shown in Table 5.6) shows a high 
degree of correlation. Due to the possible repair of C and D only after the third 
MFOP, the results follow a cycle where the MFOP failure probability increases 
slowly, and then returns to the initial level after the third MRP. There is a maximum 
of just over a quarter of a per cent error between any two values, and a mean error 
over all twelve MFOPs of 0.0747%. The correlation between the two sets of results 
gives confidence that the Petri net modelling software can accurately predict the 
reliability of repairable phased systems. 
 
The convergence of the failure rate of the first MFOP over the run of simulations is 
shown in Figure 5.13. 
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Figure 5.13 – Convergence of MFOP 1 Failure Rate 
 
5.3.3 Larger Repairable System 
 
This section gives the details and results of using the modelling method to analyse a 
larger, 10-phase, 10-component system, including MFOP complexities mentioned 
in Section 5.2.2. Table 5.7 shows the component failure rates and dependencies. 
Table 5.8 gives, for each phase, the durations and components which can cause 
abandonment. The dependencies column shows the new failure rate of the main 
component if the component listed in the column fails. Figure 5.14 shows the fault 
trees for the 10 phases.  
 
Three missions were performed in each MFOP and three MFOPs were carried out in 
each simulation. Every component failure is repaired in each MRP.  
 
All this detail was entered into the modelling software and 1,000,000 simulations 
were performed to reach an estimate of the likelihoods of failure of the MFOPs, 
missions and phases. 
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Table 5.7 – Component Failure Data  
Component Failure Rate Dependencies 
A Exponential, λ=0.0025 
D – Exp, λ=0.0015 
B – Normal, µ=150, σ=20 
Both - Exp, λ=0.000158 
B Weibull, β=3.2, η=130  
C Exp, λ=0.0041 J – Exp, λ=0.0012 
D Lognormal, µ=5, σ=0.7  
E Normal, µ=140, σ=23  
F Exp, λ=0.0016  
G Norm, µ=160, σ=19 
A – Exp, λ=0.056 
H – Lnorm, µ=5.2, σ=1.2 
Both – Weib, β=1.3, η=340 
H Exp, λ=0.00036  
I Weib, β=2.1, η=240  
J Exponential, λ=0.0024  
 
Table 5.8 – Phase Lengths & Abandonments  
Phase 
Duration 
(Hours) 
Abandonments 
1 0.5 J 
2 2.5 D, G 
3 4.0  
4 1.25 D 
5 
Normal 
(µ=3.4, σ=0.2) 
A, B, I, J 
6 0.6 G 
7 
Exponential 
(λ=0.14) 
G 
8 3.2 E, H 
9 2.1  
10 
Normal  
(µ=5.6, σ=0.4) 
C, D, E 
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Figure 5.14 – Larger System Phase Fault Trees 
 
5.3.3.1 Results 
Table 5.9 shows the number of simulations, failures, abandonments and conditional 
failure probabilities for each of the MFOPs and missions, as outputted from the 
program. Table 5.10 then shows the number of failures of each phase in each 
mission, and their total failure probability.  
 
Table 5.9 – MFOP and Mission Failure Results 
MFOP/ 
Mission 
Starts Failures Abandon- 
ments 
Failure 
Prob. 
MFOP 1 1000000 113270 618047 0.731317 
MFOP 2 886730 60814 766730 0.933253 
MFOP 3 825916 34780 778346 0.984514 
Mission 1 2712646 105400 928724 0.381223 
Mission 2 1678522 67725 805461 0.520211 
Mission 3 805336 35739 428938 0.576998 
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Table 5.10 – Phase Failure Results 
Failures in Phase Starts 
Mission 1 Mission 2 Mission 3
Total 
Failures 
Failure 
Prob. 
1 5196504 3300 72030 34800 110130 0.021193
2 5086374 45587 60528 33264 139379 0.027402
3 4946995 9 27 24 60 0.000012
4 4946935 37868 30475 20633 88976 0.017986
5 4857959 274334 310171 187647 772152 0.158946
6 4085807 32128 22453 9263 63844 0.015626
7 4021963 51337 41698 22158 115193 0.028641
8 3906770 151011 88526 36544 276081 0.070667
9 3630689 0 0 0 0 0
10 3630689 438550 247278 120344 806172 0.222044
 
The convergence of the MFOP failure rates (without abandonments) over the run of 
1,000,000 simulations is shown in Figure 5.15. 
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Figure 5.15 – Convergence of MFOP Failure Rates for Third Example 
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5.4 Summary 
 
Petri nets provide an effective, easily understood and very powerful way of 
predicting the reliability of a system or platform. The Petri net technique extends to 
the area of Phased Missions, where complexities of modelling such as component 
failure rate dependencies, varying distributions and repairable systems are easily 
included. The technique can also be used to model a basic Maintenance-Free 
Operating Period. 
 
The model outlined in this chapter can account for various reliability considerations 
such as component, system, phase, mission and MFOP failure, mission 
abandonment, the MRP and component failures affecting the failure rate of another 
component.  
 
Comparing the results from the Petri net model with an analytical solution for an 
example non-repairable system, the correlation is good. System performance 
prediction from the model can also be reached without the complexities of finding a 
qualitative solution. It can produce the probability of failure in a particular phase as 
well as the overall system reliability. The solution speed is fast and the approach 
more efficient than that for the analytical solution, even for a small system. The 
results when applied to a repairable system are also accurate compared to a Markov 
model, providing confidence in the capabilities of the Petri net modelling method. 
Its capabilities for simulating larger systems have also been demonstrated. 
 
Because the performance of the preliminary Petri net model has been demonstrated 
to be good, it is worthwhile to develop it further, including more complex aspects of 
phased missions and MFOPs. The development of this more complex model is 
covered in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 Development of Complex Model 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The successful development of a simple Petri net modelling technique for MFOPs 
and Phased Missions creates an opportunity to expand its scope. In order to provide 
a method of modelling the performance of MFOPs and phased missions as they 
would be applied in the real-world, many more considerations need to be made. 
Chapter 3 mentions the technologies and ideas identified thus far which will help to 
bring about a successful and lengthy MFOP. This includes redundancies, 
prognostics and so on. Section 4.2 discusses the development of various ways of 
modelling phased missions, and some of the latest research which suggests more 
complex aspects of it, such as phase insertions and phase choice. It is worthwhile to 
produce a method of modelling these additions to the main concepts of MFOPs and 
Phased Missions.  
 
This chapter covers the development of the simple Phased Mission and MFOP Petri 
net model into one which considers important, relevant complexities of both Phased 
Missions and MFOPs. These are discussed and then the ways in which they are 
simulated using Petri nets is explained. 
 
6.2 Phased Missions 
 
6.2.1 Phase Lengths 
 
The application of the modelling method proposed here as a simulation tool allows 
for a wide variety of distribution types to be considered (exponential, Weibull, 
normal, etc.). These distributions can be applied not only to component failure rates, 
but also to phase lengths. If one phase’s length is randomly sampled, it is 
conceivable that a second phase may need to have a length based on that of the first. 
For instance, in a typical aircraft mission, the “return to base” phase length may 
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need to mirror that of the “fly to mission” phase. As such, two further options have 
been made available as phase lengths: 
 
• Reverse a phase length: the time applied to the reverse phase mirrors that of 
the original phase. The length of the reversing phase is equal to the total time 
the original phase was active for. If the original phase was never carried out, 
the time to complete for the reversing phase will be zero. 
 
• Match a phase length: the time for the matching phase to complete is equal 
to the time left for the original phase to complete. If the original phase has 
completed, the time to complete for the matching phase will be zero. 
 
6.2.2 Probability Transitions 
 
In order to model a situation where only one of several outcomes can happen, with a 
given probability, an addition to the Petri Net modelling method has been created. 
The previous way of modelling this situation, shown in Figure 6.1, would have been 
to have two transitions (immediate or not) with the same time to switch, both taking 
an input from the same initial place. These would then output to separate places, one 
for each transition. Only one transition can take the token from the initial place, and 
the system would apply a probability check to find which one. However, it is 
difficult to implement this system in a computer model, and so the Petri net method 
has been extended to include probability transitions and probability arcs. 
 
  
 
  
 
As shown in Figure 6.2, the adaptation of the PN method involves a single transition 
which has arcs which input to the output places with given probabilities. Otherwise, 
a probability transition retains the same functionality as normal transitions, such as 
Input 0.8
0.2
Output
Not 
Output 
0.8 
0.2 
Input Output
Not 
Output 
Figure 6.2 – New Probability MethodFigure 6.1 – Previous Method 
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the ability to have a time delay, inhibition and output arcs which do not have a 
probability attached.  
 
A probability transition must have enough probability arcs such that their sum 
equals 1, as the probabilities on these arcs are interdependent: only one of them will 
be selected for an output. Thus, in Figure 6.2, the place “Output” will receive a 
token in 80% of switches, while “!Output” receives it for the rest of the time. 
 
This type of transition has found its use in applications such as probability-driven 
phase choices (section 6.2.12.2) and discrete events (section 6.3.2). 
 
6.2.3 Fleet of Platforms 
 
A typical real-life situation when considering platform reliability in action is that a 
fleet of platforms may be available to carry out many different combinations of 
missions. Each platform is identical to the others, in that they all have the same 
components, systems, prognostic and diagnostic capabilities, and so on. (Note that a 
“system” refers to any intermediate or top event of a phase fault tree – each of these 
events can very loosely be considered to correspond to the failure of a system in 
some way). Each set will, however, act independently from the others. One way of 
modelling this situation would be to have a different set of Petri Nets (Master, 
Component and Phases) for each platform. As the fleet is of identical platforms, this 
would create an unnecessary and inefficient increase in the memory required to 
simulate the scenario. Instead, coloured tokens, as described in Section 4.3.3.6, have 
been used to represent each of the platforms. 
 
Each platform in the fleet is assigned a unique “colour”. Only one set of component, 
phase and master PNs is then needed to model the entire fleet. Transitions treat each 
colour separately: for a transition to be enabled with a colour, each of the input 
places to the transition must have the correct number of tokens of that colour. The 
sampled switch times that the transition generates will differ for each different 
colour the transition is enabled in. Once the transition switches, only tokens of the 
switched colour are created in the output places.  
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For example, Figure 6.3 shows a Component PN with coloured tokens, for a three-
plane fleet. Each plane has the same components as the others, and using the 
coloured PN rules stated above, each transition for each component will have a 
different time to switch, representing the varying time to fail for each component in 
the different planes. Component 1 in the “white” plane, for instance, may have a 
time to fail of 431.8 flight hours, while the same component in the “black” plane 
could fail after 5089.6 flight hours and that in the “grey” plane has a life of 3491.6 
flight hours. The same transition will switch the different token at different times. 
 
 
Figure 6.3 – Component PN with Coloured Tokens 
 
Similarly, each plane will carry out a different set of MFOPs and missions, and will 
fail at different times and in different ways. The modelling of this is covered in the 
next section. 
 
6.2.4 Platform Operation 
 
In a typical scenario considering MFOPs, a platform might be expected to carry out 
any number and type of missions in a given interval, before maintenance takes 
place. The different planes in the fleet will be expected to perform different 
missions at the same time, and will therefore undergo different stresses and failures 
concurrently. 
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In simulating this situation, a “platform” has been considered to be an entity which 
carries out a distinct sequence of MFOPs, independent of other platforms in the 
fleet, as shown in Figure 6.4. The PNs for modelling the fleet are contained within 
the Master PN, as are those for modelling MFOPs and Missions. 
 
 
Figure 6.4 – Fleet PN Model 
 
Figure 6.4 shows three “Planes”, each with a differently coloured token in the 
“Plane p” place, where p = 1,…,nPL, the total number of platforms. This token 
enables an immediate transition which switches, and commences the first MFOP for 
the plane, putting a token in the “MFOP m1” place, where m1 is the number of the 
first MFOP for that plane. Once this MFOP is complete, an MRP will take place, 
repairing the plane to a state where it is capable of carrying out the next MFOP in 
the sequence. A place represents the “MRP Complete” state (shown in the Figure as 
“MRP Over”), and once this is marked the next MFOP begins immediately. Once 
each platform has completed its sequence of MFOPs, the simulation is considered 
complete. 
 
Note that each platform can carry out any number of MFOPs in its sequence, and 
this number need not match those of other platforms. Similarly, a platform may 
carry out the exact same sequence of MFOPs as any other platform. However, there 
is no “system of systems” approach taken with this model: two platforms 
performing the same mission or MFOP concurrently are assumed to be independent 
of each other. 
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6.2.5 MFOP Operation 
 
The example in Figure 6.4 shows three different types of MFOP. In this research, an 
MFOP is defined as a specific sequence of missions carried out without repair. If an 
MFOP differs from another by only one mission, it is a different MFOP and 
requires a different PN. PNs for example MFOPs are shown in Figure 6.5. 
 
 
Figure 6.5 – MFOP PN Model 
 
In Figure 6.5, a place, “MFOP m”, where m = 1,…,nMF, the total number of MFOPs, 
represents the start of that MFOP. Considering the coloured tokens seen in Figure 
6.3, Planes 1 and 2 are performing “MFOP 1”, while Plane 3 is carrying out “MFOP 
2”. These tokens are placed here by the “Begin MF m” arcs from the immediate 
transitions shown in Figure 6.4. Once an MFOP commences, the coloured tokens 
are immediate passed to the “Msn u1” place of the MFOP, where u1 is the first 
mission of that MFOP, while another token is sent to the “Msn Active” place for 
that mission. 
 
If a mission ends, its “Msn Active” and “Msn End” places will both be marked, and 
so an immediate transition switches in the PN shown below to start the next 
mission. After all missions have been completed, the MFOP is finished and a token 
will end up in the “MFOP Complete” place. 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, completion of an MFOP leads to an MRP, 
after which the following MFOP will begin. 
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6.2.6 Mission Operation and Abandonment 
 
Missions are modelled in much the same way as in the simple model. Shown in 
Figure 6.6, a phase to be carried out in the mission is represented by a place. Three 
other places represent the mission being active, abandoned and ended. Part of the 
platform and MFOP PNs, as explained in the two previous sections, are also shown. 
 
 
Figure 6.6 – Mission Petri Net 
 
In Figure 6.6, Plane 3 begins its first MFOP, number 2, which then commences 
mission 3. The activation of mission 3 marks the place for its first phase, and after 
the phase length its phase transition switches to phase 2. This sequence continues 
until a token marks “Msn 3 Complete”, and the next mission in the PN for the 
parent MFOP can begin, as shown in Figure 6.5. Note that it is possible for a phase 
to be repeated within the same mission. 
 
If, during any phase, that phase’s failure place is marked, this represents mission 
failure. The combination of the phase operation and phase failure places being 
marked will result in the mission failure and mission complete places being marked. 
This, in turn, removes the token from the MFOP PN and places it directly in the 
“MFOP Complete” place, so a Maintenance Recovery Period can begin 
immediately. 
 
Msn 3 
Failure 
Plane 3 MFOP 2
Msn 3MFOP 2 
Msn 3 
Active 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4
Msn 3 
Complete
MFOP 
Complete
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Because the failure of a mission in this way leads to MFOP completion and 
performance of an MRP, this failure reflects the abandonment of a mission. This 
“soft” MFOP failure allows the platform to perform future missions and stands in 
contrast to total loss, which is explained in the next section.  
 
6.2.7 Total Loss of Platform 
 
It is possible that a platform may suffer a catastrophic failure, where it is totally lost. 
Examples of this situation include a flight into terrain, explosion, abandonment in 
enemy territory, and so on. For the purposes of this model, any catastrophic failure 
will cause all activity for that platform to stop: component and system failures will 
no longer be possible, and no further missions, MFOPs or MRPs can be carried out. 
Figure 6.7 shows how this is modelled with Petri Nets. 
 
 
Figure 6.7 – Platform Failure Model 
 
In Figure 6.7, part of the PN for an example platform is shown. Plane 3 performs 
MFOP 2 first, and so tokens are passed to both “MFOP 2” places from the initial 
“Plane 3” place. Similarly, Mission 3 is the first task in MFOP 2, so tokens are put 
into the “Msn 3” and the “Msn 3 Active” places. This commences Phase 1, which 
finishes after a time and begins phase 2.  
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If, during phase 2, a catastrophic failure arises and the top place of the Phase 2 PN 
becomes marked, immediate transition 1 removes the token from the Phase 2 and 
Msn 3 Active places. A token is placed into the “Catastrophe” place, taking the 
token from the “MFOP 2” place through immediate transition 2, and thus marking 
the “Plane Crash” place. This place removes any mission tokens from the formerly 
active MFOP through immediate transition 4, after which immediate transition 3 
switches, completing the simulation for that platform. 
 
There are two different ways, therefore, that a mission and an MFOP can be 
considered to have failed: abandonment, or total loss. Hence, this requires there to 
be two sets of failure logic for each phase.  
 
6.2.8 MFOP Abandonment  
 
Upon the abandonment of a mission as explained in section 6.2.6, the platform 
would return to base for repair. The phase, mission and MFOP would be considered 
failed, and the normal sequence of missions as modelled in Figure 6.5 would not 
take place. Thus, a model of this failure process is required, as shown in Figure 6.8. 
 
 
Figure 6.8 – MFOP Failure Model 
 
In Figure 6.8, the mission profile of MFOP 1 is shown, as in Figure 6.5, running 
along the centre. Also shown here are Mission Failure, Mission Active and Mission 
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End places for each mission. If a mission is failed such that the platform is still 
capable of returning to base, a token will be in the “Msn u Fail” place. In Figure 6.8, 
the scenario is that the abandoned mission (Mission 1) has ended. In this case, the 
“Msn 1 Fail” place inhibits the transition which would typically commence the next 
mission. Instead, an immediate failure transition deactivates the mission, and places 
the coloured token in the “MFOP End” place. This allows repair to commence, after 
which the next MFOP will take place. 
 
6.2.9 Mission Abandonment to Phase 
 
Section 6.2.6 describes the modelling of the abandonment of missions. The 
modelling method requires the mission to immediately end, cancelling the MFOP 
and immediately beginning an MRP. Particularly for the case where a platform is 
performing a mission far from base, it is unrealistic to expect the mission to end 
immediately once the command to abandon it has been given. In this case, then, it is 
of use to allow a mission to abandon to a sequence of phases, after which the 
mission ends and an MRP can begin. Figure 6.9 demonstrates this idea. 
 
 
Figure 6.9 – Mission Abandonment to Phase 
 
In the Figure, the top event place for the abandonment fault tree PN in phase 2 is 
marked. As the mission is currently in phase 2, the mission is abandoned and, 
instead of the token going directly to the “Mission Complete” place, as it does in 
Figure 6.6, a token is placed in the “Abandon Phase 1” place. This phase will take 
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time to complete, after which “Abandon Phase 2” takes place. Only after these two 
phases have finished will the mission have finished and an MRP can begin. 
 
Of note is a small complication that arises from this provision of abandoning to 
phases: it would theoretically be possible for an abandonment phase to itself 
abandon to another phase, ad infinitum. Because of this, while it is possible for 
catastrophic failures to still occur during an abandonment phase, it has been made a 
condition of abandonment that the “Mission failure” place, when marked, inhibits 
all abandonment transitions. Thus, when a mission has been abandoned in a certain 
way, it cannot then be abandoned to a different phase: the sequence must complete 
as given. 
 
6.2.10 MRP Modelling 
 
If a platform is set to undergo more than one MFOP, there must be a Maintenance 
Recovery Period between the two, where the platform is brought back up to the 
point where it can perform the next MFOP. One way of modelling the progression 
from Ending MFOP → Repair → Next MFOP is shown in Figure 6.10. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.10 – MFOP-MRP Sequence Model 
 
In the Figure, whenever an MFOP commences in the Fleet PN (Figure 6.4), a token 
of the relevant colour is placed in the “MFOPs Active” place in the Component PN. 
Nothing will then happen in this part of the overall PN until the MFOP is 
MFOP 
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completed, and a coloured token is present in the “MFOP Complete” place, as 
shown in Figure 6.5. This enables an immediate transition which switches and 
marks the “MRP Active” place. When in this state, the platform is capable of 
undergoing whatever repairs are required, and will only switch out of the state when 
the necessary components for the next MFOP have been repaired. These 
components’ failure places will, if marked, inhibit the exit transition from the MRP 
Active state. When this repair is completed, the immediate transition to which the 
“MRP Active” place inputs deposits a token in the “Next MFOP” place, which 
corresponds to the “MRP Over” place shown in Figure 6.4, and allows the 
immediate transitions in that Figure to switch, commencing the next MFOP. 
 
The “MRP Active” place is one of the most important in the whole net: it is through 
this one place that many of the processes explained below, such as inspections and 
replacements, are possible. 
 
6.2.11 General Failure 
 
If it is possible for a platform to be failed in the same way during any of its phases, 
it would be inefficient to have each phase fault tree repeat the same modes and 
events of failure. Instead, therefore, it is possible to define a general failure fault 
tree which, if the top event for either catastrophic failure or mission abandonment 
occurs, the mission and MFOP will be abandoned.  
 
The fault tree PNs for general abandonment and total loss are contained in their own 
PPN, structured in the same way as the other PPNs. The main difference between 
the other PPNs and the general PPN is that the occurrence of either of the top events 
in the latter net can cause a mission failure regardless of the current phase. Figure 
6.11 and Figure 6.12 show this.  
 
In Figure 6.11, the General PPN failure top event place is marked with a token, 
indicating the platform’s total loss. This place acts as an input to four different 
failure transitions in the Master PN shown on the right side of the diagram. 
Whichever phase place is marked in the active mission and MFOP (“Phase 1” and 
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“Msn 3” in this instance) will have its token removed by the corresponding failure 
transition which puts a token in the “catastrophe” place.  
 
 
Figure 6.11 – General Platform Total Loss 
 
 
Figure 6.12 – General Mission Abandonment 
 
The procedure for abandoning a mission works in a similar way, as shown in Figure 
6.12. The marking of the General PPN Abandonment top event place will cause the 
relevant phase place to automatically lose its token via a failure transition, with the 
mission abandonment place being marked instead. If the phase is set to abandon to 
another phase, as explained in section 6.2.9, then this phase will begin (note that any 
abandonment transition for this new phase will be inhibited). Once the sequence of 
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abandonment phases has completed, or if there is no sequence, the “mission 
complete” place will be marked, and an MRP will begin. 
 
Due to the possibility of any or all of general phase failure/abandonment and  
normal phase failure/abandonment occurring at the same time, a hierarchy has been 
created to prevent more than one of these affecting a mission. This works as 
follows: 
 
1. General phase failure 
2. Individual phase failure 
3. General and individual phase abandonment 
 
As such, the general failure place is set to inhibit the transitions relating to general 
abandonment and individual fail & abandonment. Individual phase failure will 
inhibit the abandonment transitions. 
 
6.2.12 Phase Selection 
 
A phased mission does not necessarily consist of one linear sequence of phases. It is 
possible that different events, such as the failure of one or more of the objectives of 
a mission (for example, a missile missing a target), or component or system failures, 
may lead to one phase from an array of choices being selected to be performed next. 
The nature of the drivers behind the selection can be broken down into two areas: 
those prompted by events considered within the model, and those which are outside 
its scope. The former use these events to enable or inhibit progression to a different 
phase, while the latter use probability transitions, explained in section 6.2.2, to 
randomly select (with a given weighting towards each option) which phase is 
carried out next. 
6.2.12.1 Event-driven Phase Selection 
Component or system failures can affect the choice of the phase to begin next. As 
an example, consider a mission with an attack phase where a missile must be 
launched. The failure of either the launch system or the missile will prevent this 
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phase from being successful, and so an alternative phase may be performed instead, 
such as sending the platform to a secondary objective. This can be modelled using 
the PN system as shown in Figure 6.13. 
 
 
Figure 6.13 – Event-driven Phase Selection 
 
In this example, phase 2 in the master PN has two output transitions. An event (be it 
basic, intermediate or top) controls which of these is enabled at any one time, 
depending upon whether it is marked or not. If the component or system is 
operational, it will not be marked, and so the mission will progress normally from 
phase 2 to phase 3. If a failure has occurred and the event place is marked, the 
normal phase transition is inhibited, and instead the one shown below it in Figure 
6.13 is enabled instead. As a result, phase 2 will enter phase 3’ once it is finished. 
6.2.12.2 Probability-driven Phase Selection 
Certain factors (such as the weather on a given day or the likelihood of a successful 
attack) are not considered directly within the scope of the model. These factors may 
still affect the behaviour of a mission, however, and as such a method to decide the 
following phase according to user-defined probabilities has been provided. This 
method uses the probability transitions introduced in Section 6.2.2, with the 
probabilities on the arcs corresponding to those of entering each phase. 
 
 
Figure 6.14 – Probability-driven Phase Selection 
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Figure 6.14 shows a probabilistic phase transition taking its input from the phase 2 
place. In 75% of cases, the output selected will be phase 3, while in 25% of cases it 
will be phase 3’. This probability may represent anything uncontrollable by the 
operator, such as requiring a prevalent weather condition for phase 3, or the 
presence of civilians in 25% of cases requiring an alternate mission plan. 
 
6.2.13 Phase Insertion 
 
It is possible that, due to external conditions, an emergency phase may need to be 
performed immediately, after which the original phase resumes where it was 
interrupted. An example to consider is where a plane must refuel at an intermediate 
base or in-flight, due to spending longer than planned in the air. 
 
Phase insertion is another complexity of phased missions modelling which can be 
simulated in Petri net form. A typical way to mimic the insertion is shown in Figure 
6.15 below. 
 
Figure 6.15 – Phase Insertion 
 
In the Figure, an intermediate event has occurred during Phase 2. This intermediate 
event prompts an immediate transition to remove the token from the Phase 2 place 
and put one in the Emergency Phase place and one in the “Insert Control Place”. 
The latter of these inhibits the Insert transition from switching more than once in a 
given mission. Once the Emergency Phase has completed, its phase transition 
switches and the token is placed back in the Phase 2 place. The timed transition for 
Phase 2 resumes its previous switch time (increased to account for the interruption) 
Phase PN Master PN Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
Mission 
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and the mission can continue. Once the mission has ended, an immediate transition 
removes the token from the Insert Control place.  
 
As the phase interruption can compete with phase failure and abandonment in 
removing the token from the phase place, it has also been given a place in the 
hierarchy mentioned in section 6.2.11, at the bottom. Therefore, the phase insertion 
transition will be inhibited by all phase failure and abandonment top event places. 
Also, in order to ensure that phase insertion cannot occur in abandonment phases, 
every abandonment transition will, in addition to marking the abandonment phase 
and the “Mission failed” places, put a token in all of the Insert Control places for 
that mission. 
 
The improvements to the model shown in section 6.2 apply primarily to the nets in 
the Master PN, which control the active phase, mission and MFOP for each 
platform. The following section covers those changes which allow for more 
complex modelling of aspects regarding reliability and platform performance. These 
include the MFOP enablers mentioned in section 3.5.1. 
 
6.3 Reliability & Maintainability and MFOP Enablers 
 
The discussion of MFOPs so far in this chapter has focused primarily on their 
relation to the concept of phased missions. However, as outlined in Section 3.5, 
suggestions have been published as to how an MFOP of a useful duration is 
achievable. This section covers the inclusion of these aspects in the Petri net model. 
 
6.3.1 Inherent Reliability 
 
The consideration of inherent reliability in the MFOP philosophy provides for a 
greater understanding of the failure modes and distributions of the components of 
the platform. Improvements to the component reliabilities can be made and will thus 
affect the reliability of the platform. However, this improvement does not need to be 
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modelled using Petri nets – rather, more reliable and accurate failure time 
distributions can be provided for input to the model once this is known. 
 
6.3.2 Discrete Events 
 
It is possible to describe an event that does not have a “failure” like other basic 
events, but instead is the occurrence or non-occurrence of some outcome with a 
given probability at a given time, in response to a trigger. These types of events are 
here referred to as “discrete” events (DEs). An example of this is a simple human-
error consideration, such as the maintenance crew of an aircraft not replacing the 
fuel cap before flight. This is not an event that can be described as a failure over 
time, as it cannot happen mid-flight. Instead, it is a DE that either does or does not 
occur after a prompting event (in this case, refuelling before a mission begins).  
 
Discrete events use immediate probability transitions to provide an output to either 
an “event occurs” or an “event does not occur” place. The full net for a DE is shown 
in Figure 6.16.  
 
 
Figure 6.16 – Discrete Event Model 
 
The trigger for a DE can be anything considered within the scope of the model: an 
MRP, the start of a phase, mission or MFOP, a component failure and so on. If the 
trigger event occurs and its associated place becomes marked, the place causes 
transition 1 in Figure 6.16 to switch. This will mark either of the “Event” or “NOT 
Event” places, depending on a randomly sampled number between 0 and 1, and the 
arc probabilities. Transition 1 is disabled by the marking of the output places, while 
transitions 2 and 3 will remain inhibited by the trigger event, until such time as the 
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trigger event place becomes unmarked. When the input event is no longer occurring, 
either transition 2 or 3 (depending on which output was originally selected) will 
switch, removing the token from the output place. Discrete event ‘Yes’ places are 
able to act as inputs to phase fault trees, reproducing responses to failures or event 
occurrences. 
 
Phases and MFOPs have multiple places which represent their operation. If a 
discrete event takes an input from a phase or an MFOP, a “summary” place is 
created, which takes as inputs each instance of the occurrence of the relevant event 
in an OR logic. When the summary place is marked, the discrete event makes its 
decision then.  
 
6.3.3 Component Replacement 
 
The simple MFOP model considered that the replacement of a component could 
only occur if the item was failed. The repair process moved the component directly 
from the failed state to the working state. It is possible, however, that a component 
which is not failed needs to be replaced, for instance due to having a scheduled life 
after which it is considered unsafe to allow the component to continue operating. 
 
 
Figure 6.17 – Component Replacement 
 
Figure 6.17 shows a component PN which is connected to the MFOP-MRP-MFOP 
places as described in Figure 6.10. If a component fails after a given time, the token 
shown in the “Compt Up” place will move to the “Compt Dn” place. During an 
MRP, previously the token would have returned directly to the “Compt Up” place. 
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In the model shown in Figure 6.17, however, the token instead moves to the “Compt 
Replace” place. A token is then replaced in the “Compt Up” place where another 
failure time can be sampled randomly. 
 
The occurrence of an event may mean that the component must be replaced during 
the next MRP, regardless of whether it is operating or not. Figure 6.17 shows the 
“Compt Up” place providing an output to a transition on its top-left, which also 
takes inputs from the replacement trigger and MRP Active places. This transition 
then passes an output to the “Compt Replace” place. The presence of a token in the 
“Compt Replace” place resets the time of the component failure transition. The 
token is then replaced in the “Compt Up” place and a new time to failure generated. 
 
This component replacement model is used extensively as a part of other modelling 
methods. One of these is the concept of Line Replaceable Items, which are 
explained in the next section. 
 
6.3.4 Line Replaceable Items 
 
Components are rarely removed as individual items. For all the typical inspections, 
repairs or replacements that need to be performed during maintenance, this would 
be a very costly procedure, in terms of time and money. Instead, to speed this 
process up, they are often located together in batches in physical items which can be 
removed or replaced as a whole. These groups are known as Line Replaceable Items 
or LRIs. A LRI may contain other LRIs, a full system or several independent 
components. A LRI containing other LRIs is typically referred to as the parent, 
while those it contains are child LRIs.  
 
A LRI, as far as this model is concerned, is a simple, descriptive way of allowing 
multiple component replacements in response to a single stimulus, regardless of 
whether those components are currently in the working or failed states. The children 
for each LRI are specified, whether these are other LRIs, components or systems. 
Also given is the logic which dictates how many of the children must have failed in 
order for the parent to be considered worth replacing. This will either be all of the 
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children (in which case the input logic is essentially an AND gate), any one of the 
children (an OR gate), or a certain number (a x-out-of-y vote gate). 
 
 
Figure 6.18 – OR and AND logic inputs to LRI place 
 
 
Figure 6.19 – 2-out-of-3 Voting gate input to LRI place 
 
Figure 6.18 shows the first two cases mentioned, with the left-hand PN being that 
where any one input needs to have failed in order to replace the LRI. The right-hand 
PN is for the case where all of the inputs need to have failed. The three places which 
input to the LRI place are a child LRI replace place, a component failed place and a 
system failed place. If a system failed place provides input to the LRI, then the 
transition it inputs through must also output to a control place, which prevents the 
system failure place from causing multiple replacements of the LRI in an MRP. 
This control place is cleared whenever the system failed place is cleared. 
 
Figure 6.19 shows a much more complicated PN using the same three places for 
inputs as in Figure 6.18. This is an example net where any two of the three inputs 
need to have failed for the LRI to be replaced. Each input place enables a transition 
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which places a token in a “vote place”, as well as in an input control place, which 
prevents the transition from switching more than once for a given failure. The vote 
place outputs to a transition which allows it to mark the LRI place. Due to the arc-
multiplicity of two, the vote place can only enable this transition when there are two 
tokens within the vote place, which is when enough inputs are marked. When this 
condition is satisfied, the vote place inhibits all input transitions, and switches its 
output transition. This remarks itself, and marks the LRI place and a “vote control 
place”. The vote control place prevents the vote place from repeatedly enabling and 
switching its output transition. 
 
If an input place becomes unmarked, its control place will output its token to a 
newly enabled transition. The vote place also outputs to this transition, and so will 
reduce its token count by one whenever the transition switches. When all input 
places are no longer marked (which will only happen during an MRP), the vote 
place will be empty, and the vote control place will output to a transition which 
removes its token as well. Thus, the net is cleared before a new MFOP begins. 
 
The nets shown thus far merely explain how a LRI place can come to be marked. 
Once it is marked, it must play a role in replacing each component contained within 
it. Consider the PN shown in Figure 6.20. There are three components shown: A, B 
and C, each of which can be replaced as demonstrated in the previous section. Also 
shown are places representing six LRIs. LRI 1 is the parent of LRIs 2 and 3. LRI 2 
is the parent of LRIs 4, 5 and 6. LRIs 3, 4 and 5 are not considered in this example 
other than to demonstrate the nature of the LRI parent-child hierarchy.  
 
At some point during an MFOP, LRI 2 is marked for replacement during the 
following MRP, due either to failures of its child items or to having a scheduled 
replacement time. A LRI, when marked for replacement, will also mark all of its 
child LRIs for replacement. This therefore creates tokens in the places for LRIs 4, 5 
and 6, the latter of which contains A, B and C. At the time of the MRP, A and C are 
operational, while B has failed. The “LRI 6” place acts as the replacement trigger 
for each of the components, as shown in Figure 6.17. Its being marked causes the 
tokens to be removed from A and C’s up places, and B’s down place, and mark the 
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respective replacement places. These then re-mark the component-up places, 
following which a new time to fail is generated for each component. 
 
 
Figure 6.20 – LRI Replacement 
 
Each LRI has a transition which acts to remove the tokens from the places 
representing that LRI, all its child LRIs and the replacement places of all the 
components contained in itself and its children. If a LRI has a parent, the parent LRI 
place will inhibit the clearing transition for the child LRI, as the parent will have its 
own clearing transition which must switch instead. The transition that performs this 
function for LRI 2 is shown at the bottom-centre of Figure 6.20. Once the LRI has 
been replaced and all the relevant “Compt Replace” places are marked, this 
transition switches, removing the tokens from each input. 
 
Figure 6.10 shows each “component failed” place as inhibiting the transition which 
allows progression from an MRP to the next MFOP. If a component is fixed by a 
LRI, it will no longer directly inhibit this transition; the LRI place does this instead. 
 
If a system is specified to be an input to a LRI, this means nothing other than all the 
components which it contains are all to be replaced. However, the system failed 
place becomes an input to the LRI, so any failure logic will focus only on the 
system and any other inputs, not on the individual components within the system.  
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Note that a component or system cannot be part of more than one LRI, excepting 
that LRI’s set of parents. This is because a LRI is a physical location of the 
component, rather than an arbitrary grouping. 
 
6.3.5 Scheduled Life Replacements 
 
Certain items within the platform may be important, and yet cannot be supported 
within the platform architecture by redundancies or other means. If these items fail, 
they could put the platform into a critical state, and so they are subject to scheduled 
life replacements (SLRs). This means that, once a certain time has expired after the 
item was installed, the item will be replaced regardless of whether it has failed or 
not. While this is typically an expensive maintenance strategy in terms of 
throughput of components, it may prove rewarding in the improvement in overall 
platform reliability. 
 
There are two types of item to which an SLR can be applied: LRIs and individual 
components. The left-hand-side of Figure 6.21 shows the PN for an SLR as used 
with a LRI. The SLR needs to mark the main LRI place after a given length of time. 
To achieve this, whenever any MFOP is defined as being “active”, it will mark a 
SLR control place, unless the LRI is already set to be replaced.  If it is not, the 
marked control place will enable a timed transition set to switch after the length of 
time defined by the user. When this switches, the LRI is marked to be replaced 
during the next MRP. A third transition forces the SLR control place to be emptied 
whenever the LRI place is marked in a different way. 
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Figure 6.21 – SLRs for an LRI and a Component 
 
Figure 6.21 also shows the net modelling an SLR for a component. For the LRI, an 
SLR control place inputted to the timed transition, but for the component A, its “up” 
place takes this role. The “Ready for Replacement” place shown in the Figure is 
similar in purpose to the main LRI place. While the “A Up” place is marked, a 
timed transition is enabled which, once the time has expired, will place a token in 
the “ready for replacement” place, without removing it from the up place. If the 
component were to fail after this time, the token in the “A Dn” place would cause 
the ready for replacement place to be emptied, through the transition at the bottom 
of the Figure, and the component would be repaired in the next MRP as normal. 
 
If, however, the component remains in operation until the next MRP, then the 
marking of the MRP Active, Ready For Replacement and A Up places causes an 
immediate transition to switch which empties the latter two places and marks the “A 
Repl.” place. This resets the time to fail for A, and when the up place is marked 
again, a new time to fail is generated. 
 
If a component is specified to have a scheduled life replacement, and the component 
is a specific member of a LRI (that is, not as part of a parent system), then a few 
alterations must be made to the nets shown in Figure 6.20 and the right-hand-side of 
Figure 6.21 to allow the two to work together. These alterations are shown in Figure 
6.22. 
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Figure 6.22 – Combining Component LRI and SLR 
 
Figure 6.22 shows standard component and LRI arcs as dotted, and SLR arcs and 
transitions as grey. A new transition is created, inhibited by the LRI place and 
enabled by the MRP active place, which allows the replacement place to input back 
to the up place. Thus, there would be two transitions returning tokens performing 
this role. The one which was created explicitly for the LRI would be newly enabled 
by the LRI place, always allowing the replacement place to remark the up place 
regardless of whether it is the LRI or the SLR which has prompted the replacement. 
 
6.3.6 Diagnostics 
 
The purpose of a diagnostics system is to detect the occurrence and location of 
failures, faults or performance deterioration within the overall system. This can 
either be performed in real-time through the use of sensors, or during maintenance 
periods through inspections. These play a role in the ability to predict future 
failures, either of individual components, or of phases and missions, as well as 
affecting redundancies. The ways in which these two failure detection methods have 
been implemented in the PN model are outlined below. 
6.3.6.1 Sensors 
In real situations, sensors monitor a feature of a system, such as flow rate through a 
pipe, or potential difference between two points. For the purposes of the model, 
however, a sensor is a single component which, if working, will detect a failure of 
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another component or a system. The manner in which the sensor or sensor system 
decides that the failure has occurred is irrelevant here; only the ability to detect it is 
important. 
 
 
Figure 6.23 – Sensor Detecting Failure of a System 
 
In Figure 6.23, system X consists of two components, A and B, such that they both 
need to fail for X to fail. A third component, the sensor, will detect the failure of X 
only if it itself is working. This is handled in PN form by having an immediate 
transition inputting from X alone (and so being enabled whenever X is marked), 
outputting to the “Failure detected” place and back to “System X Failed”, and being 
inhibited by the “Sensor dn” place. In the marking in Figure 6.23, the currently 
operating sensor allows the marking of the detection place. 
 
A common problem with failure detection systems is a spurious trip or No Fault 
Found (NFF). Occasionally, a sensor will consider the item it is monitoring to have 
failed when no actual failure has occurred. Where there are consequences of the 
reported failure, such as switching power to a backup system, or abandoning a 
mission to return to base, this can be costly. This has been modelled in Figure 6.23 
by attaching the “Sensor up” place to a second timed transition and inputting to the 
“Failure detected” place. The timed transition will sample a time randomly from the 
NFF rate, which describes the distribution of times at which NFF errors occur. If the 
sensor remains operational and the component it is sensing does not have a detected 
failure before this time expires, the transition will switch, reproducing a spurious 
trip.  
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When an MRP takes place, any tokens in the “Failure detected” place, regardless of 
being caused by a real failure or spurious trip, will be removed as long as neither the 
sensor nor the sensed component or system is failed.  
6.3.6.2 Inspection 
If a component or system’s operation is not monitored by a diagnostic sensor 
system, it may instead be inspected at regular intervals throughout its life to detect 
failure or signs of wear. Within the scope of the MFOP policy, these inspections 
must take place within MRPs after either regular time intervals (numbers of hours), 
numbers of MFOPs, or in response to the detected failure of a higher system. 
Inspections can take place on components or systems.  
 
The formation of a PN for each item undergoing an inspection depends on the 
following factors: 
- Does the inspection take place after a fixed period of flying hours, a fixed 
number of MFOPs, or on the discovered failure of a parent system? 
- Is it a component or a system? 
- Is it a member of a LRI, either directly or through a parent system? 
 
The subsections below explain the PNs for each type of case, beginning with the 
implementation of the inspection on the various possible items. 
 
Component with no parent LRI 
 
If a component which is not a member of a LRI, either directly or through a parent 
system, is to be inspected, then this is relatively simple to model. Figure 6.24 shows 
the typical PN for this case. 
 
 - 169 - 
 
Figure 6.24 – Inspection for Component, no LRI 
 
The Figure shows a standard component, without any replacement place. An 
inspection place has been also included, and when this is marked with a token, at the 
next MRP, one of two things will happen. If the component is in the working state, 
then the transition at the bottom of the PN shown will switch and clear the 
inspection place. If the component is failed, then the inspection will switch the 
repair transition and the token will return to the “A up” place. 
 
Note that if the component has scheduled life replacements, then as explained in 
section 6.3.5, it will have had a replacement place created. However, the addition of 
the inspection place enabling the repair/replacement transition does not affect the 
SLR PN, or vice versa. There would usually be an inhibitor arc between “A Dn” and 
the MRP complete transition, as shown in Figure 6.10, but this is deleted and an arc 
leads instead from the inspection place. This is because a failure may be carried 
through an MRP if an inspection on a failed component is not yet due. 
 
Component with parent LRI 
 
A component which is part of a LRI will not typically be replaced individually, but 
instead when the overall LRI requires replacement. Section 6.3.4 explains how a net 
for a component LRI member is generated, and how they interact with each other. 
Requiring the component to undergo an inspection complicates the net further, 
depending on whether the component is a direct part of a LRI, or a parent system is. 
If the component is a direct member of a LRI, then the net as exemplified in Figure 
6.25 applies. 
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Figure 6.25 – Inspection for Component in LRI (Direct Member) 
 
The Figure shows, in grey, the standard PN for a component LRI member. Its 
“down” place inputs to the LRI (whether this is via AND, OR or vote logic does not 
affect the inspection net), while the LRI place forces replacement when marked. 
The inspection place inhibits the “MRP Complete” transition as explained above, 
and it outputs to three different transitions. As the component is a direct member of 
the LRI, its input to it is based on the component having failed. However, its failure 
is not revealed until the inspection has taken place, and therefore an arc must lead 
from the inspection place to the LRI input transition used by the component.  
 
The two other transitions to which the inspection place outputs remove its token 
based on the LRI having been replaced, but due to a component failure, and an 
inspection of the component revealing that it is still operational. 
 
If the component has a parent system which is a direct member of a LRI, then the 
component will undergo replacements, but will not have an input to the LRI 
directly. It has been considered that if a component is specified to undergo 
inspections independently of a parent system, then the component must be able to 
be replaced by itself, in addition to being part of a LRI. The PN for this is shown in 
Figure 6.26. 
 
MFOPs Active MRP Active Next MFOP
Inspection
A Up A DnA Repl. 
LRI
 - 171 - 
 
Figure 6.26 – Inspection of Component with LRI (Indirect Member) 
 
The Figure is almost identical to Figure 6.25, but for the difference of one 
transition: the LRI input transition, at the right of Figure 6.25, is not shown, as the 
component does not directly input to the LRI. Instead, a transition which allows the 
token to return directly from “A Dn” to “A Up”, without going through the 
replacement place, is shown. This is enabled by the MRP Active place, A Dn and 
the inspection place, and inhibited by the LRI place, so that if the LRI is due to be 
replaced, this is the superior condition. If an inspection during the MRP finds that 
the component is failed, it is returned immediately to the working state. 
 
System with no parent LRI 
 
Inspections of systems which are not part of a LRI do not have an immediate effect. 
If a failure of the system is detected, then the system as a whole cannot be simply 
removed and replaced, as it is not part of a LRI, and so the model assumes that the 
system’s components are in different physical locations in the platform. Instead, the 
system’s inspection must lead to further inspections of components within the 
system, as the system cannot be repaired until the components within it are repaired. 
The PN for this case takes this consideration into account, as shown in Figure 6.27. 
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Figure 6.27 – Inspection of a System with No LRI 
 
The Figure shows the failure place for System X, and an inspection place 
accompanying it. The transition labelled ‘1’ in Figure 6.27 takes inputs from the 
“MRP Active” place, System X failure and the inspection place (returning tokens to 
the former two places). When components are inspected following the failure of a 
parent system, it is transition 1 which provides the token to the components’ 
inspection places, as shown in Figure 6.32. Transition 2 removes the token from the 
inspection place during an MRP if the system is found to be working.  
 
System with parent LRI 
 
A system which is part of a LRI can be set to be inspected at regular intervals. The 
net which is created depends upon the logic used to decide whether the LRI should 
be replaced. If, as shown in Figure 6.18, the system failure place inputs to the LRI 
with an AND or OR logic, it will have a control place created for it. Upon being 
marked for inspections, the control place is converted to an inspection place. This is 
done as shown in Figure 6.28 below.  
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Figure 6.28 – Inspections on System with LRI (AND/OR Logic Input) 
 
In the Figure, an input & inhibitor arc is shown greyed out between the inspection 
place and transition 2. This is the arc as created for the control place in Figure 6.18, 
which is now the inspection place. This arc is deleted from the net, and an arc 
leading from the inspection place to transition 2 replaces it. This new arc sets the 
inspection place as only allowing the “System X failed” place to input to the LRI 
place when the inspection is due. Transition 1, which removes the token from the 
inspection place when X is found not to have failed, is newly enabled by the MRP 
Active place. Finally, the inspection place is set to inhibit the “MRP Complete” 
transition in the Component PN. 
 
If, instead, the logical input to the LRI is a m-out-of-n vote gate, then the input 
transition to the LRI Vote gate will already have had a control place created. This 
cannot be converted into an inspection place; a new place is created instead. As 
shown in Figure 6.29, this is set up in a very similar manner to Figure 6.28: the 
inspection place outputs to a transition (1) which removes the token in an MRP if 
the system X is found to be working. The transition (2) which inputs to the LRI vote 
place also now takes an input from the inspection place, and is enabled by the MRP 
Active place. 
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Figure 6.29 - Inspections on System with LRI (m-out-of-n Vote Logic Input) 
 
However the inspection place is applied, there must be conditions set to allow the 
model to know when an inspection is required. For this, there are three inspection 
schedules provided: 
 
- After a user-defined interval tI 
- After f MFOPs have been performed 
- Once a parent system has been inspected and found to have failed 
 
These three schedules are rendered in PN form as shown below. 
 
Inspection after Time Interval 
 
Figure 6.30 shows how the inspection place is marked when it is set to be performed 
after a given time interval. A timed transition is created, with its distribution set to 
be deterministic and the delay to that specified by the operator. This transition is 
enabled by the “MFOPs Active” place in the Component PN, so that whenever the 
platform is undergoing MFOPs, the transition will be enabled and waiting for the 
time delay to expire. The transition inputs to the Inspection place (which also 
inhibits it, so if an inspection is due because of another schedule, the transition is 
disabled). Whenever the time expires, an inspection will take place in the next 
MRP. 
 
X Failed
MFOPs Active MRP Active Next MFOP 
Inspection
2
Phase PN
Component PN
LRI Vote 
Place 
Vote Control 
Place 
m
 - 175 - 
  
Figure 6.30 – Inspection after Time Interval Figure 6.31 – Inspection after f MFOPs 
 
Inspection after MFOPs 
 
Figure 6.31 shows the PN method of modelling inspection after a given number, f, 
of MFOPs. Every time the “MFOP Complete” transition switches from a completed 
MFOP to an MRP, a token is also placed in the “MFOP Counter” place. When f 
tokens have been counted in that place, indicating that f MFOPs have completed, 
another immediate transition switches, removing those tokens and placing one in the 
inspection place. 
 
Inspection after Parent System Failure 
 
If a failure is detected or revealed in an important system, a typical procedure would 
be to investigate further to find the reasons for the fault. This revelation of failure 
could, therefore, cause a child system or component to be inspected. If an item is 
specified to have this type of inspection, it can be modelled in PN form. There are 
two cases within this scenario: where the parent system is itself inspected, and 
where it is not. If it is inspected, then the inspection place for the child item is 
connected to the transitions created for the parent system to pass on the noted failure 
– these are shown as transition 1 in Figure 6.27 and transition 2 in Figure 6.28 and 
Figure 6.29. Figure 6.32 below shows how the net is created to model this. 
Inspection 
MRP Active 
MFOP 
Counter 
MFOPs Active
Inspection 
MFOPs Active 
 - 176 - 
 
Figure 6.32 – Inspection after Parent System Failure Found 
 
In Figure 6.32, the transition mentioned above inputs to the “Child Inspection” 
place when, in an MRP, an inspection of system X has found a failure. If the child 
system or component is a member of a LRI, it will not inhibit this transition, while it 
will do so if it is not a member of a LRI. As such, the inhibitor arc is shown in grey 
in Figure 6.32. In order to prevent the child inspection place being marked for 
inspection several times, another transition is created to remove any tokens in the 
child inspection place when a failure in system X is found during an MRP. This is 
shown at the bottom of the figure.  
 
If the parent item is not inspected, then the inspection of the child depends directly 
upon the failure of the parent item. If the parent item has a sensor attached to it, the 
marking of the “failure sensed” place (as shown in Figure 6.23) is used to trigger 
inspection in the child; if not, the system failure place is used. The nets are created 
as shown in Figure 6.33. 
 
 
Figure 6.33 – Inspection after Parent System Failure 
 
When the place representing either “System X failed” or “System X failure sensed” 
is marked, this will mark both the inspection place of the child item and a control 
place, provided that neither of these are already marked. When an MRP next takes 
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place, the child item will be inspected for failure. If the control place is marked and 
the failure or failure sensed place is newly unmarked, a second transition removes 
the token from the control place. 
 
The inspections modelling methodology has been designed to be compatible with an 
item having multiple inspection schedules. If it has more than one way of 
establishing whether it should be inspected, there is still only one inspection place, 
but different ways of inputting to it are created. 
 
Being able to detect item failures in the ways outlined above provides a great deal of 
control over when items can be replaced and how detected failures can impact on 
current and future missions. One of the major applications of these diagnostic tools 
is the ability to bring online redundant items. This is expanded in the following 
section. 
 
6.3.7 Redundancies 
 
Redundant items are often put in systems in order to provide an extra degree of 
reliability – if the primary item fails, the redundant item is brought online to 
continue its function. The nature of redundancies is such that a group of components 
within a system are considered to be either online or offline, whenever that system is 
in either of those states. Components which are offline are further specified as 
having either cold, warm or hot failures. These relate to the component’s failure rate 
being zero, reduced, or that of the online component respectively. 
 
Redundancies are simulated in the model in two ways. They can either be manual, 
where an operator has manual control over bringing the redundant item online; or 
automatic, where a sensor system detects the failure and acts accordingly. The 
former is subject to error in that the operator may fail to bring the redundant item 
online, while the latter will fail to occur if the sensor has failed. Failure to bring a 
redundant system online is the equivalent to that system having failed, and so this 
must also be handled by the PN model. 
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In the explanation below of how PNs are created to represent redundancies, a 
standard nomenclature is used. ‘X’ refers to the item which, upon failure, requires a 
redundant item ‘Y’ to become operational. Places are used in each redundancy net 
to represent: 
 
- System X failure 
- System X/Y operational (usually abbreviated in diagrams to “X op” or “Y op”) 
- Redundancy successfully/unsuccessfully switched (written in diagrams as 
“Yes” or “No”) 
- System Y not operational (“Y not op”) 
 
Each component in an item related to a redundancy will have its main failure 
transition (or transitions, if it has dependencies on other components, as outlined in 
section 5.2.1.2.1) enabled by the item’s operational place. If the component has 
warm or hot failures when offline, another failure transition will represent this, and 
will be inhibited by the operational place. Figure 6.34 shows this. 
 
 
Figure 6.34 – Operational System Affecting Component Failure Transition 
 
If the redundancy is manually switched over by an operator, then a level of human 
error will creep into the action. Any failure by the operator to correctly activate the 
redundant item will leave it unable to perform the function it is required to. Thus, 
the item can be considered to have failed. The process of manually switching 
between the primary item and the redundancy is modelled by the PN demonstrated 
in Figure 6.35. 
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The PN shows six places and nine transitions. The left-most place, “X failed” 
enables transition 1 when it is marked. If either of places “Yes” or “No” are not 
already marked, transition 1 will switch and, as it is a probability transition, will 
mark one of them depending on the value of P(Y) and a random number. If the 
token is placed in “Yes”, this means the switch to the redundant item has been 
successful, while “No” being marked indicates the opposite. 
 
 
Figure 6.35 – Manual switchover from Item X to Item Y 
 
If “Yes” is marked and system X is still operational, transition 4 will be enabled and 
“X Op” will pass its token to place “Y Op”, indicating that item X is now turned off 
and item Y is switched on. As mentioned above, this will inhibit the online failure 
transitions of the components in X and enable those in Y. Similarly, if “No” is 
marked, X Op passes a token to “Y Not Op”, and any online failure transitions in Y 
will not be enabled. 
 
Of note are the arc multiplicities leading to and from places “X Op”, “Y Op” and “Y 
Not Op”. These are marked oX or oY as appropriate, and represent the number of 
redundant outputs from X and Y respectively. That is, if X has one redundant 
output, oX = 1. If Y were to have two further redundant items for its own failure, Z1 
and Z2, oY = 2. If Y has no outputs, oY = 1. The reason for this is that each item X 
with oX redundancies Y1,Y2,…,
X
Yo  must output one token to enable each of these, 
and so must contain oX tokens to switch each of them on upon its failure. 
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If X is repaired at any point, the “X failed” place will become unmarked and, 
depending on whether “Yes” or “No” was originally selected by transition 1, either 
of transitions 2 or 3 will be enabled, unmarking the relevant place. This, in turn, will 
enable either of transitions 6 or 8. If the redundancy switch was successful, 
transition 6 will switch, removing all tokens from Y Op and placing one in X Op. 
When X Op contains oX tokens again, it inhibits these transitions. “X Failed” 
inhibits the transitions allowing return from “Y Not Op”, so that X cannot become 
operational while it remains failed. Transitions 7 and 9 exist to allow Y Op to be 
switched off if X Op is still marked, for some reason, though this should only 
happen if item Y can be switched on by more than one primary item. 
 
Similar to the PN in Figure 6.35 is that for a sensed switchover to a redundant item. 
In this case, however, the “sensor failed” place acts as the “No” condition, while “X 
Failure sensed” is the “Yes” condition. No probability transition is needed as the 
function of the redundancy is based purely on the sensor working properly. Figure 
6.36 shows this. 
 
 
Figure 6.36 – Sensor Switchover from Item X to Item Y 
 
In the Figure, transitions 1 and 2, and the arcs between “X failed”, “X failure 
sensed” and “sensor failed” are exactly as shown in Figure 6.23. If the sensor fails, 
and then X fails, transition 4 will be enabled and X Op will be unmarked, while Y 
Not Op is marked with oY tokens. This will only be unmarked when “Sensor 
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failed”, “X failed” and “X failure sensed” are all unmarked, with a token returning 
to X Op. If a failure in X is detected, accurately or spuriously, transition 3 marks Y 
Op and unmarks X Op. 
 
The nets shown thus far model the ability of components to be online or offline, and 
the switching from an item X to an item Y, either manually or automatically. A 
complication of this, however, is that item Y may fail while it is operational. 
Similarly, Y may be repaired in an MRP, while X is not repaired. Another scenario 
already mentioned is that where Y is not activated, and thus is counted as having 
failed. In order to propagate the failure onto higher events, there must be interaction 
between “Y not op” and “Y failed” places.  
  
 
Figure 6.37 – Failure of Redundancy for Component and System 
 
Figure 6.37 shows two similar nets which handle the issue of Y failing to be 
switched on. The left-hand PN is that for a component. If component Y is a 
redundant item, the place representing “Y failed” outputs to a transition which 
marks “Y not op” with oY tokens, as long as Y Op is not marked. The arcs from “Y 
failed” propagating its failure to higher events are transferred to the Y not op place 
instead. If Y is a system, as shown in the right-hand PN in Figure 6.37, then the 
marking is the other way around: Y not op marks Y failed instead. The reason for 
this difference is that if the component failure place were to be marked by the Y not 
op place (which is the simpler of the two options), there would be two tokens in the 
component PN (one in the “up” place, one in the “down” place), which must is a 
prohibited condition. This is not an issue for the system failure place, however. 
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The “Y op” place inhibits the transition in either net in Figure 6.37 because if it is 
marked and a failure occurs in Y, it must then switch to “Y not op”. Figure 6.38 
shows how this simple switching is performed. If the opposite is true, and neither 
the “No” place nor the “Y failed” places are marked, and yet the “Y not op” place 
is, then it is set to switch back to Y op as shown in Figure 6.39. 
 
   
Figure 6.38 – Failure in Operational Item Y  
 Figure 6.39 – Repair of Failed Item Y 
 
Another issue which arises is when a system with a redundant backup system 
contains sub-systems which themselves have redundancies. The issue concerns the 
components within the systems. Typically, a primary or redundant system will 
enable or disable the online and offline transitions of all sub-components, even 
those that are contained within sub-systems, as they are all turned on or off at the 
same time. If, however, a sub-system has a redundancy, then its sub-components 
may be switched on or off either when the main system or the sub-system switches 
to the redundancy.  
 
Consider the platform shown in Figure 6.40. It consists of two parallel systems, A1 
and A2, of which A1 is the primary system and A2 is the secondary, redundant 
system. If A1 fails, all sub-systems and components are switched off and A2 
becomes online, along with all its sub-items. A1 contains three subsystems: B1 and 
B2 are in parallel, with B2 acting as the redundant system for B1; C is independent. 
A2 contains two subsystems with no redundancies. Each subsystem contains two 
components in series.  
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Figure 6.40 – Example Platform with Redundant Systems 
 
At the start of a mission, A1 is online and A2 is offline, along with sub-systems D 
and E, and components Q, R, S and T. Within system A1, B1 and C are initially 
online, while B2 is offline. If B1 fails, B2 is turned on and continues its function, 
allowing A1 to continue operating as well. If C fails while B1 is operational, A1 
fails and B1 is turned off. Thus, components Z and Y are dependent on the 
operation of both B1 and A1 for being online or offline. 
 
It is undesirable to have more than one “System Operational” place enable or inhibit 
components’ online and offline transitions, as shown in Figure 6.34. This is 
because, to continue the example used above, while the online transitions of Y and 
Z would rightly be disabled whenever either of A1 or B1 were disabled, the offline 
transitions would need both of them to be inactive to be enabled. So, if B1 failed 
and switched to B2, its components’ offline transition would be inhibited as A1 is 
still operational. The solution to this problem is, firstly, to allow A1 to control the 
marking of the operational places of both B1 and B2, such that they can only be 
marked when A1 is marked. Secondly, if any component is controlled by two 
redundant systems in a hierarchy, as shown in Figure 6.40, only its most immediate 
parent system with redundancies is allowed to operate its online and offline 
transitions. 
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For instance, the platform in Figure 6.40 would allow the “System A1 Operational” 
place to control only the components in System C, U and V. Components Y and Z 
would be controlled by “B1 Op”, and W and X by “B2 Op”. The marking of child 
operational places by the parent operational place is performed as shown in Figure 
6.41. If the parent system operational place (“P Op”) becomes marked, an 
immediate transition will copy this to the child item operational place (“C Op”) as 
long as it is not already marked with oC tokens and is not failed. Once again, the 
arcs have multiplicities related to the number of outputs of the parent and the child. 
A second transition removes the tokens from C Op when P Op is marked with less 
than oP tokens. 
 
 
Figure 6.41 – Marking of Child Op places by Parent Op place 
 
A point which has already been mentioned briefly is that an item can have more 
than one redundancy. Similarly, an item can be the redundancy for more than one 
input. In the former case, the places representing “X op”, “X failed”, “Yes”, “No”, 
and the transitions which affect just these places (numbers 1, 2 and 3 in Figure 6.35; 
numbers 1 and 2 in Figure 6.36), are not duplicated. Places for “Y op”, “Y not op”, 
and transitions inputting and outputting from these are created for each redundant 
item, if they do not exist already. These transitions are numbers 4-9 in Figure 6.35 
and 3-8 in Figure 6.36. If an item is being used as a redundancy for multiple 
primary items, its “Y op” and “Y not op” places will be reused, as will the 
transitions in Figure 6.37 and Figure 6.39. Transitions 4-9 in Figure 6.35 and 3-8 in 
Figure 6.36 will be duplicated for each primary input to the redundant item. 
 
In summary, a method has been shown which allows creation of Petri nets to model 
the situation where a system or component has a redundant item which can perform 
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its function in the event of its failure. There is the capability to model any 
combination of system and component, with multiple inputs or outputs possible. 
Redundancies can be switched either manually, with a penalty relating to the 
probability of failure to switch on the redundant item; or automatically through 
sensors, with a penalty relating to the potential for failure of the sensors. 
 
6.3.8 Prognostics 
 
Prognostics have been identified as one of the key areas to help bring about a useful 
duration for an MFOP. Prognostic technologies attempt to accurately predict the 
future failure of components or systems. This can be through a health monitoring 
system, which uses sensors to keep track of the stresses on and lifetimes of items, or 
to measure the deterioration in output of a system. Another option is inspection, 
where maintenance engineers visually examine an item to verify its level of wear. A 
third part of prognostics is Scheduled Life Replacement, where an item is 
automatically replaced after a certain lifespan regardless of how worn it is. This was 
explained in section 6.3.5. 
 
Modelling prognostic systems introduces some complexities – in real life, 
components have masked future failure times, and the exact time of failure is 
impossible to predict. However, during their life, components may give signs which 
indicate how they cope with the stresses they are placed under, and thus how they 
may last into the future. Warrington et al discuss one method of modelling 
prognostics, as included in their URAM simulation model [23]. Components which 
can be monitored have a prognostic indicator which allows an estimate of their 
future failure time to be made. However, the accuracy of this prediction is based on 
the skill and experience of the technician inspecting the item. The prognostic model 
used in URAM takes account of this, assigning a probability value to the event of 
the prognostic indicator being successfully noted or not. This value increases over 
time, as the indicator becomes more difficult to miss. Also accounted for is a 
minimum time before which the indicator cannot be noticed, known as a prognostic 
horizon.  
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It is difficult, however, to reconcile this concept with randomly sampled failure 
times within a computer simulation model. As stated above, it is expected that the 
prediction of a future failure time on the simulated time to failure. In a real situation, 
however, the future failure time is not known – the only clues to this figure are the 
levels of wear which occur. In order to accommodate this fact, therefore, a different 
model to Warrington et al has been proposed. 
  
The prognostic model can be broken down into several parts: 
 
• Creating ‘wear’ in components – this wear can be either physical, 
particularly in terms of mechanical items, or it can be simply a way of 
expressing deterioration in an item’s performance. The term ‘wear’ is used 
to denote any performance measure or physical characteristic which would 
allow prediction of a component’s future life. 
• Establishing what the wear level on the component is, through inspection or 
diagnostic systems. 
• Using the amount of wear on a component to predict what life it is likely to 
have left. 
• Considering the missions within the MFOP and the revealed system and 
component failures together with the predicted failure times for prognostic-
monitored components to establish whether a mission is likely to fail 
catastrophically. 
• If a catastrophic failure is found to be imminent mid-mission, abandoning 
(and therefore failing) the current MFOP to preserve the platform. 
Alternatively, when the platform is analysed during an MRP, looking at 
possible future failures and replacing them before they can cause failures in 
the next MFOP. 
6.3.8.1 Modelling Component Wear 
The proposed method of modelling prognostics considers each item which is 
monitored to have at least one level of wear specified for it, with each level 
corresponding to a defined portion of the lifetime of the component. For instance, a 
given component may have the following levels of wear: 
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• Level 1 (Early wear/bedding-in) – 0-10% of item lifetime 
• Level 2 (Entering late life) – 70-80% 
• Level 3 (Failure imminent) – 90-99% 
 
Each level of wear, as seen, corresponds to a percentage of the lifetime of the item 
in which it tends to occur. These levels of wear, when they occur, can then be used 
to make pessimistic estimates of when the future failure will occur. The model 
considers the probability of the wear level occurring at any time to be uniform 
within the percentage bounds stated, and zero outside those levels.  
 
The percentage values pertaining to each level of wear are inputted to the model. 
This can then use a randomly sampled number between 0 and 1 to generate a 
percentage point of the component’s life at which it will enter that level of wear, as 
Figure 6.42 shows.  
 
 
Figure 6.42 – Sampling a Random Point of Component Life for Wear Level 
 
In Figure 6.42, a number, X, has been randomly generated and is set to 0.647. If the 
range between 
al
P  and 
bl
P  is considered as a unit, then the random number defines 
a proportion of that unit. The time at which the wear level is sampled to occur is 
therefore as shown in equation 6.1. 
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Using this formula gives a progression through wear which has a degree of 
randomness, and is linked to the component’s life. In the example shown in Figure 
6.42, 
al
P  = 20% and 
bl
P  = 40%. The percentage life at which the component will 
switch to the wear level is therefore 0.647 × (40-20) + 20 = 12.94 + 20 = 32.94%. 
When multiplied by the component’s lifespan and added to the last repair time, the 
time to enter the wear level is found. This time is used in a PN which allows the 
component, when operational, to build up wear. 
 
Figure 6.43 shows the standard “up” place for a component as being connected to a 
timed transition. Whenever the component is operational, this transition will be 
enabled, and the time generated for it to switch will be equal to that calculated by 
equation 6.1. Whenever it does switch, an additional token will be deposited in the 
“Wear Level” and “Control” places, indicating the current level of wear of the 
component. Once the maximum number of wear levels, nl, is reached, an inhibitor 
arc with that multiplicity prevents the transition from switching. 
 
 
Figure 6.43 – Modelling Wear in Components 
 
6.3.8.2 Diagnosing Wear Level 
Once a method of modelling wear in components is established, a further issue is 
that of discovering what the wear level is. As mentioned in section 6.3.6, there are 
two main ways of diagnosing faults in a system: through sensors or inspection. This 
also applies to discovering wear in a component, and affects not just the net which 
is created, but also the way in which the prognosis can be dealt with. 
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If sensors monitor the wear in the item, then the wear level will be discovered 
immediately, during an MFOP, and action can be taken to mitigate it should an 
imminent component failure be important enough to threaten the mission. The only 
issue threatening this capability is the operation or failure of the sensor component. 
Figure 6.43 shows how this is applied in PN form. The “sensor failed” place for the 
sensor component inhibits the wear level timed transition, so that the detected level 
of wear, equal to the number of tokens in the corresponding place, stays equal to the 
last updated value. As the component’s failure time gets closer, no more wear is 
detected, and so no mitigating actions can take place unless any predictions from 
wear that has been found are accurate enough to prevent mission failure. 
 
  
 
If, instead, the wear levels are found through inspection, then as inspections can 
only take place during an MRP, there are two types of wear level – the state in 
which the component is in, in real-time, and the state of which the operator is aware, 
for which plans can be made. This difference between actual and detected wear 
levels is shown in Figure 6.43. In the Figure, one place representing both types of 
wear level is shown. The timed transition inputting to “Wear Level (Actual)” is left 
free to switch, as long as the control place is not inhibiting it. This place cannot 
cause any actions to take place, however. Only once an MRP is taking place and an 
inspection is due will the current wear level be discovered and component 
replacements are able to take place. The transition which removes the inspection 
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place’s token, should the component be found to be operational, is inhibited by the 
Wear Level (Actual) place, to prevent the loss of the token occurring before the 
inspection place can move the tokens from Wear Level (Actual) to Wear Level 
(Detected). 
6.3.8.3 Predicting Component Failure Times 
The purpose of creating a model for component wear is to allow the level of wear to 
provide information about the probable life of the component. Calculations can be 
made regarding the level of wear and the time at which it was detected in order to 
create bounds for the component failure time. These calculations take into 
consideration a confidence interval in order to provide a value for component failure 
time. 
 
The simplest situation is where a component’s increase in wear level is detected by 
a sensor. Note that “wear level” refers to the category of wear of the component (a 
discrete level), rather than the continuous amount of wear on the component. If a 
component’s wearing is sensed, then the time at which the present wear level 
category was entered is known very accurately. The formula which calculates the 
lower and upper bounds for the component failure time, 
aF
t  and 
bF
t  respectively, 
where the time of entering the wear level is known accurately is shown in equation 
6.2 below. 
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6.2 
 
Setting initial values for 
aF
t  and 
bF
t  as being zero and infinity respectively, equation 
6.2 sets their latest values to the most accurate of either the current value, or a new 
value calculated with the latest information. This new value is the component’s age 
at entering the wear level divided by one of the bounds to reach a minimum and a 
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maximum for the failure time. As an example, consider a component, operational 
since time t=0, whose wear levels are specified to be: 
 
- Wear level 1 – 30-40% 
- Wear level 2 – 50-65% 
- Wear level 3 – 78-92% 
 
The component is sensed as entering wear level 1 after 34.092 hours. This marks the 
bounds of its failure time as lying between 
aF
t  and 
bF
t  as calculated below. 
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These bounds for the failure time of [85.23,113.64] hours are fairly loose, mainly 
due to the early time and the bands for wear level 1. It is usual for the failure time to 
become more accurate and refined as the component ages. A confidence interval 
specifies the point at which we are sure to that proportion that the component will 
not have failed before. For instance, if the confidence interval is specified to be 
95%, then this suggests that we can be 95% certain that the component will not fail 
before 86.65 hours in this example, as 85.23 + (113.64–85.23)×(1–0.95) = 86.65 
hours. 
 
If the component enters wear level 2 after 66.86 hours, the bounds for the failure 
time are refined as shown below: 
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Thus the earlier failure time bound has been refined substantially, but the later time 
has remained the same. The confidence interval of 95% suggests a new estimated 
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failure time of 103.40 hours. Calculating results for wear level 3 may lead to further 
refinement, and thus allow much more confidence over abandoning an MFOP at a 
particular time, or replacing the component in an MRP before it has had the chance 
to fail. 
 
While sensed component monitoring can lead to good levels of accuracy in 
predicting component failure time, it is not so straightforward when component 
wear is only discovered through inspections. In this scenario, component failure 
times are predicted similarly, but with less accurate information. Consider the 
example used with a sensed component above, but instead of the wear level being 
discovered immediately, it is found through inspections at regular intervals of 40 
hours. 
 
As above, the component enters its wear level 1 at time 34.092 hours. At the 
inspection at time 40 hours, the component is found to have entered wear level 1. 
The earliest point at which it could have entered this is at the very beginning of the 
component’s life, and the latest point is just before the current inspection. To find 
the bounds for the component failure time, equation 6.2 can be adapted to take these 
considerations into account: 
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6.3 
 
From equations 6.3, the bounds can be calculated as accurately as possible: 
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A problem with the calculation above is that, obviously, if the component’s failure 
time were 0 hours, then the component would have failed immediately, and not be 
at wear level 1. A limiting factor on the minimum value, therefore, is whether or not 
the suggested failure time would lead to entering wear level 2 before the current 
inspection. This limiting condition can be expressed as shown in equation 6.4 
below. 
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6.4 
 
Given that the earliest time that the component could enter wear level 2 is negligibly 
after the current inspection time, the earliest time that this suggests for the 
component failure time is hours 54.61
65
40 0, ,0max100 =


×=
aFt . The final term in 
equation 6.4 states this as the inspection time divided by the upper percentage 
bound for the next wear level. The bounds of (61.54,133.33) suggest a 95% 
confidence interval of failing after 65.13 hours. 
 
At the next inspection, at 80 hours, the component is in wear level 2. The 
predictions for component failure time come out as 
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which suggests a 95% confidence interval failure time of 89.28 hours. Given that 
the next MFOP is likely to take longer than 9.28 hours to complete, if the failure of 
the component will cause mission failure, then the component would be replaced 
during the MRP in which the inspection is taking place. The assessment of whether 
components are critical for mission and MFOP operation is covered in the next 
section. 
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6.3.8.4 Assessing MFOP Criticality 
Once predictions have been made for all components whose wear levels have 
updated, it is important to check whether the new information suggests that the 
current mission or MFOP is under threat. There is a hierarchy of desired outcomes 
from them, which affects how the prognostic systems are applied. The best result 
from an MFOP is the successful completion of all missions within it. If, however, 
the MFOP is destined for failure, then abandonment of a mission before it has begun 
(for aircraft, this will be during the safest point of a mission, before take-off) is best. 
During a mission, it is most important to prevent catastrophic failure, and loss of the 
platform, so that it can carry out more missions in the future. If the current mission 
must be abandoned to do this, then this is the best option.  
 
In order to best protect an entire MFOP, an assessment of component wear, taking 
into account revealed and sensed failures which have not been repaired, for each 
individual mission is performed during the MRP preceding it. This forces the 
replacement of any component which is considered critical. During an active 
MFOP, criticality is only tested for the current mission. If the assessment results in a 
possibility of completing the current mission without catastrophic failure, then the 
mission is not abandoned. It will only be aborted once it is considered that there is 
no way to avoid total loss. This criticality assessment is also performed at the start 
of a mission, in order to prevent it taking place if the platform is not in a healthy 
state. 
 
The criticality assessment consists of three main parts: 
 
1. Assigning predicted durations of each phase in the mission  
2. Establishing what the most likely mission phase profiles are 
3. Estimating whether each phase in the mission is likely to fail or not. 
 
Appendix A.4.2.4 explains the methods by which the model assesses the criticality 
of the current mission and MFOP in more detail. Because phases can be inserted or 
chosen to follow the current phase, as explained in sections 6.2.12 and 6.2.13, this 
can lead to complicated or multiple possible mission profiles. The model considers 
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each phase insertion, choice and abandonment and predicts the mission profile 
based on how they currently stand.  
 
If, however, there is a probability-based phase choice at some point within the 
mission, this leads to the creation of multiple mission profiles, each with a different 
probability attached. Mission profiles with a probability of less than 1 × 10-6 are 
discarded, while in the others, the phase durations are summed to find the estimated 
duration of the mission. The mission profiles are then sorted in order of length and 
probability of occurrence. The probabilities of each mission profile are added 
together with increasing duration and, once the summed probability is greater than 
the confidence interval, mission profiles with longer durations are discarded.  
 
The model then takes each phase in each mission profile in turn. Taking into 
account revealed and sensed component failures as well as components predicted by 
the prognostics model to have failed by the time that phase has ended, decides if any 
phase in that profile will have failed, thus failing the mission profile. Depending on 
the predictions made, the model will either take immediate action to abandon the 
current mission, replace all critical components, or do nothing. The method by 
which the PN performs these actions is explained in the next section. 
 
Usually, once a component gets to a certain wear level, it would be replaced at the 
next MRP – this is Condition Based Maintenance. The prognostic model used here 
makes predictions which consider the importance of a component to a mission. 
Hence, if the component’s failure in the current mission or forthcoming MFOP is 
calculated to be critical, it will be repaired in the next or current MRP. If it is not, 
the platform is considered to be capable of carrying the potential failure, and it will 
be repaired once it has actually failed. 
6.3.8.5 Modelling Actions Taken Based on Predictions 
There are, as stated above, two main actions that can be taken if component failures 
are deemed to be imminent. If the component failures are predicted to cause mission 
and MFOP failure before they can be satisfactorily completed, then they will be 
abandoned. If this occurs, or if during an MRP components are found to be critical 
for any part of the next MFOP, they are replaced.  
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In order to perform any of these actions, the wear level place 
shown in Figure 6.43 is linked to a timed transition, which inputs 
to a place called “Action”, as shown in Figure 6.43. Only one arc 
leads from the wear level place to the timed transition and back, 
in order to enable it, rather than nl arcs. This is because the 
action place can be marked even if the wear level place only 
contains one token, if the model predicts the component failure 
to occur before the end of the current mission. 
 
The action place sets off component replacement during either an MFOP or an 
MRP. The way it does this varies according to whether or not the component is a 
member of a LRI. If it is not, a replacement place and transitions are created as in 
Figure 6.17, with the Action place acting as the replacement trigger. Figure 6.44 
shows this in more detail. 
 
 
Figure 6.44 – Prognostics Prompting Component Replacement 
 
In the Figure, the action place is connected to the immediate transition to the top-left 
of the “Up” place via an input arc and an output arc. Whenever the action place is 
marked and the component is operational, the component will be replaced during 
the next MRP. If the component has failed, then the action place is likely to have 
been marked if the component was critical for the MFOP. Either way, the failed 
component will be replaced at the next MRP. If the component undergoes 
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inspections, the inspection place will be an input to the repair transition shown to 
the bottom-left of the “Dn” place. The transition immediately below this, which the 
action place enables, is inhibited by the inspection place so that its token will be 
used up in the next MRP.  
 
The method by which the failed component is replaced is unimportant, either by 
inspection or due to a prognosis. The transition which removes the inspection place 
if the component is operational, shown in grey in Figure 6.44, is inhibited by the 
action place (this is the same transition which is also inhibited by the “Wear Level 
(Actual)” place, as shown in Figure 6.43. 
 
If the component is an input to an LRI, then the PN for replacement is set up 
slightly differently. The creation of an LRI will have already set the component up 
for replacement, and if the component is a direct input to the LRI, then the 
component failure place will have an input and an output arc to an LRI input 
transition, as shown in Figure 6.18 and Figure 6.19.  
 
Figure 6.45 shows the component with replacement net, and the prognostic net as 
well. Similarly to the inspection place in Figure 6.44, the LRI place enables the 
component repair transition and inhibits the prognostic transition allowing 
component repair. In this case, however, the action place does not enable the 
component replacement transition (to the top-left of the “Up” place). Instead, 
whenever it is marked, it forces the LRI which the component is a part of to be 
replaced, regardless of the state of the other members of it. The LRI will cause the 
component to be replaced instead.  
 
When the component replacement place is marked, immediate transitions are 
enabled which remove the tokens from the action, wear level (actual), wear level 
(detected) and control places. Each of these places inhibits the transition emptying 
the replacement place, so they can each be cleared before the net moves on. 
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Figure 6.45 –Component Member of LRI with Prognostics 
 
The other action that the prognostic system can take if it predicts catastrophic 
failure, is abandoning an active mission. Section 6.2.11 explains how, if specified 
by the operator, a method to fail or abandon any phase in any mission is provided. 
This general failure mechanism is used to allow the prognostic system to abandon 
the mission. Regardless of whether the operator has included consideration of 
general abandonment, a top event place for this eventuality, in addition to all of the 
transitions which remove the place from the phase places, as shown in Figure 6.12, 
is created anyway. When prognostics are specified for a component, a link is created 
between the “action” place and the “General abandonment top event” place via an 
immediate transition, as shown in Figure 6.46. This is inhibited by the “MRP 
Active” place, so that the transition will not switch during an MRP, when a mission 
cannot be abandoned. 
 
 
Figure 6.46 – Prognostic Abandoning of Mission 
 
To summarise, a method, procedure and set of PNs have been explained which 
allow the model to consider prognostic systems, which predict the future failure of 
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components and their effect on the platform. This allows the abandonment of 
missions and the replacement of items before they are allowed to result in total loss. 
 
6.4 Summary 
 
This chapter has explained the creation of nets which simulate the behaviour of 
systems undergoing MFOPs and phased missions. The modelling method presented 
takes account of complex aspects of MFOPs and Phased Missions, including: 
 
• The Petri nets are newly capable of modelling multiple platforms within a 
fleet, multiple MFOPs and multiple missions. Missions and MFOPs can be 
catastrophically failed or abandoned, with catastrophic failure leading to 
total loss of the platform. 
• A “general phase” set of fault trees can be provided, in order to allow a 
mission or MFOP to be failed or abandoned in any phase. 
• A mission need not consist of a simple linear progression from one phase to 
the next. Phases may be inserted immediately, interrupting the current phase, 
which resumes afterwards. Alternatively, the next phase may be chosen, 
either randomly or resulting from the failure or operation of certain systems 
or components, from an array of possible candidates. 
• Discrete events are events which do not occur according to a probability-
time distribution, but in response to a stimulus. The stimulus may be any 
event, such as the commencement of a particular phase, the failure of a 
system or starting an MRP. When the trigger event occurs, the discrete event 
either occurs or does not occur according to a set probability. This can then 
feed into phase or general fault trees. 
• In real life, components may be replaced when they have not failed. This is 
modelled in the program by using a “component replacement” place. When 
this is marked, the component’s time to fail is reset and a new one created 
when the component is operational again.  
• The function of replacing items regardless of being operational or failed is 
used by a method of modelling Line Replaceable Items. These are batches of 
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components on the same physical item, which are easily removed and 
replaced, to provide a quick changeover during maintenance.  
• Another complexity of MFOPs to be considered is Scheduled Life 
Replacements. These force a component or LRI to be replaced in the next 
MRP after a certain time. 
• A method of modelling prognostic monitoring systems is presented. This 
simulates the build-up of wear in components, and then uses that wear to 
calculate predictions for their future failure. If this future failure is imminent 
and critical for the MFOP, the current mission can be abandoned and the 
component set to be replaced. 
• Diagnostic modelling is provided in the form of “sensors”, which discover 
failures and faults in real-time, during missions; and “inspections”, where 
these are only found during the Maintenance Recovery Period. Finding these 
failures can affect the replacement of components, systems or LRIs, and can 
affect mission abandonment. 
• Redundancies are items which take over the functionality of a specific 
component or system whenever it fails. The capability for modelling this is 
also included here. 
 
All of these modelling methods have been implemented in a form which allows 
production of results which describe the performance of the platform or fleet. This 
is explained in Appendix A. The next chapter describes the application of the 
proposed model to a life-sized system, and the methods by which suggested 
improvements are evaluated for effectiveness. 
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Chapter 7 Application of Model to Large System 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
A modelling method has been created, both in theory and in the form of a software 
tool, which allows the estimation of reliability parameters for a fleet of platforms 
performing maintenance-free operating periods and phased missions. It is important, 
however, to demonstrate the potential applications of this in the real-world industry. 
One of the potential uses for it could be in the design stage of a new military 
aircraft, to attempt to minimise the possibility of missions failing. Another is in the 
proposed installation of systems designed to protect mission reliability onto a 
currently operational platform. 
  
In order to show some of the principles which may be applied when using the 
method developed in this thesis, an example is given in this chapter which takes a 
large, complex system architecture and attempts to reduce the MFOP, mission and 
phase unreliability figures through the use of MFOP enablers. 
 
7.2 Application to Previous Systems 
 
Before being applied to a large system, the complex program was first used with the 
three examples employed in Chapter 5. This was in order to establish that it was 
producing verifiable results, and is consistent with expectations, giving a degree of 
confidence that the results for more complex systems will also be accurate. The 
reason for the reuse of these systems was because the nets produced by the complex 
model do not exactly match those of the simple model explained in Chapter 5. For 
instance, a net for a platform will be created featuring the MFOP sequence, and the 
inspection procedure for the repairable system differs in the complex model. As a 
result of the difference in the PNs, a comparison between the simple model results 
and those of the complex model becomes necessary. 
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7.2.1 Non-repairable Small System 
 
The details of the non-repairable small system are given in section 5.3.1. These 
details were inputted to the new model, and 10,000,000 simulations performed. The 
results of the simulations from the complex model are compared to those of the 
analysis and of the simple model, in Table 7.1. These results are the phase failure 
probabilities. 
 
Table 7.1 – Comparison of Model and Analysis Phase Failure Probabilities for Non-Repairable 
System 
Phase 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Analysis 0.00225 0.03850 0.05107 0.00194 0.03452 0.05447 
Simple Model 0.00223 0.03849 0.05111 0.00193 0.03443 0.05451 
Complex Model 0.00224 0.03857 0.05096 0.00194 0.03453 0.05442 
Per cent Error 0.258% 0.173% 0.216% 0.105% 0.036% 0.092% 
       
Phase 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Analysis 0.05210 0.00327 0.03271 0.05493 0.05302 0.00451 
Simple Model 0.05213 0.00330 0.03280 0.05500 0.05298 0.00447 
Complex Model 0.05209 0.00328 0.03270 0.05486 0.05302 0.00448 
Per cent Error 0.027% 0.229% 0.031% 0.124% 0.008% 0.660% 
 
The Table shows a high degree of correlation between the phase failure probabilities 
given by the complex model and those from the analytical results. The highest error 
is just under two thirds of a per cent, though this higher figure can be attributed to 
the very low failure probabilities. In reality, the figures are very accurate. 
 
7.2.2 Repairable Small System 
 
Section 5.3.2 discusses a repairable system for which a Markov analysis method 
was used to solve. These results were compared with a run of 10,000,000 
simulations of the simple model. 10,000,000 more simulations were performed with 
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this system using the complex model. The results from this are compared with the 
previous sets of results as in Table 7.2. 
 
Table 7.2 – Comparison of Model and Analysis MFOP Failure Probabilities for Repairable 
System 
MFOP 
MFOP 
Failure Prob. 
(Markov) 
MFOP Failure 
Prob. (Simple 
Model) 
MFOP Failure 
Prob. (Complex 
Model) 
Percentage 
Error between 
results 
1 0.324730 0.324872 0.324961 0.0710% 
2 0.333304 0.333222 0.333218 0.0258% 
3 0.339405 0.339228 0.339415 0.0029% 
4 0.324815 0.324865 0.324308 0.1560% 
5 0.333167 0.332750 0.333617 0.1351% 
6 0.339582 0.339362 0.339962 0.1120% 
7 0.324777 0.323946 0.324464 0.0962% 
8 0.333110 0.333117 0.332244 0.2600% 
9 0.339528 0.339884 0.339519 0.0027% 
10 0.324715 0.324741 0.324702 0.0039% 
11 0.333333 0.333041 0.332512 0.2463% 
12 0.339443 0.339061 0.341150 0.5030% 
 
The Table shows, once again, a good degree of correlation between the complex 
model results and those of the simple model and the Markov analysis. The highest 
error is just over half a per cent, while most other errors are less than a tenth of a 
percent. These figures are also very accurate, and lend yet more confidence to the 
complex model. 
 
7.2.3 Repairable Larger System 
 
Section 5.3.3 describes a larger repairable system, featuring ten phases and ten 
components. It has features such as phase abandonment and component 
dependencies. 1,000,000 simulations were performed using the complex model 
program, and these are compared to the results from the simple model in  
Table 7.3 and Table 7.4. 
 
The Tables show a good correlation between the two sets of results. The relative 
error between every data point for the complex and simple model is less than 1%. 
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There is one exception to this, the failure probabilities for phase 3, which have an 
exceptionally low value. 
 
Table 7.3 – Comparison of MFOP and Mission Failure Probabilities for Large Repairable 
System 
MFOP/ 
Mission 
Simple Model 
Failure Prob. 
Complex Model 
Failure Prob. 
Failure 
Prob. error 
MFOP 1 0.11327 0.11346 0.1651% 
MFOP 2 0.06858 0.06903 0.6461% 
MFOP 3 0.04211 0.04243 0.7621% 
Mission 1 0.03886 0.03916 0.7747% 
Mission 2 0.04035 0.04046 0.2671% 
Mission 3 0.04438 0.04418 0.4546% 
    
MFOP/ 
Mission 
Simple Model 
Abandon 
Prob. 
Complex Model 
Abandon Prob. 
Abandon 
Prob. error 
MFOP 1 0.61805 0.61734 0.1146% 
MFOP 2 0.86467 0.86420 0.0546% 
MFOP 3 0.94240 0.94226 0.0155% 
Mission 1 0.34237 0.34162 0.2184% 
Mission 2 0.47986 0.48034 0.0992% 
Mission 3 0.53262 0.53202 0.1125% 
 
Table 7.4 – Comparison of Phase Failure Probabilities for Large Repairable System 
Phase 
Simple 
Failure Prob.
Complex 
Failure Prob.
Error between 
results 
1 0.02119 0.02130 0.4892% 
2 0.02740 0.02743 0.0823% 
3 1.21 × 10-5 1.42 × 10-5 14.3073% 
4 0.01799 0.01803 0.2428% 
5 0.15895 0.15887 0.0464% 
6 0.01563 0.01573 0.6775% 
7 0.02864 0.02879 0.5284% 
8 0.07067 0.07054 0.1847% 
9 0.00000 0.00000 - 
10 0.22204 0.22164 0.1801% 
 
Thus, for each of the models used by the simple program, the complex model has 
been able to reproduce the results very accurately. While this only confirms that the 
modelling of the simple aspects of the complex model is accurate, this is still an 
important basis to continue on to modelling a large system. 
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7.3 Application to a Large System 
 
The close correlation between the results from the simple model and those from the 
complex model suggest that the complex model is capable of producing satisfactory 
results. A more complicated demonstration of its operation is given in this section.  
 
In order to ensure that the model was capable of handling the type of large, complex 
systems used by operators such as the Royal Air Force, systems information on a 
model of aircraft were provided. This information comprised a single-phase fault 
tree establishing how the aircraft could experience total loss, and a set of documents 
explaining missions systems and giving component failure data. Also provided was 
information on three typical missions that the aircraft is typically required to 
perform. This data has been modified to produce only a demonstration of the sort of 
results which can be achieved. 
 
The conversion of this data into something compatible with the model required the 
production of two sets of fault trees – catastrophic failure and abandonment for each 
phase. The single-phase total loss fault tree was slightly truncated, due to its size, so 
that intermediate events at a certain level of resolution were categorised as 
“undeveloped”, with their failure rates set to that calculated by FaultTree+. After 
this, each branch of the tree was analysed for its relevance to each phase of each 
mission that the aircraft would perform. If it was deemed to be not applicable to a 
particular phase, the branch was deleted. Thus, a number of distinct total loss phase 
fault trees were produced. The compilation of the set of phase abandonment fault 
trees was based on the observation that, while engine failure and similar incidents 
may cause catastrophic failure, the failure of an aircraft to deploy a missile or 
sonobuoy can only cause the mission to fail and be abandoned. Thus, the first set of 
mission abandonment fault trees was based on the failure of mission-critical, but 
non-flight-critical systems. Each fault tree considers the failure of any of these 
phase-critical systems as prompting phase abandonment. The causes of failure for 
each of the systems were estimated from the systems information and component 
failure data provided. 
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An important point is that while the information used with the model is based on 
that available for the aircraft, it would be very difficult to reproduce the typical 
conditions of mission or platform failure without an expert knowledge of the 
system. Because of this, efforts have been made to produce a set of mission 
scenarios which are realistic in terms of size, complexity and in the failure rates 
used, but may not necessarily represent accurately the operation of an aircraft in an 
actual military environment. The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the usefulness 
of the Petri net modelling method when applied to a large system; it is not to exactly 
replicate and improve the mission performance of a military aircraft. 
 
7.3.1 The System 
 
Much of the data regarding the systems which make up the aircraft is subject to 
security restrictions, and so cannot be published in full. This section, however, aims 
to give a brief overview.  
7.3.1.1 Potential for Total Loss 
The main ways in which Total Loss can occur are considered to be: 
 
• Deviation from intended flight path: 
o Loss of aerodynamic control (LAC):  
o Loss of/incorrect thrust from engines: this could be due to lack of 
fuel, insufficient thrust from engines (for instance, due to an engine 
failure), or an erroneous supply of air data due to icy conditions. 
 
• Loss of structural integrity: 
o Structural damage and physical hazards: either due to failure of 
systems such as powerplant systems or the landing gear; or due to 
physical hazards present in the aircraft’s environment. 
o Fire or explosion: explosion could be due, for instance, to the fuel 
tank exploding (such as happened with TWA Flight 800 in 1996 
[86]), while a fire could have stemmed from the engines, weapons 
bay or several other systems. 
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o Failure of the landing gear to support the aircraft. 
 
• Controlled Flight into Terrain: 
o Autopilot fails 
o Display errors 
o Erroneous navigational data 
o Pilot lack of consciousness 
o Human performance limits exceeded 
7.3.1.2 Potential for Mission Abandonment 
Missions are abandoned when any of the mission critical systems have failed. These 
have been identified as: 
 
• Tactical Command System (TCS) – interacts with the aircraft’s other 
systems to provide the crew with all the data they need to complete 
missions. Allows for mission, information and sensor management, and 
displays all information through various visual units. Interfaces with crew 
through the use of keyboards, mice, programmable entry panels, multi-
function displays, and so on. 
• Defensive Aids Sub-system (DASS) – this system allows the detection of 
threats, evaluates the size of the threat, warns the crew and puts in place 
measures to deal with the threat. 
• Flight Management System (FMS) – provides data on aircraft position and 
other navigational information 
• Magnetic Anomaly Detector (MAD) – detects fluctuations in the earth’s 
magnetic field which may indicate the presence of a ferrous objects such as a 
submarine. 
• Radio Communications System (RCS) – allows communication with other 
entities such as aircraft, mission control, air bases, and so on, either through 
voice or data transfer (such as tactics, mission data, etc.) 
• Stores – items deployed during missions. May include weapons, defensive 
aids and sonobuoys amongst others. 
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• Radar/Identification of Friend or Foe (Radar/IFF) – allows detection of 
various items, with follow-up functions. For instance, surface vessels may 
be detected, classified and tracked; submarine masts may be spotted and 
tracked; warnings of adverse weather can be given; persons may be found 
during a search and rescue (SAR) operation. 
• Electronic Support Measures (ESM) – detects the emission of 
electromagnetic data, and provides information about the emitter, such as 
bearing, range, position, and emitter type. 
• Electro-Optical Surveillance/Detection System (EOSDS) – provides day or 
night imaging surveillance capability while airborne.  
7.3.1.3 Missions and Phases 
There are three missions used in the set of simulations: anti-submarine warfare 
(ASW), anti-surface warfare (ASUW) and search and rescue (SAR). Each of the 
missions has the following basic profile: 
 
• Pre-Flight Check and Taxi (1 hour) 
• Engine Start (15 minutes) 
• Take-off (1 minute) 
• Climb (15 minutes) 
• Transit (3 hours) 
• Descent into operational area (15 minutes) 
• Operations (various durations) 
• Ascent out of operational area (15 minutes) 
• Return transit (3 hours) 
• Descent towards runway (15 minutes) 
• Approach (10 minutes) 
• Landing (5 minutes) 
• Taxi to hangar (30 minutes) 
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The order of the phases and their lengths are based upon the data provided. The 
individual missions have the following operational phases: 
 
• ASUW and ASW: 
o On-Task (5 hours) – 10% of phases have an inserted “Attack” phase. 
o Attack (9 minutes) – reverts to On-Task once finished. 
• SAR: 
o On-Task (2.5 hours) 
 
Each mission requires the use of different systems to the others, and thus several of 
the phases mentioned above have several different total loss and abandonment fault 
trees depending on the mission they are used in. Each phase which can be 
abandoned is set to abandon to the logical return phase – for instance, “Transit” 
abandons to the phase “Return transit”. As such, most of the return phases reverse 
their counterparts’ durations, as mentioned in Section 6.2.1, rather than having an 
absolutely defined value. The phase fault trees used are given in Appendix B, in the 
format as inputted to the simulation program. 
7.3.1.4 Platforms and MFOPs 
A fleet of three platforms is used with a set of three possible MFOPs. Each platform 
performs each MFOP once, in a different order. These orders are: 
 
Platform 1 – MFOP 1, MFOP 2, MFOP 3 
Platform 2 – MFOP 3, MFOP 2, MFOP 1 
Platform 3 – MFOP 2, MFOP 3, MFOP 1 
 
Each of the MFOPs is a different combination of the three available missions. These 
combinations are: 
 
 MFOP 1 – ASUW, ASW, SAR 
 MFOP 2 – ASW, ASUW, SAR 
 MFOP 3 – SAR, ASW, ASUW 
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7.3.1.5 Component data 
Most component data was taken directly from the information provided or best 
estimates obtained. However, some component data was missing, and so a universal 
estimate of a failure rate of one failure in a million was applied to these 
components, using a negative exponential distribution. Note, however, that this does 
not indicate that all components with a failure rate of 1 × 10-6 had missing data. 
7.3.1.6 Enablers 
No enablers were used in the first generation of the simulations. One of the aims of 
this chapter is to show the process by which platform weaknesses are identified and 
enablers, such as prognostics or redundancies, can be used to reduce their 
contribution to MFOP and mission failure. 
 
7.3.2 Performance of Simulations and Results 
 
Three sets of simulations were carried out, with improvements being made between 
each set and the next. The following sections describe the results of each set and the 
improvements made for the next set. 
7.3.2.1 First Generation 
The first set of simulations was performed and the results compiled and analysed. 
70,100 simulations were performed, at which point the result was considered to 
have converged. Figure 7.1 shows the convergence of each of the platform 
catastrophic failure (CF) probabilities. 
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Figure 7.1 – Convergence of Platform Catastrophic Failure Probabilities 
 
In order to demonstrate the nature of the process by which system reliability 
problems can be identified and potential improvements suggested, it was decided 
that the focus of the analysis of the first set of results would be on attempting to 
improve the catastrophic failure probability of the platforms. As such, a pareto 
analysis, whereby the most critical factors are identified in a hierarchy downwards, 
terminating with improvements to the most vulnerable items. 
 
This process begins by observing the failure probabilities of the different platforms 
and identifying which, if any, of the MFOPs they perform are more or less prone to 
total loss of the aircraft. Table 7.5 shows this information. 
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Table 7.5 – Platform and MFOP Catastrophic Failure Probabilities 
Platform Category No. Starts No. CFs CF Prob. 
PF1 Platform 70100 323 0.0046 
 MFOPs 210001 323 0.0015 
 MFOP1 70100 98 0.0014 
 MFOP2 70002 103 0.0015 
 MFOP3 69899 122 0.0017 
PF2 Platform 70100 322 0.0046 
 MFOPs 209949 322 0.0015 
 MFOP3 70100 125 0.0018 
 MFOP2 69975 101 0.0014 
 MFOP1 69874 96 0.0014 
PF3 Platform 70100 325 0.0046 
 MFOPs 209982 325 0.0015 
 MFOP2 70100 111 0.0016 
 MFOP3 69989 96 0.0014 
 MFOP1 69893 118 0.0017 
 
The results show that the total CF probabilities for each of the platforms are nearly 
identical. This is to be expected, as each platform performs the same MFOPs as 
each other, albeit in a different order. The results show very similar figures for each 
of the MFOP catastrophic failure probabilities for each platform. MFOP3 causes 
most problems in platforms 1 and 2, but fewest in platform 3. Similarly, MFOP1 
causes fewest problems in the first two platforms, but most in the third. There is no 
discernible pattern between the first or last MFOPs performed by a platform causing 
most or fewest catastrophic failures. This lack of a pattern in the results suggests 
that any minor differences in the catastrophic failure probability of the different 
MFOPs are little more than natural variation. As such, there is no weight to place on 
any of the three MFOPs as being more or less of a problem than the others. 
 
Considering this, the analysis then looked at the absolute MFOP failure probabilities 
independently of the platforms, and how the three different missions affect these. 
The convergence of each of the MFOP CF probabilities is demonstrated in Figure 
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7.2, while the numerical data on the MFOP CF probabilities and those of the 
missions within them is given in Table 7.6. 
 
 
Figure 7.2 – Convergence of MFOP Catastrophic Failure Probabilities 
 
Table 7.6 – MFOP and Mission Catastrophic Failure Probabilities 
MFOP Category No. Starts No. CFs CF Prob. 
MFOP1 MFOP 209867 312 0.00149 
 Missions 583330 312 0.00053 
 ASUW 209867 113 0.00054 
 ASW 199925 102 0.00051 
 SAR 173538 97 0.00056 
MFOP2 MFOP 210077 315 0.00150 
 Missions 584953 315 0.00054 
 ASW 210077 97 0.00046 
 ASUW 194091 124 0.00064 
 SAR 180785 94 0.00052 
MFOP3 MFOP 209988 343 0.00163 
 Missions 579176 343 0.00059 
 SAR 209988 90 0.00043 
 ASW 194796 139 0.00071 
 ASUW 174392 114 0.00065 
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These results show that there is little difference between the failure probabilities for 
MFOPs 1 and 2, but MFOP 3 has a slightly higher chance (0.00013) of failing. For 
MFOP1, there is little difference in the likelihood of total loss for each of the 
different missions. In MFOP2, however, the ASW mission has a fairly low failure 
probability, while ASUW has a fairly high value. In MFOP3, ASW and ASUW 
both have fairly high failure probabilities, while that for SAR is low. 
 
Once again, however, there is no significant pattern or difference in any of the 
results which suggests that one MFOP or mission is a great problem more than any 
of the others. As such, all of the missions must be assessed equally for their absolute 
CF probability, and how this is affected by the phases within them. 
 
 
Figure 7.3 – Convergence of Mission Catastrophic Failure Probabilities 
 
Figure 7.3 shows the convergence of the mission CF probabilities, which are shown 
numerically in Table 7.7. As can be seen, ASUW has the highest probability, 
followed by ASW and then SAR. However, there is still little difference in real 
terms between the failure probabilities – they are exceptionally low. In order to 
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understand the phases which are the common causes of failure, consider Figure 7.4 
below. 
 
Table 7.7 – Mission Catastrophic Failure Probabilities 
Mission Starts No. CFs CF Prob. 
ASUW 578350 351 0.000607 
ASW 604798 338 0.000559 
SAR 564311 281 0.000498 
 
Mission Failures in Phases 
Take-Off
3%
Climb
8%
Transit
11%Descent1
6%
On-Task
40%
Return
16%
Descent2
5%
Approach
6%
Land
3%
Others
2%
 
Figure 7.4 – Proportion of Mission Failures in Individual Phases 
 
From Figure 7.4, it can be seen that the main contributors to mission failure are the 
phases On-Task, Return and Transit. These phases account for two-thirds of 
catastrophic failures of missions, and thus should be the focus of any attempts to 
improve platform CF probabilities.  
 
The analysis took the most critical of the phases, On-Task, and looked at the 
systems which were causing its failure most often. The causes of these system 
failures were then analysed in turn, until the primary causes of failure were 
ascertained. For instance, the top event of the On-Task phase is “Aircraft 7”. The 
three subsystems of this are: 
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• 1.1-DEV_FP5 (failed in 20% of top event failures) 
• 1.2-CFIT4 (40%) 
• 1.3-STRCT7 (41%) 
 
The results suggest that the latter two systems are more critical than the first (note 
that all gates are OR gates unless otherwise stated). Looking at 1.3-STRCT7, it has 
two events below it in the phase fault tree - 1.3.1STRC6 and 1.3.2FIRE7, which 
cause 74% and 26% of failures respectively. 1.3.1STRC6 has four subsystems: 
 
• SD_GEN_SYS4 (16% of failures) 
• G647-2 (84%)  
• SD_LOW_ZHA (0%) 
• SD-FCS (0%) 
 
This shows that SD_LOW_ZHA and SD-FCS are not critical at all, while 
SD_GEN_SYS4 is much less important than G647-2. All of the failures of this gate 
are caused by SDSTOREDAM1, which has only one input (SDWEP1). SDWEP1 
has two inputs, SD_WEPS1 and SD_NON_WEP, which cause two-thirds and one-
third of its failures respectively. SD_NON_WEP has two component inputs which 
cause it to fail an equal number of times, while SD_WEPS1 has one subsystem and 
two component inputs. The two components, G023 and G618, have a modest effect 
on SD_WEPS1, causing 14% and 17% of failures respectively. The subsystem, 
SD_WEP_PL1, however, prompts SD_WEPS1 to fail 69% of the time.  
 
Continuing this approach across the three phases earmarked for improvement yields 
a list of systems and components which are the main causes of total loss. This list is 
shown in Table 7.8, which shows the estimated phase criticality for the given item, 
and the method proposed to remedy the problem. The place of the items within the 
phase fault trees can be seen in Appendix B.1.  
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Table 7.8 – Items Most Critical for Total Loss of Aircraft 
Estimated Phase Criticality1 
Item Type 
Phases 
Affected Transit 
On-
Task 
Return 
Remedy 
G594 System All Flight2 25% 12% 19% Redundancy 
G625 Component All Flight 2% 1% 1% 
Improve Inherent 
Reliability 
NVEPITDISP & 
NVECDISP 
Systems All Flight 24% 14% 20% 
Create LRI, SLR – 
50h 
NVMMRSYSERR System All Flight 10% 6% 8% Redundancy3 
CDD1EFISERR Component All Flight 14% 9% 12% Prognostics 
CDD2EFISERR Component All Flight 7% 4% 6% Prognostics 
CDERRPFD2HW Component All Flight 7% 5% 6% Prognostics 
WEP_LAUNCH System 
On-Task, 
Attack 
- 15% - Redundancy 
SD_NON_WEP System 
On-Task, 
Attack 
- 9% - Redundancy 
EXP_WEP System 
On-Task, 
Attack 
- 4% - 
Abandon mission 
if either of two 
inputs fails 
G621 Component 
On-Task, 
Attack 
- 6% - SLR – 70h 
G642-GATE1 Component Return - - 11% Improve IR 
G642-G178 Component Return - - 14% Improve IR 
G274NMVTUPR Component All Flight 7% 3% 19% Prognostics 
 
7.3.2.2 Second Generation 
The proposed remedies were applied to a second generation of simulations, as can 
be seen in Appendix B.2. A set of 76,800 simulations were performed with this new 
information, and results obtained in a similar fashion to those of the first generation. 
The convergence of the platform failure probabilities can be seen in Figure 7.5. 
 
                                                
1 The per cent figure given estimates how often, proportionally, the corresponding item contributed 
to the failure of the phase. 
2 Flight phases are Climb; Transit; Descent1; On-Task; Attack; Off-Task; Return; Descent2; 
Approach; Land. 
3 NVMMRSYSERR has two subsystems, NVM1SYSERR and NVM2SYSERR, the failure of either 
of which causes system failure. The redundancy puts in place a third sub-system, which comes 
online when either of the other two sub-systems fails. 
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Figure 7.5 – Convergence of Platform CF Probabilities for Second Generation of Simulations 
 
These results were first used to gain an understanding of how the remedies proposed 
in Table 7.8 have affected the catastrophic failure probability. Following this, a new 
analysis was performed on MFOP and mission abandonment, to see how this could 
be improved. 
 
Table 7.9 compares the platform, MFOP and mission total loss probabilities from 
the first and second generations of simulations.  
 
Table 7.9 – Reduction in CF Probabilities between Generations of Simulations 
Item 
1st Generation 
CF Prob. 
2nd Generation 
CF Prob. 
Relative 
Reduction 
PF1 0.0046 0.0041 11.3% 
PF2 0.0046 0.0038 16.7% 
PF3 0.0046 0.0037 20.0% 
MFOP1 0.0015 0.0013 12.6% 
MFOP2 0.0015 0.0011 24.7% 
MFOP3 0.0016 0.0015 11.1% 
ASUW 0.00061 0.00048 20.5% 
ASW 0.00056 0.00052 6.6% 
SAR 0.00050 0.00039 21.7% 
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Each platform, MFOP and mission shows a modest reduction in the failure 
probability, which suggests that the remedies of the primary causes of total loss are 
having some effect. In order to show the level at which the MFOP enablers which 
have been employed are successful, a note was made of the improvement in 
reliability performance for each of the items: 
 
• The prognostic components can be measured by how many times they failed 
overall, and how many times the prognostics system in place led to MFOP 
abandonment and component replacement. 
o CDD1EFISERR had 59 critical failures and was replaced by the 
prognostics system 299 times. 
o CDD2EFISERR had 33 critical failures and 168 replacements. 
o CDERRPFD2HW had 31 critical failures and 129 replacements. 
o G274NMVTUPR had no critical failures and was replaced 8 times. 
From this, it can be inferred that the prognostics system can prevent 
potential mission-critical component failures approximately 80% of the time. 
 
• The effectiveness of the redundant items which have been put in place can 
be measured by finding the number of failures of the parent systems, and the 
number of times the redundancy switched or failed. 
o The system G594 was changed in the second generation of 
simulations, such that it became the parent of G594-MAIN and 
G594-RED. The latter is a carbon copy of the former, with redundant 
versions of the sub-components. With a sensed redundancy, 2393 
switches were made, all of which were successful, and no failures of 
G594 occurred. However, results show that only 138 of these 
switches were made due to an actual failure of G594-MAIN. The 
NFF rate of the sensor was 1 × 10-4 hr-1, as it was for all the other 
sensors. This value may be unrepresentative of a real-life situation, 
but does show the importance of reducing the NFF rate of sensors 
detecting system failures.  
o Similarly, SD_NON_WEP was converted to contain a main system 
and a redundant system, switched by a sensor. This had 2339 
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switches with a 100% success rate. This time, however, only 47 
failures of the primary sub-system, SDNW_MAIN, occurred, with 
no failures of the redundant system. 
o NVMMRSYS had manual switchovers to a redundant system. With 
this system, as mentioned in footnote 3 of Table 7.8, NVMMRSYS 
has two subsystems, NVM1SYSERR and NVM2SYSERR, and if 
either of these fails, a third sub-system, NVM3SYSERR, is 
activated. 66 switchovers took place, of which 61 were successful. 
On top of the five failed switches, two more failures of the overall 
system took place, due to NVM3SYSERR failing. 
o WEP_LAUNCH was set up such that it was the main system in 
SD_WEP_PL1. WEP_LAUNCH failed 122 times, and 118 of the 
switches to the redundant item were successful. No failures of 
SD_WEP_PL1 took place. 
These examples show the important differences between bringing online 
systems either automatically or manually. Manually-switched redundancies 
are more prone to human error not bringing the redundant item online. 
Automatic systems will very rarely fail to bring online the redundant item, 
but may well cause NFFs the majority of the time. 
 
• Improvements in inherent reliability were applied to items G625, G642-
GATE1 and G642-G178. In the first generation of simulations, these items 
failed 10, 22 and 22 times respectively (adjusted to compensate for the 
difference in the numbers of simulations performed). In the second 
generation, the items failed 3, 4 and 1 times respectively. These values 
reflect a very good improvement in the number of failures. 
 
• NVEPITDISP and NVECDISP were put into an LRI, such that if one of the 
items failed, the other item was replaced at the same time. The idea behind 
this is that because a failure of either of these items will cause the parent 
system to fail, the replacement of the other child system should improve its 
reliability performance, hopefully bringing about a reduction in parent 
system reliability through a change in maintenance regime alone. In this 
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scenario, however, the introduction of a LRI seems to increase the number 
of failures of the parent system, G442/443 by more than three and a half 
times. A possible explanation for this is that if either of the items 
NVEPITDISP or NVECDISP has a long life before failure, the replacement 
of it as part of an LRI, before it has failed, leads to a good chance that the 
replacement component will have a shorter time to fail. Because each 
simulation regards the platform over a specified interval, this may make it 
less likely in any given simulation that either of the components could 
survive until the end of the three MFOPs, and more likely to cause parent 
system failure. 
 
• A feature which may have exacerbated the problems mentioned in the 
previous point is that the LRI was scheduled to be replaced automatically 
after every 50 hours in service. Component G621 also had scheduled life 
replacements, every 70 hours, though these only had a modest effect, 
reducing the number of failures from 32 down to 25. 
 
After focusing on the causes of total loss, the analysis moved on to MFOP and 
mission abandonments. The process begins in the same way as that for total loss. 
Figure 7.6 shows the convergence of the MFOP abandonment probabilities over the 
set of simulations, while Table 7.10 shows the numerical results. It can be seen that 
MFOPs 1 and 2 have an approximately equal abandonment probability, while 
MFOP 3 has a probability which is lower by about 0.075. An apparent reason for 
this is that the search and rescue mission, SAR, is the final mission in both MFOPs 
1 and 2, and the “FlightCheck3” phase is abandoned a much larger percentage of the 
time the later in the MFOP it occurs. There is no such large increase in the 
abandonment probabilities for missions ASUW or ASW depending on position 
within the MFOP. 
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Figure 7.6 – Convergence of MFOP Abandonment Probability for Second Generation of 
Simulations 
 
Table 7.10 – Abandonment Probabilities of MFOPs 
MFOP Category No. Starts No. 
Abandons 
Abandon 
Prob. 
MFOP1 MFOP 230030 70727 0.30747 
 Missions 638859 70727 0.11071 
 ASUW 230030 10828 0.04707 
 ASW 219105 29262 0.13355 
 SAR 189724 30637 0.16148 
MFOP2 MFOP 230215 70835 0.30769 
 Missions 640958 70835 0.11051 
 ASW 230215 17567 0.07631 
 ASUW 212558 14285 0.06721 
 SAR 198185 38983 0.19670 
MFOP3 MFOP 230136 53388 0.23198 
 Missions 635609 53388 0.08400 
 SAR 230136 16251 0.07061 
 ASW 213804 22005 0.10292 
 ASUW 191669 15132 0.07895 
 
Table 7.11 shows the overall abandonment probabilities of the three different 
missions. As expected, SAR has the highest probability, of 13.9%, followed by 
ASW at 10.4% and ASUW at 6.3%.  The phases in which these abandonments 
typically take place are shown in Figure 7.7. From this, it can be seen that the vast 
proportion (81.6%) of mission abandonments take place in the two phases “Flight 
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Check” and “On-Task”. These, then, should be the focus of efforts to improve the 
mission abandonment figure. 
 
Table 7.11 – Abandonment Probabilities of Missions 
Mission 
No. 
Starts 
No. 
Abandons 
Abandon 
Prob. 
ASUW 634257 40245 0.063452 
ASW 663124 68834 0.103803 
SAR 618045 85871 0.138940 
 
Failures in Phases
Flight Check
45.4%
Climb
1.3%
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7.9%
Descent1
0.6%
On-Task
36.2%
Off-Task
0.6%
Return
7.6%
Others
0.3%
 
Figure 7.7 – Proportion of Mission Abandonments in Individual Phases 
 
The method used in section 7.3.2.1 to establish the primary causes of MFOP 
abandonment was reapplied to create another list of systems and components. These 
items, their effect on phases On-Task and Flight Check and the remedies put in 
place to prevent their high criticalities are shown in Table 7.12. 
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Table 7.12 – Items Most Critical for Abandonment of MFOP 
Item Type Sub-system 
Estimated 
MFOP 
Criticality4 
Remedy 
APR Component DASS5 2.9% Redundancy 
SUPERHET System DASS 2.5% Redundancy 
DRR Component DASS 0.9% Improve IR 
CBR Component DASS 0.6% Improve IR 
TQG Component DASS 7.4% Improve IR; Redundancy 
LRA Component DASS 6.2% Improve IR 
MADCOMPAMP Component MAD6 3.0% Redundancy 
DETECTHEAD Component MAD 4.2% Improve IR 
SMGMTPROC Component STORES7 1.8% Improve IR; Redundancy 
SPINCHAN System ESM8 6.1% Redundancy 
MRX Component ESM 2.6% Improve IR 
REC-EXC Component 
RADAR-
IFF9 
4.4% 
Redundancy 
RFTRANS Component 
RADAR-
IFF 
5.5% 
Improve IR; Redundancy 
RFSCAN Component 
RADAR-
IFF 
6.2% 
Improve IR; SLR – 80h 
TUR1 Component EOSDS10 8.3% Improve IR; SLR – 80h 
PDU1 Component EOSDS 1.8% 
Redundancy; LRI with 
Redundant Item 
SCU1 Component EOSDS 13.6% 
Improve IR; SLR – 50h; 
Redundancy 
 
                                                
4 This value is the approximate proportion of MFOP abandonments contributed to by the specified 
item. 
5 DASS sub-system features in the following phases: All FlightCheck, Climb, Transit, Descent1, All 
On-Task, All Attack, Off-Task and Return. 
6 MAD sub-system features in phases FlightCheck1, On-Task1 and Attack1. 
7 STORES is used in phases FlightCheck1, FlightCheck2, Attack1 and Attack2. 
8 ESM is used in phases FlightCheck2, On-Task2 and Attack2. 
9 RADAR-IFF is used in FlightCheck2, FlightCheck3, On-Task2, On-Task3 and Attack2. 
10 EOSDS is used in FlightCheck3 and On-Task3. 
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In addition to the recommended improvements shown in Table 7.12, two more LRIs 
are to be created, containing: 
 
• LRI_RWR – APR, SUPERHET, the redundancy for SUPERHET, and 
SIGNAL REC 
• LRI_TRDS – DEC, TQG, DASSLNCH. 
7.3.2.3 Third Generation 
The remedies suggested were implemented in a third generation of simulations, as 
can be seen in Appendix B.3. 70,000 simulations were carried out, until all the 
results had a satisfactory level of convergence, as shown in Figure 7.8. 
 
Table 7.13 shows a comparison between the different MFOP abandonment 
probabilities for the second and third generations.  
 
Table 7.13 – Comparison of Abandonment Probabilities between Simulations 
Item 2
nd Generation 
Abandon Prob. 
3rd Generation 
Abandon Prob. 
Relative 
Reduction 
MFOP1 0.307469 0.109258 64.5% 
MFOP2 0.307691 0.106816 65.3% 
MFOP3 0.231985 0.087392 62.3% 
ASUW 0.063452 0.019814 68.8% 
ASW 0.103803 0.045108 56.5% 
SAR 0.138940 0.039231 71.8% 
 
As can be seen from the results, the measures brought in to reduce the abandonment 
probabilities, shown in Table 7.12, have been very successful. While MFOPs are 
still abandoned around 11% of the time, this is a huge reduction from the previous 
value of between 23% and 31%. The typical relative probability reduction is nearly 
two-thirds for the MFOPs, and reaches a value of nearly three quarters in the case of 
mission SAR.  
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Figure 7.8 – Convergence of MFOP Abandonment Probability 
 
The success of the various remedies can be approximated, although in many cases 
items had several remedies put in place at the same time, so the effect of any one is 
difficult to ascertain.  
 
• The failure rate of many of the components was reduced to a tenth of its 
previous value. This resulted in a large reduction in the number of failures 
for each of these components, as shown in Table 7.14. Note that in this 
Table, the number of failures for the second generation has been adjusted to 
account for the different numbers of simulations performed. A vast reduction 
in the number of failures per item can be seen, which plays a large role in the 
reduction of MFOP abandonments. 
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Table 7.14 – Comparison of Component Failure Numbers 
Component 2
nd Generation 
Failures 
3rd Generation 
Failures 
CBR 1177 19 
DRR 1645 39 
TQG 12917 331 
LRA 10844 247 
DETECTHEAD 12644 304 
SMGMTPROC 6066 122 
MRX 5002 117 
RFSCAN 14087 328 
RFTRANS 12643 307 
TUR1 22237 541 
SCU1 36138 874 
 
• The three new LRIs can have their performance measured based on the 
number of failures of the parent system: 
o LRI_RWR contains the items for which RADWARNR is the parent. 
The number of failures of RADWARNR reduced by 90%, though it 
is difficult to say how much of this can be ascribed to the LRI. 
o Similarly, LRI_TRDS contained the sub-items for TRDS. TRDS 
failed 67% less in the third generation than the second. 
o The problem, mentioned in section 7.3.2.2, of LRIs replacing long-
life items with shorter-lived components, reared its head with PDU1. 
In the third generation, PDU1 failed 8% more often than in the 
second generation. 
 
• Redundancies were used regularly in the third generation of simulations. A 
way of measuring the performance of the redundancies is to look at the 
reduction in the number of parent system failures over the set of simulations. 
Table 7.15 shows these values, in addition to other parameters concerning 
redundancies, such as No Faults Found and the number of failed switches. 
The “Type” column refers to whether a redundancy is sensed (S) or manual 
(M). 
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Table 7.15 – Reduction of Failures due to Redundancies 
Parent System 
Failures Item Type 
No. 
Switches 
NFFs 
No. 
Failed 
Switches 2nd Gen 3rd Gen 
Reduction 
APR S 8417 2423 0 13340 1276 90.4% 
TQG S 3798 2377 0 32600 10769 67.0% 
MADCOMPAMP S 12485 2287 0 22889 2839 87.6% 
SMGMTPROC S 3031 2385 0 6083 26 99.6% 
REC-EXC S 13472 2215 0 65071 33792 48.1% 
RFTRANS S 3734 2372 0 65071 33792 48.1% 
PDU1 M 5075 0 490 63372 4686 92.6% 
SCU1 S 6312 2238 0 63372 4686 92.6% 
SUPERHET M 5094 0 484 13340 1276 90.4% 
SPINCHAN M 12836 0 1317 16789 1959 88.3% 
 
The Table shows that each of the redundancies has had an effect on the 
number of parent system failures, with the lowest reduction being just under 
half, for REC-EXC and RFTRANS. The failures for the parent system of 
SMGMTPROC, SMGMTSYS, were reduced to almost zero. 
The NFF rate was the same for the sensors used in the third generation as for 
the second. Here, however, while the number of NFFs is around the same, it 
has less impact as the number of switches due to a real fault is typically 
much larger than those for catastrophic failures. Nonetheless, a great deal of 
abandoned missions would be prevent through the improvement of the NFF 
rate for sensors controlling redundancy switchovers. 
 
Ultimately, the main point of these improvements to the system design is to 
decrease the number of MFOPs that are abandoned. Table 7.16 shows a comparison 
between the MFOP failure probabilities (for either abandonment or total loss) in the 
first set of simulations, and those for the third set. 
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Table 7.16 – MFOP Failure Probability Comparison 
MFOP 
1st Generation 
Failure Prob. 
3rd Generation 
Failure Prob. 
MFOP1 30.7% 11.1% 
MFOP2 31.0% 10.8% 
MFOP3 23.6% 8.9% 
 
As the table shows, the probabilities of failure of the three different MFOPs, which 
were so problematic for the first generation, have been reduced to a much more 
satisfactory level in the third generation. Further improvements could be made, 
potentially, to reduce this value even more. 
 
7.4 Summary 
 
The modelling method presented in Chapter 6 and implemented in the form of a 
simulation program (as explained in Appendix A), has been applied to several 
systems in this chapter. 
 
First, the model was applied to those systems shown in Chapter 5 for the simple 
modelling method, in order to demonstrate it is capable of producing the same 
values. The success of this led to the model being applied to a much larger, more 
realistic system. A method by which the model could be used to investigate the 
effectiveness of different strategies to try to decrease the MFOP failure probability 
is presented. Through the use of various MFOP enablers, the MFOP failure 
probabilities were able to be reduced from around 30% to around 10%. 
Furthermore, the modelling method was able to give more detailed information 
regarding the performance of the system, such as suggesting that use of LRIs may 
increase the expected number of failures of components.  
 
The ability to investigate the application of many different reliability technologies to 
a real-world system is one which provides a great deal of value. It has great 
potential to be used in the design stage of a new platform, to find the most effective 
(both in terms of reliability and cost) ways of increasing its availability. 
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Chapter 8  Conclusions and Further Work 
 
8.1 Summary 
 
The concept of maintenance-free operating periods (MFOPs) has been introduced as 
a length of time in which no maintenance other than simple replenishment of fuel, 
stores, and so on can take place. A system performing an MFOP must complete all 
of the missions scheduled within that time without incurring any failures which 
prevent any further operation with a high, specified, likelihood. Once an MFOP is 
completed, a maintenance recovery period (MRP) takes place. During this time, any 
sub-system failures which occurred during the mission are fixed, while inspections 
and tests ensure that no part of the system is likely to cause failure during the 
forthcoming MFOP. 
 
MFOPs were introduced in order to help plan platform operations and the support 
resources required. It also attempts to make reliability concepts more appropriate for 
the end user. The ability to have a high degree of confidence that a platform will be 
able to carry out all assigned tasks, before undergoing highly organised and 
scheduled maintenance, is an ideal future situation. Previous research has indicated 
that the most effective way to provide a high-value, high-confidence MFOP is 
through the use of technologies such as prognostics, which aim to accurately predict 
future failure; diagnostics, which identify and locate current failures; and redundant 
systems to replace the functionality of failed systems.  
 
A second concept, phased missions, has also been demonstrated. A phased mission 
is one where a system operates to complete a sequential set of objectives over 
different time intervals. The system will use different sub-systems at different times 
in order to complete each of the individual objectives, and so will have a failure 
logic model which changes with each of the phases.  
 
The probability of mission failure cannot be found by simply multiplying the phase 
unreliabilities, because at phase change times, the system must be in a state which 
allows it to function in both the exiting and the entering phase. This statistical 
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dependence requires a more complex analysis method than multiplying phase 
unreliabilities. 
 
Several existing techniques are commonly used to solve the phased missions 
scenario, such as fault tree analysis, Markov methods and binary decision diagrams 
(BDDs). However, drawbacks of these methods include factors such as an explosion 
in the size of a Markov model as the system complexity increases, or the inability of 
fault trees to consider complicating factors such as component dependencies. Other 
complexities of phased missions include the insertion of a phase within the mission, 
following the failure of an item within the system; non-deterministic phase 
durations; phase choices, where the subsequent phase is selected from a group, 
based on random events or the current system state; and the two different failure 
modes of mission abandonment and catastrophic failure. 
 
The twin concepts of phased missions and MFOPs combine well, such that an 
MFOP can be redefined to be a period of a certain number of missions in a given 
order, during which there is a high, specified, probability that none of the missions 
can fail such that emergency maintenance is required or the system is lost. In order 
to consider all of the factors which would affect the performance of MFOPs with 
phased missions, a modelling method is required which is more powerful than either 
fault trees, BDDs or Markov methods. 
 
A new method of modelling MFOPs with the phased mission situation has been 
proposed. This uses Petri nets (PNs), a digraph with two types of node (places and 
transitions), which allow the storage and transmission of data, in the form of 
“tokens”. The position and number of tokens within the various places in the net at 
any one time represents the currently modelled system state. This simple, yet 
powerful, method is capable of denoting many possible situations. 
 
The new modelling method consists of three different types of net:  
 
• A component PN (CPN), which contains all of the data relating to 
component states, such as “working”, “failed”, “replacing”, and so on, and 
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the transitions to switch between these states. The CPN also contains 
information on whether the platform is undergoing repair or not. 
 
• A set of phase PNs (PPNs), which are representations of phase fault trees. 
These take inputs from component failure places, and combine these to 
model whether the overall platform has failed in any phase. Failure consists 
of two possible modes: total loss and abandonment. As such, each PPN 
typically contains two PN fault trees. 
 
• A master PN (MPN). This contains the models of each of the platforms, the 
MFOPs they have to perform, the missions within the MFOPs, and the 
phases within the missions. If a phase failure top event occurs while that 
phase is active, the MPN models mission and MFOP failure (either 
catastrophic or abandoned).  
 
The model can consider a fleet of identical platforms, through the use of “coloured” 
tokens. One colour is considered completely independently of another, and in this 
application there is no possible interaction between tokens of different colours. The 
use of coloured tokens significantly reduces the overall size of the PN model, as one 
set of PPNs, CPN and MPN can be used for the whole fleet. Each different platform 
performs a different sequence of MFOPs, after which the modelling ends. 
 
The various complexities of both MFOPs and phased missions are modelled in PN 
form. For instance, it is possible that a certain combination of failures may occur 
such that the mission always fails, regardless of which phase it is in. These can be 
described as general failures and can be stored under a General PPN, again in the 
form of either abandonment or total loss. 
 
Phase choices can take place through a small alteration of the PN mechanism: 
“probability arcs” allow a single transition to output to just one of a selection of 
possible output places, according to a given probability for each. As such, a 
probabilistic phase choice can take place, while phases can also be chosen based on 
the current system state. These event-driven phase choices can be made to occur 
 - 233 - 
based on a specified conditional fault tree, stored within the relevant PPN, where the 
presence or absence of the top event alters which phase is chosen to perform next. 
 
It is considered unrealistic for an abandoned mission to end instantly – for example, 
an aircraft in mid-flight is unable to immediately appear at the base after aborting. 
Instead, the aircraft must go through a series of phases which are different from 
those it was intending to perform. As such, the model allows emergency phases to 
be carried out in the event of mission abandonment, ending with MFOP abortion 
and an unscheduled MRP. As part of this, it is possible for a phase’s duration to 
mirror that of another phase, such that, for instance, the length of a “return” phase is 
exactly equal to that of a “transit” phase, regardless of whether the earlier phase was 
cut short. 
 
Another feasible scenario is one where a phase must be inserted into the mission, 
before continuing with the previous objectives. An example of this is in-flight 
refuelling, something which is commonly performed with long-range aircraft such 
as Nimrod. The PN model considers this to taking place when the top event of a 
conditional fault tree has occurred. The phase is immediately carried out, 
interrupting the previous phase, which continues where it left off. 
 
An event may occur whose appearance cannot be described according to a time-
based probability distribution, but as in response to the occurrence of another event, 
with a certain probability. These are here termed “discrete events”, and are 
modelled in PN form using probability arcs to propagate a trigger event (which may 
be, for example, the start of a mission or phase, a component failure, and so on) to 
either “event occurs” or “event does not occur”, based on a randomly sampled value 
and the assigned probabilities. These are useful to represent factors such as weather, 
human responses to stimuli or preventable maintenance issues (such as failing to 
replace a panel, for instance), and can be used as inputs to PPNs. 
 
It is common practice within many industries to remove a group of components in 
close physical proximity as one, due to the failure of one or more of them. These are 
termed “Line Replaceable Items” (LRIs). The modelling method allows components 
to be replaced together regardless of their operational state, with new failure times 
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being sampled following replacement. These replacements can also be scheduled to 
occur after a certain length of time in flight, so as to prevent a serious failure event 
occurring. 
 
If a failure event does occur, its occurrence and location may need to be found for a 
variety of reasons. For instance, it may not be repairable until the failure is seen, or 
the failure may require a redundant system to be brought online. These diagnostics 
are here modelled in two forms: sensors, and inspections. Sensors are physical 
components which can themselves fail, but if they are operational, will immediately 
detect a failure in the component or system they are monitoring. Another issue is 
that of No Faults Found (NFFs) – the sensor detects a main system failure where 
none has occurred. These spurious trips can be a large problem where the sensor, for 
instance, causes mission abandonment upon failure detection. A NFF rate can be 
specified, modelling NFFs and their effect on the system. Inspections, however, are 
performed only within MRPs, and can, for instance, prompt item replacement if a 
failure is found. Inspections can be set to be performed after a certain length of time, 
after a given number of MFOPs, or in response to a discovered failure in a higher 
system. 
 
If a component or system fails, it may be necessary to bring a previously non-
operational item online to replace its function. These items are called redundant, and 
can be useful, albeit with a penalty of cost, bulk or weight. The redundant systems 
are modelled as being brought online either manually or automatically. Automatic 
transition occurs through the use of sensors. As mentioned above, these can fail and 
thus not bring the redundant system online. Also, NFFs may take the main system 
offline where no failure has occurred. Manual transition is carried out by an 
operator, and as such is subject to human error. A success rate of the transition 
taking place is specified, and so redundant items will fail to be brought online a 
certain proportion of the time. However, spurious trips will not occur with manual 
transitions. 
 
Prognostic systems aim to predict the future failure of components, which systems 
will be affected by this and whether any phases and missions will potentially fail. A 
modelling method for this has been proposed based on the concept of levels of wear. 
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It is assumed that components degrade, that this wearing is detectable and can be 
categorised into levels of wear. It is further assumed that the levels of wear occur at 
certain stages within the life of the component, expressed as a percentage range of 
its failure time. Once a component has reached a level of wear at a certain time, 
predictions can be made as to how much longer it may have before it fails. 
Predictions of the length of the current or future missions can then be made, and the 
effect of the component failure upon the mission estimated. If a current mission is 
predicted to fail, it can be abandoned and the failing component replaced. During an 
MRP, if any mission is predicted to fail, components can be replaced to prevent this. 
 
All of these considerations have been represented in PN form, and designed to take 
into account other complications (such as components which are part of an LRI 
undergoing inspections). The modelling method has been applied in the form of a 
program, which uses a Monte-Carlo simulation approach to randomly sample 
transition switching times for components, phases, and so on. These timed 
transitions are switched, followed by any enabled immediate transitions, until each 
simulation ends. If enough simulations are performed, an accurate picture of the 
performance of the platform can be seen. The program has been used with a real-life 
system to establish whether it is a useful tool and that the modelling method works 
as intended, to provide valuable information at the design stage on the MFOP 
performance of a platform or fleet of platforms. 
 
8.2 Conclusions 
 
The aim of the research was to produce a modelling method capable of considering 
the two concepts of MFOPs and phased missions in-depth, and giving important 
data on whether a system undergoing these is performing as required. The following 
conclusions can be made: 
 
• A full-scale, in-depth model capable of considering both MFOPs and phased 
missions has not been previously produced. The modelling method shown in 
this thesis is novel, and can provide valuable information on a new reliability 
metric which has not seen widespread use in any industry to date. 
 - 236 - 
• While Petri nets have previously been applied to phased missions, there has 
not been, to date, a method of providing models with a consistent structure 
and mode of creation. This thesis has built upon previous works in order to 
provide a way of modelling phased missions which is easily understood and 
can be repeatedly applied to different scenarios. 
 
• An adaptation of the Petri net has been suggested, clarifying the situation 
where two immediate or identically-timed transitions are enabled from the 
same place, where only one transition can take the token within it. Instead, 
these transitions are replaced by a single one, which has “probability arcs” 
leading to output places. Only one of the places connected to a probability 
arc will take the token when the transition switches, according to a randomly 
sampled number. 
 
• Methods of modelling the complexities of phased missions, such as 
abandonment to phases, phase insertion, phase selection, and so on, have 
been produced in the form of Petri nets. Even outside the scope of MFOP, 
these have uses in the form of a simulation program. 
 
• The enablers of MFOP, such as redundancy, prognostics, inspection, 
automated sensing, line replaceable items, and so on, have all been 
considered within the model shown. The methods of modelling these in PN 
form are new, and may have uses outside of the scope of this thesis. 
 
• In particular, a prognostic PN model has been produced which has a wear-
based method of predicting future component failure. This is then combined 
with phase fault trees to establish whether a component likely to fail before 
the mission or MFOP has ended will cause a critical system failure. If so, the 
current MFOP can be abandoned or, if the prognostic system is being used 
during an MRP, the component can be replaced. 
 
• The suggested model has been implemented in the form of a Monte-Carlo 
simulation program. This takes inputs such as phase fault trees, component 
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failure data, sensors, discrete events, MFOP enablers, and fleet, MFOP, 
mission and phase data. This program is capable of providing a great deal of 
information regarding the implementation of various MFOP enablers, 
mission structures, abandonment and maintenance regimes, and so on. It is 
hoped that this will be a useful tool to designers considering reliability 
issues, in order to find the most effective ways of having a high-value 
MFOP with a high degree of confidence. It is possible that it may provide 
data which is counter-intuitive, such as LRIs potentially increasing the 
expected number of failures of a sub-component within a certain timeframe. 
As a result, it is of great value to understand how MFOPs may be 
implemented in real-world systems. 
 
8.3 Further Work 
 
The scope of this research leads to the possibility of further areas of investigation. 
Potential directions are discussed in the following sections. 
 
8.3.1 Verification of Repairable Larger System Results 
A larger system was modelled as described in section 5.3.3. As the system and 
mission profile used in that example was so complex, the results from the 
simulations could not be compared to theoretical figures. It would be worthwhile for 
mathematical values to be produced in order to compare these with the results from 
the simulations.  
 
8.3.2 Cost modelling 
 
While the model shown here considers many of the important areas of both MFOPs 
and phased missions, a factor absent from this is the costs associated with various 
maintenance regimes, employment of manpower, total loss of platform, cost of 
phase insertion or abandonment, and so on. It would be useful to expand the 
research to include cost factors, and potentially other important considerations. 
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8.3.3 Reconfigurability 
 
There is no direct consideration of reconfigurability outside of the scope of 
redundant systems. While the model is capable of handling many different 
variations of redundancies, such as several systems sharing a single redundant 
output, a redundancy itself having a redundancy, or a single system having several 
redundancies, it is possible that there are further complications specific to 
reconfigurable systems which require direct modelling. 
 
8.3.4 Phase and Component Dependency 
 
While the model takes account of components which affect each others’ failure 
rates, there is no consideration within the model of how different phases may affect 
component failure rates, or how the failure of components or system may lengthen 
or shorten a phase’s duration. It is probable, for instance, that a jet engine is more 
likely to fail mid-flight than when the aircraft is idling. Similarly, if one of several 
jet engines fails mid-flight, it is likely that the aircraft will take more time to return 
to base. 
 
8.3.5 Degradation 
 
The model has a very binary approach to component failures. In reality, a common 
issue is that the performance of components gradually reduces over time. This may 
manifest itself by reducing system effectiveness, lengthening phases or possibly 
affecting phase choice. A realistic approach would be to allow the wear-levels of 
components as shown in the prognostic model to affect the outcome of systems or 
phases. 
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8.3.6 Prognostics 
 
The prognostics model used within this research has been necessarily simplified, in 
order for it to be included as part of a broader whole. It is certainly possible that 
there are much more complex ways of predicting component failures and their 
effects on systems, or that several approaches need to be all considered at the same 
time within a single model. A broader, more accurate prognostic model may be 
capable of being produced.  
 
8.3.7 Platforms and MFOPs 
 
The model restricts the number of MFOPs that a platform may perform, and in 
doing so can only provide an observation of the platform over a relatively short 
period of time. The ability to consider many more MFOPs, potentially an unlimited 
number, over the full lifecycle of a platform, would be a useful feature. This would 
lend itself well to consideration of whole life cost. 
 
8.3.8 MFOPs and Missions 
 
The results from section 7.3.2 provided an indication that the placement of a 
mission within an MFOP may significantly affect the probability of the MFOP 
failing, especially where the failure is categorised as an abandonment. It would be 
useful to investigate the extent of this dependency on mission order, to find if there 
is an easy way to establish the optimum MFOP survivability figure. An example of 
how this might be carried out would be to have eight MFOPs, each with seven 
instances of “Mission 1”, and one instance of “Mission 2”. “Mission 2” would be in 
a different location in each MFOP, and the resulting failure rates for each of the 
MFOPs would be compared. 
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8.3.9 Maintenance & Logistics Support 
 
The maintenance regimes within the model shown here are simplified. In the real 
world, the maintenance of the platforms will be an issue which is critical to how 
they then go on to perform MFOPs. Factors such as availability of spares or 
manpower, operation of different bases, repair only of necessary components or 
systems in a “just in time” capacity, potential for inspection to fail to find a present 
fault, and so on, could all be modelled more accurately, providing a much better 
picture of how maintenance issues could affect MFOP performance. 
 
8.3.10 Importance Measures 
 
An important aspect of the modelling capability is the necessity of indicating which 
MFOPs, missions, phases, systems, components and so on are the most important. 
The ability to give various types of importance measure for each of these items, for 
both catastrophic failure and abandonment, would be useful. Furthermore, the 
ability to indicate the effectiveness of a particular enabler, such as a redundancy, 
would provide a valuable indicator.  
 
8.3.11 Optimisation 
 
The fault trees that the model uses are converted to PN form in such a way that they 
exactly represent the original fault tree. There are, however, many optimisation 
techniques which exist in order to reduce the size of fault trees and thus the number 
of calculations required to find the top event occurrence probability. These same 
optimisation techniques would reduce the size of the phase PNs and speed up the 
simulations.  
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8.3.12 System of Systems 
 
A recent development of reliability within the military environment is that of 
systems of systems. The approach considers several distinct types of system 
working together to achieve a common mission. A particular system may provide a 
valuable function at an early part of the mission, which has a given timeframe to 
complete, otherwise another system cannot perform its function. This interaction of 
different systems is complex to model. It is probable that the phased mission and 
MFOP concepts may fit comfortably within this area. Similarly, a PN approach may 
be able to consider all factors necessary to modelling each mission. An investigation 
into how these issues may work with the system of systems concept would be 
useful. 
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Appendix A Description of Simulation Program 
 
A.1 Introduction 
 
The creation of a complex PN model is one which would require a great deal of 
time to recreate even one scenario of component failures. One of the benefits of 
performing these tasks on a computer simulation program, as outlined in Section 
1.5, is that thousands or millions of simulations can be performed in a short 
timeframe. A simulation program using Monte-Carlo methods can, with sufficient 
numbers of simulations, build up an accurate picture of the reliability performance 
of the platform. 
 
These facts led to the creation of a program which applies the Petri net modelling 
methods explained in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 in the form of Monte-Carlo 
simulations. This is the means of providing the data to accurately analyse all aspects 
of the combination of phased missions and MFOPs being performed by a series of 
platforms.  
 
The following sections of this appendix will explain the procedures of the program, 
including: 
 
• Inputting phase fault trees, component data, mission, MFOP and platform 
data, and information on MFOP and phased mission complexities 
• Conversion of inputted information into a useful set of PNs 
• Changing options regarding running the simulations 
• Performing simulations on the platform 
• The way in which the inputted data is stored, and what parameters from the 
simulations are stored 
• Outputting the results obtained or information on the system 
 
In this appendix, code is always displayed in a different font, and is written as 
it would typically be in C++, except where abbreviated code is indicated in square 
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brackets. Comments are shown either on the same line as code, using two forward 
slashes //, or as a block of text, which is bookended by a forward slash and an 
asterix:  
 
/* A block of text following /* will be ignored by the compiler 
until ended with the characters: */ 
 
Similarly, text which forms the inputs or outputs to the program is also written in a 
different font. 
 
A.2 Basic Information 
 
The simulation model was programmed in C++ using Microsoft Visual Studio 6.0. 
This is an object-oriented language, which differs from structured languages. Most 
programming languages provide the capability for creating variables of integer, 
floating point, Boolean and string types, amongst others. In a structured language, it 
is possible to define a structure type which contains many different sub-variables. 
For instance, consider the following code: 
 
struct simple_structure 
{ 
 int a; 
 float b; 
 bool c; 
 char d; 
}; 
 
A structure has been defined of type simple_structure which has the sub-
variables a, b, c and d. Values can be assigned to these sub-variables and functions 
can be written to use them. In an object-oriented programming language, this ability 
to bind together sub-variables under an umbrella structure is still present. Also 
defined under that umbrella, however, are the functions capable of being performed 
on the sub-variables. Instead of a structure, this is known as an object of a class. 
This can be defined in C++ as follows: 
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class simple_object 
{ 
public: 
 void function1(); 
 int function2(); 
 float function3(); 
private: 
 int a; 
 float b; 
 bool c; 
 char d; 
}; 
 
The public and private operators are there to define what aspects of the class 
non-object functions can access. Best practice states that object functions should be 
accessible, or “public”, to any part of the program, while the variables should be 
“private”, or only directly accessible to the object. Typically, the only way to access 
a variable in an object is if a function exists to return the variable or its memory 
pointer. Continuing with the above example, the object would be defined in the 
following way: 
 
void external_function() 
{ 
 simple_object object_name;   //Defining the object 
 object_name.function1();     //Accessing a function of the 
object 
} 
 
Coding in an object-oriented language allows for a great deal of flexibility and 
memory efficiency. Every effort has been made with the code to establish a good 
balance between time to run all of the simulations and the memory used in doing so. 
Dynamic memory allocation (DMA), where variables, arrays, and objects are only 
defined at run-time to be the size that they need to be, has been used copiously. 
Using DMA allows for the possibility of memory leaks, where memory is allocated 
but is not released after it is no longer needed. All memory leaks have been 
removed from the program, so that its RAM usage remains stable while running a 
batch of simulations. 
 - 253 - 
The interface of the program is not a standard Windows application. Like most 
simple programs coded in C++, the graphical user interface (GUI) is, instead, a 
screen resembling DOS, an early text-based operating system, as shown in Figure 
A.1. 
 
 
Figure A.1 – Typical GUI of Simulation Program 
 
The status of the inputted model is shown at the top of the program screen, with 
information such as the number of simulations to be performed and fleet, MFOP 
and mission data. The user options are presented in the form of menus, each one of 
which has an assigned number. The number is typed in where the screen says “Enter 
your choice”, and pressing enter takes the user to that option. Some options result in 
sub-menus, while others perform tasks directly. 
 
Upon execution, the program first creates a main simulation object named “Sim”, of 
class “Input_Output”. This single object controls the entire program and operates 
everything else. The whole of the rest of the code, including all other objects, is a 
part of Sim. These other objects are: 
 
• A Petri Net object, containing all the information on the various PNs 
• Objects for Platforms, MFOPs, Missions and Phases 
• Objects for LRIs, Systems, Components and Discrete Events 
• Objects for redundancies and prognostics. 
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Sim also contains variables such as the numbers of platforms, MFOPs, missions, 
phases, LRIs, systems, components and discrete events, in addition to the 
confidence level mentioned in Section 6.3.8.3, and the number of simulations to be 
performed. The PN object is created at run-time, although it is initially empty.  
 
A.3 Inputting Data to the Program 
 
The first step necessary to operating the program is to input data to allow it to create 
the various Petri Nets used to model the fleet of platforms and their missions. All 
inputs are in the form of text files, which are easily inputted to the program, but 
must be in a very specific format for each type of input. As Figure A.2 shows, 
entering the input menu, the user is faced with two options: return to the previous 
menu, or input the phase failure & abandonment fault trees, and sensor and 
component failure data.  
 
 
Figure A.2 – Input Menu 
 
A.3.1 Phase Fault Tree, Component and Sensor Data 
 
Figure A.3 shows the process by which the Phase fault trees, component failure 
rates, sensor data, discrete events and component dependencies are inputted to the 
program. The following sections describe this in more detail. 
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Figure A.3 – Flowchart describing input processes for phase fault trees, component data, 
sensors, discrete events and component dependencies 
 
Entering the name of a text file which contains this information begins the process 
of creating the first set of PNs. This file must contain the following information, in 
the following order: 
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- Number of phases to be inputted. 
- Catastrophic Failure Fault tree information for each phase 
- If an abandonment specific to the phase is possible, the details of the fault tree 
for that. 
- Fault tree information for general total loss and general abandonment 
- Failure information for each basic event specified in the phase fault trees 
- Information on sensors, including what they monitor and failure rates 
- Data on discrete events 
- Specifics of dependencies between components 
A.3.1.1 Phase Fault Trees 
The layout of the text file is very precise. For inputting the phases, this is as follows: 
 
PHASES <# PHASES>     
      
PHASE  <PHASE NAME> <# EVENTS>    
      
<EVENT 1 NAME> <GATE TYPE> <# EVENTS > <EVENT 1> <EVENT 2> ...
<EVENT 2 NAME> <GATE TYPE> <# EVENTS > <EVENT 1> <EVENT 2> ...
...      
      
ABANDONS <# EVENTS>     
      
<EVENT 1 NAME> <GATE TYPE> <# EVENTS > <EVENT 1> <EVENT 2> ...
...      
      
PHASE <PHASE NAME> <# EVENTS>    
...      
 
In practice this is typed as: 
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PHASES 6        
        
PHASE A 5       
        
GTOPA + 5 G1001 G1002 A B C 
G1001 * 2 G1003 D    
...        
        
ABANDONS 1       
        
ATOPA * 3 A1001 C E   
A1001 + 5 A B D F G 
...        
 
The number of phases (“no_phases”) inputted at the top of the file allows for the 
creation of an array of objects relating to phases. The number in the array is 
no_phases+1, which accounts for the general phase in addition to the others. While 
each of these objects stores a great deal of information, the only data that can be 
saved immediately is the name of each phase and the number of the system which 
represents the abandonment fault tree top event.  
 
For each phase, the fault trees for total loss and abandonment are written in text 
format. Each line represents one event, top or intermediate, of the fault tree, with the 
name of that event written first. Each of these has a logic gate attached to it, into 
which various other events input. If the logic gate is an AND gate, this is written as 
‘*’, while if it is an OR gate, this is typed as ‘+’. Following this is the number of 
event inputting to the logic gate and the names of each of these. The data are 
inputted and the events are separated into their different types. All top events are the 
names of the first lines in each fault tree. Intermediate events are the names of the 
other lines in each fault tree, while basic events are those which have no logic gate 
inputs. 
 
The program assigns a number to each event, based on their type and the value of a 
global non-variable identity called NO_BASICS. This number, set to a preliminary 
value of 1000, defines the maximum number of basic events which may be inputted. 
 - 258 - 
Each basic event number lies in the range 0 to NO_BASICS-1, while each top or 
intermediate event number lies in the range NO_BASICS to 5×NO_BASICS-1. These 
numbers are attached not just to events but to places which represent those events, 
and are used for identification. 
 
Once the phase fault trees have been inputted, the general failure and abandonment 
fault trees are taken in. These follow exactly the same format as above, swapping 
the words “PHASE <PHASE NAME>” for “GENERAL FAILURES”. The number of basic 
events throughout all the different fault trees is added up, taking account of any 
repetitions, and this forms the number of components (“no_compts”). As mentioned 
in section 6.2.3, the other events from the fault trees are considered to be systems, 
and so that number is summed (again accounting for repetition of events), and this 
becomes “no_systems”. These values are used to create two objects arrays. 
 
The only information that can be stored on each component or system, at this point, 
is its name and number. In addition, the program scans through the fault trees, and 
sets each component object to store the numbers of the systems it occurs in. Each 
system object stores data on each system and component inputting to it, as well as 
the number of times that system is repeated, and the phases in which it occurs.  
 
Following the logging of data for each phase, system and component, the program 
begins converting each event in each fault tree into PN form. The PN object 
mentioned above contains two object arrays – one for places, and one for 
transitions, in addition to other variables. Each place object is quite small, 
containing data only on the name of the place, its number, the marks it contains for 
each platform and the numbers of the transitions to which it connects with three 
different types of arc. A transition object also contains this arc data on places linked 
to it, as well as whether it is timed or immediate, probabilistic or not, its time to 
switch, any probability arcs, the probability distribution from which the time to 
switch is sampled and whether it is enabled or not. These objects are set up in a two-
dimensional array. The first dimension is the number of phases plus three, which 
relates to each PPN, the General PPN, the Master PN and the Component PN. The 
second dimension is the number of places or transitions within each of these. 
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The process of fault tree conversion to PN form begins by creating in the 
component PN the three places, shown in Figure 6.10, which represent “MFOP 
Active”, “MRP Active” and “Next MFOP”. Two loops are then entered, running 
through each phase in turn and, within that phase, each event. As according to the 
phase PN information shown in Section 5.2.1.1, a place is created for each fault tree 
event, with the logic gates set up according to the inputted information. Sub-event 
places are also created, and if these are basic events, the “up” and “down” places, as 
well as the failure and repair transitions are added and connected to each other. As 
each place or transition is set up, the relevant object (phase, system, component) is 
made aware of that node’s number, expressed as a PN and place, in the array. Most 
of these are stored with an accompanying “type” number. This number is arbitrary, 
as long as it is different from other place and transition “types”, and can be recalled 
when the program needs the node index in another function. For instance, the “up” 
and “down” places for a component are types 0 and 1 respectively.  
A.3.1.2 Component Failure Data 
Once each of the fault trees has been set up in PN form, and all the data extracted 
and organised in arrays of objects, the next stage is to input the component data. The 
information must be arranged as shown below: 
 
COMPONENTS      
      
<COMPONENT 1 NAME> <R/U> <ON DIST> <PARAS> <OFF DIST> <PARAS> 
<COMPONENT 2 NAME> <R/U> <ON DIST> <PARAS> <OFF DIST> <PARAS> 
...      
 
where R/U  is whether the component’s failure is revealed or unrevealed.  
 ON DIST  is the component’s online failure distribution type, followed by 
its parameters 
 OFF DIST is, if it exists, the component’s offline failure distribution type, 
followed by the relevant parameters. This is used with 
components which are set offline by a redundant system and 
have warm or hot offline failures. 
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The distribution types are of six different types, each entered in a specific way: 
 
- EXP is the exponential distribution. It requires one parameter, which is the 
failure rate per hour. 
- SET is a deterministic time, followed by a time in hours. The component will 
fail at exactly this time. This is used mainly for experimentation and 
troubleshooting, and is not a realistic description of a component’s actual 
failure rate. 
- NORM is the normal distribution. It has two parameters, the average failure time 
and the standard deviation. 
- LNORM is the lognormal distribution, with the same two parameters for the 
logarithm of the function. 
- WEIB2 and WEIB3 are the two-parameter and three-parameter versions of the 
Weibull distribution. The first two parameters, common to both, are the shape 
and scale parameters respectively, while the third one, used only with WEIB3, is 
the location parameter, which shifts the distribution such that no failure can 
occur before this point. 
 
Examples of how these component distributions are laid out are shown below. 
 
COMPONENTS        
        
A EXP 5.9E-5  EXP 7.2E-8   
B SET 50      
C NORM 600 70  NORM 1500 40 
D LNORM 6.9 0.1     
E WEIB2 2.4 700     
F WEIB3 2.4 700 300    
...        
 
The program has calculated how many components to expect during the previous 
stage, so this information is not necessary to input. After the first set of probability 
distributions is inputted, the program checks whether the next input is the name of 
any of the distribution types or not. If it is, then it knows to input the rest of the data 
for the offline failure transition and create this for the component. Otherwise, there 
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are no PNs to set up; the information is added to the relevant timed transition 
objects. 
A.3.1.3 Sensor Data 
Once component data has been saved, the next set of information to be taken in is 
that for sensors. Sensors are themselves components, and so failure data needs to be 
specified for them, in addition to the items that the sensors monitor. The standard 
layout for this information in the inputting text file is as follows: 
 
SENSORS       
       
<SENS 1 NAME> <SENSED ITEM> <R/U> <FAIL DIST> <PARAS> <NFF DIST> <PARAS>
<SENS 2 NAME> <SENSED ITEM> <R/U> <FAIL DIST> <PARAS> <NFF DIST> <PARAS>
...       
 
An example of this would be: 
 
SENSORS       
       
SENS_A A R EXP 7E-8 EXP 6E-3 
SENS_G1001 G1001 U EXP 4E-11 EXP 8E-4 
...       
 
The number of sensors does not need to be inputted; the program will input each 
line at a time, create the PNs for the component as needed, and loop through this 
procedure until it is recognised that the section for sensors has ended. The sensor 
could have been included as a component in the phase fault trees entered earlier. If 
it was, the failure data is applied to the component’s online transition as above. If it 
is a new component, then the PN is set up for it with the inputted failure data. 
Following this, the failure place for the item which the sensor monitors is found, 
and two new transitions and a place are created to allow the detection to take place, 
as shown in Figure 6.23. Every place for the sensor is set to have a number lying in 
the range of 5×NO_BASICS to 6×NO_BASICS-1. 
 
The No-fault-found (NFF) rate describes the frequency with which sensors “find” a 
failure which does not exist. One of the major problems regarding availability of 
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platforms, NFF may force evasive action or bring online redundant systems when it 
is not necessary too. The probability distribution which describes the likelihood of 
an NFF occurring is inputted after the main failure distribution. If a sensor is perfect 
and does not give spurious trips, the NFF rate does not need to be entered. 
 
A catastrophic failure fault tree describes events which must happen in order for the 
platform to undergo total loss. It is a real-world, definite result of a series of 
component and system failures. An abandonment fault tree, however, is a 
description of the events which must happen before the current mission is aborted, 
and this is based on the information which is available at the time. As such, if the 
sensor is mentioned in a catastrophic failure fault tree, it is assumed that the sensor’s 
failure is critical to the phase. If, however, the sensor inputs to an abandonment fault 
tree, it is assumed that the data the sensor provides is most important. As such, the 
arcs from the sensor’s failure place are all transferred instead to the “failure sensed” 
place just set up. 
 
Sensors are components, and so their data on names, numbers, failure data, and so 
on, is stored as part of the components object array. 
A.3.1.4 Discrete Events 
The next stage in the inputting of the first text file is the discrete events. As 
described in Section 6.3.2, these can be set up to be triggered by almost any event 
describable by the model. However, many of these events have not yet been set up. 
As a result, it is possible to input at this stage only discrete events which are 
triggered by component, sensor or system failures. Because it is called at two 
different stages, the function for inputting discrete events is external to, and called 
by, the function which inputs this text file. The discrete event data is inputted using 
the following format: 
 
DISCRETE EVENTS <# EVENTS>  
   
<DE 1 NAME> <TRIGGER NAME> <SUCCESS PROBABILITY> 
<DE 2 NAME> <TRIGGER NAME> <SUCCESS PROBABILITY> 
...   
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An example of this might be: 
 
DISCRETE EVENTS 4  
   
DE1 A 0.76 
DE2 G2001 0.5 
...   
 
The input function loops for the number of DEs to be entered. Taking each line at a 
time, the trigger event name is searched for among the sensors, components and 
systems. When the correct item is found, the failure place is logged. After this, a 
search is performed to establish whether the DE has already been inputted as a 
component input to a fault tree. If it has, the component net is converted into a 
discrete event PN; if not, it is created as new in the component PN. The conversion 
process makes the “Component Failure” place into the “Yes” place and the 
“Component Operational” place into the “No” place. The timed failure transition 
becomes a probabilistic, immediate decision transition, while the repair transition is 
the transition which clears the Yes place when the trigger place is emptied. A 
transition is created to empty the No place. The arcs are altered to be in the right 
place, leaving the next stage to be performed, which links the trigger place to the 
DE net, enabling the decision transition and inhibiting the yes and no place 
clearance transitions. 
 
Objects are created for each discrete event, and store information on its name, 
number (the number for each DE is set to be in the range 6×NO_BASICS to 
7×NO_BASICS-1), the associated probability of the event succeeding and each of the 
places and transitions. 
A.3.1.5 Component Dependencies 
A component dependency, explained further in Section 5.2.1.2.1, describes the way 
a component’s failure rate may change when another component fails. The nature of 
this change is capable of being expressed, to the program, in two ways. The first of 
these is by specifying another distribution for the component to be used when the 
other component fails. The second is by inputting a “stress level”. The “stress” on a 
component can be thought to be a combination of all of the factors which can cause 
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an item to fail faster or slower: temperature, humidity, vibration, and so on. If the 
stress on a component doubles when another component fails, the failure time 
decreases by half. 
 
The method of inputting data on component dependencies is shown in an example 
below: 
 
DEPENDENCIES      
      
A 2 D EXP 1.2E-3  
  E NORM 1.1E-3 100 
   EXP 0.018  
C 1 E 1.3   
 
The number of components with dependencies does not need to be given. As the 
component dependency details are the last set of data to be inputted, the input 
function will continue input dependency data until the end of the file is reached.  
 
A component name is taken in, followed by the number of components on which it 
is dependent. If the number is one, then the program inputs one component name 
followed by the stress or failure data for one transition. If, however, it is dependent 
on the upper limit of two components, then there are three extra transitions needed. 
The relevant number of transitions is created and linked to the “operational” and 
“failure” places for each component dependency, as shown in Figure 5.5. If a stress 
value is entered, as a proportion of the normal value, the new failure transition is 
given the same distribution information as the original failure transition. The 
component object which has the multiple failure transitions is then set to store this 
information. 
 
A.3.2 MFOP Enabler Data 
 
Once the first set of information has been installed, the program allows the user to 
specify a second text file which contains information on the MFOP Enablers, as 
shown in Figure A.4. 
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Figure A.4 – Inputting MFOP Enablers Text File 
 
Pressing ‘2’ and then entering the full name of the file begins the process. The 
program allows five types of item to be specified at this point, in the following 
order: 
 
1. Line Replaceable Items (LRIs) 
2. Scheduled Life Replacements (SLRs) 
3. Inspections 
4. Redundancies 
5. Prognostics 
 
The data is inputted as described in the flow chart in Figure A.5. 
A.3.2.1 LRI Data 
LRI data must be set out in the text file as shown below: 
 
LRI  <# LRIs>     
      
<LRI 1 NAME> <VOTE NO> / <# ITEMS> <ITEM 1 > <ITEM 2> ... 
<LRI 2 NAME> <VOTE NO> / <# ITEMS> <ITEM 1 > <ITEM 2> ... 
...      
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Figure A.5 – Flowchart describing input process for MFOP Enablers Text File 
 
An example of this would be: 
 
LRI 2     
      
LRI_1 2/3 LRI_2 B G3001  
LRI_2 1/4 A G D A4010 
 
START 
Enter textfile name 
File 
found? 
Input LRI data, create 
PNs and object array 
Inspection 
data? 
Input inspection data, 
create PNs 
Go to 1 
1 
Input redundancy, 
create PNs and 
object array 
Redundancy 
data? 
Prognostics 
data? 
Input prognostics 
data, create PNs and 
object array 
END 
LRI 
data? 
SLR 
data? 
Input SLR data, 
create PNs 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y
Y
Y
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
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The number of LRIs must be stated on the first line, after the word “LRI”. Following 
this, rather than taking each line in turn and creating each LRI one at a time, certain 
sections of all the LRIs are generated in sequence. This is due to the interactions 
that may exist between different items; the program must be aware of all of the LRIs 
it is making. 
 
An array of objects for the LRIs is set up, and the vote number, number of events 
and the event names are inputted and stored locally. Each LRI object is given a 
name and the vote number, after which each of the items which are contained in the 
LRI are categorised according to whether they are components, systems or child 
LRIs. Each LRI object stores the array index numbers of its child items, and, if it 
exists, its parent LRI. The total number of sub-items is stored also at this point. 
 
Another loop is entered, one pass for each LRI, and the number of places and 
transitions to be created is established. This is done so that the arrays for the place 
and transition objects, contained in the Petri_Net object as mentioned above, can 
be extended to contain the new nets.  
 
The next stage is creating the PNs to replace components, systems and child LRIs. 
Running through each LRI one at a time, component and system failure places are 
located, as are LRI main places. A first input transition is created and the index 
number is stored in the LRI object – other input transitions do not need these 
numbers stored, as their index numbers increment by one from this value for each 
child item. If the vote number equals the number of events, then the logic input to 
the LRI is created as an AND gate, and this one input transition will perform the 
task. If the vote number equals one, the logic is an OR gate, and a new input 
transition is needed for each input. The transitions are linked to the input places and 
the LRI main place, as shown in Figure 6.18. The figure shows that systems have 
control places created for the inputs, and so these are created after all of the other 
input items have been managed. If the vote number is greater than one and less than 
the number of events, then the logical input to the LRI is as a voting gate. The input 
transition already created is linked to by the vote place, as shown in Figure 6.19. 
The child item places are linked to vote transitions and control places as shown in 
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the figure. Each LRI object is set to store the index numbers for each place and 
transition used in inputting to the main place. 
 
The subsequent step is to set each LRI with child LRIs to place a token in the 
child’s main place, using an immediate transition. After this, all component inputs, 
either directly or indirectly through being a part of a child system, are set to be 
replaced whenever the LRI place is marked, as shown in Figure 6.20. The new place 
and transition index numbers are stored by the matching component object. The 
final step is to create the transitions which remove the tokens from the LRIs when 
all sub-components have been replaced. 
A.3.2.2 Scheduled Life Replacements 
If the operator specifies individual LRIs or components to undergo regular 
replacements, regardless of its working or failed state, that information is entered 
here. Its simple format is exemplified below: 
 
SCHEDULED LIFE 2 
  
A 150 
LRI_2 300 
 
The number of SLRs to be created is given after the words “SCHEDULED LIFE”. The 
first line is taken in, and the first term, which should be the name of the component 
or LRI, is compared to the object arrays and found. The PNs are created as shown in 
Figure 6.21, with the relevant component or LRI object made to remember the 
places and transitions. If a component is also a member of an LRI, an account is 
made of this as shown in Figure 6.22. The timed transitions which, when they 
switch, mark the item as requiring replacement are given the “SET” distribution, 
with the parameter being the second term entered from each line. 
A.3.2.3 Inspections 
When inputting data on inspections to be carried out, the text file must have its 
information set out in the following way: 
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INSPECTIONS  <# INSP>  
   
<ITEM 1 NAME> T/M/S <PARAMETER> 
<ITEM 2 NAME> T/M/S <PARAMETER> 
...   
 
The number of inspections to be inputted must be stated after the title 
“INSPECTIONS”. “T/M/S” specifies the type of inspection that the item is to have: 
‘T’ refers to an inspection carried out after a given time, specified where the line 
says “<PARAMETER>”. ‘M’ is an inspection made after a number of MFOPs, while ‘S’ 
allows a system to be specified which, if found to be failed, prompts the inspection 
of this item. An example of how the inspection data is inputted is shown below. 
 
INSPECTIONS  6  
   
G2001 T 300 
B M 4 
C S G2001 
...   
 
Once the information is all inputted, the program checks to see whether the item is a 
system or component, and if it is a member of an LRI or not. The places and 
transitions to be created are counted and the object arrays extended again. Initially, 
inspection places are created and linked to the relevant component or system item, 
accounting for LRI membership. The PNs for this are shown in Section 6.3.6.2. If 
the inspection place becomes marked through a count of time or MFOPs, the 
transitions to allow this are created next. If, however, inspections are based upon the 
discovery of failure in a higher system, then the program must complete the process 
of creating nets for inspection of the higher system if this is specified. Only after 
this loop has ended can another loop be entered, linking system inspection, “failure 
sensed” or failure places with a transition to input to the lower item. As with all 
other inputs, the LRI, system and component objects store the index numbers of 
places created for them, where this is necessary.  
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A.3.2.4 Redundancies 
Redundancies and prognostics, which are covered in the next section, are handled 
slightly differently to the other MFOP enablers inputted. Each of these has its own 
object containing information about the enabler. Component (which can have both 
redundancies and prognostics) and system (which can only have the former) objects 
have a pointer to each of these built-in and set to zero at run-time. Only when the 
item is defined as having redundancies or prognostics is the object for the enabler 
created and the pointer set to the newly-allocated memory point. 
The process of inputting the details of redundant items begins with the information 
given in the text file. This is laid out, typically, as shown below. 
 
REDUNDANCIES <# REDS> 
 
<ITEM NAME>  S/M      <PARAMETER> <# OUTPUTS> <OUTPUT 1> ... 
 
An example of this is shown below: 
 
REDUNDANCIES 4 
 
A     S SENS_A     2 B C 
C     M 0.89       1 D 
G2002 S SENS_G2002 1 G2003 
G3004 M 0.56       3 C F H 
 
Redundancies, as explained in Section 6.3.7, are either automatically switched upon 
failure detection by a sensor, or they are manually switched by an operator. The 
former scenario is selected by using an ‘S’ and specifying a sensor component to 
link to. The manual switching requires a parameter to specify the probability that 
the redundancy will be successfully brought online. After this is given, the number 
and name of the items which are brought online when the main system fails are 
inputted. 
 
After the data is inputted, the program enters a loop which is bounded by the 
number of items with redundancies. Almost the entirety of each redundancy PN is 
created in this loop, one at a time. The failure places for the item is located, and the 
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net allowing it to be turned off upon failure is set up, depending upon whether the 
item is a system or component, and the automatic or manual nature of the switching. 
This includes linking the “X Op” place to component online and offline transitions 
as shown in Figure 6.34. The redundancy object in the item is made to store the 
index number for each place or transition created. 
 
Another loop is then entered, within the previous one, which is terminated by the 
number of redundant item outputs the main item has. Each output item has its 
redundancy nets created and linked to the “Yes” or “No” places, which represent the 
successful or unsuccessful switching to the redundant item(s), as shown in Figure 
6.35 and Figure 6.36. The “Y Op” place, like the “X Op” place earlier, is linked to 
the component(s) which are turned on when the redundancy is brought online. 
These details of these nodes are stored in the item’s redundancy object.  
 
The final part of the function creates the PNs which link the “X Op” place for a 
subsystem with redundancies to that of a higher system with redundancies. As 
shown in Figure 6.41, the X Op place for the child item must be unmarked when the 
parent system fails. Because this is linking different redundant items, this must be 
performed outside of the previous two loops. The function ends after this, and 
prognostics information may be entered. 
A.3.2.5  Prognostics 
As explained in section 6.3.8, the prognostics modelling method devised within this 
research is based on the idea of detectable deterioration in components. This 
deterioration, or wear, must be expressed in the form of levels, with confident 
predictions based on the typical point in an item’s life when the wear level occurs. 
Thus, in order to set up nets for prognostics, it is necessary for the wear levels to be 
specified in the input text file: 
 
PROGNOSTICS 2 
 
C 3 15 25 40 50 70 92 
I 2 10 20 80 90 
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This information is set up with the number of prognostic components stated 
immediately after the title, and the names of each item specified first on each line. 
Following the component name, the number of wear levels is given, followed by the 
lower and upper bounds for each level in turn. Thus, in the example shown, 
component ‘C’ has three wear levels, with the bounds 15%-25%, 40%-50% and 
70%-92% of the component’s life. ‘I’ has two wear levels, the first between 10% 
and 20%, and the second between 80% and 90% of the component’s life. 
 
This is all the information that the program needs to set up the PNs. By this point, 
all diagnostic methods (sensors and inspections) should have been declared and 
inputted, and the program uses this information, if it exists, in generating the PNs 
for prognostics. The input function enters a loop terminated by the number of 
prognostics, and creates the set of nodes and arcs entirely within that loop.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the components which feature prognostics have an object 
created to store such data as the wear levels, the current predicted failure time, PN 
information, and so on. The correct component is found in the component object 
array by searching for the inputted name, and, if it does not already exist, the net for 
component replacement is set up. If it does already exist, then the component is 
probably part of a LRI, and so the LRI number is located. The places and transitions 
for “Wear Level (Actual)” and “Action” are set up, as well as the transitions which 
remove the tokens from these when the replacement place is marked. If the 
component has sensed failures, the PNs are set up to use the sensor to detect the 
wear. If, instead, regular inspections are performed, the inspection place is 
connected as shown in Figure 6.43, with the “Wear Level (Detected)” place set up 
as well.  
 
If the component was earlier found to be a part of an LRI, then when the prognostics 
model requires the component to be replaced, a transition is set up to force the LRI 
to replaced, regardless of the state of its other inputs. Otherwise, the action place is 
linked to the “Replace component” transition and the function exits. This ends the 
second input stage, following which the missions data can be entered. 
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A.3.3 Platform, MFOP and Mission Data 
 
Once the MFOP enablers information has been entered, the final stage of the input 
process is telling the program the details of the fleet, the MFOPs they will perform, 
the missions within those MFOPs and the phases in the missions. The program 
prompts for the input as shown in Figure A.6. 
 
 
Figure A.6 – Inputting Platform, MFOP and Mission data 
  
Entering ‘3’ and then the name of the file containing the information begins the 
process. Figure A.7 shows a flow chart describing the process by which the data 
inputted is used to create the Master PN. All details, excluding those for discrete 
events, are taken in and stored before any PNs are created. How the data must be set 
out is explained in the following sections. 
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Figure A.7 – Flowchart describing input process for Platform, MFOP and Mission Data Text 
File 
A.3.3.1 Fleet and MFOP information 
Everything in the program must be pre-determined. Platforms perform a set 
sequence of MFOPs, following which the simulation is complete. This data takes 
the form exemplified  below: 
 
FLEET 4 
 
PLTFM1 3 MFOP1 MFOP2 MFOP3 
PLTFM2 4 MFOP2 MFOP2 MFOP3 MFOP3 
PLTFM3 2 MFOP1 MFOP1 
PLTFM4 2 MFOP1 MFOP4 
START 
Enter textfile name 
File 
found? 
Go to 1 
1 
Discrete 
Events? 
Input discrete events, 
create PNs and 
update object array 
END 
Y 
Y
N 
N 
Input platform data 
Input MFOP data 
Input missions data 
Create object arrays 
Link object arrays to 
establish order of 
MFOPs, missions 
and phases 
Set colours for all 
required objects to 
number of platforms 
Create Mission PNs 
Create Platform PNs 
Set size of master PN 
Create MFOP PNs 
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The number of planes in the fleet is given next to that title. After this the name of 
each platform is given on a line, followed by the number of MFOPs it is to perform 
and the names of these. The MFOP data is laid out in a similar way: 
 
MFOPS 4 
 
MFOP1 3 ASUW ASW MISSION3 
MFOP2 4 MISSION3 ASW ASUW ASUW 
MFOP3 2 MISSION3 MISSION3 
MFOP4 1 MISSION4 
 
The number of MFOPs is entered next to the title “MFOPS”. Each set of information 
for an MFOP is written on a line, with the name coming first, followed by the 
number of missions within it and the names of each of them. 
 
The platforms and MFOPs each have their own objects in arrays. At this stage, 
however, the only information that can be entered are, for the fleet, the names of 
each platform and the number of MFOPs they perform. For the MFOPs objects, the 
data stored is their names and the number of missions within them. A function also 
tells each platform object of the sequence of MFOP indices which it performs. 
A.3.3.2 Missions Information 
Because of the phased mission complexities allowed by the model, as specified in 
Section 6.2, factors such as phase choices or insertions make inputting missions data 
much more involved than the respective process for MFOPs and platforms. The first 
thing to declare is the mission name and the number of phases contained within it: 
 
MISSION1 7 
 
Each phase is then declared on a line, followed by the phase length distribution and 
parameters. If a phase is identified as definitely following after, then this is also 
declared: 
 
Alpha SET 1.5 Beta 
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The phase probability distributions can also “match” or “reverse” another phase’s 
duration, as stated in Section 6.2.1. If this type of distribution is required, it is 
inputted by typing either “MATCH” or “REV” and then the name of the phase as the 
parameter. If there is a probabilistic phase choice, then instead of stating one follow-
on phase, the word “OUTCOME” allows these to be stated, with a name and 
probability for each outcome: 
 
Alpha SET 1.5  
 OUTCOME Good_Weather 0.9 Beta  
 OUTCOME Heavy_Rain 0.1 Delta 
 
Like the platforms and MFOPs, missions have an object array which stores 
important data used in running the simulations. One subset of this is the order of the 
phases in the mission, which includes the possibilities and probabilities for which 
phase follows the current one. Thus, the number of outcomes, their names and 
probabilities are stored for each phase, with the indices of the phases as they appear 
in the phase object array also remembered. Note that if a phase is an ending for the 
mission, the “next phase” must be declared as “END”. 
 
The information explained thus far is necessary – all phases in the mission must be 
inputted with a phase duration probability distribution and at least one subsequent 
phase. Extra information may also be entered, however. One example of this, 
introduced in section 6.2.9, is the idea that phases may be abandoned without 
immediately ending the mission. Instead, a phase is declared to be started upon 
abandonment in the following way: 
 
Alpha SET 1.5 Beta 
 ABANDON Delta 
 
If no abandonment phase is specified, the program will assume that the mission 
ends immediately when the phase’s abandonment fault tree top event place is 
marked.  
 
In addition to this, it is possible to state conditions under which one of three things 
will happen: 
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- The phase may abandon to an alternative phase than the one specified above. 
- A different subsequent phase may be carried out (this is equivalent to the 
“event-driven phase choice explained in section 6.2.12.1). 
- A phase may be immediately inserted, with the current phase resumed once the 
inserted phase (or sequence of phases) have finished. 
 
These options are invoked by using the “IF” statements outlined below: 
 
Alpha SET 1.5 Beta 
 ABANDON Delta 
 IF (A + C) OUTCOME Epsilon 
 IF (B + D) ABANDON Gamma 
 IF (A + A1004) INSERT Mu 
 
When the program encounters an “IF” word, it prepares to input a string of 
characters which are interpreted in a special way. Each “IF” statement has a set of 
logical conditions and a resulting action. While the action is categorised easily 
enough, the input conditions are more difficult to handle. The logical conditions 
entered give a fault tree-like structure to the causes of the action. In order to better 
organise the conditions, they are separated, within each statement, into “levels”, 
“groups” and “events”. The way it works is best explained through the use of an 
example. Consider the following conditional statement: 
 
IF D * (I + A4003) * ( B + C * (G2001 + H)) INSERT Epsilon 
 
All names of components, systems and phases are turned into events. The example 
shows a set of events causing the insertion of phase Epsilon into the current phase. 
A “level” indicates proximity to the top event of the logical conditions. For instance, 
because ‘D’, indicating the failure of component D, occurs at level 0, it directly 
inputs to the action. Where a open-bracket is encountered, this indicates that another 
level must be created. Thus, “(I + A4003)” occurs on level 1. However, 
“B + ...” also occurs on level 1, but is not in the same bracket. Thus, these form 
different “groups” within level 1. Each group must have only one logic type, so if 
the program encounters multiple types within the same group, it will put the events 
surrounding the second logic type into a new level. This can be seen with the 
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statement “( B + C * (G2001 + H))”, where an OR and AND symbol feature in 
the same set of brackets. The program effectively puts a set of brackets around the 
second logic symbol, so it would read “( B + (C * (G2001 + H)))”. ‘C’ is then 
on level 2, and “G2001 + H” is on level 3. 
 
The net for each conditional statement is set up in the PPN of the phase to which it 
applies. Figure A.8 shows the PN for the conditional statement given above. 
 
 
Figure A.8 – PN for Example Conditional IF Statement 
 
As the Figure shows, each “IF” statement has a place which enforces the action it is 
tasked to perform. In order for this to be marked, immediate transitions are set up 
which represent the logic in each group on each level. Each group on each level has 
a place created for it, while each event failure place directly enables the logic 
transition for the group to which it inputs.  
 
In this way, then, the program takes in actions based on user-defined conditions. 
The only other complexity regarding inputting the data on each phased mission is 
the ability to repeat phases. The usefulness of this comes, for instance, if a phase has 
only two possible lengths rather than a distribution, and so two OUTCOMEs could be 
specified with a certain probability. The first phase name is inputted as stated above, 
while subsequent phases have a suffixed index given in square brackets after the 
name: 
 
 
 
IF 
D 
L1 G1
L1 G2 
I 
A4003
B 
L2 G1 
C 
L3 G1
H 
G2001 
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Beta        SET   1.5     Gamma   ABANDON Delta 
       IF    G       OUTCOME Epsilon [2] 
Epsilon     MATCH Beta    Beta    [2] 
Beta [2]    REV   Epsilon Alpha 
Epsilon [2] MATCH Gamma   Gamma 
 
As the example shows, a repeated phase is consistently referred to using the “[2]”, 
“[3]”, etc., after the name. The phase will be failed and abandoned using the same 
fault trees as the normal occurrence.  
 
In summary, a typical mission profile may look like that shown in the example 
below. The program takes in all of these details and only once all mission data has 
been inputted does the process of creating the Master PN begin. 
 
ASUW 7 
 
Alpha       SET     1.5  
       OUTCOME Success 0.9 Beta  
       OUTCOME Heavy_Rain 0.1 Delta 
       ABANDON Epsilon [2] 
       IF D * ( B + C ) INSERT Epsilon 
       IF A INSERT Delta 
Beta        SET 1.5 Gamma ABANDON Delta 
       IF G OUTCOME Epsilon [2] 
Gamma       SET 1.5 Delta ABANDON Delta 
       IF G2001 + ( B * (E+D)) INSERT Epsilon [2] 
Delta       REV Epsilon [2] 
            OUTCOME Success    0.8 END 
            OUTCOME No_Land    0.2 Delta 
Epsilon     MATCH Beta Beta [2] 
Beta [2]    REV Epsilon Alpha 
Epsilon [2] MATCH Gamma Gamma 
 
A.3.3.3 Creating the Master Petri Net 
Once all of the platform, MFOP and mission data has been taken in, the program 
links the different objects together. For instance, if MFOP 1 contains missions A 
and B, but not C, then the MFOP 1 object will store the indices to the first two 
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mission objects, and the order in which they appear, but not the third. Each MFOP 
object is also linked to the relevant phase objects for each part of the mission, as 
well as the platforms which perform it. Platform objects create an array of mission 
object indices, while mission objects contain an array of platform and MFOP 
objects indices. Similar arrays are also set up for phases and systems. 
 
When the program has stored these links, it counts the number of transitions and 
places which are required in the various PNs and sets the number of colours 
throughout the model as being equal to the number of platforms. The first loop 
entered creates the nets for the missions, starting with the places for “mission 
failure”, “mission success” and “mission active”. Each phase place and timed 
transition is set up in the order in which they were inputted, with arcs linking the 
phases in the sequence as desired. If a transition has a probabilistic phase choice, the 
timed phase transition is set up with probability arcs. Following this, general & 
phase abandonment immediate transitions are established, and linked to either the 
“mission success” place or the phase specified to be carried out instead. The nets for 
the IFs, as explained above, are created, with a hierarchical structure also set up to 
prevent more than one of these being able to affect a phase at the same time. This is 
based on the order which the conditional statements were entered, and works by 
each IF top place inhibiting the transition which activates the action of all those IFs 
below it in the hierarchy. Each phase object is made aware of the IFs which affect it, 
with all necessary details, such as transitions, outcomes, and so on. 
 
MFOP and platform nets are then set up as explained in section 6.2. This is 
followed by the nets for catastrophic failures, at which point the procedure ends. 
The only possible information left to be inputted, should they be required, are 
discrete events relating to the items inputted either by the enablers or the missions 
text files. 
A.3.3.4 Discrete Events 
Entering discrete events in the missions text file uses the same function as explained 
in section A.3.1.4. If they are entered, the same procedures are followed, except that 
more trigger events can be used:  
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• If an MFOP or phase name is entered, the system has no way of knowing 
which of the potentially many repetitions of the “MFOP/phase active” places 
is marked. To prevent this causing problems, a new place is set up, to which 
each of the occurrences of the MFOP or phase input to in an OR logic. This 
then acts as the trigger to set off the discrete event. 
• LRI and mission names may be entered also, so that when an LRI is set to be 
replaced, or the “mission active” place is marked, the discrete event will be 
triggered.  
• Component and system names can also be entered here as well, though there 
is no reason for these not to have been entered in the phase fault trees & 
component data text file. 
 
Once all information is inputted, the function ends and the user returns to the main 
menu. No more data may now be inputted, unless the user selects option ‘2’ from 
the main menu. This option deletes all inputted information. 
 
A.4 Performing Simulations 
 
A.4.1 Simulation options 
 
After inputting all of the necessary information to create all of the PNs, and store 
information in the object arrays for the overall PN, places, transitions, platforms, 
MFOPs, and so on, the system will allow the operator to begin running simulations. 
Before this is started, the user can alter various options which affect the simulation 
performance. The options menu is found by entering ‘4’ on the main menu. Figure 
A.9 shows the options menu. 
 
The number of simulations to perform is preset by the user. This must be an integer 
and is entered by typing ‘1’ and then the number of simulations required. The 
confidence interval which is used by the prognostics functions is set in option ‘2’. 
This is inputted as a percentage, and must be a multiple of five. If it is not entered in 
this way, the nearest multiple of five is set instead. 
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Figure A.9 – Simulation Options Menu 
 
It is possible to add “commentary” to the simulations, which describes what is 
happening in the simulations as it runs through. Entering ‘3’ leads the user to a sub-
menu which allows each possible commentary item to be specified, as shown in 
Figure A.10.  Each item can be individually selected, or they can all be turned on at 
once by entering ‘9’. The status at the top of the program screen shows the items 
which have been selected to be commented on. The default setting is to have no 
commentary. Note that if “Component Failures/Repairs” or “Timed Transition 
Switching” is selected, the program will halt whenever a component fails, an MRP 
is entered, or a timed transition switches. When the user presses any key, the 
simulations will continue. 
 
 
Figure A.10 – Commentary Options 
 - 283 - 
The user can also state the options for data recording which are required. The 
default for this setting is that simulation information on everything is recorded, but 
this can be changed by entering ‘4’ on the simulation options menu. This enters 
another sub-menu, as shown in Figure A.11. 
 
 
Figure A.11 – Data Storage Options 
 
The individual items are turned on or off by entering the corresponding number. 
This will, however, only minimally affect the speed with which the simulations are 
performed, so it is not advised to change any of these options unless there is a clear 
reason for doing so. 
  
A.4.2 Simulation Process 
A.4.2.1 Initial Processes 
Once the options are set as required, the simulations can begin by entering ‘5’ on 
the main menu. This enters a function which does not exit until all the simulations 
have completed. Figure A.12 describes the process by which simulations take place. 
The process begins by setting some initial conditions. A function in C++ allows the 
current time point, expressed as the number of seconds since January 1, 1970, to be 
given. This is recorded, with the intent of allowing the duration of the simulations to 
be calculated. An array of the indices of all the timed transitions in the overall PN is 
set up, allowing each of their times to switch, if they are enabled, to be quickly 
found. 
 - 284 - 
 
Figure A.12 – Flow chart describing process by which simulations take place 
 
Each platform, MFOP and mission object contains, respectively, a list of all the 
MFOPs, missions and phases they are to carry out. This is expressed in two ways 
for each object – the first is the indices of the sub-items as they appear in their own 
object arrays, while the second is compared to the order in which they appear. For 
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instance, consider the following arrays of MFOPs and missions, with the numbers 
expressing the indices of the relevant objects, noting that in C++, all arrays number 
their indices by starting at zero: 
 
Table A.1 – Example MFOP & Mission Arrays 
MFOP Object 
Array 
Mission Object 
Array 
MFOP Mission 
Index Array 
MFOP 
Mission Order 
0. MFOP1 
1. MFOP2 
2. MFOP3 
3. MFOP4 
0. MISSION1 
1. MISSION2 
2. MISSION3 
3. MISSION4 
{3, 0} 
{0, 1, 2} 
{2, 0, 3} 
{2, 0} 
{0, 1} 
{0, 1, 2} 
{0, 0, 1, 2} 
{0, 1, 1} 
 
The first two columns in Table A.1 show the arrays of the MFOP and mission 
objects in the program. In the third column is, for each MFOP object, a list not of 
the order in which the missions occur, but of the indices to the objects for all the 
missions contained within the MFOP, ignoring any repetitions. The lists in the 
fourth column show the specific order of the missions performed by each MFOP, 
with the numbers relating to the point in the Mission Index Array. For instance, 
MFOP1 has the mission order {0,1}. Each number is compared against the Mission 
Index Array, so MFOP1 performs MISSION4 and then MISSION1. MFOP 3 
performs MISSION3 twice, then MISSION1 and MISSION4.  
 
The platform and mission objects have similar arrays for MFOPs and phases 
respectively. This allows the program to keep track of which phases, missions and 
MFOPs are being carried out by which platforms at the current point in time. These 
current value variables are set to their initial values when the simulation process 
begins. The places which represent “Component Up” and “X Op” for each item 
with redundancies are all marked with one token in each colour. Platform start 
places are also marked with the corresponding colour. 
  
The program operates by switching the timed transition with the earliest time, and 
then switching each immediate transition which becomes enabled as a result. After 
this, the next timed transition switches, and so on. For this to system to work, the 
program needs to put each timed transition’s time to switch into chronological 
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order. Marking the places as mentioned above causes the component failure 
transitions to be enabled, but not the phase transitions. As such, the immediate 
transitions must all be switched to prepare the nets for the upcoming simulation. 
The function that performs this task resembles the following algorithm: 
 
1 int immediates_enabled=0,*phaseswitches=0,*transswitches=0; 
 do 
 { 
  for (int a=0;a<immediates_enabled;a++) 
  { 
   if (check_enabled(imm_trans)) 
   { 
    Switch_Trans(imm_trans); 
    imm_trans.set_enabled(switch_colour,0); 
10    check_scenarios(); 
    //If transition is no longer enabled, remove from list. 
    if (!check_enabled(imm_trans)) 
    { 
     [delete imm_trans from array] 
     immediates_enabled--; 
     a--; 
    } 
   } 
   else 
20   { 
    [delete imm_trans from array] 
    immediates_enabled--; 
    a--; 
   } 
  } 
  immediates_enabled=0; 
  [delete old imm_trans array if exists] 
  [create new imm_trans array] 
  for (int b=0;b<no_phases+3;b++) 
30  for (i=0;i<no_transitions[b];i++) 
  { 
   bool itenabled=check_enabled(b,i,switch_colour); 
   //If transition is enabled 
   if (!Tran_array[b][i].return_timed() && itenabled) 
   { 
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    immediates_enabled++; 
     [add enabled imm_trans to array] 
   } 
40  } 
 }while (immediates_enabled>0); 
 
The algorithm describes a “do...which” loop (the C++ version of a do...until loop), 
which forcibly runs through once and then keeps looping unless the exit condition is 
satisfied. In this case, an integer parameter called “immediates_enabled”, which is 
the count of the number of immediate transitions currently enabled, must be zero 
before the loop ends. On the first pass, immediates_enabled is zero, and so the 
for loop which switches all enabled transitions is bypassed. Instead, an array of the 
indices of the enabled immediate transitions is created, with immediates_enabled 
set to the size of that array. On the next pass, the for loop switches each immediate 
transition in the array in turn, checking each time that the switching of a previous 
transition has not disabled one of those set to be switched. If the switched transition 
is now disabled, it is removed from the list. A new array of enabled immediate 
transitions is then created again, and will do so until no more are enabled, when the 
loop exits. 
 
Each discrete event, component, system, phase and mission object has two Boolean 
variables which allow the program to keep track of whether they are operational or 
failed, and whether this has happened just recently or not. These are called “down” 
and “just_switched” and are used to prevent data which must be recorded from 
being so more than once. The program’s initial functions set these values to zero for 
each object. The platform objects each have a “clock”, which remembers the last 
point at which an event occurred. This is used to update various objects with 
information such as the last repair time, time of failure, and so on. These are all set 
to zero at the start. 
A.4.2.2 Sampling Transition Switching Times 
When all of the immediate transitions have been switched and the platform clocks 
set to zero, the program is ready to generate switching times for each of the timed 
transitions. The flowchart describing the process involved is shown in Figure A.13.  
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 Figure A.13 (a)– Flow chart describing process by which transitions are initialised 
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Figure A.13 (b) – Flowchart  describing process by which transitions are initialised 
 
The function which performs this, called “Initialise_Transitions” creates an 
array named “translist”, which contains the details of each enabled timed 
transition, including its indices and its time to switch. When sampling the switching 
time for each transition, the function first checks if it is enabled, and upon 
confirmation it calls a function with the transition object called “Get_Time”. This 
function looks at the distribution set for the transition and uses this to generate a 
time for failure in a particular way for each distribution type. This is typically based 
upon the Cumulative Distribution Function for the distribution type, and a randomly 
sampled floating-point number between 0 and 1, as explained in Sections 1.5 and 
6.3.8.1. Timed transitions which are set to match or reverse another transition’s 
switching time are updated each time the platform’s clock is updated. This sets a 
disabled time to the transition which, when it becomes enabled, is added to the 
platform time to form the matched or reversed switching time. Once the list is 
created, the transitions have their Boolean “enabled” flags set to 1 and they are 
ordered in ascending switching time. 
A.4.2.3 Simulation Performance 
Once the initial parameters are all defined, the program enters a loop which does not 
exit until all of the simulations are complete. With each pass of the loop, a function 
is performed, called “Test_For_Failure”. This function is part of the Petri_Net 
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object and it performs the core requirements of each simulation pass: switch a timed 
transition, switch all enabled immediate transitions, and record data. The general set 
of functions performed can be seen in the flowchart in Figure A.14. 
 
When each transition is switched, a basic count of time, based on the number of 
flying hours, is kept up to date with this. The program will check to see if the switch 
was relevant in some way. For instance, if a component failure transition switches, a 
component has failed and this failure must be recorded. The data for this is useful 
not just to the relevant component object, which counts the number of failures and 
the average MTBF, but also any system objects to which it inputs, any sensors 
which may connect to it, and so on. Similarly, if a phase transition switches, this 
could be either a normal phase transition or an event-driven phase choice, as shown 
in Section 6.2.12.1. Whatever the cause, the starting phase must have its start 
recorded in its phase object and the old phase set as being successful. The results of 
the phase change may be the end of a mission, so if this is the case, the number of 
the current mission that the platform is undertaking must be changed, and the first 
phase of it activated. 
 
If a phase or a component has switched, the “just_switched” Boolean value in the 
relevant object must be set to 1, and all others set to zero. After this, the 
“check_immediates” function mentioned in section A.4.2.1 is performed. Because 
simulations are now active, the “check_scenarios” function, called on line 10 of 
the check_immediates algorithm, becomes important. This function tests for 
various conditions after each immediate transition switch, which includes: 
• Component or system inspection 
• Component repair or replacement 
• LRI replacement 
• Phase insertion 
• Phase failure 
• Mission abandonment 
• Starting and ending of MRP 
• Inspection of prognostic components in MRP and criticality testing, which 
may lead to replacement (see Section A.4.2.4). 
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Figure A.14 – Test_For_Failure Function Flowchart 
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Once all the immediate transitions that are enabled have switched, and the data from 
the resultant marking of the net is recorded, the next stage is to run the 
Initialise_Transitions function mentioned in section A.4.2.2. When this is first 
run, it merely creates an array of transition times. If the array is found to already 
exist, a different part of the function is entered, which generates switching times for 
transitions based on those which have just switched. For instance, if a phase 
transition has just switched, a new phase transition will be enabled, so this transition 
is found and a time is sampled for it. Any transitions whose times are set to match 
or reverse either the ending or the starting phase are updated. Other conditions lead 
to different procedures being followed, and new transition times being created. The 
translist array which keeps a record of the transition switching times must have 
the old time removed and the new one put in place. The array is then sorted in 
ascending order of time to switch. 
 
A final set of functions records the effects of component failures on systems, the 
effects of system failures on phases, and the switching of discrete events. When 
these functions are finished, the program resets the just_switched values for each 
object and tests to see whether the “Simulation success” place is marked. If it is not, 
the loop reruns Test_For_Failure. Otherwise, the overall PN is reset, necessary 
values are changed, and the initialisation process for the net, as described in sections 
A.4.2.1 and A.4.2.2 is performed ready for the next simulation. If the finished 
simulation is the last, a summary of the elapsed time for all the simulations to 
complete is displayed on screen, and a keypress returns the user to the main menu. 
A.4.2.4 Assessing Component Criticality 
Section 6.3.8 explains the methods by which the program assesses a component’s 
predicted future failure. This includes modelling and detecting component wear, and 
using this to predict future failure times. Also explained is how the actions that the 
prognostic model can take – abandoning a mission immediately, or having a 
component replaced during an MRP – are carried out in Petri net form. This section 
explains how the program reaches its decisions on the criticality of components to 
the current or future missions, and assigns a switching time to the prognostic 
“action” transition accordingly. 
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When a platform undergoes an MRP, and all components have been repaired or 
inspected for wear levels; or when the Initialise_Transitions function is 
performed, the program will enter a function called “test_criticality”. This 
function makes use of the confidence interval which has been defined by the user 
(as mentioned in section A.4.1). 
 
The first task that the function performs is considering each of the phases within the 
mission and assigning a duration to them. If, for example, the confidence interval 
was 90%, the program would find the time at which 90% of phases with this 
duration probability distribution would have completed.  
 
The second stage of the function is to create a list of phase sequences, taking into 
account any insertions, abandonments or event- or probability-driven phase choices. 
The method of this stage is explained by way of an example. Consider the mission 
with the phase sequence as shown in Figure A.15. The phases are Alpha, Beta, 
Gamma and Delta, with the phase indices 0,1, 2 and 3 respectively. ‘-1’ is an index 
symbolising the end of the mission. 
 
 
Figure A.15 – Example Mission Net 
 
The function begins with the active phase, as the operational state of the current 
mission means that previous phases have not failed it, and thus cannot have any 
more effect on the mission performance. The program creates a series of arrays, 
each of which relates to the phase sequences. These include: a matrix of phase 
sequences, MPS and the number of phases in, probability of, and estimated time 
duration of each sequence. For the first phase, these will look like equations A.1. 
Note that, in this example, the confidence interval is assumed to be 95%. 
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{ } { } { } { }
PSPSPSPS TPNM   time,Sequence array,y Probabilit sequence,in  phases ofNumber 
2.1110
 
A.1 
 
With the second phase, however, there is a probabilistic phase choice. Because of 
this, the program creates a second line in each of the arrays and fills in the relevant 
information. This is done by multiplying each line in the probability array by the 
relevant probability of entering the new phase on that line, and by adding on that 
phase length to the sequence time array. If any sequence probability is less than 
1 × 10-6, that line is deleted from the arrays. The arrays will look like equations A.2 
at this stage. 
 
Line New
Line Active
4.32.22.1
7.45.32.1
2.02.01
8.08.01
2
2
30
10
←
←




=+
=+




=×
=×








PSPSPSPS TPNM
 
A.2 
 
The sequence on which it concentrates remains the top line. At the next stage, there 
is another probabilistic phase choice. Phase Beta can either progress to Gamma or 
revert back to Alpha. The arrays then become those shown in equations A.3. 
 
Line New
Line Active
9.52.17.4
4.3
6.99.47.4
08.01.08.0
2.0
72.09.08.0
3
2
3
010
30
210
←
←






=+
=+






=×
=×












PSPSPSPS TPNM
 
A.3 
 
Phases Gamma and Delta are added to the arrays, until the mission end is found. 
This finalises the row: 
 
Line Active
9.5
4.3
8.112.26.9
08.0
2.0
72.0
3
2
5
010
30
13210 ←





 =+

















 −
PSPSPSPS TPNM
 
A.4 
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When a line finishes, the program re-arranges the arrays so that the finished 
sequences are ordered by increasing duration. The program will then sum the 
probabilities of the finished sequences, and if this sum is greater than the confidence 
interval, any lines with durations longer than the newly finished sequence are 
deleted. However, any unfinished lines with shorter durations are kept, as they may 
yet yield a shorter mission span than the currently finished ones. In the example 
shown, the sum of the finished line probabilities is 0.72, which is less than the 
confidence interval of 0.95. As such, the line with the shortest time is selected next 
(the second sequence), and the function continues. After the second sequence is 
completed and re-ordered, the arrays look like those in equations A.5. 
 
Line Active9.5
8.11
4.3
08.0
72.0
2.0
3
5
3
010
13210
130
←























−
−
PSPSPSPS TPNM
 
A.5 
 
The sum of the finished lines is now 0.92, still less than the confidence interval of 
0.95. The program selects the only unfinished line, the third one, and continues. 
When this is finalised, the arrays are those in equations A.6. 
 
Line Active
6.10
1.8
5.16
8.11
4.3
0064.0
016.0
0576.0
72.0
2.0
5
4
7
5
3
01010
3010
1321010
13210
130
←
























































−
−
−
PSPSPSPS TPNM
 
A.6 
 
The sum of the probabilities of the finished lines is now 0.9776, greater than the 
confidence interval. However, both of the unfinished lines have times less than the 
greatest of these, 16.5 hours, and so the program continues. The fourth line is 
quickly finalised, and the fifth line expanded so the arrays look like equations A.7. 
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Delete
3.15
2.21
5.16
8.12
8.11
1.8
4.3
000512.0
004608.0
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72.0
016.0
2.0
7
9
7
7
5
5
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

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


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

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

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


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









−
−
−
−
−
−
PSPSPSPS TPNM
 
A.7 
 
The sixth line of the arrays in equations A.7 can be deleted, as the confidence 
interval time is still 16.5 hours, and the duration of this phase sequence is 21.2 
hours. If sequence seven is then expanded, all three sequences will have times 
greater than 16.5 hours, so the program deletes these lines and exits the loop. The 
result from this part of the function is that at least 95% of possible phase sequences 
will have ended inside 16.5 hours. 
 
The next stage of the function uses each of the finalised phase sequences to make 
estimates as to whether or not a particular component with prognostics is likely to 
have failed by the end of each phase in that sequence. Any that may have done are 
noted. The program then makes a note of the components and systems which have 
had revealed or sensed failures. Each phase in each sequence is then again taken in 
turn. The component PN and the relevant phase PN are then reset so that no 
components or systems in them are failed, except those that are known to be 
potentially failed by the end of them. The failures are cascaded up, and if the phase 
fails catastrophically, this is noted. After this has been done for each phase in each 
sequence, the PNs are set back to their previous values. 
 
If a mission is currently active, all of the different phase sequences has failed 
catastrophically, then the prognostic action transition is given a switching time 
equal to the current system time – effectively an immediate switching. If none are 
failed, the action transition is given a very large switching time. If some are failed 
and some are active, the transition is made to switch at the notional mission end 
time. This has the effect of waiting to see how the mission progresses before 
potentially abandoning it. 
 - 297 - 
If an MRP is taking place, any components which may cause mission failure, even 
in just one potential scenario, are replaced. Only if a component cannot cause any of 
the missions in the forthcoming MFOP to fail is it left to continue. 
 
The approach described here is an attempt to automate and model what is, in reality, 
often a very complex decision-making process. This allows a degree of control and 
accuracy in the area of predicting future component failure times based on available 
information. 
 
A.5 Outputs 
 
When data is inputted or simulations are performed, it is possible for the program to 
create text files which provide data to the user. There are two types of output 
available: Petri net information and simulation results. Pressing option ‘7’ on the 
main menu, as shown in Figure A.1, leads to the options menu displayed in Figure 
A.16. 
 
 
Figure A.16 – Output Menu 
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A.5.1 Petri Net information 
 
One of the most important requirements of a program applying the Petri net method 
described in this thesis is to allow the Petri nets which have been created to be 
checked. This was important for debugging the program while it was being written, 
but is also vital when putting a system into the program for analysis, to check it has 
been converted as expected. 
 
The format of the Petri net information text file follows a set pattern, which is 
shown below.  
 
0: PHASE Alpha 
 
PLACES 
                       Gate 
Place     Gate Name   Number      Marks 
    0          GTOP    1000      (1,1,0) 
    1         G1001    1001      (0,0,0) 
... 
 
TRANSITIONS 
Transition 
  Number      Timing     Stress 
    0     Immediate      1 
       1     EXP(0.03)      1 
       2     SET(50)        1 
       3     Immediate, Probability Transition (0.1,0.9,0)      1 
... 
 
INPUT/OUTPUT MATRIX 
 
   0      1      2      3      4      5   ... 
   0   1 0 1  1 0 1                                                         
   1          1 1 0  1 0 1                0 0 1                             
   2                        1 0 1  1 0 1                                    
   3                                      0 1 0                             
... 
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LINKS 
 
(0 0)-(6 7) - 0 0 1 
... 
 
Each PN is displayed in turn, with the number and name of the net acting as a title. 
The first subsection is a list of the places within the net. These are referred to by 
index within the net array of places, name, “gate number” and the marks for each 
colour as allocated at the start of simulations. The gate number helps the program to 
recognise the purpose of the place, according to a list of pre-defined ranges. These 
ranges are summarised in Table A.2, where N refers to the global defined parameter 
NO_BASICS, defined in Section A.3.1.1. 
 
Table A.2 – List of Gate Numbers by Place Type 
Range from Range up to but 
not including 
Type of place 
0 N Component 
N 5N System 
5N 6N Sensor 
6N 7N Discrete Event 
7N 8N LRI 
50N 60N Phase 
60N 70N Mission 
70N 80N MFOP 
80N 90N Platform 
90N  IF 
 
The “marks” column will not typically display any numbers greater than zero, 
unless the PN information is output after simulations have been run.  
 
The next set of information is that on the transitions within the net. Each transition 
is identified by its location in the array for that PN.  If it is timed, then the assigned 
distribution and parameters are shown. If not, it is labelled as “immediate”. The 
“stress” assigned to the transition is also given. This will typically be 1, unless it is a 
failure transition for a component with dependencies. If the transition is 
probabilistic, then it is labelled as such next to the timing information. The 
probabilities for each of the output arcs it has are given in brackets. 
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A matrix of arc multiplicities for each of the places and transitions in the net is then 
shown. Along the top of the matrix are the index numbers of transitions, while down 
the left-hand side are the place indices. Because a text file can only have a certain 
number of characters on a line, only 140 transitions can be shown in each matrix. If 
this limit is exceeded, the program will show another matrix below, starting from 
transition 141, 281, and so on. Each element of the matrix has three values, 
corresponding to, from the perspective of the place, input arc multiplicity, output arc 
multiplicity, and inhibitor arc multiplicity. For instance, if place 4 has arcs {3,4,2} 
to transition 6, this is the equivalent of the net in Figure A.17. If the element is 
blank, all arcs are zero. 
 
 
Figure A.17 – Net with arcs {3,4,2} 
 
The final set of information is that for arcs which link between places in the current 
net and transitions in other nets. In the example given, the link is 
“(0 0)-(6 7) - 0 0 1”. This indicates that a single inhibitor arc goes from place 
0 in net 0 to transition 7 in net 6. From the information given by the text file, the full 
net can be reproduced in graphic form, and analysed for correctness.  
 
A.5.2 Simulation Results 
 
The other output from the program is a text file which shows the results of the 
simulations which have been run. This is option ‘2’ on the output menu as shown in 
Figure A.16. This gives results in a table format, with the following data provided: 
 
• Platform, MFOP and mission failures and abandonments 
• Phase failures and the systems which caused these 
• System and component failures 
• Discrete event switches 
• LRI failures and replacements 
3
4
2
4 6
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• Prognostic components, the number of abandonments and replacements 
• Redundant items, the number of switches, and the success rate of these 
• Inspected items, and the number of inspections and located failures. 
 
Further information on each of these is given below. 
A.5.2.1 Platform Failure Information 
The first set of data given concerns the performance of each platform. This is 
tabulated for each one, and shows the number of starts, the number of times an 
MFOP or mission was abandoned, and the number of catastrophic failures. This 
information is also broken down for each of the MFOPs and missions that the 
platform undertook, as shown in the example below. 
 
PLATFORM PERFORMANCE SUMMARY 
 
  PLAT- | MISSION/ |        |  ABANDON- | FAIL- | UNRELI-               
  FORM  | MFOP     | STARTS |   MENTS   | URES  | ABILITY  
--------+----------+--------+-----------+-------+--------- 
 PLTFM1 |    MFOPs |     63 |        17 |    46 |   0.730159 
        | Missions |     68 |        17 |    46 |   0.676471 
        |          |        |           |       | 
        |    MFOP1 |     50 |         8 |    42 |   0.84 
        |    MFOP2 |      8 |         5 |     3 |   0.375 
        |    MFOP3 |      5 |         4 |     1 |   0.2 
        |          |        |           |       | 
        | MISSION1 |     50 |         7 |    40 |   0.8 
        | MISSION2 |      3 |         0 |     1 |   0.333333 
        | MISSION3 |     15 |        10 |     5 |   0.333333 
        |          |        |           |       | 
 PLTFM2 |    MFOPs |    101 |        56 |    45 |   0.445545 
... 
 
As the example shows, a figure for unreliability is given. This is the total number of 
catastrophic failures divided by the number of starts for that MFOP or mission.  
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A.5.2.2 MFOP Failure Information 
The information on MFOP failures is similar to that for platforms. An example table 
is shown below. 
 
      | MISSION/ |        | ABANDON- | FAIL- | ABANDON | FAILURE     
 MFOP | PLATFORM | STARTS |  MENTS   | URES  | PROB    | PROB      
------+----------+--------+----------+-------+---------+--------- 
MFOP1 |          |     60 |        2 |     2 | 0.03333 | 0.03333 
      | Missions |    176 |        2 |     2 | 0.01136 | 0.01136 
      |          |        |          |       |         | 
      |   PLTFM1 |     15 |        1 |     1 | 0.06667 | 0.06667 
      |   PLTFM3 |     30 |        1 |     1 | 0.03333 | 0.03333 
      |   PLTFM4 |     15 |        0 |     0 |       0 | 0 
      |          |        |          |       |         | 
      | MISSION1 |     60 |        1 |     1 | 0.01667 | 0.01667 
      |    Alpha |     60 |        0 |     1 |       0 | 0.01667 
      |     Beta |     55 |        0 |     0 |       0 | 0 
      |    Gamma |     55 |        0 |     0 |       0 | 0 
      |    Delta |     71 |        1 |     0 | 0.01408 | 0 
      |  Epsilon |      0 |        0 |     0 |    ---- | ---- 
      |          |        |          |       |         | 
      | MISSION2 |     58 |        0 |     0 |       0 |   0 
      |     Beta |     58 |        0 |     0 |       0 |   0 
... 
 
The failure data for each MFOP is, like that for the platforms, split up so it can be 
seen which platforms and missions featured the most or the fewest failures. The 
number of times each platform started the MFOP is shown, as is the number of 
times the MFOP started each of its missions and the phases within each of these. 
Probabilities of the MFOP failing or being abandoned for a given platform or in a 
particular mission or phase are shown. 
A.5.2.3 Mission Failure Information 
The results for the individual missions is laid out as in the example below.  
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         | MFOP/    |        |          |       |         |             
         | PHASE/   |        | ABANDON- | FAIL- | ABANDON | FAILURE     
 Mission | PLATFORM | STARTS |  MENTS   | URES  | PROB    | PROB      
---------+----------+--------+----------+-------+---------+--------
- 
MISSION1 |          |    138 |        4 |     5 | 0.02899 | 0.03623 
         |   Phases |    683 |        4 |     5 | 0.00586 | 0.00732 
         |          |        |          |       |         | 
         |   PLTFM1 |     41 |        2 |     2 | 0.04878 | 0.04878 
         |   PLTFM3 |     30 |        1 |     1 | 0.03333 | 0.03333 
         |   PLTFM4 |     15 |        0 |     0 |       0 | 0 
         |   PLTFM2 |     52 |        1 |     2 | 0.01923 | 0.03846 
         |          |        |          |       |         | 
         |    MFOP1 |     60 |        1 |     1 | 0.01667 | 0.01667 
         |    MFOP2 |     78 |        3 |     4 | 0.03846 | 0.05128 
         |          |        |          |       |         | 
         |    Alpha |    138 |        2 |     2 | 0.01449 | 0.01449 
         |-    Beta |    121 |          |       |         |  
         |-   Delta |     13 |          |       |         |  
         |     Beta |    121 |        1 |     0 | 0.00826 | 0 
         |    Gamma |    122 |        0 |     3 |       0 | 0.02459 
         |    Delta |    162 |        1 |     0 | 0.00617 | 0.00617 
         |-     END |    131 |          |       |         |  
         |-   Delta |     29 |          |       |         |  
         |  Epsilon |      0 |        0 |     0 |   ---   |  --- 
... 
 
The table of results is once again very similar to those for platforms and MFOPs. 
Each mission’s figures are broken down into the platforms, MFOPs and Phases 
which link to it. Values are given for numbers of starts, abandonments and 
catastrophic failures, with probabilities for the latter two. Something different to 
note, however, is that phases which have several options for which phase follows on 
show the number of times each output option was selected. This is denoted by a 
hyphen before the phase name. For instance, either of phases Beta or Delta can 
follow phase Alpha, and of the 134 times Alpha didn’t fail, 121 led to Beta being 
performed, and 13 to Delta.  
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A.5.2.4 Phase Failure Information 
The output given by the program relating to phase failure information is split into 
two parts. The first relates the phase failures to the missions, phase choices and 
platforms, while the second shows the systems which prompted the phase failures. 
The first set of information is similar to that shown in the previous three sections, an 
example of which is shown below. 
 
              |  PLATFORM/   |           |           |                
     PHASE    |   MISSION    |   STARTS  |  FAILURES | UNRELIAB.  
--------------+--------------+-----------+-----------+------------- 
        Alpha |              |       268 |        43 |   0.160448 
              |     Missions |       268 |        43 |   0.160448 
              |              |           |           | 
              |       PLTFM1 |        73 |        13 |   0.178082 
              |       PLTFM2 |       129 |        25 |   0.193798 
              |       PLTFM3 |        66 |         5 |   0.0757576 
              |              |           |           | 
              |     MISSION1 |       112 |        10 |   0.0892857 
              |     MISSION3 |       156 |        33 |   0.211538 
              |              |           |           | 
              |         IF 0 |           |        10 |  
              |         IF 1 |           |         0 | 
... 
 
As before, the number of times the item of concern has failed is related to each 
platform which performs it, and the missions which it forms part of. The number of 
times the phase failed in each of these is also shown, together with a figure for 
unreliability, conditional to the mission or platform. The program does not 
distinguish between an abandoned or a catastrophically failed phase. Another piece 
of information given here is the number of times that the phase was affected by an 
“IF” event as explained in Section A.3.3.2. These are listed in the order in which 
they were inputted, without any further information on whether they relate to a 
phase abandonment or insertion, or an event-driven phase choice. 
 
The second set of information is typically laid out as in the example below. 
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              |              |           |  CRITICAL  
     PHASE    |    SYSTEM    |  FAILURES |  FAILURES  
--------------+--------------+-----------+----------- 
        Alpha |              |        43 |        43 
              |         GTOP |        33 |        12 
              |        G1001 |         0 |         0 
              |        ATOP1 |       231 |        31 
              |              |           | 
         Beta |              |         6 |         6 
              |        GTOP2 |         0 |         0 
              |        G2001 |         0 |         0 
              |        G2002 |         0 |         0 
              |        G2003 |         0 |         0 
              |        ATOP2 |         7 |         5 
 
This table shows the “systems” (top and intermediate gates in the phase fault trees) 
which can contribute to phase failure. Each time one of these systems fails, the 
“failures” value in the relevant phase object is incremented. If the phase fails, the 
program searches through each of the systems which could contribute to its failure, 
and notes those which have failed. Each of these is classed as a “critical failure”, 
even if it did not necessarily help cause phase failure. In the example above, system 
“ATOP1” in phase Alpha failed 231 times, but only caused Alpha to fail or be 
abandoned 31 times. This could be due to Alpha not being active before another 
phase failed or an MRP was entered. 
A.5.2.5 System Failure Information 
System failure information is given in terms of the phases each system can cause 
failure in, and the sub-systems and components which are inputting events to it. A 
typical table of information is shown below. 
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              |   PHASE/LOWER  |           |           |             
              |     SYSTEM/    |           |  CRITICAL |             
    SYSTEM    |   COMPONENT    |  FAILURES |  FAILURES |    MTTF     
--------------+----------------+-----------+-----------+----------- 
         GTOP |                |        33 |           | 5.44432 
              |          Alpha |        12 |           | 
              |                |           |           | 
              |          G1001 |         0 |         0 |  
              |                |           |           | 
              |              A |        33 |        33 |  
              |              B |         0 |         0 |  
              |              D |         0 |         0 |  
              |                |           |           | 
        G1001 |                |         0 |           |       0 
              |          Alpha |         0 |           | 
              |                |           |           | 
              |                |           |           | 
              |              B |         0 |         0 |  
              |              D |         0 |         0 |  
              |                |           |           |    
        ATOP1 |                |       231 |           | 4.12259 
              |          Alpha |        31 |           | 
              |                |           |           | 
              |                |           |           | 
              |         SENS_E |        36 |        34 |  
              |             -E |           |           |  
              |              F |       216 |       197 | 
... 
 
The number of times the system failed is shown at the top. Each time a failure is 
recorded, the time since the last repair is added to an average value, which is shown 
in the last column, under “MTTF”, or Mean Time to Failure. The sub-systems 
which could cause the failure of this item are shown. As with the phase failure 
information, both “failures” and “critical failures” are recorded. The former is the 
number of times the child item failed, while the latter is the number of times the 
child item was failed when the parent item failed.  
 
The components which could cause system failure are then shown. This list includes 
not only the components which are direct inputs to the system, but those inputting to 
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sub-systems. Failure and critical failure information is then given as with the sub-
systems. For instance, in the example shown, component ‘A’ has failed 33 times, 
and because it is a direct input to system “GTOP”, which has an OR failure logic, 
each of these was a critical failure. GTOP subsequently failed phase Alpha 12 times.  
 
Note that where the system is part of an abandonment fault tree, sensors which are 
children of that system will input to it when the item they sense fails, and not when 
the sensor itself fails. This is explained in Section A.3.1.1. When outputting, the 
program highlights the item which is sensed by the sensor component below its 
name in the table. In the example above, “ATOP1” has input component “SENS_E”, 
which passes on the failures of component ‘E’. 
A.5.2.6 Component Failure Information 
Information showing the simulation results pertaining to the individual components 
is shown in a table similar to that for the systems. An example of this is given 
below. 
 
   COMPONENT  |    SYSTEM    |    FAILURES   |   MTTF     
--------------+--------------+---------------+----------- 
            A |              |        33 (0) |   5.44432 
              |         GTOP |            33 |  
              |        GTOP2 |             0 |  
              |        G2001 |             0 |  
              |        G2002 |             0 |  
              |        GTOP4 |             0 |  
              |        GTOP5 |            33 |  
              |     AGENERAL |             0 | 
 
The data in this table relates the component failures only to those systems to which 
it inputs, directly or indirectly. For instance, in the example above, component A is a 
direct input to system G2002, which is a sub-system of both G2001 and GTOP2, and 
so these are also listed. The number of failures of component A, together with a 
figure for the average mean time to fail is given. Below this, the number of times 
the failure of A caused a failure of the systems for which it is an input is given. In 
the example shown, A failed GTOP and GTOP5, but none of the other systems. 
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If a component is redundant, it is possible that an attempt to bring it into operation 
may fail, and thus cause parent system failure, as explained in Section 6.3.7. If this 
is the case, the number of times the component was not brought online is shown in 
brackets next to the number of actual failures. 
A.5.2.7 Discrete Event Information 
Every time a discrete event switches, the results of that switch are recorded by the 
program into the corresponding discrete event object. The data is compiled and 
added to the simulation below the component failure information, taking a form 
similar to that shown below. 
 
          |  NUMBER  |  NUMBER  |  NUMBER  |              |            
   EVENT  | SWITCHES |    YES   |    NO    |    SYSTEM    | FAILS  
----------+----------+----------+----------+--------------+-------- 
       D1 |       33 |       24 |        9 |          TOP |      14 
          |          |          |          |        G1001 |      14 
       D2 |        0 |        0 |        0 |              |  
       D3 |      112 |        7 |      105 |              | 
 
The number of times each event switched and the number of times it resulted in a 
positive or negative outcome is shown. If the discrete event is an input to one or 
more systems, the number of times its failure prompted the system to fail is shown. 
A.5.2.8 LRI information 
Similarly to the discrete events, the number of times an LRI is switched and the 
inputs which prompted these are shown in a table, similar to the example below. 
 
              | # REPLA-  |     EVENT    | NUMBER OF  
   LRI NAME   |  CEMENTS  |     NAME     | FAILURES   
--------------+-----------+--------------+----------- 
        LRI_1 |         0 |        LRI_2 |         0 
              |           |        LRI_3 |         0 
        LRI_2 |        31 |        LRI_4 |         0 
              |           |        LRI_5 |        31 
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A.5.2.9 Prognostics Information 
Each component which has its performance estimated by a prognostics system will 
have the data from this outputted to a table similar to the one below. 
 
        |        | WEAR  |        | REPLACE- |  MFOP    |  REPLACE  
 COMPT  | STARTS | LEVEL | NUMBER |  MENTS   | ABANDONS |     RATE     
--------+--------+-------+--------+----------+----------+---------- 
      C |    150 |     1 |      3 |        0 |        0 |        0 
        |        |     2 |      2 |        0 |        0 |        0 
        |        |     3 |      1 |        1 |        0 |        1 
 
The table shows the name of the component, and the number of times that it 
“started”; taking account of the amount of times a simulation began for each 
platform, and the number of times it was repaired. Each wear level the component 
can experience is shown with the number of times it was found to be worn to that 
stage. If the component’s predicted future failure in any of the wear levels prompted 
its replacement or an MFOP to be abandoned, the number of times this happened is 
shown. Also displayed is a rate, equal to the number of replacements divided by the 
number of times the wear level was entered. 
A.5.2.10   Redundancies Information 
Each item which has redundancies assigned to it will have the details of these 
shown in a table similar to that below. 
 
             |        | NUMBER OF |           |           | SUCCESS  
  ITEM NAME  |  TYPE  | SWITCHES  |  SUCCESS  |  FAILURE  |  RATE     
-------------+--------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-------- 
           A | Manual |        31 |        20 |        11 | 0.645161 
           E | Sensed |        26 |        26 |         0 |        1 
 
The table lists the items (components or systems) which have redundancies. The 
type of redundancy, manual or sensed, is shown in the next column. The number of 
times the switch occurred, and how many of these succeeded or failed, is shown, 
together with a success rate. Note that the “failure” number should match the 
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number in brackets for the redundant item in either of the component or system 
failure information tables. 
A.5.2.11   Inspections Information 
Each item which undergoes inspections will have the details of these given. The 
data shown is the component or system name, the number of times it was inspected, 
and how many item failures were found during each inspection. The rate of 
replacement with respect to number of inspections is then shown in the next 
column. The table below demonstrates this.  
 
              | NUMBER OF   | FAILURES | REPLACEMENT  
   ITEM NAME  | INSPECTIONS |   FOUND  |     RATE     
--------------+-------------+----------+------------- 
            F |          86 |       86 |           1 
        G3001 |         115 |      115 |           1 
 
The data on item inspections is the last of the sets of results that the program 
exports.  
 
A.6 Summary 
 
A program has been created for the task of simulating a fleet of platforms 
undergoing phased MFOPs. This applies the Petri net models explained in Chapter 
5 and Chapter 6, using inputs, in the form of text files, containing phase fault trees, 
component failure data, MFOP enabler information, and mission configurations. 
Using these, it creates arrays of objects, which can store information on each item 
such as a place, transition, phase, component or system.  
 
The Petri nets it creates are simulated by randomly assigning switching times to all 
enabled timed transitions. These are switched in the order of these times, with all 
subsequently enabled immediate transitions being switched in between. By doing 
this over a satisfactory number of simulations, the expected performance of each 
platform, MFOP and mission can be estimated. When compared with the results 
from different system and enabler configurations, conclusions may be drawn over 
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the approach which appears to be most apt. This data has the potential to allow a 
great deal of improvement and demonstration of quality of systems, and could thus 
become a very valuable part of the design process. 
 - 312 - 
Appendix B Data Input Files 
 
This section contains the data files inputted to the simulation program. These were 
used to obtain the results given in Chapter 7. No explanation is given, as these fault 
trees are based on restricted material. It is felt that the short length of event names 
should be sufficiently informative without compromising sensitive data. 
 
There are three generations of files. The second and third generations have minor 
differences from the first, and so the sections detailing these files will only highlight 
the differences from the previous set. The file “nimmish.txt”, shown in the first 
generation, did not undergo any changes.   
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B.1 First Generation 
 
B.1.1 Fault Tree, Component Data and Discrete Events file 
 
PHASES 19 
PHASE FlightCheck1 51 
 
AIRCRAFT1 + 2 1.3-STRCT1 1.4-ON_GND 
1.3-STRCT1 + 2 1.3.1STRC1 1.3.2FIRE1 
1.4-ON_GND + 1 G368 
1.3.1STRC1 + 2 SD_GEN_SYS1 SD_LOW_ZHA 
1.3.2FIRE1 + 2 EXPLOSION FIRE_DAM1 
EXPLOSION + 1 G592-1 
SD_GEN_SYS1 + 2 SD_ENG SD_LGS1  
FIRE_DAM1 + 2 FIRE_FLUID1 FIRE_OTHER1 
SD_ENG + 5 G155 G157 G164 G160 G415 
FIRE_FLUID1 + 3 G694. G714 G005-1 
SD_LGS1 + 1 SD_LG1  
SD_LG1 + 2 G449 G368 
FIRE_OTHER1 + 3 G481 G009-1 G226 
SD_LOW_ZHA + 2 G660. G641 
G157 + 2 G157NONFBO G637 
G368 + 3 LG-LHGRSTRC LG-RHGRSTRC LG-ASSY1 
G160 + 2 G160-G286 G160-G287 
G009-1 + 1 G009-G316  
G009-G316 + 3 G009FRSPGND G009-G11 G009-TIT 
G009-G11 * 2 G009-G15 G009-G12 
G009-TIT * 2 CF-APU-TIT FP-FIRE14 
G226 + 4 G226-G1 G226-G264 G226-G369 G226-G474 
G592-1 + 2 G592-002-1 G592-003-1 
G592-002-1 + 1 G592-004  
G592-003-1 + 5 G592-006-1 G592-009 G592-083 FU-PMPFRXP
 FU-TMPSNSFR 
G592-004 * 2 G592-005 CF-EXTFIRE 
G592-005 + 8 FU-BURSTDR FU-DRAINVLK FU-XPOPPLK FU-LBURST FU-LFLAMEAF
 FU-RBURST FU-RFLAMEAF FU-RBURST 
G592-006-1 + 1 FU-T4AWIRE  
G592-009 * 2 FU-GA_NIS FU-GA_OC 
G592-083 + 3 G592-011 G592-012 G592-013 
G415 + 4 PP-415-ENG1 PP-415-ENG2 PP-415-ENG3 PP-415-ENG4 
G005-1 * 3 G005LEAK1 CF-OX-IGN1 CF-OX-COMB1 
G005LEAK1 + 2 G005BRA1 G005OBGRATM 
G005BRA1 + 1 G005BLKEGRD  
G005BLKEGRD * 2 G005-ECSGRD G005-BOSGRD 
G226-G1 + 3 G226-G11 G226-G167 G226-G700 
G226-G11 * 2 G226DRILL11 G226-EF1-1 
G226-G167 * 2 G226DRILL21 G226-EF2-1 
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G226-G264 + 3 G226-G265 G226-G284 G226-G838 
G226-G265 * 2 G226DRILL12 G226-EF1-2 
G226-G284 * 2 G226DRILL22 G226-EF2-2 
G226-G369 + 3 G226-G370 G226-G389 G226-G921 
G226-G370 * 2 G226DRILL13 G226-EF1-3 
G226-G389 * 2 G226DRILL23 G226-EF2-3 
G226-G474 + 3 G226-G475 G226-G494 G226-G999 
G226-G475 * 2 G226DRILL14 G226-EF1-4 
G226-G494 * 2 G226DRILL24 G226-EF2-4  
G226-G700 * 2 G226-HF1-1 CF-FP-LK-1  
G226-G838 * 2 G226-HF1-2 CF-FP-LK-2  
G226-G921 * 2 G226-HF1-3 CF-FP-LK-3  
G226-G999 * 2 G226-HF1-4 CF-FP-LK-4  
 
ABANDONS 144 
 
ABANDONS1 + 6 DASS FMS MAD RCS TCS STORES 
DASS + 3 DASSDET DASSEVAL DASSPROT 
DASSDET + 2 RADWARNR MISWARNR  
DASSEVAL + 1 DSM 
DASSPROT + 2 TRDS CFD  
RADWARNR + 3 APR SUPERHET SIGNALREC 
MISWARNR + 2 ECU MISSENS  
TRDS + 3 DEC TQG DASSLNCH 
CFD + 3 SDU DCU CFDF 
SUPERHET + 2 SUC SUR 
SIGNALREC + 3 CDBAND MIDHIBAND SIGCONV 
CDBAND + 2 CBR CBA 
MIDHIBAND + 2 DRR DASSANT 
SIGCONV * 2 DC1 DC2 
DASSANT + 2 DASSFANT DASSRANT 
DASSFANT * 2 HA1 HA2 
DASSRANT * 2 HA3 HA4 
MISSENS + 4 STP STB MISLSENS MISRSENS 
MISLSENS * 2 SLN SLB 
MISRSENS * 2 SRN SRB 
DASSLNCH + 2 LRA PLC 
CFDF        / 6 12 DR1 DR2 DR3 DR4 DR5 DR6 DR7 DR8
 DR9 DR10 DR11 DR12 
DR1 + 4 FMG1 CMG1 TOP1 BOT1 
DR2 + 4 FMG2 CMG2 TOP2 BOT2 
DR3 + 4 FMG3 CMG3 TOP3 BOT3 
DR4 + 4 FMG4 CMG4 TOP4 BOT4 
DR5 + 4 FMG5 CMG5 TOP5 BOT5 
DR6 + 4 FMG6 CMG6 TOP6 BOT6 
DR7 + 4 FMG7 CMG7 TOP7 BOT7 
DR8 + 4 FMG8 CMG8 TOP8 BOT8 
DR9 + 4 FMG9 CMG9 TOP9 BOT9 
DR10 + 4 FMG10 CMG10TOP10 BOT10 
DR11 + 4 FMG11 CMG11TOP11 BOT11 
DR12 + 4 FMG12 CMG12TOP12 BOT12 
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FMS + 3 FMCFAIL MCDU USMS 
FMCFAIL + 2 EGI FMC  
MCDU * 2 MDCU1 MDCU2 
EGI * 2 EGI1 EGI2  
FMC * 2 FMC1 FMC2  
EGI1 + 4 EGI1INPUTS EGI1UNIT EGI1POW EGI1TRAY 
EGI2 + 4 EGI2INPUTS EGI2UNIT EGI2POW EGI2TRAY 
EGI1INPUTS * 2 EGI1GPS EGI1ANT  
EGI2INPUTS * 2 EGI2ANT EGI2GPS  
USMS * 4 USMS1 USMS2USMS3 USMS4 
USMS1 + 2 USMS1COM USMS1CB  
USMS2 + 2 USMS2COM USMS2CB  
USMS3 + 2 USMS3COM USMS3CB  
USMS4 + 2 USMS4COM USMS4CB  
MAD + 5 MADCOMPAMP DETECTHEAD VECTMAGNET MADBASE MADCB 
RCS + 2 TDI COMM  
TDI * 3 TSN TCSOSSATCOM 
COMM * 2 VOICECOM TEXTCOM  
TSN * 2 L16 L11  
TCSOS + 3 IOPS TCSOSMD TCSOSSCSI 
VOICECOM * 2 RADIOCHAN ADDITIONAL  
TEXTCOM + 2 TCSOS TTYMODEM  
TTYMODEM + 3 TTYMOD TTYKEYGEN TTYPOWSW 
RADIOCHAN + 2 RADIOF RADCTRLF  
ADDITIONAL * 2 L16 SATCOM  
L16 + 5 DLS JTT ANTSYS3 L16SWI L16BUS 
L11 + 6 L11DTS L11DLP L11CRYPT L11PWRSW L11CB
 L11RADIO 
SATCOM + 3 INTERFACE INTELEC SIGCOMM 
RADIOF * 2 HF V/UHF 
RADCTRLF * 2 TCSOS RMU  
RMU * 2 PILOTRMU COPILOTRMU  
HF * 2 HF1 HF2  
V/UHF * 2 "V/UHF1,2" V/UHF3-5  
INTERFACE + 3 MOUNTS PSW PNL 
INTELEC + 4 MODEM RFC PSU CTRLUNIT 
SIGCOMM + 3 KEY DSC ANTENNAE 
MOUNTS * 2 MT1 MT2  
MODEM + 4 RPA BAS MCD MPS 
CTRLUNIT + 3 SCI AUI PRO 
ANTENNAE * 2 ANTSYS1 ANTSYS2  
ANTSYS1 + 2 ANT1 MCM1  
ANTSYS2 + 2 ANT2 MCM2  
DLS + 2 RAD BAT  
ANTSYS3 * 2 ANTTOP ANTBOT  
L16SWI + 2 SWA PWR  
L16BUS * 2 L16BUSA L16BUSB  
ANTTOP + 2 ATT RAT  
ANTBOT + 2 ATB RAB  
L16BUSA + 3 BAC CBA TBA 
L16BUSB + 3 BBC CBB TBB 
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"V/UHF1,2" * 2 V/UHF1 V/UHF2  
V/UHF3-5 * 3 V/UHF3 V/UHF4 V/UHF5 
V/UHF1 + 5 V/U1XCVR V/U1FILT V/U1ANT V/U1DTOA V/U1LOGU 
V/UHF2 + 5 V/U2XCVR V/U2FILT V/U2ANT V/U2DTOA V/U2LOGU 
V/UHF3 + 5 V/U3XCVR V/U3FILT V/U3ANT V/U3DTOA V/U3LOGU 
V/UHF4 + 5 V/U4XCVR V/U4FILT V/U4ANT V/U4DTOA V/U4LOGU 
V/UHF5 + 5 V/U5XCVR V/U5FILT V/U5ANT V/U5DTOA V/U5LOGU 
V/U2FILT * 2 V/U2VFILT V/U2UFILT  
HF1 + 6 HF1RECEXC HF1POWAMP HF1ANTTUN HF1PPSFIL HF1DTOA
 HF1SHUNT 
HF2 + 8 HF2RECEXC HF2POWAMP HF2ANTTUN HF2PPSFIL HF2DTOA
 HF2SHUNT HF2POWSW GHF2ANT  
GHF2ANT + 5 HF2FWDANT HF2CNTANT HF2AFTANT HF2ANT HF2GNDANT 
L11RADIO * 4 HF1 HF2 V/UHF4 V/UHF5 
PILOTRMU + 2 FCRA1 RMUIF1  
COPILOTRMU + 2 FCRA2 RMUIF2  
FCRA1 * 2 NRCTCS FI1  
RMUIF1 + 4 PSU1 MC1 FLX1 CA1 
FCRA2 * 2 B3I2 FI2  
RMUIF2 + 4 PSU2 MC2 FLX2 CA2 
NRCTCS + 2 B3I1 TCSOS 
TCS + 3 TCSPROC TCSOPTCSREC 
TCSPROC + 2 IOPIFU TCSOS 
TCSOP * 4 NORM5WKSTN PILOTWKSTN ACO2WKSTN ORDN2WKSTN 
TCSREC * 6 VIDINTU HDDR MAGDISK1 MAGDISK2 CBS TXTPRINT 
IOPS / 2 3 IOP1 IOP2 TAC1PWRSW 
NORM5WKSTN * 5 WKSTN1 WKSTN2 WKSTN3 WKSTN4 WKSTN5 
PILOTWKSTN + 4 PILOTTCP PILOTDP PILOTTCPIFU PILOTCHRD 
ACO2WKSTN * 2 ACOWKSTN1 ACOWKSTN2  
ORDN2WKSTN * 2 ORDWKSTN1 ORDWKSTN2  
ORDWKSTN1 + 3 ORD1PEP ORD1PSU ORD1SONRS 
ORDWKSTN2 + 3 ORD2PEP ORD2PSU ORD2SONRS 
ACOWKSTN1 + 4 ACO1PEPS ACO1PSU ACO1CHRDS ACO1INPUTS 
ACOWKSTN2 + 4 ACO2PEPS ACO2PSU ACO2CHRDS ACO2INPUTS 
ACO1PEPS * 2 ACO1PEP1 ACO1PEP2  
ACO1CHRDS * 2 ACO1CHRD SPARECHRD  
ACO1INPUTS * 4 ACO1KEYP ACO1KEYB ACO1KEYPL ACO1ROLBAL 
ACO2PEPS * 2 ACO2PEP1 ACO2PEP2  
ACO2CHRDS * 2 ACO2CHRD SPARECHRD  
ACO2INPUTS * 4 ACO2KEYP ACO2KEYB ACO2KEYPL ACO2ROLBAL 
WKSTN1 + 5 WK1PEP WK1DPWK1PSU WK1CHRD WK1INPUTS 
WKSTN2 + 5 WK2PEP WK2DPWK2PSU WK2CHRD WK2INPUTS 
WKSTN3 + 5 WK3PEP WK3DPWK3PSU WK3CHRD WK3INPUTS 
WKSTN4 + 5 WK4PEP WK4DPWK4PSU WK4CHRD WK4INPUTS 
WKSTN5 + 5 WK5PEP WK5DPWK5PSU WK5CHRD WK5INPUTS 
WK1PEP * 2 WK1PEP1 WK1PEP2  
WK1INPUTS * 4 WK1KEYP WK1KEYB WK1KEYPL WK1ROLBAL 
WK2PEP * 2 WK2PEP1 WK2PEP2  
WK2INPUTS * 4 WK2KEYP WK2KEYB WK2KEYPL WK2ROLBAL 
WK3PEP * 2 WK3PEP1 WK3PEP2  
WK3INPUTS * 4 WK3KEYP WK3KEYB WK3KEYPL WK3ROLBAL 
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WK4PEP * 2 WK4PEP1 WK4PEP2  
WK4INPUTS * 4 WK4KEYP WK4KEYB WK4KEYPL WK4ROLBAL 
WK5PEP * 2 WK5PEP1 WK5PEP2  
WK5INPUTS * 4 WK5KEYP WK5KEYB WK5KEYPL WK5ROLBAL 
STORES + 2 SMGMTSYS SONORELSYS  
SMGMTSYS + 4 SMGMTPROC STNCTRLU BBAYDR WEAPRELSW 
SONORELSYS * 2 SINGLAUNCH TENSHOT  
STNCTRLU * 5 STNCTRLU1 STNCTRLU2 STNCTRLU3 STNCTRLU4 STNCTRLU5 
WEAPRELSW * 4 WRELSW1 WRELSW2 WRELSW3 WRELSW4 
SINGLAUNCH * 2 SINGSHOT1 SINGSHOT2  
TENSHOT * 4 TENSHOT1 TENSHOT2 TENSHOT3 TENSHOT4 
 
PHASE FlightCheck2 1 
AIRCRAFT1A + 2 1.3-STRCT1 1.4-ON_GND  
 
ABANDONS 33 
ABANDONS1A + 7 DASS ESM FMS RADAR-IFF RCS TCS STORES 
ESM + 2 GSIGPROC INTTCS  
GSIGPROC + 2 SIGDEL ESMPRO  
INTTCS * 2 MSU 1553BUS  
SIGDEL + 2 SPINCHAN MAINCHAN  
SPINCHAN + 2 PROCFAIL SAU  
MAINCHAN + 2 ANTCLUST MRX  
ANTCLUST * 4 ACLUST1 ACLUST2 ACLUST3 ACLUST4 
PROCFAIL + 2 SRX SFE  
ACLUST1 * 3 FR1 LBA1 HBA1 
ACLUST2 * 3 FR2 LBA2 HBA2 
ACLUST3 * 3 FR3 LBA3 HBA3 
ACLUST4 / 2 3 FR4 LBA4 HBA4 
LBA1 + 2 LSPIANT1 LB1  
HBA1 + 2 HSPIANT1 HB1  
LBA2 + 2 LSPIANT2 LB2  
HBA2 + 2 HSPIANT2 HB2  
LBA3 + 2 LSPIANT3 LB3  
HBA3 + 2 HSPIANT3 HB3  
LBA4 + 2 LSPIANT4 LB4 
HBA4 + 2 HSPIANT4 HB4 
LSPIANT1 * 2 LS1-1 LS1-2 
HSPIANT1 * 2 HS1-1 HS1-2 
LSPIANT2 * 2 LS2-1 LS2-2 
HSPIANT2 * 2 HS2-1 HS2-2 
LSPIANT3 * 2 LS3-1 LS3-2 
HSPIANT3 * 2 HS3-1 HS3-2 
LSPIANT4 * 2 LS4-1 LS4-2 
HSPIANT4 * 2 HS4-1 HS4-2 
RADAR-IFF + 10 DATAPROC SIGPROC IFFINTGTR INS-GPS REC-EXC RFTRANS
 RFCTRL RFSCAN RADCOOLING 1553BBUS 
IFFINTGTR + 3 IFFUNIT CRYPTOFILL IFFCB  
RADCOOLING * 2 DRADTDCR PRADTDCR 
1553BBUS * 2 1553BUS1 1553BUS2 
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PHASE FlightCheck3 1 
AIRCRAFT1B + 2 1.3-STRCT1 1.4-ON_GND  
 
ABANDONS 3 
ABANDONS1B + 6 DASS FMS RADAR-IFF RCS TCS EOSDS 
EOSDS + 7 TUR1 SCU1 PDU1 HGP1 TLU1 PWP1 EOSDSCP 
EOSDSCP + 2 DPS1 RTS1  
 
PHASE EngStart 13 
 
AIRCRAFT2 + 2 1.3-STRCT2 1.4-ON_GND  
1.3-STRCT2 + 2 1.3.1STRC2 1.3.2FIRE2  
1.3.1STRC2 + 2 SD_GEN_SYS2 SD_LOW_ZHA  
1.3.2FIRE2 + 2 EXPLOSION2 FIRE_DAM1  
EXPLOSION2 + 1 G592-2 
SD_GEN_SYS2 + 2 SD_ENG SD_LGS2  
SD_LGS2 + 2 SD_LG1 SD_WBT1 
SD_WBT1 + 1 G495.  
G592-2 + 2 G592-002-1 G592-003-2 
G592-003-2 + 6 G592-006-2 G592-007 G592-009 G592-083
 FU-PMPFRXP FU-TMPSNSFR 
G592-006-2 * 2 GATE11-1 FU-T4AWIRE 
G592-007 * 2 CFSTOREFIRE FUINADVJETT 
GATE11-1 + 1 CFFUEAIRMIX  
 
ABANDONS 1 
ABANDONS2 + 1 RCS  
 
PHASE Take-Off 58 
 
AIRCRAFT3 + 3 1.1-DEV_FP1 1.3-STRCT3 1.4-ON_GND 
1.1-DEV_FP1 + 2 1.1.1-AERO1 1.1.2-TRST1 
1.3-STRCT3 + 2 1.3.1STRC3 1.3.2FIRE3 
1.1.1-AERO1 + 3 LAC_FCS LAC-ENV1 LAC-PILOT 
1.1.2-TRST1 + 2 TRST_FUEL1 G554-1 
1.3.1STRC3 + 4 SD_GEN_SYS3 G647-1 SD_LOW_ZHA SD-FCS 
1.3.2FIRE3 + 2 EXPLOSION3 FIRE_DAM3 
LAC_FCS + 7 G394 G568 G569 G570 G696. G698. G697.  
G554-1 + 4 G174-1 G398-1 G659-1 G173-1 
TRST_FUEL1 + 1 G166  
EXPLOSION3 + 1 G592-3  
SD_GEN_SYS3 + 3 SD_ENG SD_LGS3 SD_AIR1 
SD_AIR1 + 1 G274-1  
FIRE_DAM3 + 2 FIRE_FLUID3 FIRE_OTHER3 
FIRE_FLUID3 + 3 G694. G714 G005-3 
LAC-ENV1 + 2 G_430_LM G658 
LAC-PILOT + 2 G312 G635 
SD_LGS3 + 2 SD_LG1 SD_WBT2 
G394 + 3 LAC_FLAPS G265 G309 
G568 + 3 G670 G671 G672 
G569 + 3 G654 G673 G674 
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LAC_FLAPS + 1 G134  
G_430_LM + 1 G430  
G570 + 3 G675 G676 G677 
G647-1 + 1 SD_OTH_DAM1  
SD_OTH_DAM1 + 1 SD_CNTL1  
SD_CNTL1 + 3 BBD_OPEN SD_FLAP1 G683. 
BBD_OPEN + 1 G644  
SD_FLAP1 * 2 G265 CFFLAP>ENV. 
SD_WBT2 + 2 G396-1 G495. 
G396-1 + 3 G629 G695.G530 
FIRE_OTHER3 + 3 G481 G009-2 G226 
SD-FCS + 2 G715 GATE12 
G274-1 + 2 G274NMVTUPR G274VTPRNM 
G166 + 3 G166-2007AX G166-2007BX G166-2007CX 
G174-1 + 1 G554TL3ENTR  
G398-1 + 4 G554-ADC G554-CREW8 G554-INDERR G554-TR-INC 
G659-1 + 1 G554-G4821  
G173-1 * 2 G554-TL-2EN CF-G554-C4 
G009-2 + 1 G009-FRFLT1  
G009-FRFLT1 * 2 G009-G417 G009-TAR1 
G009-G417 + 3 G009FRSPFLT G009-G320 FP-FIRE14 
G009-TAR1 + 2 G009-G307 CF-APUOPFLT 
G592-3 + 1 G592-003-3  
G592-003-3 + 5 G592-006-3 G592-009 G592-083 FU-PMPFRXP
 FU-TMPSNSFR 
G592-006-3 * 2 GATE11-2 FU-T4AWIRE 
GATE11-2 + 2 CFFUEAIRMIX CF-NEGGMAN 
G658 + 2 G658-G100 G658-G110 
G635 * 2 HEPEVNAV NVVNAVER 
GATE12 + 2 G312E_AIRSP G312L_AIRSP 
G005-3 * 3 G005-LEAK3 CF-OX-IGN3 CF-OX-COMB3 
G005-LEAK3 + 3 G005BRA1 G005OBGRATM G005PRATMOS 
G005PRATMOS * 2 G005INSFPFL G005-PBTLFL 
G005-PBTLFL + 3 G005PBTL1FL G005PBTL2FL G005PBTL3FL 
G005PBTL1FL + 2 OX-PBTL1LK OX-PBTL1HED 
G005PBTL2FL + 2 OX-PBTL2LK OX-PBTL2HED 
G005PBTL3FL + 2 OX-PBTL3LK OX-PBTL3HED 
G430 + 2 G230 G275 
 
ABANDONS 1 
ABANDONS3 + 3 RCS FMS TCS 
 
PHASE Climb 64 
AIRCRAFT4 + 3 1.1-DEV_FP2 1.2-CFIT1 1.3-STRCT4 
1.1-DEV_FP2 + 2 1.1.1-AERO2 1.1.2-TRST2 
1.2-CFIT1 + 5 AP_CFITMSA1 CFIT_DISPL CFIT_SR_NAV CFIT_PIL1 G656. 
1.3-STRCT4 + 2 1.3.1STRC4 1.3.2FIRE4 
1.1.1-AERO2 + 3 LAC_FCS LAC-ENV2 LAC-PILOT 
1.1.2-TRST2 + 2 TRST_FUEL2 G554-2 
1.3.1STRC4 + 4 SD_GEN_SYS4 G647-1 SD_LOW_ZHA SD-FCS 
1.3.2FIRE4 + 2 EXPLOSION4 FIRE_DAM4 
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G554-2 + 4 G174-1 G398-2 G659-2 G173-1 
TRST_FUEL2 + 2 L/VNAV_ERR G166 
EXPLOSION4 + 1 G592-4  
SD_GEN_SYS4 + 2 SD_ENG SD_AIR2 
SD_AIR2 + 4 G576. G274-1 G575 G010 
FIRE_DAM4 + 2 FIRE_FLUID4 FIRE_OTHER4 
FIRE_FLUID4 + 3 G694. G714 G005-4 
AP_CFITMSA1 + 1 G425-1  
LAC-ENV2 + 2 G_430_LM G364-1 
CFIT_DISPL + 1 G312  
CFIT_SR_NAV + 3 G442/443 G635 G625 
CFIT_PIL1 + 2 G106 G109-1 
FIRE_OTHER4 + 4 G481 G010 G009-2 G226 
L/VNAV_ERR + 2 G625 G635 
G575 * 2 G575ECPVNYC G575ECSVNYC 
G398-2 + 3 G554-ADC G554-CREW8 G554-TR-INC 
G659-2 + 2 G554-G4821 G554-G4822 
G010 + 2 G010FISLKAG G010FISLKHP 
G592-4 + 1 G592-003-4  
G592-003-4 + 6 G592-006-3 G592-008-1 G592-009 G592-083
 FU-PMPFRXP FU-TMPSNSFR 
G592-008-1 * 4 CFFLJETTIS CFSTOREFIRE FUFLPROCEA FUFLPROCEB 
G364-1 * 1 G364-SVRACC  
G442/443 * 2 NVEPITDISP NVECPDISP 
NVEPITDISP + 3 NVMMRSYSERR NVEPFD1PROC NVPILOTPFD1 
NVPILOTPFD1 * 2 NVEPFD1DISP NVEND1DISP 
NVEPFD1PROC + 1 CDEDMC1SYS  
NVEPFD1DISP + 2 CDERRPFD1HW CD_SW_DU2 
NVMMRSYSERR * 2 NVM1SYSERR NVM2SYSERR 
NVM1SYSERR + 4 NVERRMMR1HW NV_SW_MMR ECSLDCCRTUN ECSBDCCRUN 
NVM2SYSERR + 2 NVERRMMR2HW NV_SW_MMR 
NVECPDISP + 3 NVMMRSYSERR NVEPFD2PROC NVCPND1 
NVCPND1 + 1 NVEPFD2DISP  
NVEPFD2PROC + 1 NVEDMC2SYS  
NVEPFD2DISP + 2 CDERRPFD2HW CD_SW_DU3 
NVEDMC2SYS + 2 CDD2EFISERR CDDMC2ECOOL 
CDEDMC1SYS + 2 CDD1EFISERR NVDMC1ECOOL 
NVDMC1ECOOL * 2 CD_DMC_COOL SFCDLC 
CDDMC2ECOOL * 2 CD_DMC_COOL SFCDLC 
NVEND1DISP + 2 CDERRND1HW1 CD_SW_DU2 
G109-1 + 4 G109INAR5DC G109IAR5DEC G109-PORTFL G109-ISMK 
G005-4 * 3 G005-LEAK4 CF-OX-IGN4 CF-OX-COMB4 
G005-LEAK4 + 3 G005-BRA2 G005OBGRATM G005PRATMOS 
G005-BRA2 + 1 G005BLKEFLT  
G005BLKEFLT * 2 G005ECSFFLT G005BLKFLT 
G109IAR5DEC * 3 OXRDCMPCOND CFOXAR5COND G109-GL-AR5 
G109INAR5DC * 2 G109-GLNAR5 OXRDCMPCOND 
G109-PORTFL + 2 G109PFLNAR5 G109PFLAR5 
G109-ISMK * 2 OX-SMK-COND G109-GL-SMK 
G109-GL-AR5 + 2 G109GLAR5S OXPLTDCFAIL 
G425-1 + 6 G593 G594 G596 G597 G598-1 G599-1 
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G594 + 5 G594-ALT G594-APPR G594-LVLCHG G594-VNAV G594-VS 
G597 + 2 G597A G597B 
G593 + 2 G593B G593C 
G599-1 + 2 G425APSENG1 G425APSENG2 
G598-1 + 1 G425-SMJAM  
G596 + 2 G425-TRMLOS G425-TRMRUN 
 
ABANDONS 1 
ABANDONS4 + 4 DASS FMS RCS TCS 
 
PHASE Transit 23 
AIRCRAFT5 + 3 1.1-DEV_FP3 1.2-CFIT2 1.3-STRCT5 
1.1-DEV_FP3 + 2 1.1.1-AERO2 1.1.2-TRST3 
1.2-CFIT2 + 5 AP_CFITMSA2 CFIT_DISPL CFIT_SR_NAV CFIT_PIL2 G656. 
1.3-STRCT5 + 2 1.3.1STRC5 1.3.2FIRE5 
1.1.2-TRST3 + 3 TRST_FUEL2 G554-3 G452 
1.3.1STRC5 + 4 SD_GEN_SYS5 G647-1 SD_LOW_ZHA SD-FCS 
1.3.2FIRE5 + 2 EXPLOSION4 FIRE_DAM5 
G554-3 + 3 G174-1 G398-2 G659-2 
SD_GEN_SYS5 + 2 SD_ENG SD_AIR3 
SD_AIR3 + 4 G576. G274-2 G575 G010 
FIRE_DAM5 + 2 FIRE_FLUID5 FIRE_OTHER5 
FIRE_FLUID5 + 4 G565. G694.G714 G005-4 
AP_CFITMSA2 + 1 G425-2  
CFIT_PIL2 + 3 G106 G580-1 G109-1 
FIRE_OTHER5 + 4 G481 G010 G009-3 G226 
G274-2 + 3 G274-G100 G274NMVTUPR G274VTPRNM 
G009-3 + 1 G009-FRFLT2  
G009-FRFLT2 + 1 G009-G417  
G580-1 * 3 G580CDPR15K G580NALCBHI ECCALT15KFT 
G580CDPR15K + 2 G580DPR15KL G580DPR15KA 
G580NALCBHI + 2 G580CHRWF SFCDLW 
G580CHRWF * 2 G580HIRXPRI G580HIRXSEC 
G425-2 + 5 G593 G594  G596 G597 G598-1 
 
ABANDONS 1 
ABANDONS5 + 4 DASS FMS RCS TCS 
 
PHASE Descent1 12 
AIRCRAFT6 + 3 1.1-DEV_FP4 1.2-CFIT3 1.3-STRCT6 
1.1-DEV_FP4 + 2 1.1.1-AERO2 1.1.2-TRST4 
1.2-CFIT3 + 5 AP_CFITMSA3 CFIT_DISPL CFIT_SR_NAV CFIT_PIL1 G656. 
1.3-STRCT6 + 2 1.3.1STRC4 1.3.2FIRE6 
1.1.2-TRST4 + 3 TRST_FUEL2 G554-4 G452 
1.3.2FIRE6 + 2 EXPLOSION3 FIRE_DAM6 
G554-4 + 3 G398-2 G659-2 G173-2 
FIRE_DAM6 + 2 FIRE_FLUID4 FIRE_OTHER5 
AP_CFITMSA3 + 1 G425-3  
G173-2 + 1 G554-TL-2EN  
G425-3 + 5 G593 G594 G596 G597 G598-2 
G598-2 + 2 G425-SMJAM G598APLDHAZ 
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ABANDONS 1 
ABANDONS6 + 4 DASS FMS RCS TCS 
 
PHASE On-Task1 26 
AIRCRAFT7 + 3 1.1-DEV_FP5 1.2-CFIT4 1.3-STRCT7 
1.1-DEV_FP5 + 2 1.1.1-AERO1 1.1.2-TRST5 
1.2-CFIT4 + 5 AP_CFITMSA4 CFIT_DISPL CFIT_SR_NAV CFIT_PIL1 G656. 
1.3-STRCT7 + 2 1.3.1STRC6 1.3.2FIRE7 
1.1.2-TRST5 + 3 TRST_FUEL2 G554-5 G452 
1.3.1STRC6 + 4 SD_GEN_SYS4 G647-2 SD_LOW_ZHA SD-FCS 
1.3.2FIRE7 + 2 EXPLOSION5 FIRE_DAM7 
G554-5 + 4 G174-2 G398-2 G659-2 G173-2 
EXPLOSION5 + 2 EXP_WEP G592-5 
FIRE_DAM7 + 2 FIRE_FLUID4 FIRE_OTHER6 
EXP_WEP + 2 G617. G607. 
AP_CFITMSA4 + 1 G425-4  
G647-2 + 2 SDSTOREDAM1 SD_OTH_DAM1 
SDSTOREDAM1 + 1 SD_WEP1  
SD_WEP1 + 2 SD_WEPS1 SD_NON_WEP 
SD_WEPS1 + 3 SD_WEP_PL1 G023  G618. 
SD_WEP_PL1 + 1 WEP_LAUNCH  
WEP_LAUNCH + 4 G582. G583. G607. G617. 
FIRE_OTHER6 + 5 G621 G481  G010 G009-3 G226 
SD_NON_WEP + 2 G024 G071 
G174-2 + 1 G554TL3ENTA  
G592-5 + 1 G592-003-5  
G592-003-5 + 6 G592-006-3 G592-007 G592-009 G592-083
 FU-PMPFRXP FU-TMPSNSFR 
G425-4 + 6 G593 G594 G596 G597 G598-3 G599-2 
G599-2 + 1 G425APSENG3  
G598-3 + 2 G425-SMJAM G598APOTHAZ 
 
ABANDONS 1 
ABANDONS7 + 5 DASS FMS RCS TCS MAD 
 
PHASE On-Task2 1 
AIRCRAFT7A + 3 1.1-DEV_FP5 1.2-CFIT4 1.3-STRCT7 
 
ABANDONS 1 
ABANDONS7A + 6 DASS ESM FMS RADAR-IFF RCS TCS 
 
PHASE On-Task3 1 
AIRCRAFT7B + 3 1.1-DEV_FP5 1.2-CFIT4 1.3-STRCT7 
 
ABANDONS 1 
ABANDONS7B + 6 DASS FMS RADAR-IFF RCS TCS EOSDS 
 
PHASE Attack1 19 
AIRCRAFT8 + 3 1.1-DEV_FP6 1.2-CFIT4 1.3-STRCT8 
1.1-DEV_FP6 + 2 1.1.1-AERO1 1.1.2-TRST6 
1.3-STRCT8 + 2 1.3.1STRC7 1.3.2FIRE8 
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1.1.2-TRST6 + 3 TRST_FUEL2 G554-6 G452 
1.3.1STRC7 + 5 SD_GEN_SYS4 G647-3 SDHIGHERZHA SD_LOW_ZHA SD-FCS 
1.3.2FIRE8 + 2 EXPLOSION6 FIRE_DAM7 
G554-6 + 3 G174-2 G398-2 G659-2 
EXPLOSION6 + 2 EXP_WEP G592-6 
G647-3 + 3 SDSTOREDAM2 SDOTHERDAM2 SD_JETT1 
SD_JETT1 * 2 G070 CFJTRELENV. 
SDSTOREDAM2 + 1 SD_WEP2  
SD_WEP2 + 2 SD_WEPS2 SD_NON_WEP 
SDOTHERDAM2 + 1 SD_CNTL2  
SD_CNTL2 + 2 BBD_OPEN G683. 
SD_WEPS2 + 3 SD_WEP_PL2 G023 G618. 
SD_WEP_PL2 * 2 WEP_LAUNCH CFWEPLNCH. 
SDHIGHERZHA + 2 G702 G707 
G592-6 + 1 G592-003-6  
G592-003-6 + 7 G592-006-3 G592-007 G592-008-1 G592-009 G592-083
 FU-PMPFRXP FU-TMPSNSFR  
 
ABANDONS 1 
ABANDONS8 + 6 DASS FMS RCS TCS MAD STORES 
 
PHASE Attack2 1 
AIRCRAFT8A + 3 1.1-DEV_FP6 1.2-CFIT4 1.3-STRCT8 
 
 
ABANDONS 1 
ABANDONS8A + 7 DASS ESM FMS RADAR-IFF RCS TCS STORES  
 
PHASE Off-Task 2 
AIRCRAFT9 + 3 1.1-DEV_FP4 1.2-CFIT5 1.3-STRCT6 
1.2-CFIT5 + 5 AP_CFITMSA2 CFIT_DISPL CFIT_SR_NAV CFIT_PIL1 G656. 
 
ABANDONS 1 
ABANDONS9 + 4 DASS FMS RCS TCS 
 
PHASE Return 25 
AIRCRAFT10 + 3 1.1-DEV_FP7 1.2-CFIT2 1.3-STRCT9 
1.1-DEV_FP7 + 2 1.1.1-AERO2 1.1.2-TRST7 
1.3-STRCT9 + 2 1.3.1STRC8 1.3.2FIRE5 
1.1.2-TRST7 + 3 TRST_FUEL2 G554-7 G452 
1.3.1STRC8 + 5 SD_GEN_SYS5 SD_COLL G647-1 SD_LOW_ZHA SD-FCS 
G554-7 + 3 G174-1 G398-1 G659-2 
SD_COLL + 2 G642 G653COLLDAY 
G642 + 2 G642-G176 G642-G177 
G642-G176 * 3 SF568UNCP/U CFPPG642RFL AWCREWE153 
G642-G177 + 2 G642-GATE1 G642-G178 
G653COLLDAY * 3 G6533TOAVD G653AVDFDAY CFTMRSKD 
G653AVDFDAY * 3 G653COMFL G653-SVFLD AWCREWE125 
G653COMFL * 2 G653CMATCFL G653CMBSFL 
G6533TOAVD + 2 G6531PLTFRL G653RLSADHD 
G653RLSADHD + 1 CF3PTHRAD  
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G6531PLTFRL * 2 G653-FLRULE CCOLL3FLT 
G653-FLRULE + 3 AWCREWE126 AWCREWE127 G312 
G653CMATCFL + 3 CF-ATCFAILS TCRADFL AWCREWE174 
G653CMBSFL + 4 CFOPBOUTRNG CFOPSBASFLS TCRADFL AWCREWE175 
AWCREWE125 * 2 HE3FDETDAY AWCREW-ERR1 
AWCREWE126 * 2 HEPTFVFRIFR AWCREW-ERR1 
AWCREWE127 * 2 HE3FVFRIFR AWCREW-ERR1 
AWCREWE153 * 2 HEPG642TCLS AWCREW-ERR2 
AWCREWE174 * 2 HEPLFATCINS AWCREW-ERR1 
AWCREWE175 * 2 HEPLTFLOPIN AWCREW-ERR1 
 
ABANDONS 1 
ABANDONS10 + 4 DASS FMS RCS TCS 
 
PHASE Descent2 18 
AIRCRAFT11 + 3 1.1-DEV_FP4 1.2-CFIT6 1.3-STRCT10 
1.2-CFIT6 + 5 AP_CFITMSA2 CFIT_DISPL CFIT_SR_NAV CFIT_PIL3 G656. 
1.3-STRCT10 + 2 1.3.1STRC9 1.3.2FIRE9 
1.3.1STRC9 + 4 SD_GEN_SYS6 G647-4 SD_LOW_ZHA SD-FCS 
1.3.2FIRE9 + 2 EXPLOSION7 FIRE_DAM6 
EXPLOSION7 + 1 G592-7  
SD_GEN_SYS6 + 2 SD_ENG SD_AIR4 
SD_AIR4 + 4 G576. G274-3 G575 G010 
G647-4 + 1 SDOTHERDAM3  
SDOTHERDAM3 + 1 SD_CNTL3  
SD_CNTL3 + 3 BBD_OPEN SD_FLAP2 G683. 
SD_FLAP2 + 1 G265  
CFIT_PIL3 + 3 G106 G580-2 G109-1 
G274-3 + 2 G274-G100 G274VTPRNM 
G580-2 * 2 G580CDPR15K G580NALCBHI 
G592-7 + 1 G592-003-7  
G592-003-7 + 7 G592-006-3 G592-007 G592-008-2 G592-009 G592-083
 FU-PMPFRXP FU-TMPSNSFR  
G592-008-2 * 3 CFSTOREFIRE FUFLPROCEA FUFLPROCEB 
 
ABANDONS 1 
ABANDONS11 + 3 FMS RCS TCS 
 
PHASE Approach 13 
AIRCRAFT12 + 3 1.1-DEV_FP8 1.2-CFIT7 1.3-STRCT11 
1.1-DEV_FP8 + 2 1.1.1-AERO3 1.1.2-TRST4 
1.2-CFIT7 + 5 AP_CFITMSA5 CFIT_DISPL CFIT_SR_NAV CFIT_PIL1 G656. 
1.3-STRCT11 + 2 1.3.1STRC10 1.3.2FIRE9 
1.1.1-AERO3 + 3 LAC_FCS LAC-ENV3 LAC-PILOT 
1.3.1STRC10 + 4 SD_GEN_SYS4 G647-5 SD_LOW_ZHA SD-FCS 
AP_CFITMSA5 + 1 G425-5  
G647-5 + 2 SDOTHERDAM3 SD_JETT2 
SD_JETT2 + 1 G070  
LAC-ENV3 + 2 G_430_LM G364-2 
G364-2 + 1 G364-SVRACC  
G425-5 + 6 G593 G594 G596 G597 G598-2 G599-3 
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G599-3 + 1 G599-LAND  
 
ABANDONS 1 
ABANDONS12 + 3 FMS RCS TCS 
 
PHASE Land 26 
AIRCRAFT13 + 4 1.1-DEV_FP9 1.2-CFIT8 1.3-STRCT12 1.4-ON_GND 
1.1-DEV_FP9 + 2 1.1.1-AERO2 1.1.2-TRST8 
1.2-CFIT8 + 5 AP_CFITMSA5 CFIT_DISPL CFIT_SR_NAV CFIT_PIL4 G656. 
1.3-STRCT12 + 2 1.3.1STRC11 1.3.2FIRE10 
1.1.2-TRST8 + 3 TRST_FUEL3 G554-8 G452 
1.3.1STRC11 + 4 SD_GEN_SYS7 G647-4 SD_LOW_ZHA SD-FCS 
1.3.2FIRE10 + 2 EXPLOSION8 FIRE_DAM8 
G554-8 + 2 G398-2 G659-2 
TRST_FUEL3 + 3 L/VNAV_ERR G069 G166 
EXPLOSION8 + 1 G592-8  
SD_GEN_SYS7 + 3 SD_ENG SD_LGS4 SD_AIR2 
FIRE_DAM8 + 2 FIRE_FLUID4 FIRE_OTHER7 
SD_LGS4 + 2 SD_LG2 SD_WBT3 
SD_WBT3 + 2 G396-2 G495. 
G396-2 + 5 G629 G695.G058 G064 G530 
CFIT_PIL4 + 2 G106 G109-2 
SD_LG2 + 3 G589. G449 G368 
FIRE_OTHER7 + 4 G481 G010 G009-4 G226 
G069 + 6 G069-IFBBD G069INSFLFP G069ARBENRQ G069ISFFLAI
 G069LGENRQ G069ISFFLAL 
G069-IFBBD + 1 G069INSFBBD  
G009-4 + 2 G009-FRFLT2 G009-G316 
G592-8 + 2 G592-002-2 G592-003-3 
G592-002-2 * 2 G592-004 CF-ONGROUND 
G069ISFFLAI + 1 G069ARAENRQ  
G109-2 + 3 G109INAR5DC G109-PORTFL G109-ISMK 
G069ISFFLAL * 3 OXRDCMPCOND CFPLE10000 G069OBOGSLS 
 
ABANDONS 1 
ABANDONS13 + 3 FMS RCS TCS 
 
PHASE Taxi 17 
AIRCRAFT14 + 2 1.3-STRCT13 1.4-ON_GND 
1.3-STRCT13 + 2 1.3.1STRC12 1.3.2FIRE11 
1.3.1STRC12 + 3 SD_GEN_SYS8 G647-6 SD_LOW_ZHA 
1.3.2FIRE11 + 2 EXPLOSION9 FIRE_DAM9 
EXPLOSION9 + 1 G592-9  
SD_GEN_SYS8 + 2 SD_ENG SD_LGS5 
FIRE_DAM9 + 2 FIRE_FLUID1 FIRE_OTHER8 
SD_LGS5 + 2 SD_LG1 SD_WBT4 
SD_WBT4 + 2 G396-3 G495. 
G396-3 + 2 G695. G064 
G647-6 + 1 SDOTHERDAM4  
SDOTHERDAM4 + 1 SD_CNTL4  
SD_CNTL4 + 2 SD_FLAP2 G683. 
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FIRE_OTHER8 + 3 G481 G009-5 G226 
G009-5 + 2 G009-FRFLT1 G009-G316 
G592-9 + 2 G592-002-1 G592-003-8 
G592-003-8 + 4 G592-009 G592-083 FU-PMPFRXP FU-TMPSNSFR 
 
COMPONENTS 
 
G164  U EXP 0.000000283 
G155  U EXP 0.000000001 
G660. U EXP 9E-10  
G637  U EXP 0.00000053 
G641  U EXP 9E-10  
G694. U EXP 9.9E-10  
G714  U EXP 9.9E-10  
G157NONFBO U EXP 1.43E-08 
G481  U EXP 0.000000075 
LG-ASSY1 U EXP 3.31E-08 
FP-FIRE14 U EXP 0.0000001 
CF-EXTFIRE U EXP 0.000001 
FU-BURSTDR U EXP 0.00000404 
FU-LBURST U EXP 0.000004 
FU-DRAINVLK U EXP 0.0000174 
FU-LFLAMEAF U EXP 0.000000001 
FU-T4AWIRE U EXP 0.0000001 
FU-RFLAMEAF U EXP 0.000000001 
FU-RBURST U EXP 0.000004 
FU-GA_NIS U EXP 0.00000078 
FU-GA_OC U EXP 0.0000002 
FU-TMPSNSFR U EXP 0.000000001 
FU-PMPFRXP U EXP 0.000000001 
FU-XPOPPLK U EXP 0.00000211 
G160-G286 U EXP 7.322E-08 
G160-G287 U EXP 3.07E-09 
PP-415-ENG1 U EXP 8.94E-11 
PP-415-ENG2 U EXP 8.94E-11 
PP-415-ENG3 U EXP 8.94E-11 
PP-415-ENG4 U EXP 8.94E-11 
LG-LHGRSTRC U EXP 6.455E-09 
LG-RHGRSTRC U EXP 6.455E-09 
G449  U EXP 4.858E-08 
G005-ECSGRD U EXP 0.04732 
G005-BOSGRD U EXP 0.000001319 
G005OBGRATM U EXP 2.903E-08 
G009-G15 U EXP 0.003909 
G009FRSPGND U EXP 9.687E-11 
G226DRILL11 U EXP 0.0003139 
G226-EF1-1 U EXP 0.000001205 
G226DRILL21 U EXP 0.0003158 
G226-EF2-1 U EXP 1.056E-07 
G226-HF1-1 U EXP 5.491E-09 
G226DRILL12 U EXP 0.0003139 
G226-EF1-2 U EXP 0.000001205 
G226DRILL22 U EXP 0.0003177 
G226-EF2-2 U EXP 1.056E-07 
G226-HF1-2 U EXP 5.491E-09 
G226DRILL13 U EXP 0.0003139 
G226-EF1-3 U EXP 0.000001205 
G226DRILL23 U EXP 0.0003176 
G226-EF2-3 U EXP 1.056E-07 
G226-HF1-3 U EXP 5.491E-09 
G226DRILL14 U EXP 0.0003139 
G226-EF1-4 U EXP 0.000001208 
G226DRILL24 U EXP 0.0003164 
G226-EF2-4 U EXP 1.056E-07 
G226-HF1-4 U EXP 5.491E-09 
G592-011 U EXP 9.998E-10 
G592-012 U EXP 9.998E-10 
G592-013 U EXP 1.285E-09 
G009-G12 U EXP 0.000001498 
G495. U EXP 5.68E-08 
CFFUEAIRMIX U EXP 0.0000025 
CFSTOREFIRE U EXP 0.001 
FUINADVJETT U EXP 6.878E-08 
G265  U EXP 2.997E-10 
G683. U EXP 1E-14 
G695. U EXP 0.00000001 
G696. U EXP 0.000000099 
G697. U EXP 0.000000064 
G698. U EXP 0.00000001 
G715  U EXP 0.000000006 
CF-APUOPFLT U EXP 0.019 
CF-NEGGMAN U EXP 0.0000277 
OX-PBTL1LK U EXP 0.00000011 
OX-PBTL1HED U EXP 0.0000012 
OX-PBTL2LK U EXP 0.00000011 
OX-PBTL2HED U EXP 0.0000012 
OX-PBTL3LK U EXP 0.00000011 
OX-PBTL3HED U EXP 0.0000012 
CF-G554-C4 U EXP 0.00718 
G670  U EXP 2.882E-09 
G134  U EXP 0.000001 
G309  U EXP 0.000001 
G671  U EXP 5.25E-09 
G672  U EXP 7.216E-09 
G654  U EXP 4.759E-09 
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G673  U EXP 8.029E-08 
G674  U EXP 5.812E-08 
G675  U EXP 2.17E-09 
G676  U EXP 9.53E-08 
G677  U EXP 7.792E-11 
G658-G100 U EXP 0.000001 
G658-G110 U EXP 0.000001 
G230  U EXP 7.598E-08 
G275  U EXP 4.428E-09 
G312E_AIRSP U EXP 2.174E-09 
G312L_AIRSP U EXP 2.015E-09 
HEPEVNAV U EXP 1.78022E-16 
NVVNAVER U EXP 0.0003156 
G166-2007AX U EXP 2.981E-09 
G166-2007BX U EXP 2.981E-09 
G166-2007CX U EXP 2.484E-10 
G554TL3ENTR U EXP 2.048E-09 
G554-ADC U EXP 9.895E-10 
G554-CREW8 U EXP 1.01197E-16 
G554-INDERR U EXP 3.095E-09 
G554-TR-INC U EXP 3.243E-11 
G554-G4821 U EXP 3.72646E-18 
G554-TL-2EN U EXP 0.000005456 
G312  U EXP 5.885E-09 
G274NMVTUPR U EXP 0.000001 
G274VTPRNM U EXP 7.504E-10 
G160-G285 U EXP 1.811E-10 
G530  U EXP 1.544E-08 
G629  U EXP 1.541E-09 
G644  U EXP 1.283E-09 
G005INSFPFL U EXP 0.004378 
G009-G307 U EXP 2.84E-08 
G009-G320 U EXP 2.074E-09 
G009FRSPFLT U EXP 1.354E-10 
G576. U EXP 0.00000009 
G656. U EXP 0.000000001 
G106  U EXP 9.9E-10 
ECSLDCCRTUN U EXP 0.000008 
ECSBDCCRUN U EXP 3.62E-08 
CD_DMC_COOL U EXP 0.001 
CDERRPFD1HW U EXP 0.00019 
CD_SW_DU2 U EXP 0.000001 
CDD2EFISERR U EXP 0.00024 
NVERRMMR1HW U EXP 0.000162655 
NVERRMMR2HW U EXP 0.000162655 
CDERRPFD2HW U EXP 0.00019 
CD_SW_DU3 U EXP 0.000001 
CDD1EFISERR U EXP 0.00024 
CDERRND1HW1 U EXP 0.00019 
NV_SW_MMR U EXP 0.000001 
OXRDCMPCOND U EXP 0.000001 
OX-SMK-COND U EXP 0.00001 
OXPLTDCFAIL U EXP 0.00001 
G364-SVRACC U EXP 4.493E-09 
G625  U EXP 0.000001 
G554-G4822 U EXP 1.01205E-20 
G109PFLNAR5 U EXP 0.000001 
G109PFLAR5 U EXP 2E-18 
G109-GL-SMK U EXP 0.004024 
G593B U EXP 0.000001 
G593C U EXP 5.003E-08 
G594-ALT U EXP 0.000001 
G594-APPR U EXP 0.000001 
G594-LVLCHG U EXP 0.000001 
G594-VNAV U EXP 0.000001 
G594-VS U EXP 0.000001 
G425-TRMLOS U EXP 2.1E-09 
G425-TRMRUN U EXP 3.084E-09 
G597A U EXP 9.945E-11 
G597B U EXP 0.000001 
G425-SMJAM U EXP 4.114E-11 
G425APSENG1 U EXP 0.000001 
G425APSENG2 U EXP 0.000001 
G575ECSVNYC U EXP 0.00001316 
G575ECPVNYC U EXP 0.00001226 
G010FISLKAG U EXP 2.281E-08 
G010FISLKHP U EXP 1.405E-08 
G005ECSFFLT U EXP 0.004378 
G005BLKFLT U EXP 0.000001365 
G109GLAR5S U EXP 0.003952 
SFCDLC U EXP 1.737E-07 
G565. U EXP 9E-10 
G452  U EXP 9.9E-10 
G580HIRXPRI U EXP 0.00002651 
G580HIRXSEC U EXP 0.00002651 
G580DPR15KL U EXP 0.000001896 
G580DPR15KA U EXP 0.0001682 
G274-G100 U EXP 7.601E-08 
SFCDLW U EXP 6.714E-08 
G598APLDHAZ U EXP 3.628E-09 
G621  U EXP 0.000001 
G607. U EXP 0.000001 
G617. U EXP 0.000001 
G583. U EXP 0.000001 
G071  U EXP 0.000001 
G582. U EXP 0.000001 
G024  U EXP 0.000001 
G023  U EXP 0.000001 
G618. U EXP 0.000001 
G554TL3ENTA U EXP 8.465E-09 
G598APOTHAZ U EXP 7.675E-09 
G425APSENG3 U EXP 0.000001 
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G070  U EXP 0.000001 
G702  U EXP 0.000001 
G707  U EXP 0.000001 
CFPPG642RFL U EXP 0.0092 
CCOLL3FLT U EXP 0.001 
CF-ATCFAILS U EXP 0.001 
HEPLTFLOPIN U EXP 0.001 
CFOPSBASFLS U EXP 0.001 
CFOPBOUTRNG U EXP 0.001 
HEPLFATCINS U EXP 0.001 
TCRADFL U EXP 0.001 
HEPTFVFRIFR U EXP 0.001 
CF3PTHRAD U EXP 0.000001 
AWCREW-ERR1 U EXP 0.000000009 
AWCREW-ERR2 U EXP 0.000000009 
SF568UNCP/U U EXP 3.578E-10 
G642-GATE1 U EXP 0.000001 
G642-G178 U EXP 0.000001 
G653-SVFLD U EXP 0.000001 
G599-LAND U EXP 0.000001 
G589. U EXP 0.000001 
G069INSFBBD U EXP 4.71E-08 
G069INSFLFP U EXP 3.514E-11 
G069ARBENRQ U EXP 3.908E-08 
G069ARAENRQ U EXP 3.427E-10 
G069LGENRQ U EXP 1.77E-08 
G069OBOGSLS U EXP 0.002794 
G058  U EXP 1.29E-08 
G064  U EXP 8.762E-08 
DSM  U EXP 0.0004 
APR  U EXP 0.0002535 
SUC  U EXP 0.0001141 
SUR  U EXP 0.0001014 
CBR  U EXP 0.0000551 
CBA  U EXP 0.0000041 
DRR  U EXP 0.0000769 
HA1  U EXP 0.0000053 
HA2  U EXP 0.0000053 
HA3  U EXP 0.0000053 
HA4  U EXP 0.0000053 
DC1  U EXP 0.0003333 
DC2  U EXP 0.0003333 
ECU  U EXP 0.00008365 
STP  U EXP 0.00001281 
STB  U EXP 0.00001281 
SLN  U EXP 0.00001281 
SLB  U EXP 0.00001281 
SRN  U EXP 0.00001281 
SRB  U EXP 0.00001281 
DEC  U EXP 0.0002352 
TQG  U EXP 0.00060467 
LRA  U EXP 0.0005005 
PLC  U EXP 0.000168 
SDU  U EXP 0.000004 
DCU  U EXP 0.0000486 
FMG1  U EXP 0.000001 
CMG1  U EXP 0.000001 
TOP1  U EXP 0.0000718 
BOT1  U EXP 0.0000718 
FMG2  U EXP 0.000001 
CMG2  U EXP 0.000001 
TOP2  U EXP 0.0000718 
BOT2  U EXP 0.0000718 
FMG3  U EXP 0.000001 
CMG3  U EXP 0.000001 
TOP3  U EXP 0.0000718 
BOT3  U EXP 0.0000718 
FMG8  U EXP 0.000001 
CMG8  U EXP 0.000001 
TOP8  U EXP 0.0000718 
BOT8  U EXP 0.0000718 
FMG9  U EXP 0.000001 
CMG9  U EXP 0.000001 
TOP9  U EXP 0.0000718 
BOT9  U EXP 0.0000718 
FMG10 U EXP 0.000001 
CMG10 U EXP 0.000001 
TOP10 U EXP 0.0000718 
BOT10 U EXP 0.0000718 
FMG11 U EXP 0.000001 
CMG11 U EXP 0.000001 
TOP11 U EXP 0.0000718 
BOT11 U EXP 0.0000718 
FMG12 U EXP 0.000001 
CMG12 U EXP 0.000001 
TOP12 U EXP 0.0000718 
BOT12 U EXP 0.0000718 
FMG4  U EXP 0.000001 
CMG4  U EXP 0.000001 
TOP4  U EXP 0.0000718 
BOT4  U EXP 0.0000718 
FMG5  U EXP 0.000001 
CMG5  U EXP 0.000001 
TOP5  U EXP 0.0000718 
BOT5  U EXP 0.0000718 
FMG6  U EXP 0.000001 
CMG6  U EXP 0.000001 
TOP6  U EXP 0.0000718 
BOT6  U EXP 0.0000718 
FMG7  U EXP 0.000001 
CMG7  U EXP 0.000001 
TOP7  U EXP 0.0000718 
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BOT7  U EXP 0.0000718 
ESMPRO U EXP 0.00021851 
MSU  U EXP 0.001104 
MRX  U EXP 0.00023099 
SAU  U EXP 0.0003169 
SRX  U EXP 0.00012306 
SFE  U EXP 0.00010911 
FR1  U EXP 0.00007948 
FR2  U EXP 0.00007948 
FR3  U EXP 0.00007948 
FR4  U EXP 0.00007948 
LB1  U EXP 0.000000024 
LS1-1 U EXP 0.000000026 
LS1-2 U EXP 0.000000026 
HB1  U EXP 0.000000024 
HS1-1 U EXP 0.000000026 
HS1-2 U EXP 0.000000026 
LB2  U EXP 0.000000024 
LS2-1 U EXP 0.000000026 
LS2-2 U EXP 0.000000026 
HB2  U EXP 0.000000024 
HS2-1 U EXP 0.000000026 
HS2-2 U EXP 0.000000026 
LB3  U EXP 0.000000024 
LS3-1 U EXP 0.000000026 
LS3-2 U EXP 0.000000026 
HB3  U EXP 0.000000024 
HS3-1 U EXP 0.000000026 
HS3-2 U EXP 0.000000026 
LB4  U EXP 0.000000024 
LS4-1 U EXP 0.000000026 
LS4-2 U EXP 0.000000026 
HB4  U EXP 0.000000024 
HS4-1 U EXP 0.000000026 
HS4-2 U EXP 0.000000026 
MDCU1 U EXP 0.00021882 
MDCU2 U EXP 0.00021882 
EGI1UNIT U EXP 0.000333 
EGI1POW U EXP 0.0000491 
EGI1TRAY U EXP 0.0000124 
EGI1GPS U EXP 0.0000375 
EGI1ANT U EXP 0.0000111 
EGI2UNIT U EXP 0.000333 
EGI2POW U EXP 0.0000491 
EGI2TRAY U EXP 0.0000124 
EGI2ANT U EXP 0.0000111 
EGI2GPS U EXP 0.0000375 
FMC1  U EXP 0.000333 
FMC2  U EXP 0.000333 
USMS1COM U EXP 0.00076923 
USMS1CB U EXP 0.0000192 
USMS2COM U EXP 0.00076923 
USMS2CB U EXP 0.0000192 
USMS3COM U EXP 0.00076923 
USMS3CB U EXP 0.0000192 
USMS4COM U EXP 0.00076923 
USMS4CB U EXP 0.0000192 
MADCOMPAMP U EXP 0.0004354 
DETECTHEAD U EXP 0.00058989 
VECTMAGNET U EXP 0.00004214 
MADBASE U EXP 0.000002231 
MADCB U EXP 0.0000096 
DATAPROC U EXP 0.00031958 
SIGPROC U EXP 0.00032909 
INS-GPS U EXP 0.00015797 
REC-EXC U EXP 0.00047708 
RFTRANS U EXP 0.00058922 
RFCTRL U EXP 0.00015179 
RFSCAN U EXP 0.0006594 
IFFUNIT U EXP 0.00037 
CRYPTOFILL U EXP 0.000017 
IFFCB U EXP 0.0000048 
DRADTDCR U EXP 0.000013 
PRADTDCR U EXP 0.000013 
1553BUS1 U EXP 0.0000046 
1553BUS2 U EXP 0.0000046 
PSW  U EXP 0.0000136 
PNL  U EXP 0.000010824 
MT1  U EXP 0.000001 
MT2  U EXP 0.000001 
RFC  U EXP 0.0002091 
PSU  U EXP 0.0000362 
RPA  U EXP 0.0000036 
BAS  U EXP 0.0000283 
MCD  U EXP 0.0000771 
MPS  U EXP 0.0000317 
SCI  U EXP 0.0000509 
AUI  U EXP 0.0002299 
PRO  U EXP 0.0000895 
KEY  U EXP 0.000367647 
DSC  U EXP 0.00010204 
ANT1  U EXP 0.0001333 
MCM1  U EXP 0.0002199 
ANT2  U EXP 0.0001333 
MCM2  U EXP 0.0002199 
JTT  U EXP 0.000001 
RAD  U EXP 0.0004431 
BAT  U EXP 0.0000525 
SWA  U EXP 0.0000136 
PWR  U EXP 0.0000136 
ATT  U EXP 0.000005 
RAT  U EXP 0.000001 
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ATB  U EXP 0.000005 
RAB  U EXP 0.000001 
BAC  U EXP 0.000000032 
TBA  U EXP 0.0000001 
BBC  U EXP 0.000000032 
CBB  U EXP 0.000000141 
TBB  U EXP 0.0000001 
V/U1XCVR U EXP 0.0003074 
V/U1FILT U EXP 0.0003908 
V/U1ANT U EXP 0.0000445 
V/U1DTOA U EXP 0.00010204 
V/U1LOGU U EXP 0.0000446 
V/U2XCVR U EXP 0.0003074 
V/U2ANT U EXP 0.0000445 
V/U2DTOA U EXP 0.00010204 
V/U2LOGU U EXP 0.0000446 
V/U2VFILT U EXP 0.0003908 
V/U2UFILT U EXP 0.0002999 
V/U3XCVR U EXP 0.0003074 
V/U3FILT U EXP 0.0003908 
V/U3ANT U EXP 0.0000445 
V/U3DTOA U EXP 0.00010204 
V/U3LOGU U EXP 0.0000446 
V/U4XCVR U EXP 0.0003074 
V/U4FILT U EXP 0.0003908 
V/U4ANT U EXP 0.0000445 
V/U4DTOA U EXP 0.00010204 
V/U4LOGU U EXP 0.0000446 
V/U5XCVR U EXP 0.0003074 
V/U5FILT U EXP 0.0003908 
V/U5ANT U EXP 0.0000445 
V/U5DTOA U EXP 0.00010204 
V/U5LOGU U EXP 0.0000446 
HF1RECEXC U EXP 0.0001964 
HF1POWAMP U EXP 0.0001131 
HF1ANTTUN U EXP 0.000141 
HF1PPSFIL U EXP 0.0000935 
HF1DTOA U EXP 0.00010204 
HF1SHUNT U EXP 0.00003906 
HF2RECEXC U EXP 0.0001964 
HF2POWAMP U EXP 0.0001131 
HF2ANTTUN U EXP 0.000187512 
HF2PPSFIL U EXP 0.0000935 
HF2DTOA U EXP 0.00010204 
HF2SHUNT U EXP 0.00003906 
HF2POWSW U EXP 0.0000068 
HF2FWDANT U EXP 0.000001 
HF2CNTANT U EXP 0.000001 
HF2AFTANT U EXP 0.000001 
HF2ANT U EXP 0.000001 
HF2GNDANT U EXP 0.000001 
L11DTS U EXP 0.0001272 
L11DLP U EXP 0.0001012 
L11CRYPT U EXP 0.0001963 
L11PWRSW U EXP 0.0000068 
L11CB U EXP 0.0000105 
TTYMOD U EXP 0.0003876 
TTYKEYGEN U EXP 0.000367467 
TTYPOWSW U EXP 0.0000068 
B3I1  U EXP 0.0000119 
FI1  U EXP 0.0000062 
PSU1  U EXP 0.0000382 
MC1  U EXP 0.0000285 
FLX1  U EXP 0.00000014 
CA1  U EXP 0.00000014 
B3I2  U EXP 0.0000119 
FI2  U EXP 0.0000062 
PSU2  U EXP 0.0000382 
MC2  U EXP 0.0000285 
FLX2  U EXP 0.00000014 
CA2  U EXP 0.00000014 
TUR1  U EXP 0.001045 
SCU1  U EXP 0.00170196 
PDU1  U EXP 0.00021692 
HGP1  U EXP 0.000025 
TLU1  U EXP 0.000021 
PWP1  U EXP 0.00000018 
DPS1  U EXP 0.0000136 
RTS1  U EXP 0.0000136 
1553BUS U EXP 0.00000001 
IOPIFU U EXP 0.00013313 
IOP1  U EXP 0.000124 
IOP2  U EXP 0.000124 
TAC1PWRSW U EXP 0.00000549 
TCSOSMD U EXP 0.00002 
TCSOSSCSI U EXP 0.0000001 
ORD1PEP U EXP 0.00006666 
ORD1PSU U EXP 0.00002381 
ORD1SONRS U EXP 0.00007594 
ORD2PEP U EXP 0.00006666 
ORD2PSU U EXP 0.00002381 
ORD2SONRS U EXP 0.00007594 
ACO1PEP2 U EXP 0.00006666 
ACO1PSU U EXP 0.00002381 
ACO1PEP1 U EXP 0.00006666 
SPARECHRD U EXP 0.0001 
ACO1CHRD U EXP 0.0001 
ACO1KEYP U EXP 0.00003333 
ACO1KEYB U EXP 0.00002527 
ACO1KEYPL U EXP 0.00002 
ACO1ROLBAL U EXP 0.0001 
ACO2PSU U EXP 0.00002381 
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ACO2PEP1 U EXP 0.00006666 
ACO2PEP2 U EXP 0.00006666 
ACO2CHRD U EXP 0.0001 
ACO2KEYP U EXP 0.00003333 
ACO2KEYB U EXP 0.00002527 
ACO2KEYPL U EXP 0.00002 
ACO2ROLBAL U EXP 0.0001 
PILOTTCP U EXP 0.00012189 
PILOTDP U EXP 0.00013548 
PILOTTCPIFU U EXP 0.00002495 
PILOTCHRD U EXP 0.0001 
WK1DP U EXP 0.00013548 
WK1PSU U EXP 0.00002381 
WK1CHRD U EXP 0.0001 
WK2DP U EXP 0.00013548 
WK2PSU U EXP 0.00002381 
WK2CHRD U EXP 0.0001 
WK3DP U EXP 0.00013548 
WK3PSU U EXP 0.00002381 
WK3CHRD U EXP 0.0001 
WK4DP U EXP 0.00013548 
WK4PSU U EXP 0.00002381 
WK4CHRD U EXP 0.0001 
WK5DP U EXP 0.00013548 
WK5PSU U EXP 0.00002381 
WK5CHRD U EXP 0.0001 
WK1PEP1 U EXP 0.00006666 
WK1PEP2 U EXP 0.00006666 
WK1KEYP U EXP 0.00003333 
WK1KEYB U EXP 0.00002527 
WK1KEYPL U EXP 0.00002527 
WK1ROLBAL U EXP 0.0001 
WK2PEP1 U EXP 0.00006666 
WK2PEP2 U EXP 0.00006666 
WK2KEYP U EXP 0.00003333 
WK2KEYB U EXP 0.00002527 
WK2KEYPL U EXP 0.00002527 
WK2ROLBAL U EXP 0.0001 
WK3PEP1 U EXP 0.00006666 
WK3PEP2 U EXP 0.00006666 
WK3KEYP U EXP 0.00003333 
WK3KEYB U EXP 0.00002527 
WK3KEYPL U EXP 0.00002527 
WK3ROLBAL U EXP 0.0001 
WK4PEP1 U EXP 0.00006666 
WK4PEP2 U EXP 0.00006666 
WK4KEYP U EXP 0.00003333 
WK4KEYB U EXP 0.00002527 
WK4KEYPL U EXP 0.00002527 
WK4ROLBAL U EXP 0.0001 
WK5PEP1 U EXP 0.00006666 
WK5PEP2 U EXP 0.00006666 
WK5KEYP U EXP 0.00003333 
WK5KEYB U EXP 0.00002527 
WK5KEYPL U EXP 0.00002527 
WK5ROLBAL U EXP 0.0001 
VIDINTU U EXP 0.00008333 
HDDR  U EXP 0.0007692 
MAGDISK1 U EXP 0.00002 
MAGDISK2 U EXP 0.00002 
CBS  U EXP 0.0000366 
TXTPRINT U EXP 0.0001 
SMGMTPROC U EXP 0.0002857 
BBAYDR U EXP 0.0000011 
STNCTRLU1 U EXP 0.000114285 
STNCTRLU2 U EXP 0.000114285 
STNCTRLU3 U EXP 0.000114285 
STNCTRLU4 U EXP 0.000114285 
STNCTRLU5 U EXP 0.000114285 
WRELSW1 U EXP 0.00000201 
WRELSW2 U EXP 0.00000201 
WRELSW3 U EXP 0.0000491 
WRELSW4 U EXP 0.000013 
SINGSHOT1 U EXP 0.00086207 
SINGSHOT2 U EXP 0.00086207 
TENSHOT1 U EXP 0.00018885 
TENSHOT2 U EXP 0.00018885 
TENSHOT3 U EXP 0.00018885 
TENSHOT4 U EXP 0.00018885 
 
DISCRETE EVENTS 26 
CF-APU-TIT FP-FIRE14 0.18  
CF-OX-IGN1 G005LEAK1 0.1  
CF-OX-IGN3 G005-LEAK3 0.1 
CF-OX-IGN4 G005-LEAK4 0.1 
CF-OX-COMB1 G005LEAK1 0.01  
CF-OX-COMB3 G005-LEAK3 0.01 
CF-OX-COMB4 G005-LEAK4 0.01 
CF-FP-LK-2 G226-HF1-2 0.05 
CF-FP-LK-3 G226-HF1-3 0.05 
CF-FP-LK-4 G226-HF1-4 0.05 
CF-FP-LK-1 G226-HF1-1 0.05 
CFFLAP>ENV. G265   0.9 
CFFLJETTIS CFSTOREFIRE 0.005 
FUFLPROCEA CFSTOREFIRE 0.01 
FUFLPROCEB CFSTOREFIRE 0.01 
CFOXAR5COND OXRDCMPCOND 0.01 
G109-GLNAR5 OXRDCMPCOND 0.061 
ECCALT15KFT G580CDPR15K 0.224 
CFJTRELENV. G070   0.9 
CFWEPLNCH. WEP_LAUNCH 0.9 
HEPG642TCLS AWCREW-ERR2 0.01 
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CFTMRSKD G6533TOAVD 0.5 
HE3FDETDAY AWCREW-ERR1 0.5 
HE3FVFRIFR AWCREW-ERR2 0.01 
CF-ONGROUND G592-004  0.05 
CFPLE10000 OXRDCMPCOND 0.109 
 
 
B.1.2 MFOP Enablers 
 
There were no MFOP enablers for the first generation of runs. 
 
B.1.3 Platform, MFOP, Mission and Phase Data 
 
FLEET 3 
 
PF1 3 MFOP1 MFOP2 MFOP3 
PF2 3 MFOP3 MFOP2 MFOP1  
PF3 3 MFOP2 MFOP3 MFOP1 
 
MFOPS 3 
 
MFOP1 3 ASUW ASW SAR 
MFOP2 3 ASW ASUW SAR 
MFOP3 3 SAR ASW ASUW 
 
MISSIONS 3 
 
ASUW 15 
 
FlightCheck1  SET     1       EngStart 
EngStart     SET     0.25    Take-Off 
Take-Off     SET     0.0167  Climb 
      ABANDON Land 
Climb      NORM  0.25  0.0003  Transit 
      ABANDON Approach  
Transit      NORM  3.0 0.15 Descent1 
      ABANDON Return 
Descent1 SET 0.25 On-Task1 
  ABANDON Off-Task 
On-Task1 NORM 2.5 0.8  
  OUTCOME NoAtt 0.9 On-Task1 [2] 
  OUTCOME Attac 0.1 Attack1 
  ABANDON Off-Task 
On-Task1 [2] NORM 2.5 0.8 Off-Task 
  ABANDON Off-Task 
Attack1  SET 0.15 On-Task1 [2] 
  ABANDON  Off-Task 
Off-Task REV Descent1 Return 
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  ABANDON Return 
Return  REV  Transit Descent2 
Descent2 REV  Climb  Approach 
Approach SET 0.167 Land 
Land  SET 0.083 Taxi 
Taxi  NORM 0.5 0.07 END 
 
ASW 15 
 
FlightCheck2  SET     1        EngStart 
EngStart     SET     0.25     Take-Off 
Take-Off     SET     0.0167  Climb 
      ABANDON   Land 
Climb      NORM  0.25  0.0003  Transit 
      ABANDON   Approach  
Transit      NORM  3.0 0.15 Descent1 
      ABANDON   Return 
Descent1 SET 0.25  On-Task2 
  ABANDON   Off-Task 
On-Task2 NORM 2.5 0.8  
  OUTCOME NoAtt 0.9 On-Task2 [2] 
  OUTCOME Attac 0.1 Attack2 
  ABANDON   Off-Task 
On-Task2 [2] NORM 2.5 0.8 Off-Task 
  ABANDON   Off-Task 
Attack2  SET 0.15  On-Task2 
  ABANDON   Off-Task 
Off-Task REV Descent1 Return 
  ABANDON   Return 
Return  REV  Transit  Descent2 
Descent2 REV  Climb   Approach 
Approach SET 0.167  Land 
Land  SET 0.083  Taxi 
Taxi  NORM 0.5 0.07    END 
 
SAR 13 
FlightCheck3  SET     1        EngStart 
EngStart     SET     0.25     Take-Off 
Take-Off     SET     0.0167  Climb 
      ABANDON   Land 
Climb      NORM  0.25  0.0003  Transit 
      ABANDON   Approach  
Transit      NORM  3.0 0.15 Descent1 
      ABANDON   Return 
Descent1 SET 0.25  On-Task3 
  ABANDON   Off-Task 
On-Task3 NORM 2.5 0.8 Off-Task 
  ABANDON   Off-Task 
Off-Task REV Descent1 Return 
  ABANDON   Return 
Return  REV Transit  Descent2 
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Descent2 REV Climb  Approach 
Approach SET 0.167  Land 
Land  SET 0.083  Taxi 
Taxi  NORM 0.5 0.07   END 
 
B.2 Second Generation 
 
B.2.1 Fault Tree, Component Data and Discrete Events file 
 
The second generation of the fault tree, component and discrete event data file made 
some alterations to current gates, and some new additions. The changes from the 
previous file are shown below. 
 
PHASE Climb 68 
 
... 
NVMMRSYSERR * 2 NVMSEMAIN NVM3SYSERR 
NVMSEMAIN * 2 NVM1SYSERR NVM2SYSERR 
NVM1SYSERR + 4 NVERRMMR1HW NV_SW_MMR ECSLDCCRTUN  
    ECSBDCCRUN 
NVM2SYSERR + 2 NVERRMMR2HW NV_SW_MMR 
NVM3SYSERR + 2 NVERRMMR3HW NV_SW_MMR_R 
NVECPDISP + 3 NVMMRSYSERR NVEPFD2PROC NVCPND1  
... 
G425-1  + 6 G593 G594 G596 G597 G598-1 G599-1 
G594  * 2 G594-MAIN G594-RED 
G594-MAIN + 5 G594-ALT G594-APPR G594-LVLCHG G594-VNAV
    G594-VS  
G594-RED + 5 G594-ALTR G594-APPRR G594LVLCHGR  
    G594-VNAVR G594-VSR 
G597  + 2 G597A G597B  
... 
 
PHASE On-Task1 29 
 
... 
SD_WEPS1 + 3 SD_WEP_PL1 G023 G618. 
SD_WEP_PL1 * 2 WEP_LAUNCH WEP_LAUNCHR 
WEP_LAUNCH + 4 G582. G583. G607. G617. 
WEP_LAUNCHR + 4 G582.R G583.R G607.R G617.R  
FIRE_OTHER6 + 5 G621 G481 G010 G009-3 G226  
SD_NON_WEP * 2 SDNW_MAIN SDNW_RED 
SDNW_MAIN + 2 G024 G071 
SDNW_RED + 2 G024R G071R 
 - 335 - 
G174-2  + 1 G554TL3ENTA 
... 
 
ABANDONS7 + 7 DASS FMS RCS TCS MAD G617. G607. 
... 
 
ABANDONS7A + 8 DASS ESM FMS RADAR-IFF RCS TCS 
    G617. G607. 
...   
 
ABANDONS7B + 8 DASS FMS RADAR-IFF RCS TCS EOSDS 
    G617. G607. 
... 
 
PHASE Attack1 19 
... 
SD_WEP_PL2 * 3 WEP_LAUNCH WEP_LAUNCHR CFWEPLNCH. 
... 
 
ABANDONS8 + 8 DASS FMS RCS TCS MAD STORES G617. 
    G607. 
... 
 
ABANDONS8A + 9 DASS ESM FMS RADAR-IFF RCS TCS 
    STORES G617. G607. 
... 
 
GENERAL FAILURES 1 
 
GENTOP + 1 EMPTYCOMP 
 
ABANDONS 1 
 
AGENERAL + 1 EMPTYCOMP2 
 
COMPONENTS 
 
EMPTYCOMP U EXP 1E-20 
EMPTYCOMP2 U EXP 1E-20 
... 
NVERRMMR3HW U EXP 0.000162655 EXP 1e-6 
... 
NV_SW_MMR_R U EXP 0.000001 EXP 1e-9 
... 
G625  U EXP 1e-7 
... 
G594-ALTR U EXP 0.000001 EXP 1e-9 
G594-APPRR U EXP 0.000001 EXP 1e-9 
G594LVLCHGR U EXP 0.000001 EXP 1e-9 
G594-VNAVR U EXP 0.000001 EXP 1e-9 
G594-VSR U EXP 0.000001 EXP 1e-9 
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... 
G582.R  U EXP 0.000001 EXP 1e-9 
G583.R  U EXP 0.000001 EXP 1e-9 
G607.R  U EXP 0.000001 EXP 1e-9 
G617.R  U EXP 0.000001 EXP 1e-9 
... 
G642-GATE1 U EXP 1e-7 
G642-G178 U EXP 1e-7 
... 
 
SENSORS 
 
SENS_G594 G594  U  EXP 7e-9   EXP 1e-4 
SENS_SDNW SD_NON_WEP U EXP 7e-9 EXP 1e-4 
SENS_CDD1 CDD1EFISERR U EXP 7e-9 EXP 1e-4  
SENS_CDD2 CDD2EFISERR U EXP 7e-9 EXP 1e-4 
SENS_CDDE CDERRPFD2HW U EXP 7e-9 EXP 1e-4 
SENS_G274 G274NMVTUPR U EXP 7e-9 EXP 1e-4 
SENS_NVEPIT NVEPITDISP U EXP 7e-9 EXP 1e-4 
SENS_NVECPD NVECPDISP U EXP 7e-9 EXP 1e-4 
 
B.2.2 MFOP Enablers 
 
Due to the emptiness of the first generation input file, the second version was 
entirely new. The update is shown below. 
 
LRI 1 
 
LRI_NV 1/2 NVEPITDISP NVECPDISP 
 
SCHEDULED LIFE 2 
 
LRI_NV 50 
G621   70 
 
INSPECTIONS 0 
 
REDUNDANCY 4 
G594-MAIN  S SENS_G594 1 G594-RED 
NVMSEMAIN  M 0.9       1 NVM3SYSERR 
WEP_LAUNCH M 0.95      1 WEP_LAUNCHR 
SDNW_MAIN  S SENS_SDNW 1 SDNW_RED 
 
PROGNOSTICS 4 
 
CDD1EFISERR 3 30 40 60 70 85 95 
CDD2EFISERR 3 30 40 70 80 92 97 
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CDERRPFD2HW 4 10 20 40 50 60 70 80 90 
G274NMVTUPR 2 30 40 80 90 
 
B.3 Third Generation 
 
B.3.1 Fault Tree, Component Data and Discrete Events file 
 
PHASE FlightCheck1 
... 
ABANDONS 150 
... 
RADWARNR + 3 SYS_APR S_HET_BIG SIGNALREC 
SYS_APR  * 2 APR APR_RED 
MISWARNR + 2 ECU MISSENS 
TRDS  + 3 DEC SYS_TQG  DASSLNCH 
SYS_TQG  * 2 TQG TQG_RED 
CFD  + 3 SDU DCU CFDF 
S_HET_BIG * 2 SUPERHET S_HET_RED 
SUPERHET + 2 SUC SUR 
S_HET_RED + 2 SUC_RED SUR_RED 
SIGNALREC + 3 CDBAND MIDHIBAND SIGCONV 
... 
MAD  + 5 MCA DETECTHEAD VECTMAGNET MADBASE  
    MADCB 
MCA  * 2 MADCOMPAMP MCA_RED 
... 
SMGMTSYS + 4 SMGP STNCTRLU BBAYDR WEAPRELSW 
SMGP  * 2 SMGMTPROC SMG_RED 
... 
 
PHASE FlightCheck2 
... 
ABANDONS 38 
... 
SIGDEL  + 2 SPIN_BIG MAINCHAN 
SPIN_BIG * 2 SPINCHAN S_CHAN_RED 
SPINCHAN + 2 PROCFAIL SAU 
S_CHAN_RED + 2 PROCFAIL_R SAU_RED 
MAINCHAN + 2 ANTCLUST MRX 
ANTCLUST * 4 ACLUST1  ACLUST2  ACLUST3  ACLUST4 
PROCFAIL + 2 SRX SFE 
PROCFAIL_R + 2 SRX_RED SFE_RED 
... 
RADAR-IFF + 10 DATAPROC SIGPROC IFFINTGTR INS-GPS  
  SYS_REC-EXC RFT RFCTRL RFSCAN RADCOOLING 
  1553BBUS 
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IFFINTGTR + 3 IFFUNIT CRYPTOFILL IFFCB 
SYS_REC-EXC * 2 REC-EXC REC-EXC_RED 
RFT  * 2 RFTRANS RFT_RED 
RADCOOLING * 2 DRADTDCR PRADTDCR 
... 
 
PHASE FlightCheck3 
 
ABANDONS 5 
 
ABANDONS1B + 6 DASS FMS RADAR-IFF RCS TCS EOSDS 
EOSDS  + 7 TUR1 SCU PDU HGP1 TLU1 PWP1 EOSDSCP 
PDU  * 2 PDU1 PDU1_RED 
SCU  * 2 SCU1 SCU1_RED 
EOSDSCP  + 2 DPS1 RTS1 
 
COMPONENTS 
 
APR_RED  U EXP 0.0002535 
SUC_RED  U EXP 0.0001141 
SUR_RED  U EXP 0.0001014 
CBR  U EXP 0.00000551 
DRR  U EXP 0.00000769 
TQG  U EXP 0.000060467  
TQG_RED  U EXP 0.000060467 
LRA  U EXP 0.00005005 
MRX  U EXP 0.000023099 
SAU_RED  U EXP 0.0003169 
SRX_RED  U EXP 0.00012306 
SFE_RED  U EXP 0.00010911 
MCA_RED  U EXP 0.0004354 
DETECTHEAD U EXP 0.000058989 
REC-EXC_RED U EXP 0.00047708 
RFTRANS  U EXP 0.000058922  
RFT_RED  U EXP 0.000058922  
RFSCAN  U EXP 0.00006594  
TUR1  U EXP 0.0001045  
SCU1  U EXP 0.000170196 
SCU1_RED U EXP 0.000170196 
PDU1_RED U EXP 0.00021692 
SMGMTPROC U EXP 0.00002857  
SMG_RED  U EXP 0.00002857 
 
SENSORS 
 
... 
SENS_SCU1 SCU1  U EXP 7e-9 EXP 1e-4 
SENS_TQG TQG  U EXP 7e-9 EXP 1e-4 
SENS_RFT RFTRANS  U EXP 7e-9 EXP 1e-4 
SENS_REC REC-EXC  U EXP 7e-9 EXP 1e-4 
SENS_MCA MADCOMPAMP U EXP 7e-9 EXP 1e-4 
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SENS_APR APR  U EXP 7e-9 EXP 1e-4 
SENS_SMG SMGMTPROC U EXP 7e-9 EXP 1e-4 
 
B.3.2 MFOP Enablers 
 
LRI 4 
 
LRI_NV   1/2 NVEPITDISP NVECPDISP 
LRI_RWR  1/4 APR  SUPERHET SIGNALREC S_HET_RED 
LRI_TRDS  1/3 DEC  TQG  DASSLNCH 
LRI_PDU1  1/2 PDU1  PDU1_RED 
 
SCHEDULED LIFE 5 
 
LRI_NV 50 
G621 70 
SCU1 50 
TUR1 80 
RFSCAN 80 
 
... 
 
REDUNDANCY 14 
G594-MAIN  S SENS_G594  1 G594-RED 
NVMSEMAIN  M 0.9   1 NVM3SYSERR 
WEP_LAUNCH  M 0.95   1 WEP_LAUNCHR 
SDNW_MAIN  S SENS_SDNW  1 SDNW_RED 
SCU1   S SENS_SCU1  1 SCU1_RED 
TQG   S SENS_TQG  1 TQG_RED 
RFTRANS  S SENS_RFT 1 RFT_RED 
REC-EXC  S SENS_REC 1 REC-EXC_RED 
MADCOMPAMP S SENS_MCA 1 MCA_RED 
SMGMTPROC S SENS_SMG 1 SMG_RED 
APR  S SENS_APR 1 APR_RED 
PDU1  M 0.9  1 PDU1_RED 
SUPERHET M 0.9  1 S_HET_RED 
SPINCHAN M 0.9  1 S_CHAN_RED 
 
